Who may say what? Thoughts about objectivity, group ability and permission in dynamic epistemic logic by Seban, Pablo
THÈSE
En vue de l'obtention du
Doctorat de l'Université de Toulouse
Délivré par : Université Toulouse III Paul Sabatier (UPS)
Discipline ou spécialité : Informatique
Présentée et soutenue par :
Pablo Seban
Le 20 Juin 2011
Titre :
Who May Say What ? Thougths about Objectivity, Group Ability and
Permission in Dynamic Epistemic Logic
Directeurs de thèse :
Philippe Balbiani
Directeur de Recherche CNRS
Université Paul Sabatier
Hans van Ditmarsch
Chercheur associé
Université de Séville
Rapporteurs :
Frédéric Cuppens
Professeur
Télécom Bretagne
Viorica Sofronie-Stokkerman
Chercheuse
Institut Max-Planck
Rineke
Verbrugge
Professeure
université de Groningen
Examinateurs :
Claudette Cayrol
Professeure - Université Paul Sabatier
Emiliano Lorini
Chercheur CNRS - Université Paul Sabatier
École doctorale :
Mathématiques Informatique Télécommunications de Toulouse (MITT)
Unité de recherche :
Institut de recherche en Informatique de Toulouse (IRIT)
Who May Say What?
Thoughts on Objectivity, Group Ability, and
Permission in Dynamic Epistemic Logic
Pablo Seban

To my father,
the greatest card player
I have ever met.
ii
Remerciements
Je remercie d’abord mes directeurs, Philippe Balbiani et Hans van Ditmarsch. Philippe pour
le se´rieux avec lequel il travaille, dans ses recherches et dans ses collaborations, pour son
soutien quotidien, ses e´claircissements permanents, sa tre`s grande disponibilite´. Hans pour
avoir voulu eˆtre mon co-directeur et avoir joue´ ce roˆle parfaitement, pour m’avoir accueilli
a` deux reprises, pour ses concerts de Violoncelle et cette magnifique balade a` ve´lo. Merci a`
tous les deux pour m’avoir fait confiance de`s le de´but – et pour l’avoir maintenue durant ces
anne´es bien que je vous aie donne´ plus d’une occasion d’eˆtre de´c¸us.
Merci a` Rineke Verbrugge, Viorica Sofronie-Stokkermans et Fre´de´ric Cuppens d’avoir ac-
cepte´ le travail pesant de relecture du pre´sent me´moire, a` Claudette Cayrol et Emiliano Lorini
pour avoir accepte´ d’eˆtre membres de mon jury. Merci e´galement aux relecteurs anonymes des
diffe´rents articles que j’ai pu soumettre, leurs e´clairages e´taient toujours utiles et profitables.
La liste est longue ensuite de celles et ceux avec qui j’ai pu collaborer de pre`s ou de
loin durant ces trois anne´es et que je tiens a` remercier. Toute l’e´quipe LILaC d’abord, qui
forme un cadre de travail ide´al si l’on cherche a` chercher. Je remercie en particulier mes co-
bureau et amis Franc¸ois et Nadine pour... tout, et Bilal, Fahima, Marwa, Mounira, Srdjan,
Manu, Ana¨ıs, Pierre et les autres “jeunes chercheurs” du 3e`me e´tage de l’IRIT. Merci pour
les discussions, le the´ du bureau d’a` coˆte´,pour la musique, et j’en passe.
Les corrections d’anglais de Marwa, de mon fre`re Pierrot et d’Agathe m’ont permis de
finaliser ce me´moire, ainsi que les dessins de ma soeur Brune. Merci a` vous pour c¸a.
Merci a` ceux qui m’ont accueilli dans leur e´quipe: Jan Broersen et son e´quipe de
l’Universite´ de U¨trecht, Barteld Koo¨ı de l’Universite´ de Groningen, Angel Nepomuceno et
toute l’e´quipe de l’Universite´ de Se´ville ou` j’ai passe´ des moments inoubliables.
Merci a` vous qui vous reconnaitrez pour les discussions stimulantes dans les confe´rences,
workshop ou e´coles d’e´te´, merci a` celles et ceux qui se sont passione´-e-s avec moi pour Eleusis,
et merci a` toi Fede.
Ces trois anne´es, de nombreuses personnes se sont battues pour que l’universite´ reste un
lieu d’e´mancipation plutoˆt que de rentabilite´ et de compe´tition. Les de´bats que ces mouve-
ments ont souleve´s ont e´te´ importants pour le monde de l’enseignement et de la recherche...
et pour moi. Merci encore a` toutes celles et tous ceux qui y ont participe´.
Merci a` Mme Albert, M. Alessandri et feu M. Exbrayat du lyce´e Joffre de Montpellier
pour m’avoir fait aimer la beaute´ des maths (que j’avais intuite´e), a` Alex pour m’avoir donne´
envie de chercher et a` Jacques Sauloy pour m’avoir permis d’apprendre a` enseigner.
Et puis il y a tous les autres, famille, amours, camarades ou amis, qui ont partage´ ces
trois anne´es avec moi, sans qui je n’aurais pu ni commencer ni surtout terminer ce travail:
les chaˆtelains officiels ou officieux qui m’ont apporte´ ce cadre de solidarite´ et de respect dans
lequel je vis, Richard, Renata, Julien, Martina, Robin, Alicia, Aure´lie (a` qui je dois tant), les
Couvreu-Planche & Co., la “God save”, les membres de “la guerre tue” et de “Ge´ne´rations
spontane´es”, tous mes camarades et mes amis de Toulouse ou d’ailleurs, pour l’e´nergie toujours
renouvele´e.
Un dernier merci et j’arreˆte: les membres de ma petite famille qui m’ont toujours soutenu,
parfois malgre´ moi. Merci a` vous anche per questo.
iii
Acknowledgments
I would like to start by thanking my supervisors Philippe Balbiani and Hans van Ditmarsch.
Philippe for how seriously his work is, both in his researches and his collaborations, for his
daily support, his permanent clearing up, his grand availability. Hans for having wanted to be
my co-supervisor and perfectly played the role, for welcoming me twice, for when he played
the cello and the beautiful bicycle ride. Thanks to both of you for trusting me from the start
– and keeping on doing it, three years long, although I gave you more than one occasion to
be disappointed.
Thanks to Rineke Verbrugge, Viorica Sofronie-Stokkermans and Fre´de´ric Cuppens for
accepting the heavy task of rereading the present paper, to Claudette Cayrol and Emiliano
Lorini for accepting to be part of my jury. Also thanks to the anonymous reviewers of the
articles I have submitted, the light they spread was always useful and beneficial.
Then stands a long list of those I have worked with, more or less directly, these three
years, and whom I want to thank. The whole LILaC team, in the first place, the ideal
researching environment if one wants to research. I particularly thank my office companions,
and friends, Franc¸ois and Nadine for... everything, and Bilal, Fahima, Marwa, Mounira,
Srdjan, Manu, Ana¨ıs, Pierre and all the other IRIT’s third floor’s “young researchers”. Thanks
for discussions, next-door tea, music, and so on.
English corrections by Marwa, my brother Pierrot and Agathe allowed me to finalise this
paper, and so did my sister Brune’s drawing. Thank you for that.
Thanks to those who welcomed me in their team : Jan Broersen and his research team
in U¨trecht University, Barteld Koo¨ı from Groningen University, Angel Nepomuceno and the
whole team in the University of Seville where I spend moments I wont forget.
Thanks to you who entered in challenging discussions with me, during conferences, work-
shops or summer schools, thanks to those who got passionate for Eleusis like I did, and thanks
to you Fede.
The last three years, many people fought for the university to remain a place of eman-
cipation rather than profit and competition. The debates raised by these movements were
important to the world of teaching and research– and for me. Thanks again to everyone who
participated in them.
Thanks to Mme Albert, M. Alessandri and the late M. Exbrayat, from Joffre high-school
in Montpellier, for making me love the beauty of mathematics (that I had intuited), to Alex
for giving me the will to research and to Jacques Sauloy for allowing me to learn how to teach.
And then, all the others, relatives, loves, comrades and friends who shared the last three
years with me, and without whom I couldn’t have started and especially not finished this work
: the inhabitants of the castle, official or not, who brought me the environment of solidarity
and respect I live in, Richard, Renata, Julien, Martina, Robin, Alicia, Aure´lie (to whom I owe
so much), the Couvreu-Planche & Co., the “God save”, all the members of “la guerre tue”
and “Ge´ne´rations spontane´es”, all my comrades and my friends from Toulouse or elsewhere,
for their always renewed energy.
A last thank you before the end : to the members of my kind family who always supported
me, at times even against my will. Thanks to you, anche per questo.

Contents
0 Introduction en franc¸ais 1
0.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
0.1.1 Qu’est-ce que la logique? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
0.1.2 Aperc¸u ge´ne´ral . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
0.2 Logiques modales pour la repre´sentation de la connaissance . . . . . . . . . . 5
0.2.1 Repre´sentation de la connaissance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
0.2.2 Notions techinques classiques en logique modale . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1 Introduction 23
1.1 What is Logic? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
1.2 Outline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
2 Modal Logic for the Representation of Knowledge 27
2.1 Representation of Knowledge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
2.1.1 The Language of Epistemic Logic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
2.1.2 The Possible Worlds Semantics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
2.1.3 Characterisation of Knowledge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
2.2 Classical Technical Notions in Modal Logic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
2.2.1 Properties of the Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
2.2.2 Properties of Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
2.2.3 Axiomatization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
2.2.4 Decidability and Classes of Complexity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
3 State of Art 43
3.1 Dynamic Epistemic Logics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
3.1.1 Public Announcement Logic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
3.1.2 What Is Knowable? - Arbitrary Public Announcement Logic . . . . . 47
3.1.3 Not All Announcements Are Public and Made by an Omniscient Agent
- Action Model Logic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
3.1.4 Objective Beliefs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
3.1.5 Partial Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
3.2 Deontic Logics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
3.2.1 Standard Deontic Logic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
3.2.2 Dynamic Logics of Permission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
3.3 Permission and Epistemic Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
v
vi CONTENTS
4 Logics of Objective Beliefs 65
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
4.2 Some Properties of the Logic of Objective Beliefs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
4.2.1 Decidability and Complexity: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
4.2.2 Adding Update . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
4.3 Update of Objective Beliefs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
4.3.1 Syntax and Semantics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
4.3.2 Axiomatization and Completeness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
4.3.3 Decidability and Complexity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
4.4 Arbitrary Update of Objective Beliefs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
4.4.1 Syntax and Semantics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
4.4.2 Axiomatization and Completeness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
4.5 Case Study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
5 Group Announcement Logic 93
5.1 Group Announcement Logic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
5.1.1 Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
5.1.2 Semantics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
5.1.3 Logical Properties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
5.1.4 Axiomatization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
5.2 Expressivity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
5.3 Model Checking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
5.3.1 Preliminary Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
5.3.2 Model Checking Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
5.4 Announcements and Ability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
5.4.1 Singleton Coalitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
5.4.2 More Than One Agent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
5.5 Security Protocols . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
6 Permission and Public Announcements 129
6.1 The Logic of Permission and Obligation to Speak . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
6.1.1 Syntax . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
6.1.2 Semantics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
6.1.3 Example: Art School . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
6.1.4 Valid Principles and Other Semantic Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
6.2 Axiomatization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
6.2.1 Soundness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
6.2.2 Completeness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
6.3 Decidability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146
CONTENTS vii
6.4 Extended Example: La Belote . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150
6.5 Comparison to the Literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
6.5.1 Classic Deontic Principles and Paradoxes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
6.5.2 Deontic Action Logics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155
6.6 Tableaux . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157
6.6.1 Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157
6.6.2 Properties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161
6.6.3 Implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166
7 Private Permissions 171
7.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171
7.2 Logic of Permitted and Obligatory Private Announcements . . . . . . . . . . 172
7.2.1 Introducing Agency and Individual Permission . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172
7.2.2 Syntax of Lpopral . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 174
7.2.3 Semantics for Lpral . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176
7.2.4 Semantics for Lpopral . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177
7.2.5 Comparison With the Non-Agent Version . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179
7.2.6 Properties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 182
7.2.7 Soundness and Completeness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185
7.3 Case Study: AIDS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189
8 Conclusion 193
8.1 Dealing with Privacy Policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 194
8.2 Dynamic Epistemic Logic with Permission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 197
Bibliography 201

Chapter 0
Introduction en franc¸ais
0.1 Introduction
De nombreuses situations font intervenir la notion de communication ainsi que des restric-
tions sur cette communication. C’est le cas lorsque l’on pense a` des informations militaires,
des communications me´dicales, des normes morales, des jeux, etc. Dans certaines des ces
situations, il se peut qu’existent des structures pour penser et organiser le droit de communi-
quer. Dans l’arme´e, par exemple, une telle structure est assez simple, et facile a` comprendre:
plus on est haut-place´ dans la hie´rarchie militaire, plus on a le droit de savoir et moins on a
l’autorisation de dire. En effet, un ge´ne´ral a acce`s a` de nombreuses informations secre`tes sans
avoir le droit de les divulguer a` ses soldats, alors qu’un soldat peut donner toutes les informa-
tions qu’il posse`de (il se peut meˆme qu’il doive les donner) sans avoir acce`s a` de nombreuses
autres. Le champ me´dical est un exemple ou` des restrictions plus subtiles empeˆchent un pa-
tron d’avoir acce`s a` des donne´es me´dicales d’un de ses travailleurs, alors qu’un docteur devrait
pouvoir y avoir acce`s. Souvent, ces structures sont pre´sente´es sous la forme d’un ensemble
de re`gles informelles, ensemble qui peut eˆtre incomplet et meˆme contradictoire, laissant la
justice de´cider ce qu’il convient de faire en cas de conflits.
Mais il n’existe pas de cadre ge´ne´ral pour analyser ce genre de situations. L’objectif
de ce me´moire est d’apporter quelques e´le´ments, dans le champ de la logique, pour une
meilleure compre´hension de la notion de ‘droit de savoir’, e´le´ments qui pourraient nous aider a`
comprendre et re´pondre aux proble`mes pour lesquels cette notion rentre en jeu. On concentre
notre re´flexion sur la partie informative de la communication (et non sur sa forme), ce qui
ame`ne notre sujet central a` la notion de ‘droit de donner une information’.
0.1.1 Qu’est-ce que la logique?
La logique est l’e´tude formelle de l’argumentation humaine. En un sens, elle peut eˆtre
conside´re´e comme l’e´tude du raisonnement humain (si l’on conside`re que les arguments
traduisent le raisonnement interne inclus dans une communication entre personnes). Son but
est d’obtenir des re´sultats formels (et sans ambigu¨ıte´s). Pourtant, le langage naturel (dans
lequel sont forme´s les arguments) est particulie`rement ambigu¨, chaque mot ayant diffe´rents
sens possibles et chaque concept ayant diffe´rentes interpre´tations dans un meˆme langage.
Pour former une the´orie logique, il est donc ne´cessaire de mode´liser une partie seulement
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du raisonnement, en suivant des conditions pre´de´termine´es. C’est ce qui se passe dans le
fameux syllogisme suivant, attribue´ a` Aristote1: “Tous les hommes sont mortels. Socrate
est un homme. Donc Socrate est mortel.” En effet, il suppose que les notions de mortalite´,
d’homme, est d’‘eˆtre’ sont sans ambigu¨ıte´s. C¸a pourrait paraˆıtre acceptable dans ce cas pre´cis,
mais cette autre phrase qui a la meˆme structure, et qui est assez connue e´galement, montrera
que ce n’est pas si e´vident en ge´ne´ral: “Les oiseaux volent. Tweety le manchot est un oiseau.
Donc Tweety vole”2. ‘Il est inexact que que tous les oiseaux volent’ pourrait me re´torquer
un lecteur avise´, et nous pourrions eˆtre d’accord. Mais le point important est qu’il existe une
ambigu¨ıte´ dans le langage naturel concernant ces concepts: lorsque l’on dit que les oiseaux
volent, entend-on ‘toujours’? ‘Ge´ne´ralement’? ‘Dans toute situation normale’? Si un aigle
se casse une de ses ailes, est-ce que c¸a rend inexact le fait que ‘les aigles volent’?
Par conse´quent, pour cre´er une the´orie logique, nous devons de´finir un langage exempt de
toute ambigu¨ıte´, et une interpre´tation de´terministe de ses formules. ‘Interpre´ter une formule’
signifie ici ‘dire si une formule est vraie ou fausse dans un contexte donne´’. Notez que rien
ne nous oblige a` conside´rer la valeur de ve´rite´ comme une fonction biniare: vrai ou faux. Qui
plus est, dans notre conception de la re´alite´ certains concepts ne sont pas binaires: je mesure
1m76, suis-je grand? Certaines diraient que oui, d’autres que non, mais notre compre´hension
commune nous me`nerait plutoˆt a` dire que je suis assez grand, mais pas tre`s grand. Certaines
the´ories logiques (voir par exemple [Dubois and Prade, 1988]) permettent de conside´rer ce
genre de concepts dont la valeur de ve´rite´ est a` la fois qualitative et quantitative. Dans cette
the`se, tous les concepts (abstraits) que l’on conside`re ne peuvent eˆtre que vrais ou faux (et
certainement pas les deux a` la fois).
Nous pouvons alors repre´senter le monde par une liste de tout ce qui est vrai (le reste e´tant
faux). Une telle liste serait impossible a` obtenir si l’on veut conside´rer toutes les proprie´te´s
du monde (et combien y en a-t-il?), mais dans des situations donne´es il est possible de se
limiter a` un nombre fini de proprie´te´s inte´ressantes et ne conside´rer que celles-la`.
Alex Brune Cha Dan
Figure 1: Un mode`le boole´en des enfants lunatiques
Les propositions suivantes sont vraies dans ce mode`le : GB , GC
Voyons un exemple: voici quatre enfants, Alex, Brune, Cha et Dan. Nous ne nous
1Nous n’avons aucune re´fe´rence pour affirmer que cette phrase est effectivement d’Aristote, et la notion de
syllogisme dans les e´crits d’Aristote est probablement plus proche de: ‘Si tous les hommes sont mortels et si
tous les grecs sont des hommes, alors tous les grecs sont mortels ’.
2Dans l’exemple classique, en franc¸ais, Tweety est souvent un pingouin. Mais il se trouve que les pingouins
volent (!) ce qui enle`ve l’effet escompte´ de cet exemple
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inte´ressons qu’a` leur humeur, conside´re´e comme binaire: ils sont joyeux ou tristes. Par
contre elle peut ne pas eˆtre statique: de fait, ces enfants sont lunatiques, leur humeur change
tout le temps!
Notre langage est base´ sur les propositions suivantes: Alex est joyeux (GA),
Brune est joyeuse (GB), Cha est joyeuse (GC) et Dan est joyeuse (GD)3. Mises ensem-
ble, elles forment l’ensemble des propositions atomiques du langage, note´ PROP . Donc,
PROP = {GA, GB , GC , GD}.
Il est alors possible de repre´senter le monde re´el par une liste des valeurs de ve´rite´ (vrai ou
faux) des propositions (prises dans l’ensemble PROP ). La figure 1 donne un exemple d’une
telle repre´sentation, appele´e mode`le propositionnel boole´en.
Il y a diffe´rents mondes possibles, ici exactement seize. Ils sont repre´sente´s dans la figure
2.
∅ : : GA
GD : : GA, GD
GC : : GA, GC
GC , GD : : GA, GC , GD
GB : : GA, GB
GB , GD : : GA, GB , GD
GB , GC : : GA, GB , GC
GB, GC , GD : : GA, GB , GC , GD
Figure 2: Enfants lunatiques: tous les mondes possibles
Ces mondes possibles sont la base de la repre´sentation du monde re´el avec des modalite´s
(qui peuvent eˆtre de temps, de croyance, de connaissance, de re´sultats d’actions etc.). De telles
repre´sentations sont introduites dans le chapitre suivant, a` travers la modalite´ de connaissance.
3Le ‘G’ vient de l’anglais ‘Good’
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Il y a un double lien entre la logique et l’informatique. D’un coˆte´, les the´ories informatiques
donnent a` la logique des re´sultats techniques importants, comme des algorithmes de´terministes
qui peuvent prouver qu’une formule est vraie dans un contexte donne´, ou dans tout contexte
possible. Le temps ne´cessaire a` l’obtention d’une telle re´ponse, en fonction de la taille de
la formule initiale, peut aussi eˆtre obtenu. Nous pre´senterons dans ce travail des re´sultats
the´oriques de ce type. Une introduction a` ceux-ci est propose´e dans la section 0.2.2.
D’un autre coˆte´, les the´ories logiques peuvent donner aux informaticiens des me´thodes
utiles pour re´soudre des proble`mes concrets. Un exemple a` la mode est le SUDOKU: un
algorithme classique peut eˆtre tre`s long a` e´crire, alors qu’une proce´dure formalisant dans un
langage logique les proprie´te´s qu’il faut satisfaire est tre`s simple a` de´velopper.
0.1.2 Aperc¸u ge´ne´ral
Je crois que la recherche scientifique devrait faire un effort permanent pour eˆtre accessible au
plus grand nombre. Il est clair que tout travail scientifique n’est pas force´ment compre´hensible
par tout le monde, par contre chaque chercheur peut faire tout son possible pour donner des
e´le´ments qui rendent au moins une partie de son travail compre´hensible a` des personnes
exte´rieures a` son champ de recherche. Il me semble que c’est particulie`rement vrai pour
une the`se de doctorat qui synthe´tise plusieurs anne´es de travail, avec une taille finale non-
impose´e et qui pourrait eˆtre lue par des lecteurs novices (famille, amis...). Le chapitre 2 est
donc consacre´ a` la pre´sentation des notions basiques de la logique modale, dans le contexte de
l’e´tude de la connaissance. Certaines de ces notions sont cependant beaucoup plus ge´ne´rales et
peuvent eˆtre utilise´es pour tout type de logique modale. Ce chapitre est traduit inte´gralement
en franc¸ais ci apre`s. J’espe`re que c¸a incitera les lecteurs non initie´s a` s’inte´resser aux e´le´ments
basiques de la logique modale.
Des travaux plus de´veloppe´s en logiques e´piste´mique, dynamique et de´ontique sont
pre´sente´s dans le chapitre 3. On y situe e´galement notre travail dans le cadre de la recherche
actuelle, et on y pre´sente des donne´es ne´cessaires a` la pre´sentation ulte´rieure de nos travaux.
On discute e´galement quelques principes qu’il nous faut suivre pour une bonne compre´hension
des notions lie´es au ‘droit de savoir’.
Dans un travail de plusieurs mois sur un sujet donne´, de nombreuses questions paralle`les
apparaissent et demandent a` eˆtre re´solues. Les chapitres 4 et 5 pre´sentent les travaux qui
ont suivi ce processus. En effet, le chapitre 4 traite du concept de croyance objective, une
notion interme´diaire entre la connaissance et la croyance, et pre´sente des re´sultats techniques
qui comple`tement ceux de [Hommersom et al., 2004]. Quant au chapitre 5, il pre´sente un
travail collectif ([A˚gotnes et al., 2010]) sur la capacite´ d’un groupe d’agents a` communiquer
une information.
Les chapitres 6 et 7 pre´sentent le re´sultat le plus important de cet essai: une formalisation
du ‘droit de dire’. Le premier pre´sente cette notion dans le contexte d’une communication
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publique, id est dans des situations ou` tout e´change d’information est public, et pour laquelle
les restrictions sur cette communication sont inde´pendantes de la nature de l’agent qui com-
munique. Dans ce formalisme, il est impossible de de´terminer qui est en train de parler, la
seule chose qui compte est ce qui est dit. La pre´sentation est base´e sur un exemple: la belote.
Le second ge´ne´ralise la premie`re proposition, en donnant une formalisation qui inclut
des permissions individuelles et qui conside`re des communications prive´es aussi bien que
publiques.
Le dernier chapitre conclut ces travaux et ouvre la voie a` des perspectives futures. En effet,
ce travail est un premier pas dans une voie inacheve´e qu’il s’agit de poursuivre, en ge´ne´ralisant
cette formalisation ou en analysant diffe´rentes situations qui utilisent ces concepts.
0.2 Logiques modales pour la repre´sentation de la connais-
sance
Qu’est-ce que cela veut dire que quelqu’un sait quelque chose? Est-il seulement possible que
quelque chose soit su? Ces questions ne sont pas nouvelles, elles ont e´te´ e´tudie´es au moins
depuis les philosophes grecs (voir [Plato, BC]) et forment le champ de l’Episte´mologie, l’e´tude
de la connaissance. Plusieurs sie`cles apre`s Platon, [Hintikka, 1962] a propose´ une analyse
logique formelle de la connaissance dans un contexte multi-agent. Son formalisme, comme
nous allons le voir, utilise la se´mantique des mondes possibles. Depuis lors, des logiques
e´piste´miques ont e´te´ utilise´es dans de nombreux champs d’e´tude, comme l’intelligence artifi-
cielle, l’e´conomie, la lingu¨ıstique ou l’informatique the´orique, en se concentrant sur les aspects
multi-agents (donc sur l’interaction entre agents, qui peuvent eˆtre des eˆtres humains ou des
syste`mes informatiques) bien plus que sur la compre´hension philosophique de la connaissance.
Il est possible dans ce formalisme de raisonner sur ce que l’on sait, sur ce qu’un agent sait
de la connaissance d’un autre, sur ce qui constitue l’ensemble des connaissances partage´es par
les agents. Mais comment le formalisme de Hintikka repre´sente-t-il cette connaissance?
0.2.1 Repre´sentation de la connaissance
Langage de la logique e´piste´mique
Tout d’abord, il nous faut de´finir proprement notre langage de la logique e´piste´mique, note´ Lel ,
en partant d’un ensemble de´nombrable d’agents AG et d’un ensemble de´nombrable d’atomes
propositionnels PROP . Dans l’exemple pre´sente´ dans le premier chapitre, on conside`re
AG = {a, b, c, d} pour Alex, Brune, Cha et Dan, et PROP = {GA, GB , GC , GD}. Voici
alors quelques formules exprimables dans notre langage:
Kb(GA): “Brune sait qu’Alex est joyeux”
(GC) −→ Kc(GC): ‘Si Cha est joyeuse, alors elle le sait”
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Kb(GD ∨ ¬GD): “Brune sait que Dan est joyeuse ou triste”
¬GC ∧Ka(GC): “Cha est triste est Alex sait qu’elle est joyeuse”.
Plus formellement, voici comment les formules du langage sont construites:
Definition 0.1 (Le Langage Lel) L’ensemble Lel (AG,PROP ) de formules e´piste´miques
est obtenu a` partir de AG et PROP en ite´rant inde´finiment les ope´rations suivantes:
• pour tout p ∈ PROP , p est une formule,
• ⊥ (“faux”) est une formule,
• si ϕ est une formule alors ¬ϕ (“non ϕ”) est une formule,
• si ϕ est une formule et si ψ est une formule alors (ϕ ∨ ψ) (“ϕ ou ψ”) est une formule,
• si ϕ est une formule alors pour tout agent a ∈ AG, Kiϕ (“i sait que ϕ”) est une formule.
Dans le cas ou` les ensembles d’atomes (PROP ) et d’agents (AG) sont clairs nous les
omettons. Cette de´finition peut eˆtre e´crite de fac¸on plus concise de la manie`re suivante4:
Definition 0.2 (Le langage Lel) Le langage Lel base´ sur un ensemble de´nombrable
d’agents AG et sur un ensemble de´nombrable d’atomes propositionnels PROP est de´fini de
la fac¸on suivante:
ϕ ::= p | ⊥ | ¬ϕ | (ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2) | Kiϕ
ou` i ∈ AG et p ∈ PROP.
On ajoute les abre´viations suivantes:
• > (“vrai”) est une abre´viation de ¬⊥
• (ϕ ∧ ψ) (“ϕ et ψ”) est une abre´viation de ¬(¬ϕ ∨ ¬ψ)
• (ϕ −→ ψ) (“ϕ implique ψ”) est une abre´viation de (¬ϕ ∨ ψ)
• (ϕ ←→ ψ) (“ϕ est e´quivalent a` ψ”) est une abre´viation de ((ϕ −→ ψ) ∧ (ψ −→ ϕ))
• Kˆiϕ (“i envisage ϕ”) est une abre´viation de ¬Ki¬ϕ. On dit que Kˆi est le dual de Ki.
Comme indique´ plus haut, ¬GC ∧ Ka(GC) (lire “Cha est triste et Alex sait qu’elle est
joyeuse”) est une formule du langage. Ceci explicite le fait que toute les formules appartenant
au langage ne sont pas force´ment intuitivement vraies. Mais personne n’a dit que toutes les
formules exprimables e´taient vraies. De fait, on n’a pas pour l’instant de´fini comment e´valuer
la valeur de ve´rite´ d’une formule e´piste´mique. Faisons-le maintenant.
4Cette description formelle d’un langage est inspire´e par la grammaire classique en informatique baptise´e
Backus-Naur Form (BNF). On l’utilise dans cet essai pour de´crire des langages formels.
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Se´mantique des mondes possibles
D’abord, nous conside´rons qu’il existe une interpre´tation objective du monde re´el,
inde´pendamment de qui le regarde. Cette interpre´tation est une liste des valeurs de ve´rite´ de
tous les faits objectifs dans l’e´tat courant. Si nous appelons propositions ces faits objectifs,
on comprend aise´ment que cette repre´sentation du monde n’est autre qu’un mode`le propo-
sitionnel Boole´en, tel qu’introduit dans le chapitre 0.1. Dans notre exemple, il s’agit d’une
liste des humeurs de tous les enfants.
Le manque de connaissance peut alors eˆtre vu comme un doute sur lequel des e´tats pos-
sibles est l’e´tat courant. Hintikka repre´sente le monde e´piste´mique (c’est a` dire le monde et
la connaissance de chaque agent) par un graphe ou` les noeuds sont des repre´sentations de
mondes possibles (donc des mode`les propositionnels) et une arreˆte, idexe´e par un agent i,
repre´sente le fait que l’agent i ne sait pas si l’e´tat courant est l’un ou l’autre des mondes
relie´s par cette arreˆte. Re´ciproquement, on dit que i sait une assertion ϕ si ϕ est vraie dans
tous les e´tats relie´s a` l’e´tat courant par une arreˆte indexe´e par i. Voici une repre´sentation
d’une situation dans laquelle Brune ne connaˆıt pas l’humeur de Cha:
Brune
Cha Brune Cha Brune
Figure 3: Mode`le e´piste´mique
La figure 4 donne une repre´sentation plus comple`te de ce genre de situations e´piste´miques:
Alex connaˆıt sa propre humeur mais ne connaˆıt pas celle de Dan, et il sait que Dan connaˆıt
sa propre humeur mais pas la sienne a` lui. Et Dan est consciente de c¸a, etc.
Dan
Alex
Dan
Alex
Figure 4: Un autre mode`le e´piste´mique
On omet dans cette figure les arreˆtes re´flexives (celles qui pointent un monde vers lui-
meˆme) qui repre´sentent le fait que les enfants envisagent le monde re´el comme une possibilite´,
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ce qui est conside´re´ toujours vrai en logique e´piste´mique.
Avant de de´finir ces notions proprement, voici une de´finition plus pre´cise de ce qu’est un
mode`le:
Definition 0.3 (Mode`le de Kripke) Etant donne´ un ensemble de´nombrable d’agents AG
et un ensemble de´nombrable d’atomes propositionnels PROP , un mode`le de Kripke est un
tuple M = (S,R, V ) ou`:
• S est un ensemble dont les e´le´ments sont appele´s “mondes” ou “e´tats”,
• V : PROP −→ 2S est une fonction de valuation qui attribue a` chaque proposition p
l’ensemble V (p) des mondes dans lesquels p est conside´re´e vraie, et
• R = {Ri}i∈AG avec pour tout i ∈ AG, Ri ⊆ S × S est une fonction binaire sur S.
On appelle mode`le pointe´ un mode`le de Kripke M, s accompagne´ d’un de ses e´tats.
p, qa a ¬p, q a
012 a
b
021
b
102
c
a
b
120
201 a
c
210
c
Figure 5: Quelques exemples de mode`les de Kripke
La figure 5 donne deux repre´sentations plus classiques de situations e´piste´miques a` l’aide
de mode`les de Kripke. Le premier mode`le repre´sente le doute d’un agent a concernant p alors
que q est su par l’agent. Le second, explicite´ (en anglais) a` la page 45, est une repre´sentation
de l’e´tat e´piste´mique suite a` la distribution de trois cartes 0, 1 et 2 parmi trois joueurs a,b et
c. Les arreˆtes re´flexives sont omises une fois de plus dans ce second dessin.
Ces mode`les nous permettent d’interpre´ter des phrases qui traitent de la ve´rite´ d’un fait
objectif, de la connaissance qu’ont les agents a` propos de ces faits, et de la connaissance des
agents concernant ce genre de phrases.
Definition 0.4 (Relation de satisfaisabilite´ pour Lel) Soit M un mode`le. On de´finit
la relation de satisfaisabilite´ |= : S × Lel −→ {0, 1} par re´currence sur la structure de ϕ5 de
la fac¸on suivante:
(On note M, s |= ϕ, qui se lit “ϕ est vraie dans l’e´tat s du mode`le M”, si |= (s, ϕ) = 1 et
M, s 6|= ϕ, qui se lit “ϕ est faux dans l’e´tat s du mode`le M”, si |= (s, ϕ) = 0)
5Cette notion est pre´sente´e en de´tail dans la remarque 0.7
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• pour tout s ∈ S, M, s |= p ssi s ∈ V (p)
• pour tout s ∈ S, M, s 6|= ⊥
• pour tout s ∈ S, M, s |= ¬ψ ssi M, s 6|= ψ
• pour tout s ∈ S, M, s |= ψ1 ∨ ψ2 ssi (M, s |= ψ1 ou M, s |= ψ2)
• pour tout s ∈ S, M, s |= Kiψ ssi pour tout t ∈ S tel que sRit, M, t |= ψ
On dit que ϕ est valide dans le mode`le M, et on note M |= ϕ, si pour tout s ∈ S, M, s |= ϕ.
On dit que ϕ est valide si pour tout mode`le M, M |= ϕ, c’est a` dire si ϕ est valide dans tout
e´tat de tout mode`le. Enfin, on note [[ϕ]]M l’ensemble des mondes s du mode`le M tels que
M, s |= ϕ.
Caracte´risation de la connaissance
Nous avons affirme´, dans la de´finition 0.1, que l’on pouvait interpre´ter Kiϕ par “l’agent
i sait ϕ”. Comme nous l’avons explique´ en introduction de ce chapitre, cette affirmation,
pour eˆtre raisonnable, doit eˆtre suivie d’arguments qui rendent la se´mantique approprie´e a`
l’interpre´tation de la connaissance. Examinons les validite´s donne´es par la se´mantique, et
celles que l’on devrait s’assurer d’avoir pour repre´senter une conception, meˆme ide´alise´e, de
la connaissance.
Avant tout, la se´mantique de Kripke, pre´sente´e dans la de´finition 0.4, impose que nos
agents, qui sont capables de savoir, ont une capacite´ de de´duction sans limite. Pourquoi?
Supposez que, dans un e´tat donne´ d’un mode`le donne´, un agent i sache que ψ est vrai et que
ψ implique ϕ. Alors les formules ϕ et ψ −→ ϕ sont satisfaites dans tout e´tat envisage´ par
i, et donc ϕ y est satisfaite aussi (car cet e´tat est un mode`le propositionnel). En d’autres
termes, les formules suivantes sont valides pour tous ψ,ϕ dans le langage et tout agent i
(Kiψ ∧Ki(ψ −→ ϕ)) −→ Kiϕ. (K)
C¸a pourrait sembler simuler raisonnablement la capacite´ de de´duction d’un agent rationnel.
Mais elle implique, par exemple, que tout agent “connaˆıt” toutes les tautologies, c’est a` dire
toutes les phrases qui sont toujours vraies. Or, bien que vous soyez probablement rationnel-le-,
pouvez vous affirmer “savoir” que la formule suivante est tautologique?
(((p ∨ t) → s) ∧ (q ↔ u)) ∨ ((p ∨ t ∧ ¬s) ∧ ((q ∧ u) ∨ (¬q ∧ ¬u))) −→ (q ∨ (v ∧ u ∧ (v −→ ⊥)))
Il est aussi largement accepte´ que si un agent sait quelque chose, alors cette chose est
vraie. Autrement dit, les formules suivantes sont valides:
Kiϕ −→ ϕ. (T)
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Il s’agit la` d’une diffe´rence importante entre “connaissance” et “croyance”, bien
que nous ne puissions pas re´sumer la connaissance a` de la croyance vraie (voir
[Burnyeat and Barnes, 1980]). Les logiques de la croyance nient souvent ce principe de ve´rite´
de la croyance, et en assument un plus faible: la cohe´rence. En effet, on conside`re alors que si
un agent croit quelque chose, il ne croit pas en meˆme temps sa ne´gation. Cela pourrait eˆtre
traduit dans l’un de ces principes e´quivalents entre eux (et qui restent vrais dans le cas de la
connaissance):
Kiϕ −→ ¬Ki¬ϕ ; ¬Ki⊥ (D)
On attribue e´galement a` la connaissance une introspection positive et ne´gative. Autrement
dit, on conside`re que si un agent sait quelque chose alors il sait qu’il le sait et, ce qui est plus
fort encore, que s’il ignore quelque chose alors il sait qu’il l’ignore. C’est la` une supposition
tre`s forte: savez-vous re´ellement quelle est l’ensemble de vos connaissances? Et pouvez vous
e´noncer la liste de tout ce que vous ignorez? Si l’on accepte ces proprie´te´s, alors on accepte
la validite´s des formules suivantes, pour tout ϕ dans le langage:
Kiϕ −→ KiKiϕ (4)
¬Kiϕ −→ Ki¬Kiϕ. (5)
Une dernie`re notion qu’il nous faut introduire est celle de connaissance commune. Alex et
Cha sont des habitue´s du Poker (comme vous le verrez, nos enfants lunatiques aiment jouer
aux cartes). Alex connaˆıt les re`gles du jeu. Il sait aussi que Cha connaˆıt les re`gles – sans
quoi il serait tente´ de tricher. Mais il sait e´galement que Cha sait qu’il connaˆıt les re`gles –
et il peut donc supposer qu’elle ne tentera pas de tricher. On pourrait continuer a` faire des
phrases de ce type... En fait, les re`gles du jeu sont connaissance commune.
Plus formellement, la connaissance commune de ϕ est l’abre´viation syntaxique d’une con-
jonction infinie de formules. Soit G un ensemble d’agents, alors la connaissance commune par
les agents de G de la formule ϕ est:
CKGϕ :=
∧
n∈N
∧
i1,...,in∈G
Ki1 . . .Kinϕ
Comme nous le verrons, cette notion est tre`s importante lorsque l’on conside`re un appren-
tissage collectif: si Brune et Alex apprennent quelque chose ensemble, et s’ils peuvent voir
que cet apprentissage est mutuel, alors l’information apprise devient connaissance commune.
Voir [van Ditmarsch et al., 2009] pour plus de de´tails.
0.2.2 Notions techinques classiques en logique modale
Il se peut que ce chapitre soit plus difficile a` comprendre pour un lecteur novice, et qu’il soit
parfaitement redondant pour un expert. Mais il semble important de de´finir et d’expliquer
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correctement les notions d’informatique qui sont utiles en logique. Ces notions ne se limitent
pas a` l’e´tude de la connaissance, au contraire la majorite´ d’entre elles sont communes a` tous
les champs de la logique modale. Nous les pre´senterons toutefois en utilisant le langage et la
se´mantique de la logique e´piste´mique.
Proprie´te´s du langage
Commenc¸ons par des notions basiques concernant la syntaxe de langages logiques.
Definition 0.5 (Taille d’une formule) Etant donne´e une formule ϕ d’un langage L on
appelle taille de ϕ, note´ |ϕ|, le nombre de symboles qui constituent ϕ.
Definition 0.6 (Sous-formule) Pour toute formule ϕ ∈ Lel on de´finit Sub(ϕ) l’ensemble
des sous-formules de ϕ en fonction de la forme de la formule ϕ:
• Sub(p) = {p}
• Sub(⊥) = {⊥}
• Sub(¬ψ) = {¬ψ} ∪ Sub(ψ)
• Sub(ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2) = {ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2} ∪ Sub(ψ1) ∪ Sub(ϕ2)
• Sub(Kaψ) = {Kaψ} ∪ Sub(ψ).
Si ψ ∈ Sub(ϕ) on dit que ψ est une sous-formule de ϕ.
On peut prouver que Sub(ϕ) est bien de´finie par re´currence sur la taille de ϕ.
Remark 0.7 (Re´currecne “sur la structure de ϕ”) Dore´nanvant, “prouver (resp.
de´finir) une proprie´te´ P (ϕ) par re´currence sur la structure de ϕ” signifie “prouver (resp.
de´finir) P (ψ) pour tout ψ ∈ PROP ∪ {⊥} et prouver (resp. de´finir) P (ϕ) en admettant
l’hypothe`se de re´currence suivante: P (ψ) est vraie (resp. de´finie) pour toute sous-formule ψ
de ϕ”. Il s’agit d’une re´currence a` travers l’ordre partiel ‘eˆtre sous formule de’.
Le langage que l’on e´tudie ici ne peut exprimer qu’un nombre limite´ de notions. En
ajoutant un ope´rateur modal (donc un nouveau symbole) a` un langage donne´, sans changer
la se´mantique des symboles pre´ce´demment introduits, le langage obtenu peut clairement ex-
primer au moins ce que pouvait exprimer l’ancien, et peut-eˆtre plus. Pre´cisons ce concept
d’expressivite´ d’un langage.
Definition 0.8 (Expressivite´ d’un langage) Etant donne´s deux langages L1 et L2 et une
classe de mode`les C, L1 est au moins aussi expressif que L2 par rapport a` C ssi pour toute
formule ϕ de L1 il existe une formule ψ de L2 qui lui soit e´quivalente. Autrement dit, pour tout
mode`le M de C, [[ϕ]]M = [[ψ]]M: le domaine de satisfaisabilite´ de ϕ dans M en conside´rant la
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se´mantique de L1 est le meˆme que le domaine de satisfaisabilite´ de ψ dans M en conside´rant
la se´mantique de L2.
Voici deux fac¸ons standards de de´terminer que L1 est au moins aussi expressif que L2:
• L2 forme un sous-langage de L1
• il existe une traduction telle que toute formule de L2 est logiquement e´quivalente a` sa
traduction dans L1.
Le langage L1 est dit plus expressif que L2 par rapport a` C si L1 est au moins aussi
expressif que L2 et L2 n’est pas au moins aussi expressif que L1 (cette notion est un ordre
partiel).
Une manie`re standard de de´terminer que L2 n’est pas au moins aussi expressif que L1 est
de mettre en e´vidence une formule ϕ de L1 et deux mode`les de C (M, s) et (M′, s′) tels que
ϕ est vraie dans (M, s) et fausse dans (M′, s′), alors que toute formule ψ de L2 est vraie
dans (M, s) ssi ψ est vraie dans (M′, s′). On dit dans ce cas que le langage L1, mais pas le
langage L2, peut distinguer les mode`les (M, s) et (M′, s′).
Une dernie`re de´finition utile concernant les langages:
Definition 0.9 (Substitution) Soit L(PROP ) un langage re´cursivement e´nume´rable base´
sur un ensemble de´nombrable d’atomes propositionnels PROP , soient ϕ,ψ, ψ1, ψ2, . . . ∈
L(PROP ) et soient p, p1, p2, . . . ∈ PROP
• On note ϕ(ψ/p) la formule de L obtenue en remplac¸ant dans ϕ toute occurence de p
par ψ.
• On e´tend la notation pre´ce´dente a` la substitution simultane´e d’une suite (finie ou infinie)
p1, p2, . . .: ϕ(ψ1/p1, ψ2/p2, ...)
Proprie´te´s des mode`les
Voyons quelques proprie´te´s se´mantiques de la logique modale, autrement dit quelques pro-
prie´te´s des mode`les que l’on conside`re. D’abord, tous les mode`les conside´re´s ici sont des
mode`les de Kripke, auxquels vient s’ajouter e´venutellement une relation supple´mentaire (qui
peut eˆtre entre des mondes et des ensembles de mondes, ou bien entre des mondes et des
relations). Rappelons que de tels mode`les, pre´sente´s dans la de´finition 0.3, sont compose´s
d’un ensemble d’e´tats, de relations binaires sur cet ensemble et d’une valuation qui attribue a`
chaque proposition un sous-ensemble de mondes (ceux ou` la proposition est conside´re´e vraie).
On peut donc les voir comme des graphes oriente´s ayant pour noeuds des mode`les boole´ens
(c’est a` dire une liste des valeurs de ve´rite´ des diffe´rents atomes propositionnels). Rappelons
e´galement que cette de´finition impose la validite´ de la formule K pour tout ope´rateur qui
suit la se´mantique pre´sente´e dans la de´finition 0.4. Un sous-mode`le d’un mode`le M donne´
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est compose´ d’un sous-ensemble de l’ensemble d’e´tats de M, et d’une structure qui est la
restriction de la structure initiale sur ce sous-ensemble. Plus formellement:
Definition 0.10 (Sous-mode`le) Soit M = (S, V, 〈Ri〉i∈AG) un mode`le de Kripke. On dit
alors que le mode`le M′ = (S′, V ′, 〈R′i〉i∈AG) est un sous-mode`le de M s’il satisfait les condi-
tions suivantes:
• S′ ⊆ S
• pour tout p ∈ PROP et tout s′ ∈ S′, s′ ∈ V ′(p) ssi s′ ∈ V (p)
• pour tout i ∈ AG et tous (s1, s2) ∈ S′ × S′, s1R′is2 ssi s1Ris2
Rappelons la notion de cloˆture transitive d’un ensemble de relations, dans le contexte des
mode`les de Kripke.
Definition 0.11 (Cloˆture transitive) Soit R = {Ri}i∈AG un ensemble de relations bi-
naires sur un ensemble donne´ S. On appelle cloˆture transitive de R la relation binaire R∗
telle que pour tous s, s′ ∈ S il existe n ∈ N et s0, s1, . . . , sn ∈ S tels que:
• s0 = s et sn = s′
• pour tout k ∈ {0, . . . , n − 1} il existe i ∈ AG tel que skRisk+1.
On peut constater qu’un mode`le peut ne pas eˆtre connexe, c’est a` dire qu’il peut ar-
river qu’un sous-ensemble d’e´tats du mode`le n’ait aucune relation avec un autre. Dans ces
conditions, un sous-mode`le particulier peut se re´ve´ler utile:
Definition 0.12 (Composante connexe - sous-mode`le engendre´) Soit M = (S, V,R)
un mode`le et s ∈ S. On appelle composante connexe induite par s dans M l’ensemble
S′ = {s′ ∈ S | sR∗s′}. On appelle sous-mode`le engendre´ de M, s le sous-mode`le M′ de M
base´ sur la composante connexe induite par s dans M.
La composante connexe de s dans M est donc l’ensemble des e´tats qui sont relie´s a` s dans
le mode`le. Cette notion est utile car le sous-mode`le engendre´ d’un mode`le pointe´ M, s est
e´quivalent a` M, s par rapport au langage Lel : une formule qui est vraie dans l’un est aussi
vraie dans l’autre. C’est ce qu’affirme la proposition 0.15, en disant que les deux mode`les
sont bisimilaires.
La bisimulation est une notion classique, en logique modale, de similarite´s entre structures
(voir [Blackburn et al., 2001]). On l’utilise souvent dans cet essai, sur des exemples ou pour
des preuves. Pre´sentons-la en de´tails:
Definition 0.13 (Bisimulation) Soient deux mode`les M = (S,R, V ) et M′ = (S′,R′, V ′).
Une relation non-vide R ⊆ S×S′ est appele´e bisimulation entre M et M′ si pour tous s ∈ S
et s′ ∈ S′ tels que (s, s′) ∈ R on a :
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atoms pour tout p ∈ PROP : s ∈ V (p) ssi s′ ∈ V ′(p);
forth pour tout i ∈ AG et tout t ∈ S: si sRit alors il existe un t′ ∈ S′ tel que s′R′it′ et
(t, t′) ∈ R;
back pour tout i ∈ AG et tout t′ ∈ S′: si s′R′it′ alors il existe un t ∈ S tel que sRit et
(t, t′) ∈ R.
On note (M, s)←→(M′, s′) ssi il existe une bisimulation entre M et M′ reliant s et s′, et
on dit alors que les structures de Kripke pointe´es (M, s) et (M′, s′) sont bisimilaires.
Notons que la bisimulation est une relation d’e´quivalence. C’est une notion importante
car elle caracte´rise le fait que deux mode`les sont modalement e´quivalent, c’est a` dire qu’ils
satisfont les meˆmes formules de Lel :
Proposition 0.14 Soient deux mode`les M = (S,R, V ) et M′ = (S′,R′, V ′), et soit une
formule ϕ ∈ Lel . Pour tout s ∈ S et tout s′ ∈ S′, si (M, s)←→(M′, s′) alors M, s |= ϕ ssi
M′, s′ |= ϕ.
La preuve de cette proposition apparaˆıt par exemple dans [Fagin et al., 1995]. En particulier,
la proposition suivante implique qu’un mode`le satisfait les meˆmes formules que son sous-
mode`le engendre´.
Proposition 0.15 Soit M, s0 un mode`le pointe´. Il est bisimilaire a` son sous-mode`le en-
gendre´.
Proof Soit M′ = (S′,R′, V ′) le sous-mode`le engendre´ de M, s0. Soit R la relation binaire
entre S et S′ de´finie de la manie`re suivante: sRs′ ssi s = s′.
On va montrer que R est une bisimulation entre M, s0 et M′, s0. D’abord, il est clair que
s0Rs0. Pour tout s ∈ S′ on a que
atoms pour tout p ∈ PROP : s ∈ V (p) ssi s ∈ V ′(p) (par la de´finition 0.10);
forth pour tout i ∈ AG et tout t ∈ S: si sRit, alors t ∈ S′ et sR′it par la de´finition 0.10, et
tRt;
back pour tout i ∈ AG et tout t ∈ S′: si sRit, alors sRit par la de´finition 0.10, et tRt.
¤
Introduisons maintenant un autre type de relation d’e´quivalence, qui est une sorte de
ge´ne´ralisation de la bisimulation. L’ide´e est de conside´rer comme e´quivalents deux e´tats d’un
mode`le donne´ qui satisfont les formules d’un sous-ensemble donne´ du langage. Nous obtenons
la notion de filtration:
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Definition 0.16 (Filtration) Soit M = (S,∼i, V ) un mode`le et Γ un ensemble de formules
clos pour la sous-formule ( id est si une formule appartient a` l’ensemble, toutes ses sous-
formules y apparaissent e´galement). Soit !Γ la relation binaire sur S de´finie, pour tous
s, t ∈ S, par:
s!Γt ssi pour tout ϕ ∈ Γ : (M, s |= ϕ ssi M, t |= ϕ)
Notons que !Γ est une relation d’e´quivalence. On appelle filtration de M a` travers Γ
(ou simplement filtration de M) le mode`le MΓ = (SΓ,∼Γi , V Γ) ou`:
• SΓ = S/!Γ
• pour tous |s|, |t| ∈ SΓ, |s| ∼Γi |t| ssi pour tout Kiϕ ∈ Γ, (M, s |= Kiϕ iff M, t |= Kiϕ)
• V Γ(p) =
{
∅ si p 6∈ Γ
V (p)/!Γ si p ∈ Γ)
Une dernie`re remarque qui a son importance: dans la classe de tous les mode`les de Kripke,
il se peut que des sous-classes particulie`res soient utiles. On les de´finit en fonction des
proprie´te´s de ses relations binaires (re´flexivite´, transitivite´, syme´trie, se´rialite´, euclidianite´,
e´quivalence). Rappelons qu’une relation binaire R sur un ensemble S est dite:
• re´flexive si pour tout s ∈ S, (s, s) ∈ R
• transitive si pour tous s, t, u ∈ S, ((s, t) ∈ R et (t, u) ∈ R) implique que (s, u) ∈ R)
• syme´trique si pour tous s, t ∈ S, ((s, t) ∈ R implique que (t, s) ∈ R)
• se´rielle si pour tout s ∈ S, il existe t ∈ S tel que (s, t) ∈ R
• euclidienne si pour tous s, t, u ∈ S, ((s, t) ∈ R et (s, u) ∈ R) implique que (t, u) ∈ R)
• d’e´quivalence si elle est re´flexive, transitive et syme´trique.
Comme nous le verrons dans le paragraphe suivant, ces proprie´te´s des mode`les correspondent
a` des proprie´te´s de la se´mantique que l’on a pre´sente´ au paragraphe 0.2.1. Plus pre´cise´ment:
• L’axiome de ve´rite´ (note´ T) correspond a` la re´flexivite´
• L’axiome de cohe´rence (note´ D) correspond a` la se´rialite´
• L’introspection positive (note´e 4) correspond a` la transitivite´
• L’introspection ne´gative (note´e 5) correspond a` l’euclidianite´
Rappelons que tous les mode`les satisfont l’axiome note´ K. On appelle donc KT (resp. KD,
K45, etc.) la classe des mode`les reflexifs (resp. seriels, transitifs et euclidiens, etc.). S5 est
une abre´viation de KT45 et correspond a` la classe des mode`les pour lesquels les relations
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binaires sont des relations d’e´quivalence. Pour tout n ∈ N et pour toute classe de mode`les C,
on note Cn la classe de mode`les qui appartiennent a` C et contiennent exactement n relations
binaires.
En particulier, S5n est la classe des mode`les de Kripke qui ont n relation qui sont toutes
d’e´quivalence:
Definition 0.17 (Mode`le e´piste´mique) Un mode`le de Kripke M = (S, {Ri}i∈AG, V ) est
dit e´pistemique si pour tout i ∈ AG, Ri est une relation d’e´quivalence sur S.
Axiomatisation
Etant donne´e une syntaxe (id est une langage), une classe de mode`le ou` on souhaite
l’interpre´ter (c’est a` dire une classe de situations, un contexte), on aimerait pouvoir car-
acte´riser les formules qui sont vraies dans ce contexte. Autrement dit, quelles sont les pro-
prie´te´s d’une formule qui garantissent qu’elle va eˆtre vraie dans n’importe quelle situation
d’un contexte donne´? La question n’est pas seulement d’eˆtre capable de de´terminer quelles
sont les formules valides, mais aussi d’avoir une justification du fait qu’elles le sont, une
preuve.
La notion d’axiomatisation a e´te´ de´veloppe´e dans ce but. Informellement, une axioma-
tisation est une description finie de sche´mas d’axiomes (conside´re´s comme the´ore`mes, donc
prouve´s) et de re`gles qui permettent de de´duire des nouveaux the´ore`mes a` partir d’anciens.
Plus pre´cise´ment, une axiomatisation A est un ensemble de sche´mas d’axiomes (toute formule
ayant la meˆme structure que le sche´ma est un axiome et est donc –par principe– un the´ore`me)
et un ensemble de re`gles (appele´es re`gles d’infe´rences).
> Ve´rite´
(A ∧B) → A ; (A ∧B) → B Simplification
A → (A ∨B) ; B → (A ∨B) Addition
A → (B → A) Conservation
(A → B) → ((A → (B → C)) → (A → C)) Syllogisme hypothe´tique (SH)
(A → B) → ((A → C) → (A → (B ∧ C))) Composition
(A → C) → ((B → C) → ((A ∨B) → C)) Disjonction
¬¬A → A Tiers exclus
(A → B) → ((A → ¬B) → ¬A) Cohe´rence
A partir de A et de A → B, de´duire B Modus Ponens (MP)
Table 1: Re`gle et axiomes de la logique propositionnelle
La table 1 est un exemple d’axiomatisation avec neuf sche´mas d’axiomes et une re`gle
d’infe´rence (le modus ponens). Elle axiomatise la logique propositionnelle. On appelle
preuve de ϕ une se´quence finie de formules {ψ1, . . . , ψn} telle que ψn = ϕ et pour tout
i ∈ {1, . . . , n} ou bien ψi est une instance d’un sche´ma d’axiome ou bien elle est obtenue a`
partir de {ψ1, . . . , ψi−1} en utilisant une re`gle d’infe´rence. S’il existe une preuve de ϕ on dit
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que ϕ est un the´ore`me et l’on note `A ϕ, ou simplement ` ϕ. Plus ge´ne´ralement, si ϕ peut
eˆtre prouve´e en ajoutant a` A un ensemble S de formules conside´re´es comme des axiomes
supple´mentaires, on note alors S `A ϕ.
Notons qu’une preuve peut eˆtre longue. La table 2 donne un exemple de preuve d’un
the´ore`me de la logique propositionnelle en utilisant l’axiomatisation A.
L1 : ` (ψ ∧ ϕ) → ψ Simplification
L2 : ` (ψ ∧ ϕ) → ϕ Simplification
L3 : ` ψ → (ψ ∨ θ) Addition
L4 : ` ϕ → (ϕ ∨ θ) Addition
L5 : ` (ψ → (ψ ∨ θ)) → ((ψ ∧ ϕ) → (ψ → (ψ ∨ θ))) Conservation
L6 : ` (ϕ → (ϕ ∨ θ)) → ((ψ ∧ ϕ) → (ϕ → (ϕ ∨ θ))) Conservation
L7 : ` (ψ ∧ ϕ) → (ψ → (ψ ∨ θ)) L3, L5, MP
L8 : ` (ψ ∧ ϕ) → (ϕ → (ϕ ∨ θ)) L4, L6, MP
L9 : ` ((ψ ∧ ϕ) → ψ) → ((ψ ∧ ϕ) → (ψ → (ψ ∨ θ)) → ((ψ ∧ ϕ) → (ψ ∨ θ))) SH
L10 : ` ((ψ ∧ ϕ) → ϕ) → ((ψ ∧ ϕ) → (ϕ → (ϕ ∨ θ)) → ((ψ ∧ ϕ) → (ϕ ∨ θ))) SH
L11 : ` (ψ ∧ ϕ) → (ψ ∨ θ) L1, L7, L9, MP
L12 : ` (ψ ∧ ϕ) → (ϕ ∨ θ) L2, L8, L10, MP
L13 : ` θ → (ψ ∨ θ) Addition
L14 : ` θ → (ϕ ∨ θ) Addition
L15 : ` ((ψ ∧ ϕ) → (ψ ∨ θ)) → ((θ → (ψ ∨ θ)) → (((ψ ∧ ϕ) ∨ θ) → (ψ ∨ θ))) Disjonction
L16 : ` ((ψ ∧ ϕ) → (ϕ ∨ θ)) → ((θ → (ϕ ∨ θ)) → (((ψ ∧ ϕ) ∨ θ) → (ϕ ∨ θ))) Disjonction
L17 : ` ((ψ ∧ ϕ) ∨ θ) → (ψ ∨ θ) L11, L13, L15, MP
L18 : ` ((ψ ∧ ϕ) ∨ θ) → (ϕ ∨ θ) L12, L14, L16, MP
L19 : ` (((ψ ∧ ϕ) ∨ θ) → (ψ ∨ θ)) →
((((ψ ∧ ϕ) ∨ θ) → (ϕ ∨ θ)) → (((ψ ∧ ϕ) ∨ θ) → ((ψ ∨ θ) ∧ (ϕ ∨ θ))) Composition
L20 : ` ((ψ ∧ ϕ) ∨ θ) → ((ψ ∨ θ) ∧ (ϕ ∨ θ)) L17, L18, L19, MP
Table 2: Preuve de la distributivite´ de ∨ sur ∧ en utilisant une axiomatisation de type Hilbert
Etant donne´e une axiomatisation, nous aimerions prouver qu’elle correspond a` l’intuition
que les the´ore`mes sont exactement les formules vraies. Plus pre´cise´ment, on aimerait prouver
qu’elle est correcte (c’est a` dire que tout the´ore`me est valide) et qu’elle est comple`te (c’est a`
dire que toute formule valide est un the´ore`me).
La comple´tude est une proprie´te´ puissante qui garantit qu’on peut prouver tout ce qui
est vrai. C’est cette proprie´te´ que [Go¨del, 1951] a montre´ eˆtre fausse dans le cas de langages
plus expressifs, en particulier l’arithme´tique. Toutes les ve´rite´s mathe´matiques ne sont donc
pas de´montrables! Mais un tel re´sultat peut eˆtre satisfait pour les logiques modales. De fait,
l’axiomatisation A est correcte et comple`te pour la logique boole´enne, par rapport a` la classe
des mode`les boole´ens.
De plus, il a e´te´ prouve´ que l’axiomatisation pre´sente´e dans la table 3 est correcte et
comple`te pour la logique K par rapport a` la classe de tous les mode`les de Kripke, autrement
dit toute formule du langage modal est un the´ore`me ssi elle est valide dans tous les mode`les
de Kripke.
Qui plus est, en utilisant la meˆme axiomatisation agre´mente´e des axiomes additionnels
D, T, 4 ou 5 (ou toute combinaison de ceux-ci) on obtient une axiomatisation correcte et
comple`te par rapport a` la classe de mode`les KD,KT,K4,K5 (ou celle issue de la combinaison
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PL Axiomes de la logique propositionnelle
K(A −→ B) −→ (KA −→ KB) Axiome K
A partir de A de´duire KA Ne´cessitation
A partir de A et de A → B, de´duire B Modus Ponens
Table 3: Axiomes et re`gles de la logique modale
correspondante). Voir [Chellas, 1980] pour plus de de´tails.
Pour prouver la comple´tude d’une axiomatisation on utilise souvent la notion de mode`le
canonique. Nous sortirions du cadre de cette the`se en essayant de donner une de´finition
ge´ne´rale de ce concept. La de´finition 0.19 donne donc une de´finition locale, suffisante dans le
contexte de cet essai. Nous de´finissons d’abord la notion d’ensemble maximal consistant:
Definition 0.18 (Ensemble maximal consistant) Soit L un langage et A une axiomati-
sation de ce langage. Un ensemble S ⊆ L est dit:
• inconsistant si a` partir des formules de S il est possible de de´duire ⊥ en utilisant A
( i.e. S `A ⊥)
• consistant sinon
• maximal consistant s’il est consistant et pour tout ϕ ∈ L \ S, S ∪ {ϕ} est inconsistant
Definition 0.19 (Mode`le canonique pour les logiques e´piste´miques) Soit A une des
logiques qui peuvent eˆtre trouve´es dans cette the`se, de´finie a` partir d’un ensemble de´nombrable
d’atomes propositionnels PROP et un ensemble de´nombrables d’agents AG, dont le langage
LA est base´ sur des modalite´s e´piste´miques {Ki}i∈AG (dans le chapitre 4, ‘K’ est remplace´
par ‘B’). Le mode`le canonique de A est le mode`le de Kripke Mc = (Sc,Rc, V c) de´fini de la
fac¸on suivante:
• Sc = {x | x est un ensemble maximal consistant pour l’axiomatisation A}
• Rc = {Rci}i∈AG ou` pour tout i ∈ AG, Rci est la relation binaire sur Sc suivante:
Rci = {(x, y) ∈ Sc × Sc | Ki(x) ⊆ y} en notant Ki(x) = {ϕ | Kiϕ ∈ x}
• pour tout p ∈ PROP , V c(p) = {x | p ∈ x}.
La plupart des preuves de comple´tude par rapport a` une classe de mode`les donne´e utilise
cette double nature du mode`le canonique. En effet, nous souhaitons prouver dans ces situa-
tions que toute formule valide est un the´ore`me de la logique. On commence donc par de´finir
le mode`le canonique de fac¸on analogue a` la de´nfinition 0.19, on prouve qu’il s’agit bien d’un
mode`le, et qu’il appartient a` la classe de mode`les conside´re´e. Si l’on prend alors une formule
valide, elle est valide en particulier dans le mode`le canonique (car on vient de prouver que
c’est un mode`le). Mais une formule valide du mode`le canonique est un the´ore`me. Pourquoi?
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Car sa ne´gation n’appartient a` aucun ensemble maximal consistant, ce qui implique, comme
nous aurons a` le prouver, qu’elle n’appartient a` aucun ensemble consistant. Si elle n’est con-
sistante avec rien, c’est que cette formule est une contradiction, ce qui signifie que la formule
initiale, qui est la ne´gation d’une contradiction intrinse`que, est un the´ore`me. En re´sume´, ceci
de´montrerait que toute formule valide est un the´ore`me, autrement dit que toute formule vraie
est de´montrable.
De´cidabilite´ et classes de complexite´
Certains re´sultats de cette the`se relevant de la notion de complexite´, nous en pre´sentons dans
ce paragraphe les e´le´ments basiques.
Commenc¸ons par la de´cidabilite´: on dit qu’un proble`me donne´ est de´cidable s’il existe
une me´thode automatique pour obtenir la re´ponse correcte a` toute instance du proble`me.
Nous pourrions appliquer cette notion a` des proble`mes de la vie courante. Par exemple ‘A
est-il plus grand que B’ est un proble`me de´cidable: il est possible de mesurer. En effet si
je veux tester si Alex (A) est plus grand que Brune (B) je peux appliquer ma me´thode et
obtenir la bonne re´ponse. Au contraire ‘A est plus chanceux que B’ semble eˆtre un proble`me
inde´cidable.
Plus formellement, en informatique, un proble`me est dit de´cidable s’il existe une algo-
rithme de´terministe qui termine en re´pondant correctement oui ou non a` toute instance du
proble`me. Certains proble`mes particuliers sont connus pour eˆtre inde´cidables, l’exemple le
plus connu e´tant probablement le proble`me du domino (ou proble`me du pavage). L’objectif
y est de savoir s’il est possible de paver une grille infinie en utilisant un ensemble fini donne´
de pave´ colore´s (dont chacun peut eˆtre utilise´ autant de fois que l’on veut), en suivant les
re`gles du domino. Un brique de Wang (Cf. [Wang, 1961]) est un carre´ dont chaque coˆte´ a
une couleur choisie dans un ensemble fini de couleurs. On dit qu’un ensemble S de briques
de Wang peut paver le plan si des copies de briques de S peuvent eˆtre place´es, chacune a` une
position de la grille, de telle sorte que les coˆte´s contigus de deux briques adjacentes soient de
la meˆme couleur. On peut utiliser de multiples copies de chaque brique, sans limitation sur
le nombre. Si l’on accepte de pouvoir pivoter ou re´fle´chir les briques alors n’importe quelle
brique de Wang peut a` elle seule paver le plan. La question de savoir si un pavage existe pour
un ensemble de briques de Wang donne´ n’est inte´ressant que dans le cas ou` nous n’autorisons
aucune rotation ni re´flexion, donc lorsque l’orientation de la brique est fixe´e. Par exemple,
pensez-vous qu’il est possible de paver le plan avec l’ensemble de briques de Wang pre´sente´
Figure 0.2.2?
Ce proble`me de de´cision a e´te´ pose´ pour la premie`re fois en 1961 par Wang dans
[Wang, 1961] ou` il prouve qu’il est inde´cidable. Ca ne veut pas dire que l’on ne peut ja-
mais savoir si un ensemble de briques donne´ permet de paver le plan. De fait, il a e´te´ prouve´
qu’il existe un algorithme qui dit ‘oui’ en temps fini si le pavage est possible. Mais il est
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Figure 6: Une instance du proble`me du pavage
impossible d’eˆtre suˆr d’avoir une re´ponse en temps fini: l’algorithme propose´ peut ne jamais
re´pondre lorsque le pavage est impossible.
Il est possible de prouver qu’un proble`me donne´ est inde´cidable en codant le proble`me du
pavage. On traduit alors notre proble`me de telle sorte que pour chaque instance de celui-ci,
sa traduction est une instance du proble`me du pavage (c’est a` dire un ensemble de briques).
Ainsi, si le proble`me e´tait de´cidable alors le proble`me du pavage le serait lui aussi.
Mais a` vrai dire les proble`mes de´cidables nous inte´ressent davantage! On les classifie
par la complexite´ de l’algorithme correspondant. En effet, on dit qu’un proble`me est dans
P s’il peut eˆtre de´cide´ par un algorithme de´terministe dont l’exe´cution requiert un temps
polynomial en la longueur de l’instance du proble`me. On dit qu’un proble`me est dans
EXPTIME si l’exe´cution de l’algorithme correspondant requiert un temps exponentiel en
la taille de l’instance. On dit qu’il est dans NP (resp. NEXPTIME) si l’algorithme corre-
spondant est non-de´terministe, et qu’il est dans PSPACE s’il requiert un temps exponentiel
mais n’utilise qu’un espace polynoˆmial. Parler d’algorithme est ici abusif (surtout dans le
cas non de´terministe), la de´finition rigoureuse utilise la notion de machine de Turing (voir
[Papadimitriou, 1994]).
On appelle EXPTIME la classe des proble`mes qui sont dans EXPTIME, et ainsi de
suite pour les autres classes de complexite´. Nous savons que P ⊆ NP ⊆ PSPACE ⊆
EXPTIME ⊆ NEXPTIME. Nous savons e´galement que P 6= EXPTIME, mais le fait
de savoir si oui ou non P = NP est un proble`me reste´ non-re´solu qui pourrait vous rapporter
un million de dollars (si toutefois vous le re´solviez).
On dit qu’un proble`me P est NP -difficile si tout proble`me dans NP peut-eˆtre re´duit
a` P. Plus formellement, P est NP -difficile si pour tout proble`me Q dans NP il existe une
traduction tr exe´cutable en temps polynomial telle que pour toute instance i de Q, Q re´ponde
oui a` i si et seulement si P re´pond oui a` tr(i). On de´finit de la meˆme manie`re les notions
PSPACE-difficile , EXPTIME-difficile, NEXPTIME-difficile, etc. Si un proble`me est
dans NP et est NP -difficile, on dit qu’il est NP -complet (et de meˆme pour les autres classes
de complexite´).
Pour une de´finition plus rigoureuse de cette classification (qui implique d’expliquer en
de´tails ce qu’est une machine de Turing), se reporter a` [Papadimitriou, 1994].
En logique en ge´ne´ral, et dans cette the`se en particulier, e´tant donne´s un langage L avec sa
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se´mantique et une classe de mode`les C ou` l’on souhaite l’interpre´ter, on e´tudie deux proble`mes
classiques: le proble`me de satisfaisabilite´ (SAT ) et le proble`me du model checking (MC). Ils
peuvent eˆtre de´finis de la fac¸on suivante:
MC: Etant donne´s une formule ϕ de L, un mode`le fini M ∈ C et un monde s de M, ϕ
est-elle satisfaite dans s?
SAT: Etant donne´e une formule ϕ de L, ϕ est-elle satisfaite dans un certain mode`le M de
la classe C?
Une se´mantique raisonnable assure que le proble`me du model checking est de´cidable (et
appartient a` une classe de complexite´ assez faible). En effet, c’est un minimum que d’eˆtre
capable d’e´valuer en temps fini si une formule est satisfaite ou non dans une situation donne´e.
Le proble`me SAT pour la logique propositionnelle et celui pour la logique e´piste´mique
(avec les axiomes de S5) sont NP -complets, et ce proble`me est PSPACE-complet pour
d’autres logiques modales. Il est inde´cidable pour certains langages plus expressifs, comme la
logique du premier ordre par exemple, ou le langage Lapal pre´sente´ dans le paragraphe 3.1.2.
Etant donne´e une logique, le proble`me SAT est important pour des motifs the´oriques: il
re´pond a` la question de savoir si une formule fait sens, s’il existe une situation ou` elle est
vraie. On dira donc qu’un langage est de´cidable (resp. NP -complet, EXPTIME-difficile,
etc.) si son proble`me SAT est de´cidable (resp. NP -complet, EXPTIME-difficile, etc.).
La re´ponse a` ce proble`me n’impose pas que soit donne´ un mode`le qui satisfait la formule
ϕ, mais dans certains cas nous aimerions e´galement pouvoir construire ce mode`le. On re´pond
alors au proble`me de la construction du mode`le:
Construction du mode`le: Etant donne´e une formule ϕ de L, exhiber un mode`le M satis-
faisant ϕ.
Une me´thode ce´le`bre de construction de mode`les utilise la notion de tableaux analytiques.
Une telle me´thode est pre´sente´e dans le paragraphe 6.6 pour le langage exprimant la connnais-
sance, les annonces publiques et la permission de donner une information.

Chapter 1
Introduction
Many situations involve communication and some kind of restrictions on this communication.
This is the case when we think about military information, medical communication, moral
norms, games, etc. In some situations, we may have structures to think about and organize
the right to communicate in such situations. In the army, for example, such a structure is
quite simple and easy to understand: the higher you are in the hierarchy, the more you may
know and the less you are allowed to say. Indeed, a general can know any secret information
but have no right to reveal it to his soldiers, while a soldier can give any information he wants
(and may have to give the information he has) without having the right to access most of
the information. As another example, in the medical field, more subtle restrictions prevent a
boss from getting one of his workers’ medical information, while a doctor may have access to
it. Often such structures are presented as an informal and incomplete set of rules, that may
be contradictory (and let the justice decide what should be done in case of conflict).
But we have no general framework to analyze such situations. The aim of this dissertation
is to make some progress, in the field of logic, in the understanding of the notion of ‘right to
say’, progress that may help us understand and answer problems that involve such a notion.
We focus on the informative part of communication (and not on its form) leading our topic
to the notion of ‘right to give a piece of information’.
1.1 What is Logic?
Logic is the formal study of human arguments. In a way it can be considered as the study
of human reasoning (if we consider arguments as the translation of internal reasoning in
a human communication). Its aim is to get formal unambiguous results about it. Yet,
natural language (in which are formed arguments) is particularly ambiguous, every word
having different possible meanings and each concept having different interpretations in a
same language. To form a logical theory, it is thus necessary to model a part of the reasoning,
following predetermined conditions. This is what happens in the following famous syllogism,
attributed to Aristotle1: “All men are mortal. Socrates is a man. Therefore, Socrates is
mortal.” Indeed, he supposes that the notion of mortality, man and ‘being’ have no ambiguity.
It may be acceptable, but another sentence with the same structure, which is also quite
1We have no references to affirm that this sentence is actually from Aristotle, and the notion of syllogism
in Aristotle’s writings is nearer to: ‘If all men are mortal and all Greeks are men, then all Greeks are mortal ’.
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famous, shows the reader that it is not that obvious: “All birds fly. Tweety the penguin is a
bird. Therefore Tweety flies”. ‘It is wrong that all birds fly’, may answer the reader, and we
could agree. But the interesting point is that there is an ambiguity in natural language on
concepts: when we say that all birds fly, do we mean ‘generally’? ‘In every normal condition’?
‘In every condition’? If an eagle breaks one of its wings, does that make wrong the fact that
‘eagles fly’?
Therefore, to form a logical theory, we need to define a formal unambiguous language and
a deterministic interpretation of its formulas. ‘To interpret’ a formula means here ‘to say if
it is true or false in the given context’. Nothing obliges us to consider the truth value as
a binary function: true or false. Indeed, in our conception of reality some concepts are not
binary: I am 1m76 tall, am I tall? Some would agree, others wouldn’t, but it would be nearer
to our common comprehension to say that I am rather tall, but not that much. Some logical
theories (see for example [Dubois and Prade, 1988]) allow to consider this kind of concepts,
which truth value is at the same time qualitative and quantitative. In this thesis, all the
(abstract) concepts we consider can only be true or false (and not even both at the same
time).
A representation of the world can thus be a list of all what is true. Such a big list may be
impossible to get if we want to consider all the properties of the world (how many are they?),
but in actual situations we can limit them to properties of interest and consider only these
ones.
As an example, here are four children, Alex, Brune, Cha and Dan. We are interested only
in their emotions, considered as binary: they feel good or bad. This may not be static: they
are moody children, so these emotions are always changing.
We base our language on the following propositions: Alex feels good (GA),
Brune feels good (GB), Cha feels good (GC) and Dan feels good (GD). Together they
forms the set of atomic propositions of the language, noted PROP = {GA, GB , GC , GD}.
We then represent the actual world as a list of the truth values (true or false) of the
propositions (taken from the set PROP ). Figure 1.1 gives an example of such a representation,
called Boolean model.
Alex Brune Cha Dan
Figure 1.1: A boolean model for the moody children
The following propositions are true in this model : GB , GC
As they are moody, there are many possible worlds, exactly sixteen of them. They are
represented in Figure 1.2.
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∅ : : GA
GD : : GA, GD
GC : : GA, GC
GC , GD : : GA, GC , GD
GB : : GA, GB
GB , GD : : GA, GB , GD
GB , GC : : GA, GB , GC
GB, GC , GD : : GA, GB , GC , GD
Figure 1.2: Moody children: all the possible worlds
These possible worlds are the basis of the representation of the actual world with modalities
(such as time, belief, knowledge, result of actions, etc.). Such representations are introduced
in the following chapter, using the notion of knowledge.
The link between logic and computer science is twofold. On one hand, computer science
gives to logical theories important technical results, as deterministic algorithms that prove
that a formula is true in a given context, or in every context. Also the time necessary to
get such answer, in function of the size of the formula, can be proved. We will present in
this work such kind of results. An introduction to them for the novice reader is proposed in
Section 2.2.
On the other hand, logical theories give to computer scientists useful methods to solve
actual problems. A fashionable example is the SUDOKU game: a classical algorithm may be
extremely long to write, but a procedure formalising in a logical language the properties that
have to be satisfied is quite easy to develop.
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1.2 Outline
I think that scientific research should be permanently concerned about being accessible to a
large majority of people. Clearly, not every scientific work can be understood by everybody,
but every researcher can do her possible to give the elements of comprehension that allow
someone out of his field to understand at least part of the work. It is particularly true for
a PhD thesis that synthesizes years of work, with a non-imposed final size and that may be
read by novice readers (friends, family,...). Chapter 2 is thus dedicated to present the basic
notions of modal logic, in the context of the study of knowledge. Yet, some of these notions
are much more general and can be used for any kind of modal logic.
More advanced frameworks of epistemic, dynamic and deontic logics are presented in
Chapter 3. In this chapter we situate our work in the current research world and present
some resources that we use in our proposals. We also discuss some principles that we may
follow to correctly understand the notions linked to the ‘right to say’.
While working during months on a given topic, many parallel questions rise and require
an answer. Chapters 4 and 5 present the work that followed this process. Indeed, Chapter
4 deals with the concept of objective belief, a notion between knowledge and belief. It also
presents technical results that complete a work proposed by [Hommersom et al., 2004]. As for
Chapter 5, it presents a common work (published in [A˚gotnes et al., 2010]) on the capacity
of a group of agents to communicate information.
Chapters 6 and 7 present the most important result of this dissertation: a formalization of
the ‘right to say’. The former presents this notion in the context of public communication, i.e.
in situations in which every communication is made publicly, and in which the restrictions to
these communications are not dependent on the nature of the agent communicating. Indeed,
in this framework, there is no agency that would allow us to say who is speaking, the only thing
that matters is what is said. The report is based on an example, namely the french card game
‘la Belote ’. The latter generalizes the first proposal, giving a framework including individual
permissions for the agents communicating, and considering private communications, as well
as public ones.
The last chapter concludes and opens toward further work. Indeed, this thesis is a work
in progress that may be continued, in generalizing the framework or in analyzing different
situations using such concepts.
Chapter 2
Modal Logic for the Representation
of Knowledge
What does it mean that someone knows something? Can anything be known? These questions
are not new, have been studied at least since the Greek philosophers (see [Plato, BC]) and form
the field of Epistemology, the study of Knowledge. Some centuries after Plato, [Hintikka, 1962]
proposed a formal logical analysis of knowledge in a multi-agent situation. His formalism,
as we will see, uses the semantics of the possible worlds. Since then, epistemic logics have
been used in various fields, such as artificial intelligence, economics, linguistics or theoretical
computer sciences, focusing on the multi-agent aspects (interaction between agents, that can
be human or computing systems) much more than on the philosophical understanding of
knowledge.
You can then reason about what you know, about what your adversary knows, or about
what makes part of the set of knowledge that is shared by all the agents. But how would
Hintikka’s formalism represent this knowledge?
2.1 Representation of Knowledge
2.1.1 The Language of Epistemic Logic
First of all, we need to define properly our language of epistemic logic, noted Lel , starting
from a countable set of agents AG and a countable set of propositional atoms PROP . In the
example presented in Chapter 1, we consider AG = {a, b, c, d} for Alex, Brune, Cha and Dan,
and PROP = {GA, GB , GC , GD}. Here are some examples of formulas we can express in our
language:
Kb(GA): “Brune knows Alex feels good”
(GC) −→ Kc(GC): “If Cha feels good, she knows it”
Kb(GD ∨ ¬GD): “Brune knows Dan feels good or bad”
¬GC ∧Ka(GC): “Cha feels bad and Alex knows Cha feels good”.
More formally, here is the way in which the formulas are constructed:
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Definition 2.1 (The Language Lel) The set Lel (AG,PROP ) of epistemic formulas is ob-
tained from AG and PROP by iterating indefinitely the following operations:
• for all p ∈ PROP , p is a formula,
• ⊥ (“falsum”) is a formula,
• if ϕ is a formula then ¬ϕ (“not ϕ”) is a formula,
• if ϕ is a formula and ψ is a formula then (ϕ ∨ ψ) (“ϕ or ψ”) is a formula,
• if ϕ is a formula then for all agent i ∈ AG, Kiϕ (“i knows that ϕ”) is a formula.
• Nothing else is a formula except what can be constructed using these rules finitely many
times.
We often consider that the sets of atoms (PROP ) and agents (AG) are clear or irrelevant,
and we omit them. This definition can be written in the following shorter form1:
Definition 2.2 (The Language Lel) The language Lel over a countable set of agents AG
and a countable set of propositional atoms PROP is defined as follows:
ϕ ::= p | ⊥ | ¬ϕ | (ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2) | Kiϕ
where i ∈ AG and p ∈ PROP.
We add some abbreviations:
• > (“true”) abbreviates ¬⊥
• (ϕ ∧ ψ) (“ϕ and ψ”) abbreviates ¬(¬ϕ ∨ ¬ψ)
• (ϕ −→ ψ) (“ϕ implies ψ”) abbreviates (¬ϕ ∨ ψ)
• (ϕ ←→ ψ) (“ϕ is equivalent to ψ”) abbreviates ((ϕ −→ ψ) ∧ (ψ −→ ϕ))
• Kˆiϕ (“i considers ϕ possible”) abbreviates ¬Ki¬ϕ. We say that Kˆi is the dual of Ki.
As we see, ¬GC ∧ Ka(GB) (read “Cha feels bad and Alex knows she feels good”) is a
formula of the language, thus not all the formulas belonging to the language are intuitively
true. But nobody said that every expressible formula had to be true. In fact, we did not
define how to evaluate the truth value of an epistemic formula. Hence the following.
1This formal way to describe languages is inspired by the classical grammar in computer sciences called
Backus-Naur Form (BNF). Hereafter we shall use this notation to describe formal languages.
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2.1.2 The Possible Worlds Semantics
First, we assume that there exists an interpretation of the real world, independently of who
is looking at it. This interpretation is a list of the truth values of all objective facts in the
current state of affairs. If we call propositions these objective facts, we understand easily
that this representation of the world is nothing else than a Boolean propositional model, as
introduced in Chapter 1. In our example, it would be a list of the emotions of the moody
children.
The lack of knowledge can thus be seen as an uncertainty about which is the current state
of affairs. Hintikka represents thus the epistemic world (i.e. the world and the knowledge
of all the agents) as a graph where a node is a representation of a possible world (i.e. a
propositional model) and an edge, which is indexed by an agent a, represents the fact that
agent a does not know if the current state of affairs is one or the other node linked by the
edge. Reciprocally, we say that a knows a sentence ϕ if ϕ is true in all the state of affairs
linked by edges to the current one. Here is a representation of a situation in which Brune
does not know Cha’s mood.
Brune
Cha Brune Cha Brune
Figure 2.1: Epistemic model
Figure 2.2 gives a more complete representation of this kind of epistemic situations: Alex
knows his own feelings and does not know Dan’s ones, and he knows that Dan knows her
feelings but not his ones. And Dan knows this fact, etc.
Dan
Alex
Dan
Alex
Figure 2.2: Epistemic model
We omit here the reflexive arrows that represent the fact that the children consider possible
the actual world, which is considered always true.
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Before defining these notions properly later, we define more precisely what a model is:
Definition 2.3 (Kripke model) Given a countable set of agents AG and a countable set
of propositional atoms PROP , a Kripke model is a tuple M = (S,R, V ) where:
• S is a set, each of its elements being called “world” or “state”,
• V : PROP −→ 2S is a valuation function that assigns to any propositional atom p the
set of worlds V (p) in which p is considered true, and
• R = {Ri}i∈AG with for all i ∈ AG, Ri ⊆ S × S is a binary relation on S.
(M, s), a Kripke model joint with one of its states is called pointed model.
p, qa a ¬p, q a
012 a
b
021
b
102
c
a
b
120
201 a
c
210
c
Figure 2.3: Some examples of Kripke models
Figure 2.3 gives two more classical representations of epistemic situations with Kripke
models. The first model represents the uncertainty of agent a about p while q is known.
The second one, explained in page 45, is a representation of a card deal, with a set of three
cards 0, 1 and 2 dealt to three players a, b and c. In the second one, the reflexive arrows are
omitted again.
These models allow us to interpret sentences that speak about truth of an objective fact,
knowledge of agents about these facts, and knowledge of agents about this kind of sentences.
Definition 2.4 (satisfiability relation for Lel) Let M be a model. We define the satisfi-
ability relation |= : S ×Lel −→ {0, 1} inductively on the structure of ϕ2 in the following way:
(We note M, s |= ϕ, read “ϕ is true in the state s of the model M”, if |= (s, ϕ) = 1 and
M, s 6|= ϕ, read “ϕ is false in the state s of the model M”, if |= (s, ϕ) = 0)
for all s ∈ S, M, s |= p iff s ∈ V (p)
for all s ∈ S, M, s 6|= ⊥
for all s ∈ S, M, s |= ¬ψ iff M, s 6|= ψ
2This notion is presented in detail in Remark 2.7
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for all s ∈ S, M, s |= ψ1 ∨ ψ2 iff (M, s |= ψ1 or M, s |= ψ2)
for all s ∈ S, M, s |= Kiψ iff for all t such that sRit, M, t |= ψ
We say that ϕ is valid in the model M, noted M |= ϕ if for all s ∈ S, M, s |= ϕ. We say
that ϕ is valid if for all models M, M |= ϕ, i.e. if ϕ is valid in any state of any model. We
note [[ϕ]]M the subset of S composed by the states s such that M, s |= ϕ.
2.1.3 Characterisation of Knowledge
We claimed, in Definition 2.1, that we could read Kaϕ as “agent a knows that ϕ”. As said
in Section 2, this claim, to be reasonable, needs to be followed by some arguments that make
this semantics appropriate to speak about knowledge. Let us examine the validities given by
the semantics, and the validities we should enforce to model a maybe idealized conception of
knowledge.
First of all, the Kripke semantics, presented in Definition 2.4, imposes that our agents,
who are able to know, have an absolute capacity of deduction. Why? Suppose that, in a
given state of a given model , an agent i knows ψ and knows that ψ implies ϕ. Then ψ and
ψ −→ ϕ are satisfied in any state that i considers possible, thus ϕ is satisfied there also. In
other words, the following formulas are valid, for all ψ,ϕ in the language:
(Kiψ ∧Ki(ψ −→ ϕ)) −→ Kiϕ. (K)
This could appear a reasonable simulation of the capacity of deduction of a rational agent.
But it implies, for example, that every agent “knows” every boolean tautology, i.e. every
sentence that is always true. But even if the reader is probably rational, could he say that he
‘knows’ that the following formula is a tautology?
(((p ∨ t) → s) ∧ (q ↔ u)) ∨ ((p ∨ t ∧ ¬s) ∧ ((q ∧ u) ∨ (¬q ∧ ¬u))) −→ (q ∨ (v ∧ u ∧ (v −→ ⊥)))
It is also widely accepted that if an agent knows something then it is true. Thus the
following formulas are valid:
Kiϕ −→ ϕ. (T)
There clearly lies one difference between “knowledge” and “belief”, though we cannot reduce
knowledge to true belief (see [Burnyeat and Barnes, 1980]). Logics of belief usually avoid this
principle of truth of belief, but use a deeper one: coherence. Indeed, we usually consider that
if you believe something you do not believe its negation. This would be translated into one
of the following equivalent principles (that remain true in the case of knowledge):
Kiϕ −→ ¬Ki¬ϕ ; ¬Ki⊥ (D)
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We also accept that knowledge obeys positive and negative introspection. In other words,
we consider that if an agent knows something, she knows that she knows it, and, which is
more, if she does not know something, then she knows she does not. This implication is very
strong: do you actually know what is your “knowledge base”? And do you know the entire
list of what you do not know? If we accept these properties, we accept the validity of the
following formulas, for all ϕ in the language:
Kiϕ −→ KiKiϕ (4)
¬Kiϕ −→ Ki¬Kiϕ. (5)
A last notion that we may introduce is the notion of common knowledge. Alex and Cha
are used to play Poker (as you shall see, our moody children like to play cards). Alex knows
the rules of the game. He also knows Cha knows the rules – if it were not the case, he could
try to cheat. But he also knows Cha knows that he knows the rules – and therefore he can
suppose she will not try to cheat. We could continue making sentences of this form... In fact,
the rules of the game are common knowledge.
Formally, the common knowledge of ϕ is the syntactic abbreviation of an infi-
nite conjunction of formulas. Let G be a set of agents, therefore CKGϕ abbreviates∧
n∈N
∧
i1,...,in∈G Ki1 . . .Kinϕ.
As we shall see, this notion is very important when considering public learning: if Brune
learns something together with Alex, and if each one can see that this learning is mutual, there-
fore the information learned becomes common knowledge. See [van Ditmarsch et al., 2009]
for more details.
2.2 Classical Technical Notions in Modal Logic
This chapter may be harder to understand for the novice reader and may again be per-
fectly redundant for the expert. But it seems important to define and explain correctly the
computer-science notions that are relevant in studies of logic. These notions are not restricted
to the study of knowledge, on the contrary the majority of them are very common in all the
fields of modal logic. Nevertheless, we shall present these notions using the language and
semantics of epistemic logic.
2.2.1 Properties of the Language
Let us start with very basic notions regarding syntax in logical languages.
Definition 2.5 (Length of a formula) Given a formula ϕ of a language L we call length
of ϕ, noted |ϕ|, the number of symbols that constitute ϕ.
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Definition 2.6 (Subformula) For all formula ϕ ∈ Lel we define Sub(ϕ) the set of subfor-
mulas of ϕ depending of the form of ϕ:
• Sub(p) = {p}
• Sub(⊥) = {⊥}
• Sub(¬ψ) = {¬ψ} ∪ Sub(ψ)
• Sub(ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2) = {ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2} ∪ Sub(ψ1) ∪ Sub(ϕ2)
• Sub(Kiψ) = {Kiψ} ∪ Sub(ψ).
If ψ ∈ Sub(ϕ) we say that ψ is a subformula of ϕ.
We can prove that Sub(ϕ) is well defined by induction on the length of ϕ.
Remark 2.7 (Induction “on the structure of ϕ”) From now on, “prove (resp. define)
a property P (ϕ) by induction on the structure of ϕ” means “prove (resp. define) P (ψ) for all
ψ ∈ PROP ∪{⊥} and prove (resp. define) P (ϕ) admitting the following Induction Hypothesis
(IH): P (ψ) is true (resp. defined) for all subformula ψ of ϕ”.
The language studied here can express limited notions. If you add a modal operator (i.e. a
new symbol) to a given language, without changing the semantics of the previous symbols,
the language you obtain can clearly express at least the concepts that could be expressed by
the previous language, and maybe more. Let us precisely describe this concept of expressivity
of a language.
Definition 2.8 (Expressivity of a language) Given languages L1 and L2 and a model
class C, L1 is at least as expressive as L2 with respect to C iff for every L1-formula ϕ there
is a equivalent L2-formula ψ. In other words, for every C-model M, [[ϕ]]M = [[ψ]]M: the
denotation of ϕ in M with respect to the L1-semantics is the same as the denotation of ψ in
M with respect to the L2-semantics.
Two standard ways to determine that L1 is at least as expressive as L2 are:
• L2 form a sublanguage of L1
• there is a translation (reduction) from L2 to L1 such that every L2-formula is logically
equivalent to its transalation in L1.
The language L1 is more expressive than L2 with respect to C if L1 is at least as expressive
as L2, but L2 is not at least as expressive as L1 (the notion is a partial order).
The standard way to determine that L2 is not at least as expressive as L1 is that there
are an L1-formula ϕ and two C-models (M, s) and (M′, s′) such that ϕ is true in (M, s) and
false in (M′, s′), but any L2-formula ψ is true in (M, s) iff ψ is true in (M′, s′). We then
also say that the language L1, but not L2, can distinguish between the models (M, s) and
(M′, s′).
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A last useful definition about languages:
Definition 2.9 (Substitution) Let L(PROP ) be a recursively enumerable language based
on a countable set of atomic propositions PROP , ϕ,ψ, ψ1, ψ2, . . . ∈ L(PROP ) and
p, p1, p2, . . . ∈ PROP
• We denote asϕ(ψ/p) the L formula obtained from ϕ by replacing every occurrence of p
in ϕ by ψ.
• We extend the previous notation to simultaneous substitution for the infinite sequences
p1, p2, . . .: ϕ(ψ1/p1, ψ2/p2, ...)
2.2.2 Properties of Models
Let us now see some semantical properties of modal logic, in other words some properties
of the models we consider. First of all, the models we consider in all this work are Kripke
models, possibly augmented with an additional relation (that can be between a world and
set of worlds or between a world and relations). Let us recall that such models, defined in
Definition 2.3, are composed of a set of states, binary relations on this set, and a valuation
that assigns to any propositional atom a subset of states (those in which the proposition is
true). Thus we can see them as oriented graphs where the nodes are boolean models (i.e. a
truth value for any propositional atom). Note that this definition imposes the validity of the
formula K for any operator which follows the semantics presented in Definition 2.4. Indeed,
if Kiψ ∧Ki(ψ −→ ϕ) is true in a state s of a model M, then it means that for all states t
linked to s by Ri, they satisfy both ψ and ψ −→ ϕ. As they are boolean models, we conclude
that they all satisfy ϕ, QED.
A submodel of a given modelM is composed of a subset of the states of M, and a structure
that is the restriction of the initial structure on the obtained subset. More formally:
Definition 2.10 (Submodel) Let M = (S, V, 〈Ri〉i∈AG) be a Kripke model. Then we call a
submodel of M a model M′ = (S′, V ′, 〈R′i〉i∈AG) satisfying the following:
• S′ ⊆ S
• for all p ∈ PROP and all s′ ∈ S′, s′ ∈ V ′(p) iff s′ ∈ V (p)
• for all i ∈ AG and all (s1, s2) ∈ S′ × S′, s1R′is2 iff s1Ris2
Recall the notion of transitive closure of a set of relations in the context of Kripke model.
Definition 2.11 (transitive closure) Let R = {Ri}i∈AG be a set of binary relations over
a set S. We call transitive closure of R the binary relation R∗ such that for all s, s′ ∈ S there
exist n ∈ N and s0, s1, . . . , sn ∈ S satisfying:
• s0 = s and sn = s′
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• for all k ∈ {0, . . . , n − 1} there exists i ∈ AG such that skRisk+1.
We can now observe that a model may not be connected, i.e. it may happen that one
subset of states has no relation with another. In these conditions, a particular submodel
comes to be relevant:
Definition 2.12 (Connected component - Generated submodel) Let M = (S, V,R)
be a model and s ∈ S. We call connected component induced by s in M the set S′ = {s′ ∈
S | sR∗s′}. We call generated submodel of M, s the particular submodel M′ of M based on
the connected component induced by s.
The connected composant of s in M is thus the set of all the states linked to s in M. This
notion is useful as the generated submodel of a model M is equivalent to M with respect to
the language Lel : a formula that is true in one is also true in the other. This is statuted by
Proposition 2.15, saying that the two models are bisimilar.
Bisimulation is a well-known notion of structural similarity (see [Blackburn et al., 2001])
that we use frequently in examples and proofs. It sometimes says that two models are modally
equivalent. Let us present it in details:
Definition 2.13 (Bisimulation) Let two models M = (S,R, V ) and M′ = (S′,R′, V ′) be
given. A non-empty relation R ⊆ S×S′ is a bisimulation between M and M′ iff for all s ∈ S
and s′ ∈ S′ with (s, s′) ∈ R:
atoms for all p ∈ PROP : s ∈ V (p) iff s′ ∈ V ′(p);
forth for all i ∈ AG and all t ∈ S: if sRit, then there is a t′ ∈ S′ such that s′R′it′ and
(t, t′) ∈ R;
back for all i ∈ AG and all t′ ∈ S′: if s′R′it′, then there is a t ∈ S such that sRit and
(t, t′) ∈ R.
We write (M, s)←→(M′, s′) iff there is a bisimulation between M and M′ linking s and s′,
and we then say the pointed Kripke structures (M, s) and (M′, s′) are bisimilar.
Note that bisimuation is an equivalence relation. Bisimulation is an important notion
because it characterizes the fact that two models are modally equivalent, i.e. satisfy the same
formulas of Lel :
Proposition 2.14 Let two models M = (S,R, V ) and M′ = (S′,R′, V ′) be given. Let
ϕ ∈ Lel be a formula. For all s ∈ S and for all s′ ∈ S′, if (M, s)←→(M′, s′) then M, s |= ϕ
iff M′, s′ |= ϕ.
The proof of this proposition can be found for example in [Fagin et al., 1995]. In particular,
we obtain with the following proposition that a model satisfies the same formulas as its
generated submodel.
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Proposition 2.15 Let M, s0 be a pointed model. It is bisimilar to its generated submodel.
Proof Let M′ = (S′,R′, V ′) be the generated submodel of M, s0. Let R be the binary
relation between S and S′ defined in the following way: sRs′ iff s = s′.
We show that R is a bisimulation between M, s0 and M′, s0. First, clearly s0Rs0. For
all s ∈ S′
atoms for all p ∈ PROP : s ∈ V (p) iff s ∈ V ′(p) (by Definition 2.10);
forth for all i ∈ AG and all t ∈ S: if sRit, then t ∈ S′ and sR′it by Definition 2.10, and tRt;
back for all i ∈ AG and all t ∈ S′: if sRit, then sRit by Definition 2.10, and tRt.
¤
We introduce another kind of equivalence relation, that is a form of generalization of
bisimulation. The idea is to consider as equivalent two states of a given model that satisfy
all the formulas of a particular subset of the language. We then introduce the useful notion
of filtration:
Definition 2.16 (filtration) Let M = (S,∼i, V ) be a model and let Γ be a set of formulas
closed under subformulas. Let !Γ be the relation on S defined, for all s, t ∈ S, by:
s!Γt iff for all ϕ ∈ Γ : (M, s |= ϕ iff M, t |= ϕ)
Note that !Γ is an equivalence relation. We call the filtration of M through Γ (or
simply the filtration of M) the model MΓ = (SΓ,∼Γi , V Γ) where:
• SΓ = S/!Γ
• for all |s|, |t| ∈ SΓ, |s| ∼Γi |t| iff for all Kiϕ ∈ Γ, (M, s |= Kiϕ iff M, t |= Kiϕ)
• V Γ(p) =
{
∅ if p 6∈ Γ
V (p)/!Γ if p ∈ Γ)
An important last remark: in the entire class of all Kripke models, some particular sub-
classes may be useful. We define them according to the properties of its binary relations
(reflexivity, transitivity, symmetry, seriality, euclidianity, equivalence). Recall that a binary
relation R over a set S is
• reflexive if for all s ∈ S, (s, s) ∈ R
• transitive if for all s, t, u ∈ S, ((s, t) ∈ R and (t, u) ∈ R) implies (s, u) ∈ R)
• symmetric if for all s, t ∈ S, ((s, t) ∈ R implies (t, s) ∈ R)
• serial if for all s ∈ S, there exists t ∈ S such that (s, t) ∈ R
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• euclidean if for all s, t, u ∈ S, ((s, t) ∈ R and (s, u) ∈ R) implies (t, u) ∈ R)
• an equivalence relation if it is reflexive, transitive and symmetric.
As we will see in the following section, these properties of the models ‘correspond’ to the
axioms we presented in Section 2.1.3 . More precisely,
• Truth (noted T) corresponds to reflexivity
• Coherence (noted D) corresponds to seriality
• Positive introspection (noted 4) corresponds to transitivity
• Negative introspection (noted 5) corresponds to euclideanicity
Recall that all the models satisfy the implication noted K. We thus call KT (resp. KD, K45,
etc.) the class of reflexive models (resp. serial models, transitive and euclidian models, etc.).
S5 abbreviates KT45 and corresponds to the class of models for which R is an equivalence
relation. For all n ∈ N and for C a class of models, we call Cn the class of models that belongs
to C and contains exactly n binary relations.
In particular, S5n is the class of Kripke model that have n relations that are equivalence:
Definition 2.17 (Epistemic model) A Kripke model M = (S, {Ri}i∈AG, V ) is called an
epistemic model if for all i ∈ AG, Ri is an equivalence relation over S.
2.2.3 Axiomatization
Given a syntax (i.e. a language), a class of models where to interpret it (i.e. a class of
concrete situations, a context) and semantics (i.e. an interpretation of the language in the
contexts), we would like to characterize formulas that are true in this context. What are
the properties of a formula that guarantee that it will be true in every situation of a given
context? The question is not only to be able to determine which are the valid formulas, but
to get an explanation of why they are true, and a proof of it.
> Truth
(A ∧B) → A ; (A ∧B) → B Simplification
A → (A ∨B) ; B → (A ∨B) Addition
A → (B → A) Conservation
(A → B) → ((A → (B → C)) → (A → C)) Hypothetical syllogism (HS)
(A → B) → ((A → C) → (A → (B ∧ C))) Composition
(A → C) → ((B → C) → ((A ∨B) → C)) Disjunction
¬¬A → A Excluded middle
(A → B) → ((A → ¬B) → ¬A) Coherence
From A and A → B, infer B Modus Ponens (MP)
Table 2.1: Propositional logic, axioms and rule
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The notion of axiomatization has been developed for this purpose. Informally, an axioma-
tization is a finite description of axiom schemata and rules that allows to derive deterministi-
cally all the formulas we consider as theorems of the logic. More precisely, an axiomatization
A is a set of axiom schemata (i.e. each formula that has the same structure of the schemata
is an axiom and then is –by principle– a theorem) and a set of rules (called inference rules).
Table 2.1 is an example of axiomatization, with nine axiom schemata and one inference rule.
It axiomatizes propositional logic. We call proof for ϕ a finite sequence {ψ1, . . . , ψn} of for-
mulas such that ψn = ϕ and for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n} either ψi is an instantiation of an axiom or
is obtained from {ψ1, . . . , ψi−1} using an inference rule. If there is a proof for ϕ we say that
ϕ is a theorem and we note `A ϕ, or simply ` ϕ. More generally, if ϕ can be proved adding
to A a set of formulas S considered as additional atoms, we note it S `A ϕ.
Note that a proof may be quite long. Table 2.2 gives an example of a theorem’ proof in
propositional logic.
L1 : ` (ψ ∧ ϕ) → ψ Simplification
L2 : ` (ψ ∧ ϕ) → ϕ Simplification
L3 : ` ψ → (ψ ∨ θ) Addition
L4 : ` ϕ → (ϕ ∨ θ) Addition
L5 : ` (ψ → (ψ ∨ θ)) → ((ψ ∧ ϕ) → (ψ → (ψ ∨ θ))) Conservation
L6 : ` (ϕ → (ϕ ∨ θ)) → ((ψ ∧ ϕ) → (ϕ → (ϕ ∨ θ))) Conservation
L7 : ` (ψ ∧ ϕ) → (ψ → (ψ ∨ θ)) L3, L5, MP
L8 : ` (ψ ∧ ϕ) → (ϕ → (ϕ ∨ θ)) L4, L6, MP
L9 : ` ((ψ ∧ ϕ) → ψ) → ((ψ ∧ ϕ) → (ψ → (ψ ∨ θ)) → ((ψ ∧ ϕ) → (ψ ∨ θ))) HS
L10 : ` ((ψ ∧ ϕ) → ϕ) → ((ψ ∧ ϕ) → (ϕ → (ϕ ∨ θ)) → ((ψ ∧ ϕ) → (ϕ ∨ θ))) HS
L11 : ` (ψ ∧ ϕ) → (ψ ∨ θ) L1, L7, L9, MP
L12 : ` (ψ ∧ ϕ) → (ϕ ∨ θ) L2, L8, L10, MP
L13 : ` θ → (ψ ∨ θ) Addition
L14 : ` θ → (ϕ ∨ θ) Addition
L15 : ` ((ψ ∧ ϕ) → (ψ ∨ θ)) → ((θ → (ψ ∨ θ)) → (((ψ ∧ ϕ) ∨ θ) → (ψ ∨ θ))) Disjunction
L16 : ` ((ψ ∧ ϕ) → (ϕ ∨ θ)) → ((θ → (ϕ ∨ θ)) → (((ψ ∧ ϕ) ∨ θ) → (ϕ ∨ θ))) Disjunction
L17 : ` ((ψ ∧ ϕ) ∨ θ) → (ψ ∨ θ) L11, L13, L15, MP
L18 : ` ((ψ ∧ ϕ) ∨ θ) → (ϕ ∨ θ) L12, L14, L16, MP
L19 : ` (((ψ ∧ ϕ) ∨ θ) → (ψ ∨ θ)) →
((((ψ ∧ ϕ) ∨ θ) → (ϕ ∨ θ)) → (((ψ ∧ ϕ) ∨ θ) → ((ψ ∨ θ) ∧ (ϕ ∨ θ))) Composition
L20 : ` ((ψ ∧ ϕ) ∨ θ) → ((ψ ∨ θ) ∧ (ϕ ∨ θ)) L17, L18, L19, MP
Table 2.2: Proof for the distributivity of ∨ over ∧ using Hilbert-style axiomatization
Given an axiomatization, we may want to prove that it corresponds to the intuition that
the theorems are the always true formulas. More precisely, we may want to prove that it is
sound (i.e. every theorem is a validity) in all considered models and complete (i.e. every
valid formula is a theorem).
Completeness is a powerful property that guarantees that all that is true can be proved.
This is the property that [Go¨del, 1951] proved to be wrong for more expressive languages, in
particular arithmetic. But such a result may be satisfied for modal logics. In fact, Hilbert-
style axiomatization for propositional logic is proved to be sound and complete in all Boolean
models.
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What is more, it has been proved that the axiomatization presented in Table 2.3 is sound
and complete with respect to all Kripke models, i.e. that a formula is a theorem of modal
logic iff it is valid in all Kripke models.
PL Axioms of Prop. Logic as in Table 2.1
Ki(A −→ B) −→ (KA −→ KB) Axiom K
From A infer KiA Necessitation
From A and A → B, infer B Modus Ponens
Table 2.3: Modal logic, axioms and rules
Moreover, using the same axiomatization with additional axioms D, T, 4 or 5 (or any
combination of them) we obtain a sound and complete axiomatization with respect to the
corresponding class of models KD,KT,K4,K5 (or the corresponding combination). See
[Chellas, 1980] for details.
To prove completeness, we often use the notion of canonical model. Trying to give a
general definition of this concept would lead us out of our purpose. Definition 2.19 gives thus
a local definition, that is sufficient in the context of this thesis. We first introduce the notion
of maximal consistent set:
Definition 2.18 (Maximal consistent set) Let a language L and an axiomatization for
this language A be given. A set S ⊆ L is said to be:
• inconsistent if from the formulas of S it is possible to derive ⊥ using A ( i.e. S `A ⊥)
• consistent otherwise
• maximal consistent if it is consistent and for all ϕ ∈ L \ S, S ∪ {ϕ} is inconsistent
Definition 2.19 (Canonical model for epistemic logics) Let A be one of the logics that
can be found in this thesis, defined over a countable set of propositional atoms PROP and a
countable set of agents AG, which language LA is based on the epistemic modalities {Ki}i∈AG
(in chapter 4, symbol ‘K’ is replaced by ‘B’). The canonical model of A is the Kripke model
Mc = (Sc,Rc, V c) defined as follows:
• Sc = {x | x is a maximal consistent set of the axiomatization of A}
• Rc = {Rci}i∈AG with for all i ∈ AG, Rci is the following binary relation over Sc:
Rci = {(x, y) ∈ Sc × Sc | Ki(x) ⊆ y} where Ki(x) = {ϕ | Kiϕ ∈ x}
• for all p ∈ PROP , V c(p) = {x | p ∈ x}.
Most of the proofs of completeness with respect to a given class of models use the double
nature of the canonical model. Indeed, in such proofs we want to show that any valid formula
is a theorem of the logic. Therefore, we first define the canonical model in a similar way as in
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Definition 2.19, prove that it is a model, and that it belongs to the corresponding class. We
then take a valid formula which, as valid in every model, is valid in the canonical model. But
a valid formula of the canonical model is a theorem. Why? Because, its negation does not
belong to any maximal consistent set, which implies, as we would have to prove, that it does
not belong to any consistent set. And if it cannot be consistent with anything, then it is an
intrinsic contradiction, which means that the initial formula, its negation, is a theorem. To
sum it up, this would prove that every valid formula is a theorem, which means that every
true formula is provable.
2.2.4 Decidability and Classes of Complexity
Some of the results of this thesis being related with the notion of problem complexity, we
present briefly in this section the basic notions of this concept.
Decidability is the first useful notion: informally we say that a given problem is decidable
if there is an automatic method to find the correct answer for every instance of the problem.
We could imagine a comparison with real-life problems. For example ‘Is A taller than B’ is
a decidable problem: it is possible to measure. Indeed if I want to test if Alex (A) is taller
than Brune (B) I can apply my method and get the good answer. But ‘Is A more lucky than
B’ seems to be an undecidable problem.
More formally, in computer science, a problem is said decidable if there exists a deter-
ministic algorithm which ends answering correctly yes or no to every instance of the problem.
Some particular problems are known to be undecidable. The most famous example is proba-
bly the Domino problem (also known as the Tiling problem). The purpose is to know if it is
possible to tile an infinite grid using a given finite set of reproducible coloured tiles, following
the condition of the domino game. A Wang tile (cf. [Wang, 1961]) is a unit square with each
edge colored from a finite set of colors. A set S of Wang tiles is said to tile a planar grid if
copies of tiles from S can be placed, one at each grid position, such that abutting edges of
adjacent tiles have the same color. Multiple copies of any tile may be used, with no restriction
on the number. If we allow the tiles to be rotated or reflected, any single Wang tile can tile
the plane by itself. The question of whether such a tiling exists for a given set of tiles is
interesting only in the case where we do not allow rotation or reflection, thus holding tile
orientation fixed. For example, do you think it is possible to tile the plane with the following
set of Wang tiles?
This decision problem was first posed in 1961 by Wang in a seminal paper ([Wang, 1961])
and has been proved to be undecidable. That does not mean that you can never decide if a
given set allow to tile the plane. In fact it has been proved that there is an algorithm that
says yes in finite time if the tiling is possible. But the algorithm proposed before may never
answer in the case where the tiling is not possible.
One way to show that a given problem is undecidable is by encoding the tiling problem
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Figure 2.4: An instance of the domino problem
into it. We translate our problem so that for every instantiation of it, its translation is an
instantiation of the Tiling problem (i.e. every finite set of tiles). Therefore if the given
problem were decidable, so would be the Tiling problem.
But we are more interested in decidable problems! Those are classified by the complexity
of the relative algorithm. Indeed, we say that a problem is in P if it can be decided by
a deterministic algorithm which execution requires a time polynomial on the length of the
given problem. We say that a problem is in EXPTIME if the execution of the relative
algorithm requires a time exponential on the length of the input. We say that it is in NP
(resp. NEXPTIME) if the corresponding algorithm is non deterministic, and that it is in
PSPACE if it requires only polynomial space.
We call EXPTIME the class of problems that are in EXPTIME, and so on for the
other classes of complexity. It is a known fact that P ⊆ NP ⊆ PSPACE ⊆ EXPTIME ⊆
NEXPTIME. It is also known that P 6= EXPTIME, but to know if P = NP or not is an
open problem that may yield you one million dollars (if you solve it).
We say that a problem A is NP -hard if every NP problem can be reduced to A. More
formally, A is NP -hard if for every problem B in NP there is a translation tr computable
in polynomial time such that for all instances i of B, B answers yes to i if and only if A
answers yes to tr(i). We define in the same way PSPACE-hardness , EXPTIME-hardness,
NEXPTIME-hardness, etc. If a problem is in NP and is NP -hard, we say that it is
NP -complete (and so on for the other complexity classes).
For a more rigorous definition of this classification (which requires to explain what a
Turing machine is), the reader may look at [Papadimitriou, 1994].
In logic in general and hereafter in particular, given a language L together with its se-
mantics and a class C of models where to interpret it, two classical problems are studied: the
problem of Satisfiability (SAT ) and the problem of the model checking (MC). They can be
defined in the following way:
MC: Given a formula ϕ of L and a finite model M∈ C, is ϕ satisfied in a world of M?
SAT: Given a formula ϕ of L, is ϕ satisfied in a model M of the class C?
Reasonable semantics ensure that the problem of the model checking is decidable (and
with a low class of complexity). Indeed, a requirement we may demand to such semantics is
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to be able to evaluate in finite time if a formula is satisfied or not in a given finite model.
The SAT problem for propositional logic and epistemic logic (with the S5 axioms and only
one agent) is NP -complete, and it is PSPACE-complete for some other modal logics. It
is undecidable for some more expressive languages, as first order logic for example, or the
language Lapal presented in Section 3.1.2.
Given a logic, the SAT problem is important at a theoretical level: it answer to the
question if a given formula makes sense. Therefore, we say that a language is decidable
(resp. NP -complete, EXPTIME-hard, etc.) if the SAT problem is decidable (resp. NP -
complete, EXPTIME-hard, etc.). The answer to this problem does not require to give a
concrete model where the formula ϕ is satisfied, but in some cases we would like to construct
such a model. In this case, we find an answer to the problem of the model construction:
Model Construction: Given a formula ϕ of L, give a model M satisfying ϕ.
A well known method of model construction uses analytic tableaux. One such method is
presented in Section 6.6 for a language expressing knowledge, announcements and permission
to give a piece of information.
Chapter 3
State of Art
In this chapter we present some of the works that inspired us in developing our formalisms.
Indeed, to understand the notion of “right to communicate a piece of information” some
notions have to be clarified from the start. We would like to precisely define what we mean
by “communication”, which notion of “right” we shall use, and if previous works tried to
merge these notions.
The first part of this chapter is thus dedicated to the logics of knowledge and communi-
cation, called Dynamic Epistemic Logics tackling also the concept of Knowability : what can
be known? Some gaps appear and justify the works presented in the chapters 4 and 5.
We present in a second part the basic ideas of deontic logics, the logics of obligation,
permission and prohibition, before seeing in a third section which works tried to merge both
fields in a formalism of the right to communicate.
3.1 Dynamic Epistemic Logics
3.1.1 Public Announcement Logic
Consider an example involving our moody children: Brune and Alex reached the final round
of the Texas Hold’em Poker game (Cha and Dan, in a bad mood, let them play alone). Texas
Figure 3.1: Texas Hold’em
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Hold’em is a very fashion-conscious variant of classical poker in which each player gets five
cards from a set of fifty-two. At the end of the deal each one will have two cards in his/her
hand, and five cards will be face up on the table. Each player is then able to form her hand,
which is composed by the best 5-cards combination using his own cards and the five cards
shared with her adversaries. This variant of classical poker makes the game more interesting
because the uncertainty about the cards of your adversary is not total, some of them being
common knowledge to all players.
But not all the cards are dealt at the beginning, and the structure of the deal makes the
game even more interesting. Indeed, each player first receives her two cards and a round of
bets starts. Then three cards are dealt face up (‘the flop’),then a fourth (‘the turn’) and a
fifth (‘the river ’), the three of these deals being followed by a round of bets. Each of these
deals can be seen as an announcement to all players that one card is part of the common
final hand. This announcement is public, in the sense that everybody knows it takes places,
and everybody knows everybody knows it, and so on... In fact, it is common knowledge
(cf. Section 2.1.3) that it takes place. Clearly, this announcement will change the state
of knowledge of the agents about the world, though it does not change the factual world
(because the deal was fixed before the game started, and no actions that are part of the
game can change it). After this announcement, the players will eliminate from the deals they
considered possible the ones in which the revealed card wasn’t on the table. But also, as the
announcement is public, they know that nobody consider these deals possible anymore, so
they will eliminate them from the representation they have of the state of knowledge of the
other agents. And they know that the other agents know that no other agent consider those
deals possible anymore... They are erased from the common representation of the world!
This is the basic idea of Public Announcement Logic, that was first introduced by
[Plaza, 1989]. Let us introduce its language and semantics:
Definition 3.1 (Syntax of Lpal) The language of public announcement logic Lpal over a
countable set of agents AG and a countable set of propositional atoms PROP is defined as
follows:
ϕ ::= p | ⊥ | ¬ϕ | ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2 | Kiϕ | [ϕ1]ϕ2
where i ∈ AG and p ∈ PROP .
The boolean and epistemic parts of the language are read as usual (See Chapter 2) and [ϕ1]ϕ2
is read ‘after the public announcement of ψ1, ψ2 is true’.
This language is interpreted in the same models than Lel in the following way.
Definition 3.2 (Semantics of Lpal and restricted model) Let M be a model and let s
be a state of S. The satisfiability relation M, s |= ϕ is defined inductively on the structure of
ϕ as follows:
M, s |= p iff s ∈ V (p)
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M, s 6|= ⊥
M, s |= ¬ψ iff M, s 6|= ψ
M, s |= ψ1 ∨ ψ2 iff (M, s |= ψ1 or M, s |= ψ2)
M, s |= Kiψ iff for all t such that sRit, M, t |= ψ
M, s |= [ψ]χ iff (M, s |= ψ implies M|ψ, s |= χ)
where M|ψ = (S′,R′, V ′) is the update (or restriction) of a model M after the public an-
nouncement of ψ, defined as:
• S′ = [[ψ]]M = {s ∈ S|M, s |= ψ}
• V ′(p) = V (p) ∩ S′ for all p ∈ PROP
• for all i, R′i = Ri ∩ (S′ × S′)
Remark 3.3 This definition looks incorrect, because it uses the satisfiability relation to define
the restricted model, and vice versa. But to define the restricted model, we only need the
definition of the satisfiability relation for a subformula ψ of the initial one, and thus for all
subformulas of ψ. The definition is thus well-founded by induction on the structure of the
formula.
Here is, as an example, the representation of a simple deal of cards between three of our
children:
012 a
b
021
b
102
c
a
b
120
201 a
c
210
c
Figure 3.2: Deal of three cards between three agents
Actual state ‘012’ represents the deal in which Alex has 0, Brune 1 and Cha 2.
Cha, Alex and Brune have one card each, dealt from a set of three cards only, {0, 1, 2}.
They know that these are the dealt cards, though they don’t know the actual deal in which
Alex has 0, Brune 1 and Cha 2. The propositional atoms are of the form Xi with X ∈ {0, 1, 2}
and i ∈ {a, b, c}. We read for example 2a as ‘Alex has 2’. We labelled the states of the models
so that the name of a state makes clear the deal it represents. The actual state, for example,
46 CHAPTER 3. STATE OF ART
is called ‘012’. The model of Figure 3.2 represents this epistemic situation. We call this model
M∗. We omitted reflexive arrows in each state for each of our three children.
What happens now if Alex announces publicly that he does not have the 1? The result
appears in Figure 3.3.
M: 012 a
b
021
b
102
c
a
b
120
201 a
c
210
c
¬1a!
M|(¬1a) : 012 a
b
021
201 a
c
210
Figure 3.3: Alex announces: “I don’t have the 1 ”
As we said before, the result of this public announcement is that the states in which
1a was true are erased from the model. This comes from the strong property of public
announcement: not only everybody learns its content, but the states for which it was false
before the announcement are not conceivable anymore.
After the announcement, Cha knows what is the exact distribution, in other words
M, 012 |= 〈¬1a〉Kc(0a ∧ 1b ∧ 2c). Brune does not know which it is, but she knows Cha
knows it: M, 012 |= 〈¬1a〉Kb(Kc(0a ∧ 1b ∧ 2c) ∨Kc(2a ∧ 1b ∧ 0c)).
Remark 3.4 (Moore Sentences) We said ‘its content was true before the announcement’,
and this use of the past may appear as superfluous. Indeed, we could believe that after an
announcement of ϕ, ϕ is still true and the receiver of the message knows that ϕ. But this is
not true in general, because a formula may become false after it has been announced. We call
this an unsuccessful update. Let us see an example.
Suppose the reader you are does not know what is a Moore sentence. If you are not used
to epistemic logics this may be the case. Then let me say to you the following: ‘ ‘You don’t
know that Moore sentences are unsuccessful updates but they are!”.
This sentence was true before my announcement, indeed Moore sentences were actually
unsuccessful updates and you didn’t know that. But now you do! (Though you may not see
what precisely is a Moore sentence, if you believe me you know at least that it is an unsuc-
cessful update, because I told you so). Therefore this sentence was true before I announced
it, and it became false after. We call Moore sentences this kind of formulas, of the form
p ∧ ¬Kip, presented by [Hintikka, 1962]. For more information about Moore sentences, see
[van Ditmarsch and Kooi, 2006]
Properties: One first (and surprising) property is that Lpal is not more expressive than
Lel . This comes from the following two principles:
3.1. DYNAMIC EPISTEMIC LOGICS 47
• announcements cannot change the objective state of the world (they only change the
knowledge of the agents about it)
• an announcement teaches something to an agent iff she knows that this announcement
(if possible) would teach it to her
More formally, we define (by induction on the structure of ϕ) the following translation tr
from Lpal to Lel such that any S5n-model valid, for all ϕ ∈ Lpal , tr(ϕ) ←→ ϕ.
• tr(p) = p
• tr(⊥) = ⊥
• tr(¬ϕ) = ¬tr(ϕ)
• tr(ψ ∨ ϕ) = tr(ψ) ∨ tr(ϕ)
• tr(Kiϕ) = Kitr(ϕ)
• tr([ψ]p) = tr(ψ) −→ p
• tr([ψ]⊥) = ¬tr(ψ)
• tr([ψ]¬ϕ) = tr(ψ) −→ ¬tr([ψ]ϕ)
• tr([ψ](ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2)) = tr([ψ]ϕ1) ∨ tr([ψ]ϕ2)
• tr([ψ]Kiϕ) = tr(ψ) −→ Kitr([ψ]ϕ)
The same idea gives us an axiomatization PAL for this language. Indeed, we need only to
take the axiomatization for S5n augmented with the reduction axioms corresponding to the
last five equalities (see table 3.1).
Nevertheless, Public Announcement Logic is not only a beautiful way of thinking about
epistemic logic, it has some interesting properties. Indeed, Lpal is proved to be exponen-
tially succinct on unrestricted structures ([Halpern and Moses, 1992, Lutz, 2006]), and inter-
esting complexity results have been given, even when we consider common knowledge (see
[Lutz, 2006] for details).
Public announcement logic have been widely studied and extended. The next two sections
present two of those extensions that are useful to our work.
3.1.2 What Is Knowable? - Arbitrary Public Announcement Logic
Arbitrary public announcement logic [Balbiani et al., 2008] has been developed to tackle the
problem of what is called ‘knowability’ in Philosophy. In [Fitch, 1963], Fitch addresses the
question whether what is true can become known. As we saw with Moore sentences, this is
not true in general. Furthermore Fitch’s Paradox ([Fitch, 1963]) ensures that if every truth
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instantiations of propositional tautologies
Ki(ϕ −→ ψ) −→ (Kiϕ −→ Kiψ) distribution (of knowl. over impl.)
Kiϕ −→ ϕ truth
Kiϕ −→ KiKiϕ positive introspection
¬Kiϕ −→ Ki¬Kiϕ negative introspection
[ϕ]p ←→ (ϕ −→ p) atomic permanence
[ϕ]¬ψ ←→ (ϕ −→ ¬[ϕ]ψ) announcement and negation
[ϕ](ψ ∧ χ) ←→ ([ϕ]ψ ∧ [ϕ]χ) announcement and conjunction
[ϕ]Kiψ ←→ (ϕ −→ Ki[ϕ]ψ) announcement and knowledge
[ϕ][ψ]χ ←→ [ϕ ∧ [ϕ]ψ]χ announcement composition
From ϕ and ϕ −→ ψ, infer ψ modus ponens
From ϕ, infer Kiϕ necessitation of knowledge
From ϕ, infer [ψ]ϕ necessitation of announcement
Table 3.1: PAL axioms and rules
can be known then every truth is actually known. An overview of the different studies on
Fitch’s paradox can be found in [Brogaard and Salerno, 2004].
Public announcement logic is not expressive enough to face this notion. The main idea
of the work presented in this chapter is to add a quantified modality to Lpal and to interpret
‘knowable’ as ‘known after some announcement’.
Therefore, the language Lapal extends Lpal with an additional inductive construct ¤ϕ,
read ‘after any possible announcement, ϕ becomes true’. In other words:
Definition 3.5 (Syntax of Lapal) The language of arbitrary public announcement logic
Lapal over a countable set of agents AG and a countable set of propositional atoms PROP is
defined as follows:
ϕ ::= p | ⊥ | ¬ϕ | ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2 | Kiϕ | [ϕ1]ϕ2 | ¤ϕ
where i ∈ AG and p ∈ PROP .
We denote by ♦ the dual of ¤, id est ♦ϕ := ¬¤¬ϕ: ‘there is some announcement after
which ϕ is true’. Therefore ϕ would be ‘knowable’ if ♦(Kϕ). We interpret this language in
the same class of models, the epistemic models. The interpretation of this new modality ¤
(the other ones remaining identical) is :
M, s |= ¤ϕ iff for all ψ ∈ Lel : M, s |= [ψ]ϕ.
This logic has many interesting properties, most of them proved in [Balbiani et al., 2007]
or [Balbiani et al., 2008]:
• Lapal is strictly more expressive than Lpal .
• ¤ has the S4 properties, that is for all ϕ,ϕ ∈ Lapal :
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1. |= ¤(ϕ ∧ ψ) ←→ ¤ϕ ∧¤ψ
2. |= ¤ϕ −→ ϕ
3. |= ¤ϕ −→ ¤¤ϕ
4. |= ϕ implies |= ¤ϕ.
• Mac-Kinsey (MK) and Church-Rosser (CR) formulas are valid for ¤, that is for all
ϕ ∈ Lapal :
MK: |= ¤♦ϕ −→ ♦¤ϕ
CR: |= ♦¤ϕ −→ ¤♦ϕ
• For all ϕ ∈ Lapal , Ka¤ϕ −→ ¤Kaϕ is valid, but not the converse.
• There is a finite axiomatization for Lapal that is shown to be sound and complete. The
axioms and inference rules involving arbitrary announcement are:
¤ϕ −→ [ψ]ϕ where ψ ∈ Lel
From ϕ, infer ¤ϕ
From ψ −→ [θ][p]ϕ, infer ψ −→ [θ]¤ϕ where p 6∈ Θψ ∪Θθ ∪Θϕ
where Θϕ denotes the set of atoms occurring in a formula ϕ.
• Unfortunately, Lapal is shown to be undecidable by encoding the tiling problem into the
SAT -problem for APAL (see [French and van Ditmarsch, 2008]).
3.1.3 Not All Announcements Are Public and Made by an Omniscient
Agent - Action Model Logic
Two gaps appear in the previous work to those willing to use logic to consider multi-agent
systems, or only situations that involve different persons. First, if not any truth can nec-
essarily be known, in the formalisms we presented until now any truth can be announced.
But if announcements can be made by actual agents (and not only by an omniscient one),
it appears clearly that for an agent to be able to say truthfully something, she has at least
to know it, condition not always satisfied. Second, communication is not limited to public
announcements: there are private announcements between two agents or inside a group of
agents, other agents may see that a communication is taking place or not, etc...
[Baltag and Moss, 2004] propose the following formalism, called action model logic, that
generalises public announcement logic, including many kinds of informative events1. An event
is not only a formula publicly announced, but represents the uncertainty of the different agents
about the announcement that is actually taking place. Follows an example.
1We use the terminology of “event” instead of “action” that supposes a notion of will that we do not have.
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Return to the situation presented in Figure 3.2. Suppose that Cha shows her card to
Brune. Alex does not know which card she is showing, but he can see she shows her card,
so he knows that Brune and Cha know which card it is. Baltag et al. suggest the following
epistemic event model. Each state is a deterministic epistemic event, with a precondition
that ensures that it is executable. As for epistemic models, a link indexed by an agent i
between two events means that agent i cannot distinguish these two events. In our example
the representation of the event is the following:
sh2 : Kc2c a
a
sh0 : Kc0c
a
sh1 : Kc1c
Figure 3.4: Cha shows her card to Brune
There are three possible events corresponding to the fact that Cha shows her card to Brune.
The two girls know that Cha showed 2, and Alex consider two possible events (Cha showing
1 or Cha showing 2). The third one (Cha showing 0) is also in their collective imagination.
Indeed, Cha can imagine that Alex does not have 0, and leading him to consider posible
that Cha shows her 0. Each of those events has a precondition (that is Cha having 0, 1 or 2
respectively). In each case Brune and Cha know exactly which event is taking place. All of
that is common knowledge between the three agents (because the event in itself is public).
What would be the result of such a complex event on our initial model is presented in figure
3.5.
012 a
b
021
b
sh2 : Kc2c
a,b,c
a
a
sh0 : Kc0c
a,b,c
a
102
c
a
b
120 ⊗ sh1 : Kc1c
a,b,c
201 a
c
210
c
012 a 021
102
c
a 120
201 a
c
210
c
Figure 3.5: Result of the event
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After this example, we shall define precisely this formalism.
Definition 3.6 (Event Model) An epistemic event model over a countable set of agents AG
is a triple E = (E,−→AG, pre) where E is a set (of simple events), −→AG= {−→i| i ∈ AG}
is a AG-indexed family of binary relations on E and pre : E −→ Lel .
The main idea is that ‘simple’ events are deterministic events, that is that any observer
can deduce the impact of one event on one state. Uncertainty about which deterministic event
is actually taking place is added to the concept of simple event, creating an event model. The
event model thus created is independent from the actual state model, and the uncertainty
about which event is taking place is thus independent from the uncertainty that agents may
have about the actual state of the world. Each simple event can be executed only in the
states where its precondition is true. As they are epistemic and deterministic events, we can
consider that the precondition is the information carried by the event itself.
We define the model obtained from an initial one by executing an event model:
Definition 3.7 (Resulting model) LetM = (S,R, V ) be a state model and E = (E,−→AG
, pre) be an event model. The model resulting from M by application of the event model E is
the following: M⊗E = (S′,R′, V ′) with
• S′ = {(s, e) | s ∈ S, e ∈ E and M, s |= pre(e)}
• (s1, e1)R′i(s2, e2) iff (s1Ris2 and e1 −→i e2)
• (s, e) ∈ V ′(p) iff ((s, e) ∈ S′ and s ∈ V (p))
As we will see in further examples, event model logic allows us to add a notion of agency
to announcements. Indeed, in public announcement logic, any announcement is made by an
exterior agent, let us say the modeler herself. Such an announcement is commonly known to
be truthful by the whole set of agents. Such a condition on announcements is a serious limit
to model situations in which agents communicate.
Here are different kinds of private communication using event models. In these models,
agent a is the agent speaking, and the information he gives is ϕ, as the information exchanged
is of the form Kaϕ “agent a knows ϕ”:
Public announcement: Kaϕ
AG
Hidden announcement to b: Kaϕ
AG
AG\{a,b} >
AG
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Visible private announcement: Kaϕ
AG
AG\{a,b}
AG\{a,b}
Kaϕ1
AG
AG\{a,b}.
Kaϕn
AG
Idem with Common Knowledge on subject: Kaϕ
AG
AG\{a,b} Ka¬Kaϕ
AG
Let us define precisely the syntax and semantics of DEL:
Definition 3.8 (Laml) The language of action model logic Laml over a countable set of
agents AG and a countable set of atoms PROP , given an epistemic event model E =
(E,−→AG, pre) is defined as follows
ϕ ::= p | ⊥ | ¬ϕ | ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2 | Kiϕ | [a]ϕ
where i ∈ AG and p ∈ PROP and a ∈ E.
[a]ϕ is read ‘after any execution of action a, ϕ becomes true. We note 〈a〉 the dual of [a], id est
〈a〉ϕ := ¬[a]¬ϕ. We interpret this language in the class of all Kripke models, an event model
E being given. Using Definition 3.7 we can precise the interpretation of this new modality [a]
(the other ones remaining identical):
M, s |= [a]ϕ iff (M, s |= pre(a) implies M⊗E , (s, a) |= ϕ).
The following Definition details how to consider the succession of two epistemic events:
Definition 3.9 Let A = (A,−→A, preA) and B = (B,−→B, preB) be two events models over
a same set of agents AG. Then we define A⊗ B = C = (C,−→C , preC) where
• C = A×B
• for all i ∈ AG and all (a, b), (a′, b′) ∈ C: (a, b) −→Ci (a′, b′) iff (a −→Ai a′ and b −→Bi b′)
• for all (a, b) ∈ C, pre(a, b) = pre(a) ∧ 〈a〉pre(b).
3.1.4 Objective Beliefs
Turn back to the Texas Hold’em poker game of Alex and Brune. We saw how cards are dealt,
until five shared cards are put on the table. Each player is then able to define her own hand,
composed of the best 5-cards combination between the two cards of her game and the five
shared cards on the table. The order of the combinations is the following, from the least to
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the best: high cards, one pair, two pairs, three of a kind, straight, flush, full house, four of a
kind (‘poker’) and straight flush2.
Though our two players do not know the value of the cards that will be on the table, this
value is fixed from the beginning of the game and cannot be modified by any action of the
players. They can only update their beliefs about these objective facts.
In such a situation, the player can be wrong about the belief of the other player (“Alex
believes Brune believes she has the winning hand”), but their beliefs regarding to the cards
dealt on the table are true beliefs. We present in this section a framework proposed by
[Hommersom et al., 2004] that allows us to express this notion of objectivity of some beliefs,
that ensures that such an objective belief is true. We first first define the language of this
logic:
Definition 3.10 (Syntax of Llob) The language of the logic of objective beliefs Llob over a
countable set of agents AG and a countable set of propositional atoms PROP is defined as
follows:
ϕ ::= p | ⊥ | ¬ϕ | ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2 | Biϕ
where i ∈ AG and p ∈ PROP .
Biϕ is read “agent i believes that ϕ”. We use the usual abbreviations, in particular
Bˆiϕ := ¬Bi¬ϕ (“agent i considers possible that ϕ”). We say that a formula of Llob is boolean
if there is no occurrence of the operator of belief in it. We interpret semantically this language
on Kripke models M = (S,R, V ), the satisfiability relation M, s |= ϕ being defined just as
usual. More precisely:
• M, s |= p iff p ∈ V (s),
• M, s 6|= ⊥,
• M, s |= ¬ϕ iff not M, s |= ϕ,
• M, s |= ϕ ∨ ψ iff M, s |= ϕ or M, s |= ψ,
• M, s |= Biϕ iff for all t ∈ S, sRit implies M, t |= ϕ.
The notion of validity upon a model or a class of models is defined as usual. These definitions
are exactly the same as the equivalent definitions for epistemic logic. The difference appears
when considering the properties of the models. Indeed, we do not interpret Llob-formulas in
S5n models but in the class C0 of transitive, euclidian and o-serial models, defined as follows:
Definition 3.11 (O-serial model) We say that a Kripke model M = (S,R, V ) is o-serial
if for all s ∈ S, there exists t ∈ S such that sRit and V (s) = V (t). We call C0 the class of
models that are transitive, euclidian and o-serial.
2The entire set of rules can be found, for example, in http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Texas hold ’em.
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Indeed, this class of models bring the property we expect for objective belief: an agent
cannot believe a false propositional formula. Therefore, she may not know which is the actual
state, but she always consider possible a state in which the objective facts have the same
truth value as in the actual one, i.e. a state that has the same valuation.
3.1.5 Partial Conclusion
In this section, we presented different works that use epistemic logic, the logic of knowledge,
to express dynamic situations. The most used is the notion of public announcement, exchange
of information between the modeler and the whole set of agents. Though Action Model Logic
gives us a framework that allows to speak about private announcement, some more notions
should be improved in order to tackle the problem of ‘the right to say’:
• What kind of information is given? We presented the distinction between beliefs and
objective beliefs. What kind of technical result can we get? Can we add to this logic the
notion of arbitrary announcement, like in Lapal? We explore these questions in Chapter
4.
• Who is speaking? Is information given by an individual agent or is it given by a group
of agents? How can we formalize the notion of group announcement? This is the topic
of Chapter 5.
3.2 Deontic Logics
Dynamic epistemic logics are a good starting point to understand the notion of ‘right to say
something’: if the content of the speech is the relevant element that determines the right,
then ‘to say something’ can be interpreted as ‘to give a piece of information’. But the notion
of ‘right’ still has to be interpreted formally.
Deontic logic gives formal interpretations to the notions linked to permission and obli-
gation. ‘Must’, ‘permitted’, ‘optional’, ‘ought’, ‘should’, ‘obligatory’, ‘might’, or ‘forbidden’
are classical notions that deontic logic tries to formalize. Obviously, one cannot pretend to
give a unique interpretation of these notions: they may in particular depend on the kind of
obligation they express (moral, hierarchical, political...), but also on the nature of the object
of such obligation. Indeed, this subject may be a state of affair or a given action. The former
would be represented by formulas of the form Fϕ, where ϕ is a formula of the language,
which says that a situation in which ϕ is true is forbidden; the latter by some Fα where α
represents an action – and how to represent such notions? – and not a formula.
We present in Section 3.2.1 classical deontic logic, which is a modal logic with a similar
language than epistemic logic’s but with another interpretation. In this standard theory,
the deontic modalities are applied to formulas. In section 3.2.2 we present the logics of
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permissions, for which obligation and prohibition are applied to actions, opening the way to
what is our proposal, presented in Chapters 6 and 7.
3.2.1 Standard Deontic Logic
Like many logics, the classical deontic logic is rooted in Antiquity and the Middle Ages, e.g.,
in the Obligatio game/procedure (see [Boh, 1993]). This game, that can be seen as a logical
game of counterfactual reasoning (see [Spade, 1982]) or some kind of training on thesis defence
(see [Spade, 1992]), is based on arguments that have to follow some rules. Obligationes are
not deontic thoughts, they are not obligations, but they led to thought on deontic concepts
because they carried the idea of rules and thus of obligations in a formal frame.
Since then, deontic logics have been developed on a twofold way, both non-modal and
modal, namely [Mally, 1926] and [von Wright, 1951]. Let us present briefly the Standard
Deontic Logic based on von Wright work, and its limitations in our context.
Standard Deontic Logic (SDL) is a modal logic whose operators formalize the following
basic notions:
• it is obligatory that ϕ : Oϕ
• it is permitted that ϕ: Pϕ
• it is forbidden that ϕ: Fϕ
• it is omissible that ϕ: OMϕ.
• it is indifferent (or optional) that ϕ: Iϕ.
It is built upon propositional logic. In this standard framework, all these modalities can be
expressed using only one of them, typically the first one, obligation. This framework is a
normal KD logic.
Syntax, Semantics and Properties
Definition 3.12 (Syntax of Lsdl) The language of the standard deontic logic Lsdl over a
countable set of propositional atoms PROP is defined as follows, where p ∈ PROP :
ϕ ::= p | ⊥ | ¬ϕ | ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2 | Oϕ.
We use the classical propositional abbreviations and define the following ones: Pϕ := ¬O¬ϕ,
Fϕ := O¬ϕ, OMϕ := ¬Oϕ, Iϕ := ¬Oϕ ∧ ¬O¬ϕ.
We interpret this language on the class of serial Kripke models, using the possible world
semantics. That implies the following properties
• |= O(ϕ −→ ψ) −→ (Oϕ −→ Oψ)
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• |= Oϕ −→ Pϕ
• If |= ϕ then |= Oϕ.
We call SDL the normal KD axiomatization of this logic summed up in Table 3.2.
instantiations of propositional tautologies
O(ϕ −→ ψ) −→ (Oϕ −→ Oψ) distribution
P> or ¬Oϕ ∨ ¬O¬ϕ D
From ϕ and ϕ −→ ψ infer ψ modus ponens
From ϕ infer Oϕ necessitation
Table 3.2: Axiomatization SDL
SDL is sound and complete with respect to the class of serial models (where we interpret
the language) (see [Chellas, 1980]).
Moreover, it has been proved (see for example [Blackburn et al., 2001]) that:
• Lsdl is decidable, and the decision procedure is PSPACE-complete
• The model checking problem for Lsdl is in P
Classical Paradoxes
Standard deontic logic is famous for its ‘paradoxes’. Here are some of the most known
(cited from [Meyer et al., 1994]):
1. Empty normative system |= O>
2. Ross’ paradox |= Oϕ → O(ϕ ∨ ψ)
3. No free choice permission |= P (ϕ ∨ ψ) ↔ Pϕ ∨ Pψ
4. Penitent’s paradox |= Fϕ → F (ϕ ∧ ψ)
5. Good Samaritan paradox |= ϕ → ψ implies |= Oϕ → Oψ
6. Chrisholm paradox |= (Oϕ ∧O(ϕ → ψ) ∧ (¬ϕ → ¬Oψ) ∧ ¬ϕ) → ⊥
7. Forreseter’s paradox of gentle murder |= ψ → ϕ implies |= (Fϕ ∧ (ϕ → Oψ) ∧ ϕ) → ⊥
8. Conflicting obligations |= Oϕ → ¬O¬ϕ
9. Derived obligations |= Oϕ → O(ψ → ϕ)
10. Deontic detachment |= (O(ϕ) ∧O(ϕ → ψ)) → Oψ
The normal modal interpretation of deontic concepts imposes these validities, perceived by
deontic logicians as paradoxes. But that comes in our mind from a erroneous interpretation
of the subjects of the obligation, that are in this formalism propositions and not actions.
For example, the strangeness of the second validity is often illustrated by the following
example: ‘if you are obliged to read a letter, you are obliged to read it or to burn it’. It is
clearly a counterintuitive sentence. But the example supposes that ψ and ϕ are actions (‘to
burn the letter’) while they are actually propositions. A better example would thus be ‘if
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the letter must be red, then it must be red or green’. It is still a strange sentence, but its
strangeness does not come from the implication, but from the fact that the color of the letter
is obligatory...
In the same way, here are some sentences that reveal the claimed nature of paradox of
each validity:
3. If someone is allowed to hit his dog, he is allowed to hit his dog or his boss.
4. If someone is forbidden to commit a crime, he is forbidden to commit a crime and to
repent.
5. The doctor operates her wounded patient implies that the patient is wounded, thus if
it is obliged that the doctor operates her wounded patient then it is obliged that the
patient is wounded
6. You are obliged to go to a party; it is obliged that, if you go, you tell you are coming;
if you do not go, you are obliged not to tell you are coming. In this situation, we can
affirm that you go to the party!
7. One is forbidden to murder; still, if one murders someone, one has to do it gently; more-
over, a gentle murder implies a murder. But in this situation murders are impossible!
8. There are no conflicting obligations (sic)
9. If a child is obliged to brush her teeth, then it is obliged that if martians exist the child
brushes her teeth.
10. Same as 5.
As we can see, all these paradoxes come essentially from the fact that it seems that deontic
norms are applied to actions, while they actually applied to formulas. To be able to formalize
concepts of obligation in a context of acting agents we need some kind of dynamic modality
that represents actions, as in our proposals (Sections 6 and 7). The next section presents
some of those already existing frameworks.
3.2.2 Dynamic Logics of Permission
As we have seen, to dynamic logicians (and in particular to dynamic epistemic ones), obliga-
tions and permissions clearly apply to actions. It seems thus strange that people associate
those with static observations, and ‘confuse’ the non-deterministic choice between two actions
with the disjunction of two propositions. For deontic logic this frame of mind was reset by
John-Jules Meyer with his different approach to deontic logic (see [Meyer, 1988]), an approach
that was later followed up by [van der Meyden, 1996], the starting point for some proposals
in this thesis.
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Both of these works are adaptations of propositional dynamic logic (PDL) presented in
[Fischer and Ladner, 1979]: PDL allows to represent at the same time the truth value of
propositions (i.e. objective facts) and the effect of actions on them. In other words, we can
model in the same framework static situations and dynamic transitions.
In the language Lpdl we distinguish assertions (that describe states of facts) from actions
(that describe transitions between states of facts). The set of actions is inductively constructed
over a countable set of atomic actions Act in the following way:
α ::= a | α; β | α ∪ β
where a is an atomic action. Action α; β describes the succession of action α and action β,
action α ∪ β is the non-deterministic choice between those two actions. Figure 3.6 gives an
example of model of PDL, that we define afterwards. In this example Brune initially receives
a letter from Cha, and we look at Brune’s possible actions.
answer
read
answer
burn
answer
Figure 3.6: Brune actions while receiving a letter from Cha
Brune has three possible actions read, answer and burn. Therefore ‘read; answer’ corre-
sponds to the fact that she reads the letter and then answers to her friend, ‘read ∪ burn’ the
fact that she does one of the two actions.
Now that the notion of action is introduced, we define the language Lpdl as the following
set of assertions over the set of actions and a countable set of propositional atoms PROP by
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the following:
ϕ ::= p | ⊥ | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∨ ψ | [α]ϕ
We read [α]ϕ as “It is necessary that after executing α, ϕ is true”. Its dual, 〈α〉ϕ := ¬[α]¬ϕ
can be read as “There is an execution of α after which ϕ is true”.
Here are some examples of formulas we can express in this language:
• [read]letter is open: ‘after Brune having read the letter, it is open’
• 〈read∪burn〉(letter is open∨letter is burnt): there is an action between read and burn
that Brune can do, and after having executed it the letter is open or burnt.
Actually, Lpdl admits two more constructions of action:
• the test of ϕ, noted ϕ?, that cannot be executed if ϕ is false and has no effect if ϕ is
true.
• the iterated execution α noted α∗. The number of executions is chosen nondeterminis-
tically, i.e. α∗ := >? ∪ (α) ∪ (α ; α) ∪ (α ; α ; α) ∪ . . .
A model of PDL is a Kripke model (S, V,R) where R = {Ra}a∈Act. Figure 3.6 gives an
example of such a model, with Act = {read, burn, answer}. From the setR of binary relations
we can construct a binary relation Rα for every action α by induction on the structure of α
in the following way:
• for all a ∈ Act, Ra is already defined
• for all ψ ∈ Lpdl , Rψ? = {(s, s) | s ∈ S and M, s |= ψ}
• Rα;β = {(s, t) ∈ S2 | ∃u ∈ S s.t. (s, u) ∈ Rα and (u, t) ∈ Rβ}
• Rα∪β = Rα ∪Rβ
• Rα∗ = {(s, t) ∈ S2 | ∃t0, . . . , tn ∈ S s.t. s = t0, t = tn, and for all 0 6 i 6 n −
1, (ti, ti+1) ∈ Rα}
The semantics of the dynamic operator [α] is thus defined in the following way:
• for all action α, M, s |= [α]ϕ iff for all t ∈ S, sRαt implies M, t |= ϕ
The following is an equivalent definition of the semantics of this dynamic operator, by
induction on the structure of the action considered:
• for all a ∈ Act, M, s |= [a]ϕ iff for all t ∈ S, sRat implies M, t |= ϕ
• for all ψ ∈ Lpdl , M, s |= [ψ?]ϕ iff M, s |= ψ −→ ϕ
• M, s |= [α; β]ϕ iff M, s |= [α][β]ϕ
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• M, s |= [α ∪ β]ϕ iff M, s |= [α]ϕ ∧ [β]ϕ
The definition for the iterated execution of α may thus be understood in the following way:
• M, s |= [α∗]ϕ iff M, s |= ϕ ∧ [α][α∗]ϕ
The basic idea of Meyer was to add to PDL a special atom viol (or its negation perm)
to the set PROP of propositional atoms. Thus, we would say that an action is permitted if
its execution does not lead to a state of violation, i.e. a state where viol is true. Formally,
Pα := [α]¬viol. We could have considered another kind of permission, which is weaker:
P ′α := 〈α〉¬viol. In this case, we consider that action α is permitted if there is at least one
execution of α that does not lead to a state of violation.
Figure 3.7 illustrates this framework in the same example of Brune acting after having
received a (love) letter from Cha. In the figure violations states are marked by a big V . As
depicted in the figure, we consider that both ‘burning the letter’ and ‘answering it (without
having read it)’ lead to a violation state. We consider also that if Brune, after having read
the letter, answers NO then the resulting state violates the rule. We consider in this situation
the action answer := answer Y ES ∪ answer NO
Here are some formulas that are true in the initial state using the notation P for the
strong permission and P ′ for the weak one :
• P (read): ‘Brune is permitted to read Cha’s letter’
• ¬P (burn)∧¬P (answer): ‘Brune is neither permitted to burn Cha’s letter nor to answer
it (without having first read it)’
• 〈read〉(P ′(answer) ∧ ¬P (answer)): ‘After having read Cha’s letter, Brune is weakly
-but not strongly- permitted to answer it’. Indeed, there is an execution of answer
(namely answer Y ES) that is permitted, but not all (answer NO is not).
• 〈burn〉P (answer): ‘After having burnt the letter, Brune is allowed to answer it’
Van der Meyden noted a limit in Meyer’s work: an action is permitted or not depending
exclusively on its resulting state of affairs. This may seam reasonable, but it brings about
some counterintuitive implications, as highlighted by this last example. In fact, it would
validate the following sentence: “If after having burnt the letter Brune is allowed to answer
it, then Brune has the right to burn the letter and then answer it”. Indeed, it would be
translated by the following: 〈burn〉Panwer −→ P (burn ; answer). This is clearly a validity
of Meyer’s models, inasmuch as the resulting state of affairs after executing burn and then
answer is the same as the state of affairs resulting from the execution of (burn; anwer). If
the reader is not convinced that this result is counter-intuitive, the more famous following
example should definitely convince her: “If after shooting the president one has the right to
remain silent then one has the right to shoot the president and then remain silent”.
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answer Y ES
answer NO
read
answer
burn
answer
Figure 3.7: Considering states of violation for Brune’s actions
To solve this problem, Van der Meyden proposed to label transitions (i.e. the atomic
actions) instead of worlds (i.e. the resulting state of affairs). Formally, Van der Meyden’s
logic is an adaptation of PDL in which the models contain a special set P ⊆ S ×Act × S.
P is the set of permitted transitions: a triple (s, a, s′) is in P iff the transition labelled by a
from s to s′ is permitted. The same example as before is represented in this framework by
Figure 3.8. The plain (and green) transitions are the permitted ones, the dotted (and red)
are the ones that are not in P .
The syntax of this language contains the following construct ♦(α,ϕ) which means “there
is a way to execute action α which is permitted and after which ϕ is true”. In the example,
in the initial situation, we have ♦(read,>) and ♦((read; answer),>). He also introduces a
weak form of obligation O(α,ϕ). The meaning of O(α,ϕ) is “after any permitted execution of
α, ϕ is true”. This formalization allows to consider situations in which two different actions
that end in the same state of affairs are not permitted in the same way. Section 7.3 presents
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ans Y ES
ans NO
read
answer
burn
answer
Figure 3.8: Considering labelled transition for Brune’s actions
an example of such a situation.
3.3 Permission and Epistemic Actions
To formalize the notion of ‘right to say’ we are particularly interested in frameworks that
consider the permission on epistemic events, as presented in Section 3.1. Such frameworks
already exist.
[van Benthem et al., 2009] (see also [Hoshi, 2008]) propose a logic for protocols in dynamic
epistemic logic that can be interpreted as a logic for permitted events – and in particular
permitted announcements. A protocol is a set of sequences of events, and an announcement
is an example of such an event; “being in the protocol” can therefore be understood as “being
permitted to be said”. One purpose of this publication was to merge epistemic temporal
logic - [Parikh and Ramanujam, 2003] - with dynamic epistemic logic - [Baltag et al., 1998,
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van Ditmarsch et al., 2007]. The axiomatization of the language with added protocols is
facilitated by the translation of the latter into the former.
We only present what [van Benthem et al., 2009] call the forest generated by a pointed
epistemic model (M, s) and sequences of announcements. It corresponds to all the models
we may obtain from the initial epistemic model by applying the considered announcements.
In fact, the announcements considered are pointed event models (see Definition 3.6), and we
face sequences of such epistemic events. We call protocol a prefix-closed set of such sequences.
We call history a set consisting of such sequences preceded by a state in the epistemic model
wherein they are executed. For example, given an initial state s, and say a sequence of
first ψ! and then ϕ! as allowed according to protocol, we write sψϕ for that history: the
announcements in sequence are simply written one after the other.
Relative to a protocol Π we can construct a temporal epistemic model MΠ that contains
the initial model and all the models obtained from it by applying a sequence of epistemic
events belonging to Π. We can then express the following: ‘in the context (M, s), given the
protocol Π and after having past the history h (that starts from s), it is permitted to say ψ
after which ϕ is true’. It would be translated by MΠ, h |= 〈ψ〉ϕ and the semantics gives us
the following: MΠ, h |= 〈ψ〉ϕ iff:
• MΠ, h |= ψ
• h′ = hψ ∈ Π
• MΠ, h′ |= ϕ.
[Aucher et al., 2010] also propose to merge deontic concepts with epistemic ones. They
start from the Epistemic Deontic Logic (EDL) which language contains an epistemic op-
erator K - as in EL - and a deontic one O - as in SDL -. Note that it is a single-agent
framework. We can thus express, for example OKϕ ∧ KO¬Kψ : ‘It is obligatory that the
agent knows ϕ and the agent knows it is obligatory that she does not know ψ’. In fact, fol-
lowing [Castaneda, 1981], they distinguish formulas depending on whether they are within or
without the scope of deontic operators. In order to skip details, just assume that the deontic
operators apply to the knowledge of the agent: if p is an atomic proposition, we can express
OKp (‘the agent is obliged to know p’) but not Op (‘it is obligatory that p’). They call P (for
permitted) the dual operator of O: Pϕ := ¬O¬ϕ. They interpret this language in models in
which there is an S5-relation RK for the epistemic operator, and a KD-relation RO for the
deontic operator.
Therefore, they call epistemic norm a formula of the form ψ −→ Oϕ or ψ −→ Pϕ and
privacy policy a set of epistemic norms. A pointed EDL-model is said compliant with a given
privacy policy if all the epistemic norms it contains are satisfied in the given state of the
model.
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From there, they develop a new logic called Dynamic Epistemic Deontic Logic (DEDL)
adding to the language of EDL a dynamic operator [send ϕ] (in fact there is also another op-
erator [prom ϕ] that we skip here). It is a dynamic epistemic operator that can be understood
as the announcement (by the modeler) of ϕ. They can thus express for example the following:
[send p](Kp ∧ OKq): ‘after the announcement of p, the agent knows p and it is obligatory
that she knows q’. In this logic, they propose to formalize the notion of ‘right to say’ in the
following way: it is permitted to announce something if the result of such an announcement
is compliant with the given privacy policy. We denote as Pϕ! such a permission to announce
ϕ (and no more to know ϕ). Therefore, let PP be a privacy policy and
∧
PP the conjunction
of all the epistemic norms appearing in PP , then we have |=EDL Pϕ! ←→ [send ϕ](
∧
PP ).
Yet, these two frameworks have limitations that justify to develop our proposal (See
Chapters 6 and 7). Comparisons between our work and theirs are proposed in Section 6.5.2.
for [van Benthem et al., 2009] and in Section 8.1 for [Aucher et al., 2010].
Chapter 4
Logics of Objective Beliefs
4.1 Introduction
The Logic of Objective Beliefs (LOB) has been presented in section 3.1.4. We saw that ‘ob-
jective belief’ is a useful notion to formalize situations in which some information is observed
by the agents. If an agent believes something about such observation, then it is true. As we
saw, a typical situation is the Texas Hold’em Poker: some cards are known to be seen by
the agents nd some others are revealed publicly on the table. In this section, we present new
results regarding this framework, while extending it with some useful notions. Let us enter
inside the game!
After the initial deal and the flop, the players have to bet three times; each bet is followed
by the deal of an additional card. During these bets, even if she thinks her hand is losing,
Brune could try to bluff. She would not do it if she thinks that Alex is certain to have the
winning hand. In this framework, we would like to represent the fact that an agent believes
something (“I have the winning hand”) whatever she may observe later.
Let us suppose that, while cheating, Alex sees Brune’s hand without her knowing. He
would have a serious advantage on his opponent. In particular, he knows who has the winning
hand, and he can deduce if his opponent is sure or not that her hand is the winning one. How
could we represent an update function that allows to distinguish between the deal of a card
and a cheating access to new information?
This section, which principal results have been published in french in
[Balbiani and Seban, 2008], complete these requirements. We first present the Logic of
Objective Beliefs with an update function expressible in this logic, with a slightly different
semantics from [Hommersom et al., 2004]. We can express sentences like “ After the flop
deal, Brune considers possible that she has a losing hand” or “Alex believes that if the
river is the ace of spades, he will have a winning hand”. Secondly, we present the concept
of arbitrary update of objective beliefs. We can thus express, for example, the following:
“Brune can learn something that will let her know she has the winning hand, but whatever
Alex learns about the deal, he would still consider possible that Brune considers possible she
has the losing hand”.
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4.2 Some Properties of the Logic of Objective Beliefs
First we present the following axiomatization LOB of this logic, according to the intuition we
have about objective beliefs, then we show that this axiomatization is sound and complete
on a certain class of models.
(CPL) axioms of classical propositional logic,
(K) Bi(ϕ → ψ) → (Biϕ → Biψ),
(4) Biϕ → BiBiϕ,
(5) Bˆiϕ → BiBˆiϕ,
(Tbool) if ϕ is boolean, then Biϕ → ϕ.
As we exposed before, axioms (4) and (5) express the introspective character of belief: “if
agent i believes that ϕ, then she believes that she believes that ϕ” and “if agent i considers
possible that ϕ, then she believes that she considers possible that ϕ”, for any formula ϕ.
The axiom (Tbool) expresses the objective dimension of the belief: for any boolean formula
ϕ (i.e. ϕ corresponds to an objective fact) “if agent i believes that ϕ, then ϕ”. In other
words, we consider that the beliefs of the agents regarding the real world are consistent with
it. It corresponds to the property of o-seriality. The theorems of LOB are all the formulas
deductible from the axioms using the following deduction rules:
(MP ) if ϕ is a theorem and ϕ → ψ is a theorem then ψ is a theorem,
(GD) if ϕ is a theorem then Biϕ is a theorem.
Following [Hommersom et al., 2004], we consider the class C0 of models M = (S,R, V ) in
which for every agent i, Ri is transitive, euclidian and o-serial. This notion of o-seriality has
been presented in Definition 3.11.
Proposition 4.1 shows soundness and completeness of logic LOB with respect to the class
of models C0, a result that does not appear in [Hommersom et al., 2004].
Proposition 4.1 Let ϕ ∈ Llob . Then ϕ is a theorem of LOB iff ϕ is valid in any model of
the class C0.
Proof To show soundness (i.e. the direct implication), it is sufficient to show that axioms
are valid and that the inference rules preserve validity. First, we show that o-serial models
validate schema Tbool. Indeed, let M be an o-serial model and let s be a state of M. Then
if M, s |= Biϕ, then there exists t ∈ S such that (1) sRit and (2) V (s) = V (t). (1) implies
that M, t |= ϕ. Combined with (2), recording that ϕ is boolean, we obtain that M, s |= ϕ.
Second, as we saw in section 2.2, axioms (CPL), K, 4 and 5 are valid in the class of transitive
and euclidian Kripke models. Third, (MP ) and (GD) preserves validity by definition of the
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semantics. Indeed, let M be a model of C0. On one hand if M |= ϕ and M |= ¬ϕ ∨ ψ then
M |= ψ. On the other hand, if M |= ϕ then for all s ∈ S and all t ∈ S such that sRit, we
have M, t |= ϕ. Therefore for all s ∈ S, M, s |= Biϕ. Consequently M |= Biϕ. We obtain
the wanted result.
Let us now prove completeness (i.e. the indirect implication). We define the canonical
model Mclob = (Sc, Rci , V c) in the classical way (cf. Definition 2.19). Recall in particular
that for all maximal consistent sets x, y ∈ Sc and for all agent i, xRiy iff Bi(x) ⊆ y, where
Bi(x) = {ϕ | Biϕ ∈ x}. Let us see that the canonical model is in the class C0:
• it is transitive: Let x, y, z be such that xRiy and yRiz, i.e. Bi(x) ⊆ y and Bi(y) ⊆ z.
It is enough to show that Bi(x) ⊆ Bi(y). Therefore, take ϕ ∈ Bi(x) then Biϕ ∈ x thus
BiBiϕ ∈ x and Biϕ ∈ Bi(x) which leads to Biϕ ∈ y i.e. ϕ ∈ Bi(y).
• it is euclidean: We use axiom 5, or rather its contrapositive BˆiBiϕ −→ Biϕ. Let x, y, z
be such that xRiy and xRiz, i.e. Bi(x) ⊆ y and Bi(x) ⊆ z. It is enough to show that
Bi(y) ⊆ z. Therefore, let ϕ ∈ Bi(y) then Biϕ ∈ y thus BˆiBiϕ ∈ x. Indeed, if it were
not the case, then Bi¬Biϕ ∈ x and thus ¬Biϕ ∈ y which is false. Thus BˆiBiϕ ∈ x and
by axiom 5 Biϕ ∈ x, which means that ϕ ∈ Bi(x). With Bi(x) ⊆ z we obtain ϕ ∈ z
Q.E.D.
• it is o-serial: Let x ∈ Sc and let y◦ = Bi(x)∪{p ∈ PROP | p ∈ x}. y◦ is a consistent set.
Suppose the opposite, then there exist ϕ1, . . . ϕn ∈ Bi(x) and p1, . . . pm ∈ x ∩ PROP
such that ` (ϕ1∧. . .∧ϕn∧p1∧. . .∧pm) −→ ⊥, thus ` ¬ϕ1∨∙ ∙ ∙∨¬ϕn∨¬p1∨∙ ∙ ∙∨¬pm and
` Bi(¬ϕ1∨∙ ∙ ∙∨¬ϕn∨¬p1∨∙ ∙ ∙∨¬pm). Combining with the fact that Bi(ϕ1∧. . .∧ϕn) ∈ x
we obtain that Bi(¬p1∨∙ ∙ ∙∨¬pm) ∈ x which implies that ¬p1∨∙ ∙ ∙∨¬pm ∈ x by axiom
Tbool, a contradiction with respect to the hypothesis. So y◦ is consistent, it can thus
be extended to a maximal-consistent set of formulas y (using a classical Lindenbaum
lemma proof), that includes Bi(x) and PROP ∩ x as y◦ did. Therefore, xRiy and for
all p ∈ PROP , y ∈ V (p) iff x ∈ V (p). We obtain the wanted result.
Now it is sufficient to prove that for all formula ϕ ∈ Llob , Mclob, x |= ϕ iff ϕ ∈ x. Thus, as
Mclob is a model, a formula that is valid is a validity of this model. It is then in any maximal
consistent set of the theory, which proves that it is a theorem. We prove this truth lemma in a
classical way, by induction on the structure of ϕ. This proof is exactly the same as the proof
for the logic K (see [Fagin et al., 1995]). Let us analyse the specific induction case where
ϕ = Biψ.
(⇒) Suppose that (1) Mclob, x |= Biψ. Thus Ki(x) ∪ {¬ψ} is not consistent, and it
has a finite subset {ϕ1, . . . , ϕn,¬ψ} which is not consistent. Therefore, by propositional
reasoning, ` ϕ1 → (ϕ2 → (. . . → (ϕn → ψ) . . .)). Hence, using the necesitation rule, we
obtain ` Ki(ϕ1 → (ϕ2 → (. . . → (ϕn → ψ) . . .))). Using axiom K n times we get the following:
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` Ki(ϕ1 → (Kiϕ2 → (. . . → (Kiϕn → Kiψ) . . .))). Using that {ϕ1, . . . , ϕn} ⊆ Ki(x) we have
that Kiψ ∈ x, Q.E.D.
(⇐) If Biψ ∈ x then ψ ∈ Bi(x). Now, for all y ∈ Sc s.t. xRciy we have Bi(x) ⊆ y. Thus
for all y ∈ Sc s.t. xRiy, ψ ∈ y, i.e. Mclob, y |= ψ by IH. Therefore, Mclob, x |= Biψ.
¤
Consider the formula Bˆi>. This formula is valid in any model M = (S,R, V ) where Ri is
serial for agent i ∈ AG . Therefore, LCO is an extension of the logic KD45AG obtained by
replacing schema (Tbool) by axiom Bˆi>. The inclusion of KD45AG in LCO is a strict one if
PROP 6= ∅. To show this, we associate to any subset X of PROP , the logic LCOX obtained
by replacing schema (Tbool) by (TXbool): “Biϕ → ϕ for all ϕ boolean and based on X”. The
function X 7−→ LCOX is clearly strictly increasing: each added atom gives new theorems.
Furthermore, LCO = LCOPROP and KD45AG = LCO∅.
We use in the following sections the notion of bisimulation presented in Section 2.2. Indeed,
in this logic as in K, the following proposition is true:
Proposition 4.2 Let M = (S,R, V ), M′ = (S′, R′, V ′) two models of the class C0 and let
s0 ∈ S, s′0 ∈ S′ be two states. If (M, s0)←→(M′, s′0) then (M, s0) |= ϕ iff (M′, s′0) |= ϕ for
any formula ϕ ∈ Llob .
The proof of this proposition can be found in [Hommersom et al., 2004].
4.2.1 Decidability and Complexity:
We prove in this paragraph that the logic of objective beliefs is PSPACE-complete, a notion
presented in Section 2.2. We prove first that this logic has the finite-model property.
Proposition 4.3 Let ϕ ∈ Llob be a formula. If ϕ is satisfied in a model of C0 then ϕ is
satisfied in a finite model of C0.
We do not prove it here, but the proof is very similar to (in fact identical to a part of) the
proof of Proposition 6.32. Indeed, we take a model that satisfies ϕ, and we take its filtration
(see Definition 2.16) through the set of all subformulas of ϕ. See the proof of Proposition
6.32 for details.
Proposition 4.4 If |AG| > 2, the problem of satisfiability of Llob with respect to C0 is decid-
able and PSPACE-hard.
Proof This proof is largely inspired from the equivalent proof for KD45n in
[Halpern and Moses, 1992]. Recall that a quantified Boolean formula (QBF) can be written in
the following form: A = Q1p1Q2p2 . . . QmpmA′ where for all i, Qi ∈ {∀, ∃} and A′ is a Boolean
formula whose primitive propositions are among p1, . . . , pm. Recall that the problem of de-
ciding whether a QBF is true or not is PSPACE-complete [Stockmeyer and Meyer, 1973].
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We get our result by proving that, given a QBF A we can construct a Llob-formula ψA
such that ψA is satisfiable in C0 iff A is true. Take a QBF A of the previous form. We
call A1 := Q2p2 . . . QmpmA′ and more generally Ak := Qk+1pk+1 . . . QmpmA′. Therefore
A = Q1p1A1 = Q1p1Q2p2 . . . QkpkAk.
The formula ψA we construct enforces the existence of a binary tree-like model, in which
each leaf represents a distinct truth assignment to the primitive propositions p1, . . . , pm. Our
primitive propositions are the pi’s and additional d0, . . . , dm, where, intuitively, dj denotes
the fact that we already did at least j consecutive assignments of pi’s values. In other words,
dj is true in the nodes of depth at least j. For technical reasons that we present later, the
link between a node of depth i and a node of depth i+1 is a succession of two arrows (one for
agent 1 and the other for agent 2) with an intermediate node which is exactly identical to its
antecedent. An example of such a model is given in figure 4.1. We then define the following
Llob-formulas:
• depth captures the intended relation between the dj ’s:
depth :=
m∧
i=1
(di −→ di−1)
• determined says, intuitively, that the truth value of the proposition pi is determined at
depth i in the tree. If pi is true (resp. false) in a node s of depth j > i, then it is true
(resp. false) in all the nodes that are under s:
determined :=
m∧
i=1
(di −→ ((pi −→ B1B2(di −→ pi)) ∧ (¬pi −→ B1B2(di −→ ¬pi))))
• branchingA says that for any node of depth i, if the truth value of pi+i is quantified
universally (resp. existentially) in A, it is possible to find two successor nodes (resp.
one successor node) at depth i + 1 such that pi+1 is true at one and false at the other
(resp. pi+1 has the expected truth value):∧
{i:Qi+1=∀}
((di ∧ ¬di+1 −→ (Bˆ1Bˆ2(di+1 ∧ ¬di+2 ∧ pi+1) ∧ Bˆ1Bˆ2(di+1 ∧ ¬di+2 ∧ ¬pi+1))∧
∧
{i:Qi+1=∃}
((di ∧ ¬di+1 −→ (Bˆ1Bˆ2(di+1 ∧ ¬di+2 ∧ pi+1) ∨ Bˆ1Bˆ2(di+1 ∧ ¬di+2 ∧ ¬pi+1)).
Finally,
ψA := d0 ∧ ¬d1 ∧ (B1B2)m(depth ∧ determined ∧ branchingA ∧ (dm −→ A′)).
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We can now prove that ψA is satisfiable in C0 iff A is true. First, we show that if A is true
then ψA is satisfied by the model MψA corresponding to the requirements explained before.
We describe now such a model starting from an initial state s0 satisfying only d0. In this
description, we call “node of depth i” a node satisfying all the dj with j 6 i and no other.
Furthermore, if a node s has depth i, we call “successor” of s a node s′ of depth i + 1 such
that s(R1 ◦R2)s′, with an intermediate node that is identical to s.
Now, if Q1 = ∀, s0 has two successors sp11 and s¬p11 , p1 being satisfied in the first and
not being satisfied in the second. If Qi = ∃, we construct a unique successor s1, p1 being
satisfied in it iff A1(>/p1) is true. Then we reproduce this process for the new created states,
considering as A the actualized formula A1(>/p1) if p1 is satisfied and A1(⊥/p1) if p1 is not
satisfied, and maintaining in every further state the valuation of p1.
In other words, for all i, if Qi = ∀, each node of depth i has two successors, pi being
satisfied in the first and not being satisfied in the second. If Qi = ∃, each node of depth
i node has a unique successor, pi being satisfied iff Ai(∗1/p1, . . . ∗i−1 /pi−1, pi := >) is true
(where ∗k corresponds to the actual valuation assigned to pk).
We then end the model taking for each relation Ri its reflexive-symmetric closure. An
example of such a model is given in Figure 4.1. Note that such a model is in C0 as every
relation is an equivalence relation.
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Figure 4.1: Possible models MψA for A = ∃p1∀p2∀p3A′
One of these models, in its upper state, satisfies ψA if A = ∃p1∀p2∀p3A′ is true. The left one
if A1(>/p1) is true, the right one if A1(⊥/p1) is true.
Now suppose that A is satisfiable, we get MψA , s0 |= ψA by construction. Indeed, d0∧¬d1
is satisfied in s0, and depth ∧ branchingA is clearly satisfied in all the model. To see that
determined is a validity of the model, note that by a unique arrow R1 ◦ R2 from a node s,
we cannot reach a node of depth higher or equal to the depth of s that is not a successor of
s. Finally, we have to see that dm −→ A′ is a validity of MψA , which means exactly that if
the value of each pi is fixed, arbitrarily if Qi = ∀ and choosing the right one if Qi = ∃, the
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A′ corresponding to this choice is a true boolean proposition. That exactly means that A is
true.
Conversely, suppose that a model M = (S, V, {R1, R2}) in C0 such that M, s |= ψA exists.
Given a state t ∈ S, let Atj be the QBF that results by starting with Qj+1pj+1 . . . QmpmA′
and replacing all occurrence of pi in A′, with i < j, by > if t ∈ V (p) and by ⊥ otherwise.
Note that At0 = A and that A
t
m corresponds to A
′ where each atomic proposition has been
replaced by its valuation in t. Now we have M, s |= (B1B2)m(dm −→ A′). Thus if (s, t) ∈
(R1 ◦ R2)m and M, t |= dm then Atm is true. With the fact that M |= B1B2(branchingA)
and an easy induction on j, we can prove that for all t ∈ S, if (s, t) ∈ (R1 ◦ R2)m−j and
M, t |= dm−j ∧ ¬dm−j+1 then the QBF Atm−j is true. In particular, since M, s |= d0 ∧ ¬d1,
As0 = A is true.
¤
Proposition 4.5 The problem of satisfiability of Llob with respect to C0 is in PSPACE.
This proof is identical to the similar proof of the PSPACE complexity of the problem of
satisfiability of the logic K [Halpern and Moses, 1992]. It uses a notion of tableau that gen-
eralises the notion of propositional tableau. Such a tableau method is proposed for another
logic in Section 6.6. The idea of the proof is the following:
• First, we show that this logic has the tree-model property. That means that if a formula
is satisfiable, it is satisfied in a tree-like model. More precisely, we prove that a formula
is satisfiable iff the tableau method terminates and allow to construct such a tree-like
model. It would take at most a time exponential in the size of the formula ϕ that is
satisfied.
• Second, we show that such a model has a depth that is polynomial in the size ϕ.
• Third, we construct this tableau depth first, in other words we construct the tree-like
tableau branch by branch. Once a branch constructed, we examine if it can satisfy the
formula. If it does not, we just forget it a pass to the following branch.
In this way we obtain an algorithm that solves the problem in exponential time and polynomial
space.
Proposition 4.6 The problem of the model checking of Llob with respect to C0 is in P .
Proof To prove it, just recall that the problem of the model checking of the language of
modal logic with respect to all Kripke models is in P (see [Gradel and Otto, 1999]). As the
language is the same, it remains true if we take the particular class of models C0.
¤
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4.2.2 Adding Update
Let us now tackle the question of updating objective beliefs. What happens in a given model
if a group of agents learns that a boolean formula is satisfied? To answer this question, we first
present the framework proposed by [Hommersom et al., 2004], showing some new properties.
Definition 4.7 Let M = (S,R, V ) be a model, ϕ a boolean formula and G ⊆ AG a finite
group of agents. The update of M by ϕ and G is the model Uϕ,G(M) = (S′, R′, V ′) defined
in the following way:
• S′ = S × {0, 1},
• (x, a)R′i(y, b) iff one of the following conditions is satisfied :
– a = 0, b = 0 and xRiy,
– a = 1, b = 1, xRiy, (M, y) |= ϕ and i ∈ G,
– a = 1, b = 0, xRiy and i 6∈ G.
• V ′(x, a) = V (x).
In the case where G = ∅ we obtain that Uϕ,∅(M) satisfies (x, a)R′i(y, b) iff (xRiy and b = 0).
Clearly this update is an informative event, i.e. an event that does not change the valuation
of the propositional atoms but only the knowledge that agents may have about the situation.
It is thus equivalent to an action model, as presented in Section 3.1.3. Figure 4.2 presents
this action model:
ϕ
G
G>
AG
AG\G
AG\G
¬ϕ
Figure 4.2: Action model equivalent to the update Uϕ,G(M) for objective beliefs
Here are some properties of the result of the operation U on a model. These properties
justify the choice of this operation U to model the update of an objective belief by a group
of agents.
Proposition 4.8 Let M = (S,R, V ) be a model of the class C0, ϕ be a boolean formula and
G ⊆ AG be a group of agents. For all s ∈ S, if (M, s) |= ϕ then the submodel of Uϕ,G(M)
generated from (s, 1) is a model of the class C0.
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In other words, the class C0 is stable by the application of operation U .
Proposition 4.9 Let M = (S,R, V ) be a model of the class C0, ϕ be a boolean formula and
G ⊆ AG be a group of agents. For all s ∈ S and all i ∈ AG,
• for i ∈ G, (Uϕ,G(M), (s, 1)) |= Biϕ
• for i 6∈ G, (Uϕ,G(M), (s, 1)) |= Biϕ iff (M, s) |= Biϕ.
In other words, the agents of group G believe the formula appearing in the update is true;
the other agents believe it only if they already believed it before the update was made.
The proof of the two previous propositions is a simple verification and can be found in
[Hommersom et al., 2004]. The two following propositions say that updating by the boolean
constant > or updating by any formula for an empty set of agents change nothing to any
agent beliefs. This is quite intuitive! More precisely, they assert that such update gives a
model bisimilar to the initial one. The notion of bisimulation, denoted ←→, is introduced in
Definition 2.13.
Proposition 4.10 Let M = (S,R, V ) be a model of the class C0, ϕ be a boolean for-
mula, s0 ∈ S be a state of the model and G ⊆ AG be a group of agents. Then
(U>,G(M), (s0, 1))←→(M, s0).
Proof Let R be the binary relation between S × {0, 1} and S defined in the following way:
(s, a)Rs′ iff s = s′.
We show that R is a bisimulation between the sub-model of U>,G(M) generated from
(s0, 1) and the sub-model of M generated from s0. First, clearly (s0, 1)Rs0. Now for all
a ∈ {0, 1}, all s ∈ S (i.e. for all situation such that (s, a)Rs)
atoms for all p ∈ Θ: (s, a) ∈ V (p) iff s ∈ V ′(p) (by Definition 4.7);
forth for all i ∈ AG and all (t, b) ∈ S × {0, 1}: if (s, a)Ri(t, b), then sRit by Definition 4.7,
with (t, b)Rt;
back for all i ∈ AG and all t ∈ S: if sRit, then we distinguish two cases:
• if a = 0 then (s, 0)Ri(t, 0), with (t, 0)Rt
• if a = 1 then two cases again:
– if i 6∈ G then (s, 1)Ri(t, 0)
– if i ∈ G then (s, 1)Ri(t, 1), because M, t |= >.
In all cases we obtained b ∈ {0, 1} such that (s, a)Ri(t, b), with again (t, b)Rt.
¤
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Proposition 4.11 Let M = (S,R, V ) be a model of the class C0, ϕ be a boolean formula and
s0 ∈ S be a state of the model. Then (Uϕ,∅(M), (s0, 1))←→(M, s0).
Proof It is easy to prove it in the same way as for Proposition 4.10, with the same relation
R.
¤
Proposition 4.12 Let M = (S,R, V ) be a model of the class C0, ϕ,ψ be boolean formulas,
s0 ∈ S be a state of the model and G ⊆ AG be a group of agents. If (M, s0) |= ϕ and
(M, s0) |= ψ then (Uψ,G(Uϕ,G(M)), ((s0, 1), 1))←→(Uϕ∧ψ,G(M), (s0, 1)).
Two successive updates are thus equivalent to a unique one.
Proof It is easy to prove it in the same way as for Proposition 4.10, with the following
binary relation R between (S × {0, 1})× {0, 1} and S × {0, 1}:
• ((s, a), b)R(t, c) iff s = t, a = c and b = c.
¤
Proposition 4.13 LetM = (S,R, V ) be a model of the class C0, ϕ and ψ be boolean formulas,
s0 ∈ S be a state of the model and G,H ⊆ AG be groups of agents. If (M, s0) |= ϕ and
(M, s0) |= ψ then (Uψ,H(Uϕ,G(M)), ((s0, 1), 1))←→(Uϕ,G(Uψ,H(M)), ((s0, 1), 1)).
Therefore, if we consider two successive updates, the order is not important.
Proof It is easy to prove it in the same way as for Proposition 4.10, with the following
relation R over (S × {0, 1})× {0, 1}:
• ((s, a), b)R((t, c), d) iff s = t, a = d and b = c.
¤
Proposition 4.14 Let M = (S,R, V ) and M′ = (S′, R′, V ′) be models of the class C0, ϕ be a
boolean formula, s0 ∈ S and s′0 ∈ S′ be states of these models and G ⊆ AG be a group of agents.
If (M, s0) |= ϕ and (M, s0)←→(M′, s′0) then (Uϕ,G(M), (s0, 1))←→(Uϕ,G(M′), (s′0, 1)).
In other words, the bisimilarity between two models remains after the update of these models
by a same formula for a same group of agents.
Proof If we call R the bisimulation between the submodel of M generated from s0 and
the submodel of M′ generated from s′0, then it is easy to verify that the binary relation RU
between S × {0, 1} and S′ × {0, 1} defined as follow is a bisimulation:
• (s, a)RU (s′, a′) iff uRu′ and a = a′.
¤
The last but not the least:
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Proposition 4.15 Let M = (S,R, V ) be a model of the class C0, ψ be a boolean formulas,
s0 ∈ S be a state of the model and G ⊆ AG be a group of agents. If M, s0 |= ψ then
(Uψ,G(M), (s0, 0))←→(M, s0).
Recall that after the update, the agents that are not in G believe that (s0, 0) is the actual
state. Therefore this proposition claims that the beliefs of agents that are not in G do not
change after the update.
Proof It is easy to prove it in the same way as for Proposition 4.10, with the following
relation R between S × {0, 1} and S
• (s, a)Z(t) iff s = t and a = 0.
¤
4.3 Update of Objective Beliefs
4.3.1 Syntax and Semantics
LOB only uses the modal operators Bi. Therefore, it cannot express update of beliefs. If
we look again to our Texas Hold’em example, with only the notion of belief in our language,
how can we express the fact that after a card is dealt, on the table all the agents update
their beliefs? In this section, we propose new operators that, added to LOB, give us the
possibility to analyse dynamics of the update of objective beliefs. We adapt the framework
proposed by [Hommersom et al., 2004] to propose the Logic of Update of Objective Beliefs
(LUOB) which language contains, besides the operators Bi, operators of the form [ψ,G] for
any boolean formula ψ and any group of agents G ⊆ AG. We then present new results of
expressivity and decidability/complexity.
As we just said, the language of LUOB (Lluob) over a countable set of propositional atoms
PROP and a countable set of agents AG is defined inductively as follow:
ϕ ::= p | ⊥ | ¬ϕ | ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2 | Biϕ | [ψ,G]ϕ
where p ∈ PROP , i ∈ AG, G ⊆ AG and ψ ∈ Lpl .
We understand [ψ,G]ϕ as “after the agents of the group G learn ψ, ϕ is true”, so these
operators introduce an idea of update. Therefore, we generalize the satisfiability relation
presented in Section 3.1.4 in the following way:
• M, s |= [ψ,G]ϕ iff (M, s |= ψ implies Uψ,G(M), (s, 1) |= ϕ).
Once again, the notion of bisimilarity is useful in this framework, as two bisimilar models
satisfy the same formula. More precisely:
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Proposition 4.16 Let M = (S,R, V ), M′ = (S′, R′, V ′) be two models and s0 ∈ S, s′0 ∈ S′
be two states of these models. If (M, s0)←→(M′, s′0) then (M, s0) |= ϕ iff (M′, s′0) |= ϕ for
every formula ϕ ∈ Lluob .
Proof It can be proved by an easy induction on the structure on ϕ.
¤
Therefore, we obtain the following:
Proposition 4.17 Let M be a model, s be a state of M, ψ1, ψ2 ∈ Lpl and G1, G2 ⊆ AG.
1. M, s |= [ψ1, G1]ψ2 iff M, s |= ψ1 −→ ψ2
2. M, s |= [ψ1, G1][ψ2, G2]ϕ ←→ [ψ2, G2][ψ1, G1]ϕ.
This proposition asserts that two successive updates are interchangeable.
Proof
1. M, s |= [ψ1, G1]ψ2 iff (M, s |= ψ1 implies Uψ1,G1(M), (s, 1) |= ψ2). But by definition
of the update, (s, 1) has the same valuation of s. Therefore, as ψ2 is a propositional
formula, M, s |= [ψ1, G1]ψ2 iff (M, s |= ψ1 implies M, s |= ψ2) Q.E.D.
2. M, s |= [ψ1, G1][ψ2, G2]ϕ
iff M, s |= ψ1 implies Uψ1,G1(M), (s, 1) |= [ψ2, G2]ϕ
iff M, s |= ψ1 implies (M, s |= ψ2 implies Uψ2,G2(Uψ1,G1(M)), ((s, 1), 1) |= ϕ) (by 1.)
iff M, s |= ψ1 ∧ ψ2 implies Uψ2,G2(Uψ1,G1(M)), ((s, 1), 1) |= ϕ
iff M, s |= ψ1 ∧ ψ2 implies Uψ1,G1(Uψ2,G2(M)), ((s, 1), 1) |= ϕ (Prop. 4.13 and 4.16)
iff M, s |= [ψ2, G2][ψ1, G1]ϕ (conversely)
¤
Definition 4.18 Let ψ1, . . . , ψn ∈ Lpl , G1, . . . , Gn ⊆ AG be given. For every model M =
(S,R, V ) and every state of the model s ∈ S, we write UPn(M) = Uψn,Gn(. . . (Uψ1,G1(M)) . . .)
and UPn(M, s) = UPn(M), ((s, 1), . . . , 1).
Note that the formulas ψ1, . . . , ψn and the groups G1, . . . , Gn are supposed to be clear in
this definition. This definition comes from the interchangeability of successive updates that
allows to omit the order in a multiple update. More precisely, by propositions 4.13 and 4.16,
the order in such a succession of updates is not important when considering the satisfaction
of a formula. Therefore using the semantics and Proposition 4.17.2 we obtain the following:
Proposition 4.19 Let M = (S,R, V ) be a model, let s ∈ S, let ψ1, . . . , ψn ∈ Lpl and let
G1, . . . , Gn ⊆ AG. Then for every Lluob-formula ϕ we have:
M, s |= [ψ1, G1] . . . [ψn, Gn]ϕ iff (M, s |= ψ1 ∧ . . . ∧ ψn implies UPn(M, s) |= ϕ)
Another interesting result of Corollary of Proposition 4.16 is the following:
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Proposition 4.20 Let M = (S,R, V ) be a model of the class C0, ψ be a boolean formulas,
s0 ∈ S be a state of the model and G ⊆ AG be a group of agents. If M, s0 |= ψ then for all
ϕ ∈ Lluob we have Uψ,G(M), (s0, 0) |= ϕ iff M, s0 |= ϕ.
Proof It is a translation of Proposition 4.15 through proposition 4.16.
¤
This proposition asserts that, if the update concerns a formula satisfied in s0, then a formula
of Lluob is satisfied in (s0, 0) after the update iff it was satisfied before. We get the following
result concerning the belief of the agents after un update.
Proposition 4.21 Let M be a model, s be a state of M, G ⊆ AG a group of agents,
i ∈ AG\G, and ψ ∈ Lpl . Therefore, if M, s |= ψ then Uψ,G(M), (s, a) |= Biϕ iff M, s |= Biϕ.
Proof We pose Uψ,G(M) = (S′,R′, V ′).
Uψ,G(M), (s, a) |= Biϕ
iff for all (t, b) ∈ S′ s.t. (s, a)R′i(t, b) we have Uψ,G(M), (t, b) |= ϕ
iff for all t ∈ S s.t. sRit we have Uψ,G(M), (t, 0) |= ϕ
(because if i /∈ G then (s, a)R′i(t, b) iff sRit and b = 0).
iff for all t ∈ S s.t. sRit we have M, t |= ϕ (by Proposition 4.20)
iff M, s |= Biϕ
¤
4.3.2 Axiomatization and Completeness
Here are the axioms of LUOB.
(LOB) the axioms of the logic of objective beliefs,
(R1) [ψ,G]p ←→ (ψ → p),
(R2) [ψ,G]⊥ ←→ (ψ → ⊥),
(R3) [ψ,G]¬ϕ ←→ (ψ → ¬[ϕ,G]ϕ),
(R4) [ψ,G](ϕ ∨ χ) ←→ [ψ,G]ϕ ∨ [ψ,G]χ,
(R5) [ψ,G]Biϕ ←→ (ψ → Bi[ψ, G]ϕ) when i ∈ G,
(R6) [ψ,G]Biϕ ←→ (ψ → Biϕ) when i 6∈ G.
Axioms (R1), (R2), (R3), (R4), (R5) and (R6) have an easy interpretation, similar to the
one for PAL. Just as Lpal is not more expressive than Lel , the fact that these axioms are
reduction axioms implies that the language Lluob is not more expressive than Llob . LUOB
theorems are all the formulas deducible from these axioms, using the inference rules (MP )
and (GD) and the following inference rule:
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(GU) if ψ is a theorem then [ϕ,G]ψ is a theorem.
As Proposition 4.27 states, these axioms and inference rules give a sound and complete ax-
iomatization for the language Lluob with respect to the class C0. But we first introduce a
translation from Lluob to Llob :
Definition 4.22 For all ϕ ∈ Lluob , we define τ([ψ1, G1] . . . [ψn, Gn], ϕ) ∈ Llob for all n ∈ N,
all ψ1, . . . , ψn ∈ Lpl and all G1, . . . , Gn ⊆ AG inductively on the structure of the formula ϕ
in the following way:
• τ([ψ1, G1] . . . [ψn, Gn], p) = ψ1 ∧ . . . ∧ ψn → p,
• τ([ψ1, G1] . . . [ψn, Gn],⊥) = ψ1 ∧ . . . ∧ ψn → ⊥,
• τ([ψ1, G1] . . . [ψn, Gn],¬ϕ) = ψ1 ∧ . . . ∧ ψn → ¬τ([ψ1, G1] . . . [ψn, Gn]ϕ),
• τ([ψ1, G1] . . . [ψn, Gn], ϕ ∨ ϕ′) = τ([ψ1, G1] . . . [ψn, Gn]ϕ) ∨ τ([ψ1, G1] . . . [ψn, Gn]ϕ′),
• τ([ψ1, G1] . . . [ψn, Gn], Biϕ) = ψ1∧ . . .∧ψn → Biτ(μ ϕ) where μ is the sequence obtained
from [ψ1, G1] . . . [ψn, Gn] eliminating all the [ψ,G] such that i /∈ G,
• τ([ψ1, G1] . . . [ψn, Gn], [ψ, G]ϕ) = τ([ψ1, G1] . . . [ψn, Gn][ψ, G], ϕ).
We show that in Proposition 4.26 that for all ϕ ∈ Lluob , |= ϕ ←→ τ(∅, ϕ). To do so, we
need the two following lemmas:
Lemma 4.23 Let n ∈ N, ψ1, . . . , ψn ∈ Lpl and G1, . . . , Gn ⊆ AG. Let μ be defined as in
Definition 4.22 and for every model M and every state s, let UPn(M, s) be defined as in
Definition 4.19. Then for all θ ∈ Lluob , all i ∈ AG,
if M, s |= ψ1 ∧ . . . ∧ ψn then (M, s |= Bi(μ θ) iff UPn(M, s) |= Biθ)
Proof Let m be the number of groups Gk containing i. We have 0 6 m 6 n. By Proposition
4.13 we can suppose, without loss of generality, that i ∈ Gk iff k 6 m. Now, we call
UPm(M, s) = Uψ1,G1(. . . (Uψm,Gm(M)) . . . , ((s, 1), . . . , 1). We pose UPn(M) = (Sn,Rn, V n)
and UPm(M) = (Sm,Rm, V m).
Now UPn(M, s) |= Biθ
iff UPm(M, s) |= Biθ (by Proposition 4.21 applied m− n times)
iff for all t ∈ Sm such that sRmi t, UPm(M), t |= θ
iff for all t ∈ S s.t. sRit and M, t |= ψ1 ∧ . . . ∧ ψm, UPm(M, t) |= θ
iff for all t such that sRit, M, t |= μ θ (by Proposition 4.19)
iff M, s |= Bi(μ θ)
¤
Lemma 4.24 Let ϕ ∈ Lluob . Then for all n ∈ N, all G1, . . . , Gn ⊆ AG, all ψ1, . . . ψn ∈ Lpl :
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1. | τ([ψ1, G1] . . . [ψn, Gn], ϕ) |6 (| ψ1 | + . . . + | ψn | + 6n + | ϕ |) × | ϕ |,
2. τ([ψ1, G1] . . . [ψn, Gn], ϕ) ↔ [ψ1, G1] . . . [ψn, Gn]ϕ is valid in all models of the class C0.
Remark 4.25 First we remark that ψ1 ∧ ψ2 ∧ . . . ∧ ψn → ψ is an abuse of notation. In
fact, we should write (¬(¬(. . .¬(︸ ︷︷ ︸
n−2
¬(¬ψ1 ∨ ¬ψ2)∨¬ψ3) . . . ∨ ¬ψn︸ ︷︷ ︸
n−2
) ∨ ψ). Therefore we have :
| ψ1 ∧ ψ2 ∧ . . . ∧ ψn → ψ | = | ψ1 | + . . . + | ψn | + 6(n− 1) + | ψ | +4
6 | ψ1 | + . . . + | ψn | + 6n + | ψ |.
Proof
1. We prove it by induction on the structure of ϕ, noting χ = ([ψ1, G1] . . . [ψn, Gn], ϕ). We
note by a ‘¤’ the use of Remark 4.25 in this proof.
base case ϕ = p or ⊥: It is a direct application of Remark 4.25.
inductive cases: let us suppose that it is true for θ and θ′.
• ϕ = ¬θ : | τ(χ) | 6¤ (| ψ1 | + . . . + | ψn | + 6n) + | τ([ψ1, G1] . . . [ψn, Gn], θ) | + 1
6(IH) (| ψ1 | + . . . + | ψn | + 6n) + (| ψ1 | + . . . + | ψn | + 6n + | θ |) × | θ | + 1
= (| ψ1 | + . . . + | ψn | + 6n + | θ |)× (| θ | + 1) − | θ | + 1
6 (| ψ1 | + . . . + | ψn | + 6n + | θ |)× (| θ | + 1)
6 (| ψ1 | + . . . + | ψn | + 6n + | ϕ |)× (| ϕ |)
• ϕ = θ∨θ′ : | τ(χ) |=| τ([ψ1, G1] . . . [ψn, Gn], θ) | + | τ([ψ1, G1] . . . [ψn, Gn], θ′) | + 3
6(IH) (| ψ1 | + . . . + 6n + | θ |)× | θ | + (| ψ1 | + . . . + 6n + | θ′ |)× | θ′ | + 3
6 (| ψ1 | + . . . + 6n + | θ | + | θ′ | + 3) × (| θ | + | θ′ | + 3)
6 (| ψ1 | + . . . + | ψn | + 6n + | ϕ |)× (| ϕ |)
• ϕ = Biθ: | τ(χ) | 6¤ (| ψ1 | + . . . + | ψn | + 6n ) + | τ(μ, θ) | + 1
6 (| ψ1 | + . . . + | ψn | + 6n) + | τ([ψ1, G1] . . . [ψn, Gn], θ) | + 1
6(IH) (| ψ1 | + . . . + | ψn | + 6n) + (| ψ1 | + . . . + | ψn | + 6n + | θ |) × | θ | + 1
= (| ψ1 | + . . . + | ψn | + 6n + | θ |)× (| θ | + 1)− | θ | + 1
6 (| ψ1 | + . . . + | ψn | + 6n + | θ |)× (| θ | + 1)
6 (| ψ1 | + . . . + | ψn | + 6n + | ϕ |)× (| ϕ |)
• ϕ = [ψ,G]θ: | τ(χ) | =| τ([ψ1, G1] . . . [ψn, Gn][ψ, G], θ) |
6(IH) (| ψ1 | + . . . + | ψn | + | ψ | + 6(n + 1) + | θ |) × | θ |
= (| ψ1 | + . . . + | ψn | + 6n + | θ |) × | θ | + (| ψ | + 6) × | θ |
6 (| ψ1 | + . . . + | ψn | + 6n + | θ |)× (| θ | + | ψ | + 6)
6 (| ψ1 | + . . . + | ψn | + 6n + | ϕ |)× (| ϕ |)
2. We prove it by induction on the structure of ϕ, noting χ := [ψ1, G1] . . . [ψn, Gn]ϕ. As in
Proposition 4.19, we write UP(M, s) for Uψn,Gn(. . . (Uψ1,G1(M)) . . . , ((s, 1), . . . , 1). We
note by a ‘(∗)’ the use of Proposition 4.19 in this proof.
80 CHAPTER 4. LOGICS OF OBJECTIVE BELIEFS
• ϕ = p:
M, s |= τ([ψ1, G1] . . . [ψn, Gn], p)
iff M, s |= ψ1 ∧ . . . ∧ ψn → p
iff M, s |= ψ1 ∧ . . . ∧ ψn implies M, s |= p
iff M, s |= ψ1 ∧ . . . ∧ ψn implies UP(M, s) |= p (the valuation is unchanged)
iff M, s |= [ψ1, G1] . . . [ψn, Gn]p by (∗)
• ϕ = ⊥ : identical
• ϕ = ¬θ:
M, s |= τ([ψ1, G1] . . . [ψn, Gn],¬θ)
iff M, s |= ψ1 ∧ . . . ∧ ψn implies M, s |= ¬τ([ψ1, G1] . . . [ψn, Gn], θ)
iff M, s |= ψ1 ∧ . . . ∧ ψn implies M, s 6|= [ψ1, G1] . . . [ψn, Gn]θ (by IH)
iff M, s |= ψ1 ∧ . . . ∧ ψn implies UP(M, s) |= ¬θ by (∗)
iff M, s |= [ψ1, G1] . . . [ψn, Gn]¬θ by (∗) again
• ϕ = θ ∨ θ′ : similar
• ϕ = Biθ:
M, s |= τ([ψ1, G1] . . . [ψn, Gn], Biθ)
iff M, s |= ψ1 ∧ . . . ∧ ψn implies M, s |= Biτ(μ , θ)
iff M, s |= ψ1 ∧ . . . ∧ ψn implies for all t ∈ S s.t. sRit, M, t |= τ(μ , θ)
iff M, s |= ψ1 ∧ . . . ∧ ψn implies for all t ∈ S s.t. sRit, M, t |= μ θ (by IH)
iff M, s |= ψ1 ∧ . . . ∧ ψn implies M, s |= Bi(μ θ)
iff M, s |= ψ1 ∧ . . . ∧ ψn implies UP(M, s) |= Biθ (by Lemma 4.23)
iff M, s |= [ψ1, G1] . . . [ψn, Gn]Biθ
• ϕ = [ψ,G]θ:
M, s |= τ([ψ1, G1] . . . [ψn, Gn], [ψ,G]θ)
iff M, s |= τ([ψ1, G1] . . . [ψn, Gn][ψ,G], θ)
iff M, s |= ψ1 ∧ . . . ∧ ψn ∧ ψ implies M, s |= [ψ1, G1] . . . [ψn, Gn][ψ, G]θ (by IH)
iff M, s |= ψ1 ∧ . . . ∧ ψn ∧ ψ implies UP(M, s) |= θ by (∗)
iff M, s |= [ψ1, G1] . . . [ψn, Gn]θ by (∗) again
¤
Hence the following:
Proposition 4.26
• | τ(∅, ϕ) | ≤ | ϕ |2,
• τ(∅, ϕ) ↔ ϕ is valid in all models of the class C0.
In particular, we showed that Lluob is not more expressive that Llob . The translation above
sets that every formula of Lluob is equivalent to a formula of Llob . We can now prove the
completeness of the given axiomatization.
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Proposition 4.27 Let ϕ ∈ Lluob . ϕ is a LUOB theorem iff ϕ is valid in every model of the
class C0.
Proof For the soundness, by Proposition 4.1, it is sufficient to show soundness of the additive
axioms and inference rules. The soundness of the rule GU is evident and the soundness of
the axioms is given by Proposition 4.26.
Let us now prove completeness. We define the canonical model Mcluob = (Sc, Rci , V c) in
the classical way (cf. Definition 2.19). Its membership to the class C0 can be proved as in the
proof of Proposition 4.1.
Now it is sufficient to prove that for all formula ϕ ∈ Lluob , Mcluob, x |= ϕ iff ϕ ∈ x. We
prove this truth lemma by induction on the structure of ϕ. This proof is identical to the
proof of Proposition 4.1 for the base case and the first inductive cases. In particular, we
have already shown that for all ϕ ∈ Llob ,Mcluob, x |= ϕ iff ϕ ∈ x. Let us analyse the specific
induction case where ϕ = [ψ,G]χ:
• Mc, x |= [ψ,G]χ
iff Mc, x |= τ([ψ,G]χ by Proposition 4.26
iff τ([ψ,G]χ) ∈ x because τ([ψ,G]χ) ∈ Llob
iff [ψ,G]χ ∈ x by axioms R1, . . . , R6.
¤
4.3.3 Decidability and Complexity
In this section, we give some technical results on LUOB. First, LUOB has the finite model
property. In other words:
Proposition 4.28 Let ϕ ∈ Lluob . If ϕ is satisfied in a model of the class C0 then ϕ is satisfied
in a finite model of the class C0.
Proof By propositions 4.3 and 4.26. More precisely, if ϕ is satisfied in C0 then τ(ϕ) is satisfied
in C0 (Proposition 4.26). Thus τ(ϕ) is satisfied in a finite model of C0 (Proposition 4.3) which
implies that ϕ is satisfied in a finite model of C0 (Proposition 4.26 again).
¤
This proposition implies that the problem of satisfiability of Lluob is decidable. We also have
the decidability of the problem of the model checking. More precisely:
Proposition 4.29 The problem of satisfiability of Lluob is PSPACE-complete.
Proposition 4.30 The problem of model checking for Lluob with respect to C0 is in P .
Proof The first is a corollary of propositions 4.4 and 4.5 and the second a corollary of
Proposition 4.6 through the translation τ , using the first property of Proposition 4.26.
¤
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4.4 Arbitrary Update of Objective Beliefs
4.4.1 Syntax and Semantics
With LUOB we could express and understand situations in which agents update their objec-
tive beliefs about the world, as in poker. However, if we limit our language to the operators we
have (Bi and [ϕ, G]) it is impossible to express the notion of arbitrary update. For example,
we would like to say “Alex believes that whatever the agents learn in the future of the game,
he will still believe his hand is winning”. This notion of arbitrary update should be added to
our language, with a new modal operator. We propose in this section such operators inspired
from [Balbiani et al., 2007]. In addition to LUOB gives us the Logic of Arbitrary Update of
Objective Beliefs (LAUOB). These additional operators are of the form [?, G] for any group
of agents G ⊆ AG, with the following reading for [?, G]ψ: “whatever group G agents learn,
ψ is true”. These operators then introduce the wanted notion of arbitrary update. Let us
define more precisely the language of LAUOB Llauob over PROP and AG as follow:
ϕ ::= p | ⊥ | ¬ϕ | ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2 | Biϕ | [ψ,G]ϕ | [?, G]ϕ
where p ∈ PROP , i ∈ AG, G ⊆ AG and ψ ∈ Lpl .
We then generalize the satisfiability relation, for the same models of the class C0, in the
following way:
• (M, s) |= [?, G]ϕ iff for every boolean formula ψ, (M, s) |= [ψ,G]ϕ.
Here again, bisimulation is a useful notion, as two bisimilar models satisfy the same formulas:
Proposition 4.31 Let M = (S,R, V ), M′ = (S′, R′, V ′) be two models and s0 ∈ S, s′0 ∈ S′
be two states of these models. If (M, s0)←→(M′, s′0) then (M, s0) |= ϕ iff (M′, s′0) |= ϕ for
any formula ϕ ∈ Llauob .
This proposition can easily be showed by induction on the structure of ϕ.
Proposition 4.32 The following formulas are valid in all models of the class C0 :
(T ) [?, G]ϕ → ϕ,
(4) [?, G]ϕ → [?, G][?, G]ϕ,
(CR) 〈?, G〉[?, H ]ϕ → [?, H ]〈?, G〉ϕ.
First, remark that the formulas of the form [?, G ∪ H]ϕ → [?, G][?, H ]ϕ are not all
valid in any model of the class C0. For example, the formula [?, {i, j}](Bip → BiBjp) →
[?, {i}][?, {j}](Bip → BiBjp) is not valid in the model presented in Figure 4.3 (that belongs
to the class C0).
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1•p i,ji,j 0•¬p i,j
Figure 4.3: Two counter-examples in one model
In fact, if i and j learn p together (i.e. if the update is public), as described by the first
part of the formula, they will believe (correctly) that the other believes p. However, if they
learn p privately, one after the other, as described by the second part of the formula, they
will not update anything about the other agent beliefs.
Also remark that the formulas of the form [?, G]〈?, H〉ϕ → 〈?, H〉[?, G]ϕ are not valid
in any model of the class C0 either. For example, the formula [?, {i}]〈?, {j}〉(Bip ⊕ Bjp) →
〈?, {j}〉[?, {i}](Bip⊕Bjp) — where the operator ⊕ denotes the exclusive disjunction— is not
valid in this very model. Indeed, whatever i learns about the value of p, j can learn something
so that one and only one of the two agents believes that p. But it is not true that one of the
agents can learn something so that whatever the other learns one and only one of the two
agents will believe that p.
Proof (of Proposition 4.32) Let M = (S,R, V ) be a model of the class C0, s ∈ S be a
state of the model and ϕ ∈ Llauob be a formula.
(T ): Suppose that (M, s) |= [?, G]ϕ and (M, s) 6|= ϕ. Then, (M, s) |= [>, G]ϕ. Therefore,
(U>,G(M), (s, 1)) |= ϕ. By Proposition 4.10, the submodel of U>,G(M) generated from (s, 1)
and the submodel of M generated from s are bisimilar. This is in contradiction with Propo-
sition 4.31.
(4): Suppose that (M, s) |= [?, G]ϕ and (M, s) 6|= [?, G][?, G]ϕ. Then,
there exists a boolean formula ψ1 such that (M, s) 6|= [ψ1, G][?, G]ϕ. Therefore,
(M, s) |= ψ1 and (Uψ1,G(M), (s, 1)) 6|= [?, G]ϕ. Then, there exists a boolean formula
ψ2 such that (Uψ1,G(M), (s, 1)) 6|= [ψ2, G]ϕ. Therefore, (Uψ1,G(M), (s, 1)) |= ψ2 and
(Uψ2,G(Uψ1,G(M)), ((s, 1), 1)) 6|= ϕ. By Proposition 4.12, the submodel of Uψ1,G(Uψ2,G(M))
generated from ((s, 1), 1) and the submodel of Uψ1∧ψ2,G(M) generated from (s, 1) are bisimi-
lar. This is in contradiction with Proposition 4.31.
(CR): Suppose that (M, s) |= 〈?, G〉[?, H ]ϕ and (M, s) 6|= [?, H ]〈?, G〉ϕ.
Then there exists a boolean formula ψ1 such that (M, s) |= 〈ψ1, G〉[?, H ]ϕ and a
boolean formula ψ2 such that (M, s) 6|= [ψ2, H ]〈?, G〉ϕ. Therefore, (M, s) |= ψ1,
(Uψ1,G(M), (s, 1)) |= [H]ϕ, (M, s) |= ψ2, (Uψ2,G(M), (s, 1)) 6|= 〈?, G〉ϕ. Thus,
(Uψ1,G(M), (s, 1)) |= ψ2, (Uψ2,H(Uψ1,G(M)), ((s, 1), 1)) |= ϕ, (Uψ2,H(M), (s, 1)) |= ψ1 and
(Uψ1,G(Uψ2,H(M)), ((s, 1), 1)) 6|= ϕ. By Proposition 4.13, the submodel of Uψ2,H(Uψ1,G(M))
generated from ((s, 1), 1) and the submodel of Uψ1,G(Uψ2,H(M)) generated from ((s, 1), 1) are
bisimilar. This is in contradiction with Proposition 4.31.
¤
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4.4.2 Axiomatization and Completeness
Here are LAUOB axioms:
(LUOB) LUOB axioms
(S0) [?, G](ψ → χ) → ([?, G]ψ → [?, G]χ),
(S1) [?, G]ϕ → [ψ,G]ϕ, where ψ ∈ Lpl .
The axiom S1 has a simple interpretation. If after whatever group G of agents learn, ϕ
becomes true, then for any boolean formula ψ, after group G of agents learn ψ, ϕ becomes
true . However, it is not sufficient to ensure completeness of LAUOB for the class C0. In
order to obtain this result, we have to add the following inference rules:
(GAU) if ϕ is a theorem then [?, G]ϕ is a theorem,
(X) if θ([ψ,G]ϕ) is a theorem for all ψ ∈ Lpl then θ([?, G]ϕ) is a theorem.
In the inference rule X, θ represents a necessity form. Necessity forms were introduced by
[Goldblatt, 1982] and are similar to the notion of admissible form. More precisely:
Definition 4.33 (Necessity form for Llauob) A necessity form is an element of the set
defined inductively as follows:
• ] is a necessity form,
• if θ is a necessity form then for every formula ϕ ∈ Llauob , (ϕ −→ θ) is a necessity form,
• if θ is a necessity form then for every agent i ∈ AG, Biθ is a necessity form.
• if θ is a necessity form then for every ψ ∈ Lpl and every group G ⊆ AG, [ψ,G]θ is a
necessity form.
Note that ] appears exactly once in every necessity form. Now for every necessity form θ
and for every formula ϕ ∈ Llauob , θ(ϕ) denotes the formula obtained from θ by replacing the
unique occurrence of ] in θ by ϕ.
Proposition 4.34 and 4.39 establish the soundness and the completeness of LAUOB with
respect to the class of models C0
Proposition 4.34 Let ϕ ∈ Llauob be a formula. Then ϕ is a theorem of LAUOB only if ϕ
is valid in every model of the class C0.
Proof It is sufficient to show soundness of the additive axioms and inference rules. It is
evident for S0, S1 and GAU . We show soundness of the rule X. Suppose that θ([?, G]ϕ) is
not valid, i.e. there exists a pointed model M, s such that M, s |= ¬θ([?, G]ϕ). Therefore
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there exists ψ ∈ Lpl such that M, s |= ¬θ([ψ,G]ϕ). Hence, θ([ψ,G]ϕ) is not valid for this
particular ψ, which implies that it is not true that for all ψ ∈ Lpl , θ([ψ, G]ϕ) is valid.
¤
We define now the canonical model for this LAUOB. It is a different notion than the
notion of canonical model we saw until now. This difference comes from the infinitary nature
of the inference rule (X). Let us see it in details:
A set x of formulas is called a theory if it satisfies the following conditions:
• x contains the set of all theorems;
• x is closed under the rule of modus ponens and the rule (X).
Obviously, the least theory is the set of all theorems whereas the greatest theory is the set of
all formulas. The latter theory is called the trivial theory. A theory x is said to be consistent
if ⊥ 6∈ x. Let us remark that the only inconsistent theory is the set of all formulas. We shall
say that a theory x is maximal if for all formulas ϕ, ϕ ∈ x or ¬ϕ ∈ x. We abbreviate mct for
maximal consistent theory.
Let x be a set of formulas. For every ϕ ∈ Llauob , every ψ ∈ Lpl , every i ∈ AG and every
G ⊆ AG we define:
• x + ϕ = {χ ∈ Llauob | ϕ → χ ∈ x}
• Bix = {χ ∈ Llauob | Biχ ∈ x}
• [ψ, G]x = {χ ∈ Llauob | [ψ,G]χ ∈ x}
• [?, G]x = {χ ∈ Llauob | [?, G]χ ∈ x}
Lemma 4.35 Let x be a theory, ϕ ∈ Llauob , ψ ∈ Lpl , i ∈ AG and G ⊆ AG . Then x + ϕ,
Bix, [ψ, G]x and [?, G]x are theories. Moreover x + ϕ is consistent iff ¬ϕ 6∈ x.
Proof
• x + ϕ is a theory.
First, let us prove that x + ϕ contains the set of all theorems, by proving a useful
property: x ⊆ x + ϕ. Let χ ∈ x, we know that χ → (ϕ → χ) is a theorem. By modus
ponens we then have that χ ∈ x + ϕ.
Now let us prove that x + ϕ is closed under modus ponens. Let χ1, χ2 be formulas such
that χ1 ∈ x + ϕ and χ1 → χ2 ∈ x + ϕ. Thus ϕ → χ1 ∈ x and ϕ → (χ1 → χ2) ∈ x. But
then ϕ → χ2 ∈ x.
Third, let us prove that x+ϕ is closed under (X). Let θ be a possibility form and ψ be a
formula such that θ([ψ,G]χ) ∈ x+ϕ for all ψ ∈ Lpl . It follows that ϕ → θ([ψ,G]χ) ∈ x
for all ψ ∈ Lpl . Since x is a theory, then ϕ → θ([?, G]χ) ∈ x. Consequently, θ([?, G]χ) ∈
x + ϕ. It follows that x + ϕ is closed under (X).
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• Bix is a theory.
First, let us prove that Bix contains the set of all theorems. Let ψ be a theorem. By the
necessitation of knowledge, Biψ is also a theorem. Since x is a theory, then Biψ ∈ x.
Therefore, ψ ∈ Bix. It follows that Bix contains the set of all theorems. Second, let us
prove that Bix is closed under modus ponens. Let ψ, χ be formulas such that ψ ∈ Bix
and ψ → χ ∈ Kax. Thus, Biψ ∈ x and Bi(ψ → χ) ∈ x. Since Biψ → (Bi(ψ → χ) →
Biχ) is a theorem and x is a theory, then Biψ → (Bi(ψ → χ) → Biχ) ∈ x. Since x
is closed under modus ponens, then Biχ ∈ x. Hence, χ ∈ Bix. It follows that Bix
is closed under modus ponens. Third, let us prove that Bix is closed under (X). Let
θ be a necessity form, G ⊆ AG be a group of agents and ϕ be a formula such that
θ([ψ,G]ϕ) ∈ Bix for all ψ ∈ Lpl . It follows that Bi(θ([ψ,G]ϕ)) ∈ x for all ψ ∈ Lpl .
Since x is a theory, then Biθ([ψ,G]ϕ)) ∈ x. Consequently, θ([ψ,G]ϕ) ∈ Bix. It follows
that Bix is closed under (X).
• [ψ,G]x and [?, G]x are theories.
We obtain this result with the same proof than the previous one, considering that this
two modal operators satisfy the axiom (K) and the necessitation rule.
• Finally, x+ϕ is consistent only if ¬ϕ 6∈ x (because ϕ ∈ x+ϕ). Reciprocally, ⊥ ∈ (x+ϕ)
implies that (ϕ → ⊥) ∈ x and this implies that ¬ϕ ∈ x.
¤
Lemma 4.36 (Lindenbaum lemma) Let x be a consistent theory. There exists a maximal
consistent theory y such that x ⊆ y.
Proof Let ϕ0, ϕ1, . . . be a list of the set of all formulas. We define a sequence y0, y1, . . . of
consistent theories as follows. First, let y0 = x. Second, suppose that, for some n ≥ 0, yn
is a consistent theory containing x that has been already defined. If yn + ϕn is inconsistent
and yn + ¬ϕn is inconsistent then, by lemma 4.35, ¬ϕn ∈ yn and ¬¬ϕn ∈ yn. Since ¬ϕn →
(¬¬ϕn → ⊥) is a theorem, then ¬ϕn → (¬¬ϕn → ⊥) ∈ yn. Since yn is closed under modus
ponens, then ⊥ ∈ yn: a contradiction. Hence, either yn + ϕn is consistent or yn + ¬ϕn is
consistent. If yn + ϕn is consistent then we define yn+1 = yn + ϕn. Otherwise, ¬ϕn ∈ yn and
we consider two cases.
Either ϕn is not a conclusion of (X). Then, we define yn+1 = yn.
Or ϕn is a conclusion of (X). In this case, let θ([?, G1]χ1), . . ., θ([?, Gk]χk) be all the
representations of ϕn as a conclusion of (X). Such representations are necessarily finitely
many because there is a finite number of modal operators of the form [?, G] in ϕn. We define
the sequence y0n, . . . , y
k
n of consistent theories as follows. First, let y
0
n = yn. Second, suppose
that, for some i < k, yin is a consistent theory containing yn that has been already defined.
Then it contains ¬θ([?, G1]χ1) = ϕn. Since yin is closed under (X), then there exists a formula
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ψ ∈ Lpl such that θ([ψ,G1]χ1) is not in yin. Then, we define yi+1n = yin +¬θ([ψ,G1]χ1). Now,
we put yn+1 = ykn. Finally, we define y = y0 ∪ y1 ∪ . . .. Clearly if y is a theory then it is a
maximal consistent theory such that x ⊆ y. Let us then prove that it is a theory.
1. It contains the set of all theorems because x ⊆ y
2. It is closed under modus ponens. Indeed, if {χ, (χ −→ ϕ)} ⊆ y then there exists n ∈ N
such that {χ, (χ −→ ϕ)} ⊆ yn. Thus, yn being a theory, we obtain ϕ ∈ yn and then
ϕ ∈ y.
3. It is closed under (X) by construction: suppose that θ([ψ,G]χ) ∈ y for all ψ ∈ Lpl .
Let us call ϕn the formula it represented by θ([?, G]χ). We want to show that ϕn ∈ y.
Suppose the opposite, ¬ϕn ∈ y. This means that ¬ϕn ∈ yn by construction, i.e.
¬θ([?, G]χ) ∈ yn. Therefore there exists a ψ ∈ Lpl such that ¬θ([ψ,G]χ) ∈ yn+1 by
construction again. This is a contradiction, considering that yn+1 ⊆ y.
¤
The canonical model of LAUOB is the structure Mc = (W c,Rc, V c) defined as follows:
• W c is the set of all maximal consistent theories ;
• For all agents i, Ri is the binary relation on W c defined by xRiy iff Bix ⊆ y;
• For all atoms p, V c(p) = {x ∈ W c | p ∈ x}.
Proposition 4.37 The canonical model of LAUOB is a model of the class C0.
Proof Identical to the proof of Proposition 4.1.
¤
Proposition 4.38 (Truth lemma) Let ϕ be a formula in Llauob . Then for all maximal
consistent theories x, for all n ∈ N, for all ψ1, . . . , ψn ∈ Lpl and all G1, . . . , Gn ⊆ AG such
that ψ1 ∧ . . . ∧ ψn ∈ x, for all ϕ ∈ Llauob :
UPn(Mc, x) |= ϕ iff [ψ1, G1] . . . [ψn, Gn]ϕ ∈ x.
Proof The proof is by induction on the structure of ϕ. The base case follows from the
definition of V . The Boolean cases are trivial. It remains to deal with the modalities.
• ϕ = Biχ : Let μ be the sequence obtained from [ψ1, G1] . . . [ψn, Gn] eliminating all
the [ψ,G] such that i /∈ G. Without loss of generality, we consider that μ =
[ψ1, G1] . . . [ψm, Gm] with 0 6 m 6 n.
UPn(Mc, x) 6|= Biχ
iff UPm(Mc, x) 6|= Biχ (by Proposition 4.21)
iff there exists a mct y such that xRiy, ψ1 ∧ . . . ∧ ψm ∈ y and UPm(Mc, y) 6|= χ
iff (1) there exists a mct y s.t. Bix ⊆ y and [ψ1, G1] . . . [ψm, Gm]χ 6∈ y (by IH).
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Now, (1) is equivalent to (2) : [ψ1, G1] . . . [ψm, Gm]Biχ 6∈ x.
Indeed, if [ψ1, G1] . . . [ψm, Gm]Biχ ∈ x then Bi[ψ1, G1] . . . [ψm, Gm]χ ∈ x by Axiom R5,
and thus [ψ1, G1] . . . [ψm, Gm]χ ∈ y for any mct y such that Bix ⊆ y.
Conversely, if [ψ1, G1] . . . [ψm, Gm]Biχ 6∈ x then Bi[ψ1, G1] . . . [ψm, Gm]χ 6∈ x by Axiom
R5. Let y = Bix + ¬[ψ1, G1] . . . [ψm, Gm]χ. The reader may easily verify that y is a
consistent theory. By Lemma 4.36, there is a maximal consistent theory z such that
y ⊆ z. Hence, Bix ⊆ z and [ψ1, G1] . . . [ψm, Gm]χ 6∈ z Q.E.D.
We end this case by noting that [ψ1, G1] . . . [ψm, Gm]Biχ 6∈ x is equivalent to
[ψ1, G1] . . . [ψn, Gn]Biχ 6∈ x by axiom R6.
• ϕ = [ψ,G]χ : UPn(Mc, x) |= [ψ,G]χ
iff Uψ,G(UPn(Mc), (. . . (x, 1), . . . , 1) |= χ
iff UPn+1(Mc, x) |= χ (with an evident notation)
iff [ψ1, G1] . . . [ψn, Gn][ψ,G]ϕ ∈ x by IH
• ϕ = [?, G]χ : UPn(Mc, x) |= [?, G]χ
iff for all ψ ∈ Lpl,UPn(Mc, x) |= [ψ,G]χ
iff for all ψ ∈ Lpl,UPn(Mc, x) |= ψ implies Uψ,G(UPn(Mc, x)) |= χ
iff for all ψ ∈ Lpl, [ψ1, G1] . . . [ψn, Gn]ψ ∈ x implies Uψ,G(UPn(Mc, x)) |= χ by IH
iff for all ψ ∈ Lpl, ψ1 ∧ . . . ψn ∧ ψ ∈ x (recall ψ ∈ Lpl ) implies UPn+1(Mc, x) |= χ
iff for all ψ ∈ Lpl, ψ1 ∧ . . . ψn ∧ ψ ∈ x implies [ψ1, G1] . . . [ψn, Gn][ψ, G]χ ∈ x by IH
iff for all ψ ∈ Lpl, ψ1 ∧ . . . ψn ∈ x implies
{
ψ ∈ x and [ψ1, G1] . . . [ψ,G]χ ∈ x
ψ /∈ x and [ψ1, G1] . . . [ψ,G]χ ∈ x
iff ψ1 ∧ . . . ψn ∈ x implies for all ψ ∈ Lpl, [ψ1, G1] . . . [ψn, Gn][ψ, G]χ ∈ x
iff ψ1 ∧ . . . ψn ∈ x implies for all ψ ∈ Lpl, [ψ1, G1] . . . [ψn, Gn][?, G]χ ∈ x (by (X))
¤
Theorem 4.39 The axiomatization LAUOB is sound and complete with respect to the class
of models C0.
Proof Soundness has been proved in Proposition 4.34.
Let ϕ ∈ Llauob be a a valid formula, then it is valid in the canonical model. Therefore by
Proposition 4.38 it is in every maximal consistent theory. Hence, it is a theorem of LAUOB.
Indeed, if it were not the case, then there would exists a consistent theory x such that
¬ϕ ∈ x. Therefore, by Lemma 4.36 there exists a mct y such that x ⊆ y. Therefore ¬ϕ ∈ y.
Contradiction.
¤
Clearly, Llauob is at least as expressive as Lluob . However is Llauob more expressive than
Lluob? To answer this question, we consider the formula χ := 〈?, {i, j}〉(Bip ∧ ¬BjBip) and
the models M and Mq (members of C0) presented in Figure 4.4.
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Figure 4.4: Distinguishing Llauob from Lluob
We let the reader see that (Mq, 11) |= 〈?, {i, j}〉(Bip ∧ ¬BjBip) and (M, 1) 6|=
〈?, {i, j}〉(Bip ∧ ¬BjBip). Let us suppose that χ is equivalent to a formula χ′ ∈ Lluob .
Then χ′ would be satisfied in the same way in every model composing any couple of bisimilar
models with respect to the language restricted to the atoms appearing in χ′. Let us take an
atom q that does not appear in χ′. Thus (Mq, 11) and (M, 1) are bisimilar with respect to
the language restricted to the atoms appearing in χ′. Then the formula χ is not equivalent
to any formula of Lluob . That means that Llauob is more expressive than Lluob (it contains at
least χ in extra).
Neither we have results on the finite model property of this logic, nor on the complexity
of the problem of satisfiability. But we get the following:
Proposition 4.40 The problem of the model checking of Llauob with respect to C0 is
PSPACE-complete.
Proof This proof is analogous to the proof of the complexity of the model checking of Lgal
with respect to the models of MS5 (Theorem 5.33). See Section 5 to get more details.
¤
4.5 Case Study
We examine the situation presented in Figure 4.5. Brune and Alex are in a Poker final face to
face. Brune gets a pair of Kings in her hand. She knows it is a very good game. Alex has the
ace of spades, and another spades. When Brune proposes her bet, Alex checks to see what
will happen. The game becomes particularly interesting when, as for this example, several
players have a good hand and imagine easily to have the winning one.
Let us specify our language in this case. We pose AG = {a, b} for Alex and Brune, and
PROP = {V Ci|V ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, . . . , J,Q,K}, C ∈ {♣,♥,♦,♠}, i ∈ AG∪{t}}∪{Φa}. We read
V Ci by ‘the present deal gives the card of value V and color C to i”. When i is t (for table),
or to be more readable when i is missing, it means that the card is (or will be) dealt on
the table. Φa means that Alex has the winning hand (following poker rules). We abbreviate
Φb := ¬Φa.
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Figure 4.5: Brune wins with a “poker”
We consider the initial poker model MP . All possible deals are considered (as states of
the model). Any agent can distinguish two states if and only her own cards are different. More
precisely, we pose MP = (S, V, {Ri}i∈AG). Thus, we have: S = {(ca, cb, {p5, p6, p7}, p8, p9) |
ci = {p1i , p2i }, the propositions appearing are all different and the pja are of V Ca form }. Also,
for every proposition p, V (p) is the set of deals in which p appears. Finally, Ri links two states
if and only if the ci is identical in both deals. Note that we have (522 )× (502 )× (483 )× 45× 44 =
5.56×1013 different possible deals. Therefore this is a gigantic model of fifty million of millions
of states.
This representation clearly has some limits. A poker player probably does not repre-
sent herself all the possible deals; she would rather think in terms of probability to win.
Nevertheless, this probability corresponds to a simplified representation of this huge model.
Furthermore, a poker game includes other kinds of communicative acts besides announce-
ments, that give information on the players’ intentions or feelings. These communicative acts
are probably the heart of the game, and we cannot formalize them here. Yet, our position is
not to propose a formalism that contains all the characteristics of poker, but only the aspects
linked to the notion of objective belief that are clearly part of this game.
We examine two different situations, presented in Figure 4.6, situations in which the initial
cards received by Brune (cb) are different, but the other cards (dealt to Alex and dealt on
the table) are identical. Alex has the ace and the 9 of spades. In the first case (d1) Brune
has a pair of Kings (diamonds and clubs), in the second (d2) she has a pair of 2 (diamonds
and hearts). In both cases, the cards dealt on the table are first the 7, the 2 and the King of
spades, then the King of hearts and eventually the 9 of diamonds.
In both contexts, we use the following abbreviations:
• FLOP := 7♠ ∧ 2♠ ∧K♠
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Figure 4.6: Two deals: d1 and d2
• TURN := FLOP ∧K♥
• RIV ER := TURN ∧ 9♦
Here are some formulas that are true in this model, in the first context (Brune having a
pair of Kings)
• MP , d1 |= 〈FLOP, {a, b}〉(Ba7♠∧BaBb7♠) : After the flop, Alex believes that the 7 of
spades is dealt on the table, and that Brune believes the same fact.
• MP , d1 |= 〈FLOP, {a, b}〉Bb[R♥, {a, b}]Φb: After the flop, Brune believes that if the
King of hearts is dealt, she will have the winning hand.
• MP , d1 |= 〈TURN, {a, b}〉BbΦb: After the turn, Brune believes she has the winning
hand
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What is the difference between the two situations? In both cases, both players have a very
good hand (Alex has a flush and Brune either a poker or a full house). In both cases also,
Brune has the winning hand. The difference is that at some moment of the game (here after
the turn), Brune will be sure that she has the winning hand. In other (formal) words:
• MP , d1 |= 〈?, {a, b}〉(BbΦb ∧ Bˆa¬BbΦb)
• MP , d2 |= [?, {a, b}](Φb ∧ ¬BbΦb)
Now let us consider the possibility that a player cheats by looking at the other player’s
hand. With that possibility, for the deal d1, Alex could learn that Brune believes that she
has the winning hand. While for the deal d2 he could learn instead that she does not have
the information that she has the winning hand:
• MP , d1 |= 〈?, a〉(BaBbΦb)
• MP , d2 |= 〈?, a〉Ba(Φb ∧ ¬BbΦb)
In this second case he could be tempted to try a bluff. But Brune may cheat as well.
In that case she would know that she has a winning hand, but Alex may never get this
information, whatever he could learn afterwards (even by cheating):
• MP , d2 |= 〈?, b〉(BbΦb ∧ [?, a]Bˆa¬BbΦB)
Chapter 5
Group Announcement Logic
The previous sections worked on the kind of information that is given during a communica-
tion. The following one deals with the results a group of agents can achieve by announcing
something: agents of the group G can obtain ϕ if they each of them can do a (simultaneous)
announcement such that after such announcements ϕ becomes true.
[van Benthem, 2004] and [Balbiani et al., 2007] suggested an interpretation of the stan-
dard modal diamond where ♦ϕ means “there is an announcement after which ϕ” (see Section
3.1). This was in a setting going back to the Fitch-paradox (see [Brogaard and Salerno, 2004]).
The new interpretation of the diamond ♦ in the Fitch setting firstly interprets ♦ϕ as ‘some-
time later, ϕ’, and secondly specifies this temporal specification as what may result of a
specific event, namely a public announcement: ‘after some announcement, ϕ’. In other
words, the semantics is: ♦ϕ is true if and only if 〈ψ〉ϕ is true for some ψ; the expression
〈ψ〉ϕ stands for ‘ψ is true and after ψ is announced, ϕ is true.’ There are some restrictions
on ψ. The resulting arbitrary announcement logic is axiomatisable and has various pleas-
ing properties (see [Balbiani et al., 2007], and for more detail the extended journal version
[Balbiani et al., 2008]). Arbitrary announcement logic makes no assumption on the interpre-
tation of ♦ϕ about who makes the announcement, or indeed whether or not the announcement
can be truthfully made by anyone. In the current chapter we investigate a variant of arbi-
trary announcement logic. Instead of ♦ϕ we use a more specific operator, namely 〈G〉ϕ. Here
G is a subgroup of all agents that simultaneously make truthful public announcements, i.e.,
announcements of formulas they know. In other words, let G = {1, . . . , k}, then: 〈G〉ϕ is true
if and only if there exist formulas ψ1, . . . , ψk such that 〈K1ψ1 ∧ . . .Kkψk〉ϕ is true; now, the
expression 〈K1ψ1 ∧ . . .Kkψk〉ϕ stands for K1ψ1 ∧ . . .Kkψk is true and after agents 1, . . . , k,
simultaneously announce ψ1, . . . , ψk, then ϕ is true’. Note that the remaining agents, not in-
cluded in the set G of k agents, are not involved in making the announcement, although they
are aware of that action happening. The resulting logic is called Group Announcement Logic
(GAL). Informally speaking, 〈G〉ϕ expresses the fact that coalition G has the ability to make
ϕ come about. Logics modelling the coalitional abilities of agents have been an active area of
research in multi-agent systems in recent years, the most prominent frameworks being Pauly’s
Coalition Logic ([Pauly, 2002]) and Alur, Henzinger and Kupferman’s Alternating-time Tem-
poral Logic ([Alur et al., 2002]). The main constructs of these logics are indeed of the form
〈G〉ϕ with the intuitive meaning that coalition G can achieve ϕ. In this chapter we investigate
these notions when the actions that can be performed are truthful public announcements.
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Section 5.1 defines group announcement logic, presents various interaction axioms between
the different modalities that express intuitive properties of such joint announcements, and
the axiomatization. Section 5.2 is entirely devoted to expressivity matters, and Section 5.3
to model checking. The relation between group announcement logic and various notions of
group ability, including knowledge ‘de re’ and knowledge ‘de dicto’, is discussed in detail in
Section 5.4, which is followed by a more applied Section 5.5 that embeds these observations
into security protocols for two agents (sender and receiver) in the presence of a finite number
of eavesdroppers intercepting all communications between them. Most of this chapter has
been published in [A˚gotnes et al., 2010].
5.1 Group Announcement Logic
The main construct of the language of Group Announcement Logic (GAL) is 〈G〉ϕ, intuitively
meaning that there is some announcement the group G can truthfully make after which ϕ
will be true. Such a simultaneous announcement may sound like a lot of unintelligible noise.
But in fact it merely means a joint public action—not necessarily involving talking. We later
find ways to model subsequent announcements as sequences of simultaneous actions, making
the basic semantic idea even less appear as shouting in groups.
5.1.1 Language
The language Lgal of GAL over a set of propositions PROP and a set of agents AG is defined
by extending the language Lpal of PAL (introduced in Section 3.1.1) with a new operator [G]
for each coalition G:
Definition 5.1 (Language)
ϕ ::= p | ⊥ | ¬ϕ | ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2 | Kiϕ | [ϕ1]ϕ2 | [G]ϕ
where i ∈ AG is an agent, G ⊆ AG is a set of agents and p ∈ PROP . We write 〈G〉ϕ for
the dual ¬[G]¬ϕ and 〈i〉ϕ for 〈{i}〉ϕ. For the subset of atoms occurring in a formula ϕ we,
again, write Θϕ.
We adopt the standard definition for the notion of subformula.
5.1.2 Semantics
The interpretation of formulas in a pointed Kripke structure is defined by extending the
definition for PAL (see Definition 3.2) with a clause for the new operator:
Definition 5.2 (Semantics of GAL)
M, s |= [G]ϕ iff for every set {ψi : i ∈ G} ⊆ Lel, M, s |= [
∧
i∈G Kiψi]ϕ
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We get the following meaning for the dual 〈G〉ϕ := ¬[G]¬ϕ:
M, s |= 〈G〉ϕ iff there exists a set {ψi : i ∈ G} ⊆ Lel such that M, s |= 〈
∧
i∈G Kiψi〉ϕ
If we write this out in detail, we get: M, s |= 〈G〉ϕ iff there exists a set {ψi : i ∈ G} ⊆ Lel
such that M, s |= ∧i∈G Kiψi and M|∧i∈G Kiψi, s |= ϕ.
Observe that 〈G〉 quantifies only over purely epistemic formulas. The reason for this is
as follows. First, in the semantics of 〈G〉ϕ the formulas ψi in
∧
i∈G Kiψi cannot be unre-
stricted Lgal formulas, as that would make the definition circular: such a ψi could then be
the formula 〈G〉ϕ itself that we are trying to interpret. We therefore avoid quantifying over
formulas containing 〈G〉 operators. However, as public announcement logic is equally expres-
sive as epistemic logic within the class of all models ([Plaza, 1989]), the semantics obtained
by quantifying over the fragment of the language without 〈G〉 operators is the same as the
semantics obtained by quantifying only over epistemic formulas.
As usual, a formula ϕ is valid on M, notation M |= ϕ, iff M, s |= ϕ for all s in the
domain of M; and a formula ϕ is valid, |= ϕ, iff M |= ϕ for all M. The denotation of ϕ on
M, notation [[ϕ]]M is defined as {s ∈ S | M, s |= ϕ}. The set of validities of the logic is called
GAL (group announcement logic).
Proposition 5.3 Let two models M = (S,R, V ) and M′ = (S′,R′, V ′) be given. Let
ϕ ∈ Lgal be a formula. For all s ∈ S and for all s′ ∈ S′, if (M, s)←→(M′, s′) then M, s |= ϕ
iff M′, s′ |= ϕ.
Proof The proof is by induction on the number n of group announcement modality that
appear in the formula. If n = 0, it is the epistemic case, already underlined in Proposition
2.14. Now let us suppose that it is true for all formula with at most n−1 group announcement
operators and let us prove for any formula with at most n by induction on the structure of
ϕ. The base case is by the the main IH, the boolean cases are trivial. For the epistemic
modality, as in [Fagin et al., 1995], we use the back and forth conditions in the definition of
bisimulation. It remains to deal with the group announcement modality:
M, s |= 〈G〉ϕ
iff there exists ψ1, . . . , ψn ∈ Lel such that M, s |= 〈
∧
i∈AG Kiψi〉ϕ
iff there exists ψ1, . . . , ψn ∈ Lel such that M′, s′ |= 〈
∧
i∈AG Kiψi〉ϕ by the main IH
iff M′, s′ |= 〈G〉ϕ
¤
5.1.3 Logical Properties
To sharpen the intuition about the logic we mention some relevant validities, with particular
attention to interaction between group announcement and epistemic modal operators. Ex-
amples are |= [G]ϕ −→ [G][G]ϕ (Corollary 5.6), |= 〈G〉[G]ϕ → [G]〈G〉ϕ (Corollary 5.12), and
Ki[i]ϕ ←→ [i]Kiϕ (Proposition 5.13).
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Elementary validities
Proposition 5.4
1. 〈G〉p → p and 〈G〉¬p → ¬p. (atomic propositions do not change value)
2. 〈∅〉ϕ ↔ ϕ and [∅]ϕ ↔ ϕ (the empty group is powerless)
3. 〈Kj1ψj1 ∧ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∧Kjkψjk〉ϕ → 〈{j1, . . . , jk}〉ϕ
4. ϕ −→ 〈G〉ϕ (truth axiom)
The easy proofs are ommited. They use the following ideas:
1. In public announcement logic, and its ‘derivatives’, factual truths never change value.
2. The conjunction of an empty set of formulas is, as usual, taken to be a tautology.
3. Obvious (note that ψj1 , . . . , ψjk are purely epistemic formulas).
4. If all agents announce ‘true’, nothing changes to the system.
An announcement by the empty group (the second property above) corresponds to a “clock
tick”, a dynamic transition without informative effect. We could also see this as “nobody says
a thing” (and this now happens...). In fact you could even see this as ‘everybody says true’,
an announcement by the public (as in the fourth property): in other words, the group of all
agents have the option not to exercise their power.
Sequences of group announcements Intuitively, 〈G〉ϕ means that G can achieve a situ-
ation where ϕ is true in “one step”, by making a joint announcement. One can easily imagine
situations where it could be interesting to reason about what a group can achieve by making
repeated announcements, i.e., by a sequence of announcements, one after the other, or a com-
munication protocol. A general example is a conversation over an open channel. We want to
express that “there is some sequence, of arbitrary length, of announcements by G which will
ensure that ϕ becomes true”.
For arbitrary public announcement logic (APAL), the validity of the principle ¤ϕ −→
¤¤ϕ follows from the simple observation that a sequence of two announcements ψ and χ is
equivalent to the single announcement of ψ ∧ [ψ]χ (see [Plaza, 1989]). Less obvious is that
[G]ϕ −→ [G][G]ϕ is also valid, because now we have to show that two conjunctions of known
formulas are again such a conjunction.
Proposition 5.5 |= [G ∪H]ϕ −→ [G][H]ϕ
Proof The diamond version 〈G〉〈H〉ϕ −→ 〈G ∪ H〉ϕ of this validity makes clear that
the requirement is that two successive announcements respectively by the agents in G
simultaneously and in H simultaneously can also be seen as a single announcement by the
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agents in G ∪ H simultaneously. Let us prove how it can be done. Consider two successive
announcements
∧
i∈G Kiϕi and
∧
j∈H Kjψj . Let a Kripke structure M and a state s in M
be given such that M, s |= ∧i∈G Kiϕi, and similarly ∧j∈H Kjψj is true in state s in the
restriction of M to the ∧i∈G Kiϕi-states: M|∧i∈G Kiϕi, s |= ∧j∈H Kjψj .
Then we have:
M, s |= 〈∧i∈G Kiϕi〉〈∧j∈H Kjψj〉θ
only if M, s |= 〈∧i∈G Kiϕi ∧ [∧g∈G Kgϕg]∧j∈H Kjψj〉θ
only if M, s |= 〈∧i∈G Kiϕi ∧∧i∈H\G Ki> ∧ [∧g∈G Kgϕg](∧j∈H Kjψj ∧∧j∈G\H Kj>)〉θ
because for any agent i, Ki> is a valid formula
only if M, s |= 〈∧i∈G∪H(Kiϕi ∧ [∧g∈G Kgϕg]Kiψi)〉θ
with ∀i ∈ H\G, ϕi = > and ∀j ∈ G\H, ψj = >.
only if M, s |= 〈∧i∈G∪H(Kiϕi ∧ ((∧g∈G Kgϕg) −→ Ki[∧g∈G Kgϕg]ψi))〉θ
by a reduction axiom of PAL
only if M, s |= 〈∧i∈G∪H Kiϕi ∧∧i∈G∪H((∧j∈G Kjϕj) −→ Ki[∧j∈G Kjϕj ]ψi)〉θ
by distributing the ∧
only if M, s |= 〈∧i∈G∪H Kiϕi ∧∧i∈G∪H Ki[∧j∈G Kjϕj ]ψi〉θ
because
∧
j∈G Kjϕj is assumed true in the left conjunct of the announcement.
only if M, s |= 〈∧i∈G∪H Ki(ϕi ∧ [∧j∈G Kjϕj ]ψi)〉θ.
¤
Corollary 5.6 |= [G]ϕ −→ [G][G]ϕ
We thus get exactly the property alluded to above:
Corollary 5.7 M, s |= 〈G〉ϕ iff there is a finite sequence of announcements by agents in G
after which ϕ is true.
In Section 5.5 we discuss a security protocol example involving sequences of announcements.
Note that our result does not mean that sequences of announcements can simply be replaced
by a single announcement: whether agents are willing to do an announcement may depend
on the postconditions of such announcements. These may be known to be satisfied after each
announcement in the sequence, but not known to be satisfied initially after the entire sequence.
These matters will be discussed in great detail later.
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Church-Rosser We prove that for all groups G and H of agents, for every formula ϕ ∈ Lgal,
〈G〉[H]ϕ → [H]〈G〉ϕ is a valid formula. The principle is fairly intuitive: it says that when in
a given epistemic state group G or group H make a group announcement, there are additional
announcements by group H (after G’s announcement) and group G (after H’s announcement),
in order to reach a new common state of information. Unfortunately, its proof is rather
involved. This is because group announcements implicitly quantify over all propositional
variables in the language. Towards the proof, we first define the group-announcement depth
d(ϕ) of a formula ϕ:
Let p ∈ PROP , ψ,ψ1, ψ2 ∈ Lgal, i ∈ N , and G ⊆ N be given; then d(p) = 0; d(¬ψ) =
d(Kiψ) = d(ψ); d(ψ1 ∧ ψ2) = d([ψ1]ψ2) = max(d(ψ1), d(ψ2)); and d([G]ψ) = d(ψ) + 1. The
following lemma holds for any number k, but we will only use it for k ≤ |AG|.
Lemma 5.8 Let Q = {qi}i∈N? ⊆ PROP be pairwise distinct primitive propositions, for some
k ∈ N let θ1, . . . , θk be epistemic formulas such that for i = 1 to i = k, Θθi ∩ Q = ∅ and let
ϕ ∈ Lgal be such that Θϕ ∩Q = ∅.
For all ψ ∈ Lgal, define
{
ψα = ψ(θ1/q1, .., θk/qk, q1/qk+1, q2/qk+2, ..)
ψ−α = ψ(qk+1/q1, qk+2/q2, ..)
Then, for all structures M = (S,∼1, . . . ,∼n, V ) there is a valuation function V ′ : PROP →
2S such that
1. [[ϕ]]M = [[ϕ]]M′
2. for all ψ ∈ Lel,
• [[ψ]]M′ = [[ψα]]M
• [[ψ]]M = [[ψ−α]]M′
3. for all i ≤ k, [[qi]]M′ = [[θi]]M′ = [[θi]]M
where M′ = (S,∼1, . . . ,∼n, V ′).
Proof We define V ′ as:

V ′(p) = V (p), for all p /∈ Q
V ′(qi) = [[θi]]M, for all i ≤ k
V ′(qk+i) = V (qi), for all i ≥ 1
Items 2 and 3 follow directly from the definition of V ′. We prove item 1 by induction on
the structure of ϕ, by showing the somewhat stronger following property P (ϕ):
for all submodels M∗ of M, and for all states s ∈M∗: M∗, s |= ϕ iff M′∗, s |= ϕ.
Base case: ϕ = p ∈ PROP . M∗, s |= p iff M′∗, s |= p follows directly from the definition
of V ′. We also have that M∗, s |= ⊥ iff M′∗, s |= ⊥
Inductive cases: Let us suppose that the property P is true for all eventual ψ, ψ1 and ψ2,
and let us prove it for formulas ϕ of the form ¬ψ,ψ1 ∧ ψ2, Kˆiψ and [ψ1]ψ2. In fact, let M∗
be a submodel of M :
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• ¬ψ: M∗, s |= ¬ψ
iff M∗, s 6|= ψ
iff M′∗, s 6|= ψ (by IH)
iff M′∗, s |= ¬ψ.
• ψ1 ∧ ψ2: M∗, s |= ψ1 ∧ ψ2
iff (M∗, s |= ψ1 and M∗, s |= ψ2)
iff (M′∗, s |= ψ1 and M′∗, s |= ψ2) (by IH)
iff M′∗, s |= ψ1 ∧ ψ2.
• Kiψ: M∗, s |= Kiψ
iff for all t ∼i s , M∗, t |= ψ
iff for all t ∼′i s , M∗′, t |= ψ (by IH and as ∼i = ∼′i)
iff M′∗, s |= Kiψ.
• [ψ1]ψ2: M∗, s |= [ψ1]ψ2
iff (M∗, s |= ψ1 implies M∗|ψ1, s |= ψ2)
iff (M′∗, s |= ψ1 implies (M∗|ψ1)′, s |= ψ2)(using IH twice)
iff (M′∗, s |= ψ1 implies M′∗|ψ1, s |= ψ2)
(using IH again for ψ1, and that V ′ on the restriction is the restriction of V ′)
iff M′∗, s |= [ψ1]ψ2.
• 〈G〉ψ :
M∗, s |= 〈G〉ψ
only if there are χ1, . . . , χ|G| in Lel such that M∗, s |= 〈
∧
Kiχi〉ψ
only if there exists {χi} ⊆ Lel s.t. M∗, s |=
∧
Kiχi and M∗|(
∧
Kiχi), s |= ψ
only if there exists {χi} s.t M′∗, s |= (
∧
Kiχi)−α and (M∗|(
∧
Kiχi))′, s |= ψ (by IH)
only if there exists {χi} s.t M′∗|(
∧
Kiχi)−α, s |= ψ (**)
only if there are χ1, . . . , χ|G| in Lel such that M′∗, s |= 〈
∧
Kiχ
−α
i 〉ψ
only if M′∗, s |= 〈G〉ψ.
M′∗, s |= 〈G〉ψ
only if there are χ1, . . . , χ|G| in Lel such that M′∗, s |= 〈
∧
Kiχi〉ψ
only if there exists {χi} ⊆ Lel s.t. M′∗, s |=
∧
Kiχi and M′∗|(
∧
Kiχi), s |= ψ
only if there exists {χi} s.t. M∗, s |= (
∧
Kiχi)α and (M∗|(
∧
Kiχi)α)′, s |= ψ (**)
only if there are χ1, . . . , χ|G| in Lel such that M∗|(
∧
Kiχi)α, s |= ψ (by IH)
only if there are χ1, . . . , χ|G| in Lel such that M∗, s |= 〈
∧
Kiχ
α
i 〉ψ
only if M∗, s |= 〈G〉ψ.
In (**) we have used (the already shown) property 2 for epistemic formulas.
¤
Proposition 5.9 Let k ≥ 0, ψ and χ be Lgal -formulas and G = {i1, . . . , ik} be a set of
agents. If M, s |= 〈G〉ψ ∧ χ and p1, ..., pk ∈ PROP\(Θψ ∪Θχ), then there is a M′′ different
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from M only on the valuation of the atoms of PROP\(Θψ ∪Θχ) such that M′′, s |= 〈Ki1p1∧
∙ ∙ ∙ ∧Kikpk〉ψ ∧ χ.
Proof We use the previous lemma twice:
1. Let Q be PROP\(Θψ∪Θχ) and qi be pi for all i 6 k, θi be > for all i 6 k and ϕ be 〈G〉ψ.
By Lemma 5.8, there is V ′ such that V ′(pi) = S and [[〈G〉ψ ∧χ]]M′ = [[〈G〉ψ ∧χ]]M. As
M, s |= 〈G〉ψ ∧ χ, we have that M′, s |= 〈G〉ψ ∧ χ. Therefore there are τ1, . . . , τk in Lel
such that M′, s |= 〈∧i∈G Kiτi〉ψ∧χ. Without loss of generality, we can assume that for
all i, j, pi /∈ Θτj . Indeed, for all i, pi is equivalent to > in M′, therefore we can replace
τj by τj(>/pi).
2. Let Q be PROP\(Θψ ∪ Θχ ∪
⋃
i∈G Θτi), k = |G|, qi be pi for all i 6 k, θi be τi for
all i 6 k and ϕ be 〈∧i∈G Kiτi〉ψ ∧ χ. By Lemma 5.8, there is V ′′ such that (with M′′
as M except for valuation V ′′) [[〈∧Kiτi〉ψ ∧ χ]]M′′ = [[〈∧Kiτi〉ψ ∧ χ]]M′ and for all
i ≤ k, [[pi]]M′′ = [[τi]]M′′ = [[τi]]M′ . As M′, s |= 〈
∧
i∈G Kiτi〉ψ ∧ χ (by the first item),
the first property implies that M′′, s |= 〈∧i∈G Kiτi〉ψ ∧ χ. The second one implies that
M′′ |= ∧Kipi ↔ ∧Kiτi. We now have that M′′, s |= 〈∧i∈G Kipi〉ψ ∧ χ.
¤
A generalization of Proposition 5.9 indirectly proves the soundness of a derivation rule
in the axiomatization of GAL. Here, we need Proposition 5.9 to prove the validity of the
generalized Church-Rosser schema. But first here is a useful remark:
Remark 5.10 Let M, s be a pointed model, p ∈ PROP and i ∈ AG. If M, s |= Kip, then
for all ϕ ∈ Lel such that M, s |= ϕ we have M|ϕ, s |= Kip.
Proposition 5.11 (Church-Rosser Generalized) For any G,H ⊆ AG: |= 〈G〉[H]ϕ →
[H]〈G〉ϕ.
Proof Suppose the contrary: Let M be a model, s a state of M, ϕ ∈ Lgal and G,H ⊆ AG
two groups of agents such that M, s |= 〈G〉[H]ϕ ∧ 〈H〉[G]¬ϕ. Then, using Proposition 5.9
twice, for |G| = k and |H| = k′, we know that there are {pi}i∈G and {qi}i∈H subsets of Θ
and M′ differing from M only on the valuation of the pi, qi such that
M′, s |= 〈
∧
i∈G
Kipi〉[H]ϕ ∧ 〈
∧
i∈H
Kiqi〉[G]¬ϕ .
In particular,
M′, s |= 〈
∧
i∈G
Kipi〉[
∧
i∈H
Kiqi]ϕ ∧ 〈
∧
i∈H
Kiqi〉[
∧
i∈G
Kipi]¬ϕ .
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Note that 〈∧i∈G Kipi〉 and 〈∧i∈H Kiqi〉 are conjunctions of known facts. Using Remark 5.10
we know that they remain true after further announcements. So we have
M′, s |= 〈
∧
i∈G
Kipi ∧
∧
i∈H
Kiqi〉ϕ ∧ 〈
∧
i∈G
Kipi ∧
∧
i∈H
Kiqi〉¬ϕ
from which directly follows a contradiction.
¤
Corollary 5.12 (Church-Rosser) |= 〈G〉[G]ϕ → [G]〈G〉ϕ
We cannot in general reverse the order of G and H in Proposition 5.11. A simple coun-
terexample is the following model, where b cannot distinguish between two states but a can.
0•p b 1•¬p
We now have that M, 0 |= 〈a〉[b]Kbp ∧ 〈a〉[b]¬Kbp because M, 0 |= 〈Kap〉[b]Kbp ∧
〈Ka>〉[b]¬Kbp. Therefore 〈G〉[H]ϕ → [G]〈H〉ϕ is not valid if G = {a} and H = {b}.
More validities Just as for Church-Rosser, one would like to know whether the APAL
validity ¤♦ϕ −→ ♦¤ϕ has a GAL generalization. We know that there exists G,H ⊆ N such
that the schema [G]〈H〉ϕ → 〈H〉[G]ϕ is not valid. A counterexample is the following model M
(Figure 5.1) , i.e. for G = {a} and H = {b}, with ϕ = (KaKbp∨KbKaq)∧¬(KaKbp∧KbKaq).
•p,q11 a
b
•¬p,q01
b
•p,¬q10 a •¬p,¬q00
Figure 5.1: Counter-example of the validity of MacKinsey formula in GAL
ϕ asserts that a knows b knows p or b knows a knows q, but not both facts at the same
time. Here we have M, 11 |= [a]〈b〉ϕ∧ [b]〈a〉¬ϕ. Indeed, in this state, a can teach q to b and b
can teach p to a. Thus, depending on what one agent does (to teach or not the corresponding
fact), the other can decide whether teaching or not her knowledge. If both or none of them
decide to teach her knowledge then ϕ will be true, if only one does it then ϕ will be false.
The second agent speaking is the one who decides!
We do not know whether [G]〈G〉ϕ → 〈G〉[G]ϕ is valid.
For arbitrary announcement logic we have that Ki¤ϕ −→ ¤Kiϕ, but not the other way
round. Now, we can do more.
Proposition 5.13 For arbitrary i ∈ AG and G ⊆ AG:
1. |= Ki[i]ϕ ←→ [i]Kiϕ
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2. |= Ki[G]ϕ −→ [G]Kiϕ (but not the other way round)
Proof
1. For every model M and every state s, we have
M, s |= Ki[i]ϕ
iff for all t ∈ S such that sRit, M, t |= [i]ϕ
iff for all ψ ∈ Lel , for all t s.t. sRit, M, t |= [Kiψ]ϕ
iff for all ψ ∈ Lel , for all t s.t. sRit, M, t |= Kiψ implies M|Kiψ, t |= ϕ
iff for all ψ ∈ Lel , for all t s.t. sRit, M, s |= Kiψ implies M|Kiψ, t |= ϕ
iff for all ψ ∈ Lel , M, s |= Kiψ implies that for all t s.t. sRit, M|Kiψ, t |= ϕ
iff M, s |= [i]Kiϕ
2. For every model M and every state s, we have
M, s |= Ki[G]ϕ
only if for all t ∈ S such that sRit, M, t |= [G]ϕ
only if for all ψ1, . . . , ψn ∈ Lel , for all t s.t. sRit, M, t |= [
∧
j∈{1,...,n}Kjψj ]ϕ
only if for all {ψj} ⊂ Lel , all t s.t. sRit, M, t |=
∧
Kjψj implies M|
∧
Kjψj , t |= ϕ
only if for all {ψj} ⊂ Lel , all t s.t. sRit, M, t |=
∧
Kjψj implies M|
∧
Kjψj , t |= ϕ
only if for all {ψj} ⊂ Lel , M, s |=
∧
Kjψj implies that
for all t s.t. sRit, M, t |=
∧
Kjψj implies M|
∧
Kjψj , t |= ϕ
only if M, s |= [G]Kiϕ
¤
Finally, a rather puzzling property on the interaction between the announcements and
knowledge by two agents. The intuition behind it is that announcements wherein you can
make another agent learn facts even in the face of your own uncertainty, are rather rare.
Proposition 5.14 For any atomic proposition p ∈ PROP : |= 〈a〉Kbp ↔ 〈b〉Kap.
Proof Assume M, s |= 〈a〉Kbp. Then there is a ψa ∈ Lel such that M, s |= 〈Kaψa〉Kbp. This
formula is equivalent to Kaψa∧ (Kaψa → Kb[Kaψa]p) and thus to Kaψa∧Kb(Kaψa → p)—as
p is an atom. Let us note M′ = M|Kb(Kaψa → p) and let us proof that M′, s |= Kap. Indeed,
let t ∈ M′ s.t. t ∈ R′a(x) (in the restricted model) and let us prove that M′, t |= p. But we
have (1) M, t |= Kb(Kaψa → p) and (2) t ∈ Ra(x) (in the non-restricted model). But (1)
implies that M, t |= Kaψa → p and (2) implies that M, t |= Kaψa (because M, s |= Kaψa).
Then M, t |= p, and thus M′, t |= p.
¤
We now proceed to a more systematic treatment of validities.
5.1.4 Axiomatization
The following is a sound and complete axiomatization of group announcement logic.
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Definition 5.15 (GAL axioms and rules)
instantiations of propositional tautologies
Ki(ϕ −→ ψ) −→ (Kiϕ −→ Kiψ) distribution (of knowl. over impl.)
Kiϕ −→ ϕ truth (T)
Kiϕ −→ KiKiϕ positive introspection (4)
¬Kiϕ −→ Ki¬Kiϕ negative introspection (5)
[ϕ]p ←→ (ϕ −→ p) atomic permanence
[ϕ]¬ψ ←→ (ϕ −→ ¬[ϕ]ψ) announcement and negation
[ϕ](ψ ∨ χ) ←→ ([ϕ]ψ ∨ [ϕ]χ) announcement and disjunction
[ϕ]Kiψ ←→ (ϕ −→ Ki[ϕ]ψ) announcement and knowledge
[ϕ][ψ]χ ←→ [ϕ ∧ [ϕ]ψ]χ announcement composition
[G]ϕ −→ [∧i∈G Kiψi]ϕ where ψi ∈ Lel group announcement
From ϕ and ϕ −→ ψ, infer ψ modus ponens
From ϕ, infer Kiϕ necessitation of knowledge
From ϕ, infer [ψ]ϕ necessitation of announcement
From ϕ, infer [G]ϕ necessitation of group announcement
From η([∧i∈GKiψi]χ) for all {ψi}i∈G ⊂ Lel, deriving group announcement / Rw([G])
infer η([G]χ)
Our axiomatization of GAL is based on the standard S5 axioms for the epistemic operators
Ki, the standard reduction axioms for the public announcement operators [ϕ], and some
additional axioms and derivation rules involving group announcement operators. These are
the axiom group and specific announcement, and the derivation rules necessitation of group
announcement and deriving group announcement. A formula ϕ ∈ Lgal is derivable, notation
` ϕ, iff ϕ belongs to the least set of formulas containing GAL axioms and closed with respect
to the derivation rules.
The axiom [G]ϕ −→ [∧i∈G Kiψi]ϕ, where ψi ∈ Lel , is obviously valid in all structures.
Also the validity of “from ϕ, infer [G]ϕ” will be obvious. The derivation rule deriving group
announcement Rw([G]) is used to introduce group announcement operators in derivations. In
this rule, η is a necessity form for Lgal , definable in the same way as in Definition 4.33 (but
with a different language): ] is a necessity form; if η is a necessity form and and ϕ is in Lgal
then (ϕ → η) is a necessity form; if η is a necessity form and ϕ is in Lgal then [ϕ]η is a
necessity form; if η is a necessity form then Kiη is a necessity form.
In this section we show completeness of GAL with respect to the class of epistemic models.
But first the following:
Proposition 5.16 (Soundness) Let ϕ ∈ Lgal . Then ϕ is a theorem of GAL only if ϕ is
valid in every epistemic model.
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Proof The only difficult result is the soundness of the rule Rw(G) in the class of epistemic
models. We thus show it by induction on the structure of the necessity form η. The base
case comes from the definition of the semantics. Let us look at the inductive cases:
• η = Kiη′: for all {ψi}i∈G ⊂ Lel, M, s |= Kiη′([∧i∈GKiψi]χ)
iff for all {ψi}i∈G ⊂ Lel, and all sRit, M, t |= η′([∧i∈GKiψi]χ)
iff for all sRit, M, t |= η′([G]χ) by IH
iff M, s |= Kiη′([G]χ)
• η = ϕ −→ η′: for all {ψi}i∈G ⊂ Lel, M, s |= ϕ −→ η′([∧i∈GKiψi]χ)
iff if M, s |= ϕ then for all {ψi}i∈G ⊂ Lel, M, s |= η′([∧i∈GKiψi]χ)
iff if M, s |= ϕ then M, s |= η′([G]χ) by IH
iff M, s |= ϕ −→ η′([G]χ)
• η = [ϕ]η′: for all {ψi}i∈G ⊂ Lel, M, s |= [ϕ]η′([∧i∈GKiψi]χ)
iff if M, s |= ϕ then for all {ψi}i∈G ⊂ Lel, M|ϕ, s |= η′([∧i∈GKiψi]χ)
iff if M, s |= ϕ then M|ϕ, s |= η′([G]χ) by IH
iff M, s |= [ϕ]η′([G]χ)
¤
The proof of completeness of the axiomatization is very similar to the proof of completeness
of the axiomatization LAUOB presented in Section 4.4.2. We follow its progress.
A set x of formulas is called a theory if it satisfies the following conditions:
• x contains the set of all theorems;
• x is closed under the rule of modus ponens and the rule Rω([G]).
Again, a theory x is said to be consistent if ⊥ 6∈ x, maximal if for all formulas ϕ, ϕ ∈ x or
¬ϕ ∈ x. For all formulas ϕ we note x + ϕ = {ψ: ϕ → ψ ∈ x}. For all agents i, let Kix = {ϕ:
Kiϕ ∈ x}. For all formulas ϕ, let [ϕ]x = {ψ: [ϕ]ψ ∈ x}.
Lemma 5.17 Let x be a theory, ϕ be a formula, and a be an agent. Then x + ϕ, Kix and
[ϕ]x are theories. Moreover x + ϕ is consistent iff ¬ϕ 6∈ x.
Proof Identical to proof of Proposition 4.35, by substituting Bi by Ki and ‘[ψ,G] with
ψ ∈ Lpl ’ by ‘[ψ] with ψ ∈ Lel ’.
¤
Lemma 5.18 (Lindenbaum lemma) Let x be a consistent theory. There exists a maximal
consistent theory y such that x ⊆ y.
Proof Identical to the proof of Lemma 4.36 by substituting
• Bi by Ki
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• ‘[ψ,G] with ψ ∈ Lpl ’ by ‘[ψ] with ψ ∈ Lel ’
• [?, G] by [G] and
• ‘there exists ψ ∈ Lpl such that [ψ,G]ϕ’ by ‘there exist ψ1, . . . , ψ|G| ∈ Lel such that
[
∧
Kiψi]ϕ’
¤
The canonical model of Lgal is the structure Mc = (W c,∼c, V c) defined as follows:
• W c is the set of all maximal consistent theories;
• For all agents i, ∼i is the binary (equivalence) relation on W defined by x ∼i y iff
Kix = Kiy;
• For all atoms p, V c(p) is the subset of W c defined by x ∈ V c(p) iff p ∈ x.
Clearly, ‘=’ is an equivalence relation, therefore ∼i also is. It then has the same properties
than the relation Ri of an epistemic model, and that fact ensures that the canonical model of
Lgal is an epistemic model. Note that, because of Axioms T , 4 and 5, Kix = Kiy iff Kix ⊆ y.
We now prove a truth lemma for Lgal using a very special induction. Note that this prop-
erty (and its proof) is quite different from the truth lemma appearing in [A˚gotnes et al., 2010].
The property was not correctly proved in this paper indeed. To obtain a correct one, here
are three definitions we shall use:
Definition 5.19 The degree of a Lgal -formula is defined inductively in the following way:
for all p ∈ PROP , all i ∈ AG, all G ⊆ AG and all ϕ,ϕ1, ϕ2 ∈ Lgal : deg(p) = deg(⊥) =
0, deg(¬ϕ) = deg(Kiϕ) = deg(ϕ), degϕ1 ∨ ϕ2 = max(deg(ϕ1), deg(ϕ2)), deg([ϕ1]ϕ2) =
deg(ϕ1) + deg(ϕ2) + 2, deg([G]ϕ) = deg(ϕ) + 2.
Definition 5.20 Let ¿ be the following binary relation on N× N× Lgal :
(k′, n′, ϕ′) ¿ (k, n, ϕ) iff

k′ < k,
or (k′ = k and n′ < n)
or (k′ = k and n′ = n and ϕ′ ∈ Sub(ϕ))
where Sub(ϕ) is the
set of strict subformulas of ϕ ( i.e. subformulas of ϕ different from ϕ itself).
Note that ¿ is a well-founded partial order on N×N×Lgal . In fact, it is the lexicographical
order based on the orders 6 and ‘being a subformula’. Here are some examples:
• (0, 1018, ϕ) ¿ (1, 0, ϕ) because 0 < 1
• (0, 0, (p ∧ ¬q) −→ 〈G〉[p]q) ¿ (0, 1, p) because 0 < 1
• (10, 10, p) ¿ (10, 10, p ∧ q) because p is a subformula of p ∧ q.
Now the following:
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Definition 5.21 (Π(k, n, ϕ)) For all (k, n, ϕ) ∈ N × N × Lgal we define the property
Π(k, n, ϕ): for all ψ1, . . . , ψn ∈ Lgal , if n + deg(ψ1) + . . . + deg(ψn) + deg(ϕ) 6 k then
for all x ∈ W c, Mc, x |= 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψn〉ϕ iff 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψn〉ϕ ∈ x.
This complex definition is useful to prove the following truth lemma by induction on (k, n, ϕ)
following the order we just defined. We are now able to establish the truth lemma for Lgal :
Proposition 5.22 (Truth lemma) For all (k, n, ϕ) ∈ N× N× Lgal , Π(k, n, ϕ).
To prove it, we first consider the following lemma:
Lemma 5.23 For all (k, n, ϕ) ∈ N × N × Lgal , if for all (k′, n′, ϕ′) ¿ (k, n, ϕ) we have
Π(k′, n′, ϕ′), then Π(k, n,>).
Proof Let ψ1, . . . , ψn ∈ Lgal , be such that n + Σdeg(ψi) + deg(ϕ) 6 k and x ∈ W c, we want
to show that Mc, x |= 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψn〉> iff 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψn〉> ∈ x. If n = 0, Mc, x |= > is always
true, and so is > ∈ x. Suppose then that n > 1.
Hence we have: Mc, x |= 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψn〉>
iff

Mc, x |= ψ1
Mc, x |= 〈ψ1〉ψ2
. . .
Mc, x |= 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψn−1〉ψn
iff

ψ1 ∈ x by Π(k, 0, ψ1)
〈ψ1〉ψ2 ∈ x by Π(k, 1, ψ2)
. . .
〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψn−1〉ψn ∈ x by Π(k, n− 1, ψn)
if and only
if 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψn〉> ∈ x.
We used that for all i 6 n, we have n + deg(ψ1) + . . . + deg(ψi) 6 n + deg(ψ1) + . . . +
deg(ψn) + deg(ϕ) 6 k
¤
Proof (of Proposition 5.22) Let us prove it by induction on (k, n, ϕ). Suppose that for all
(k′, n′, ϕ′) ¿ (k, n, ϕ) we have Π(k′, n′, ϕ′). Let us prove Π(k, n, ϕ) by reasoning on the form
of ϕ. Note that by Lemma 5.23 we can already use that Π(k, n,>).
Let ψ1, . . . , ψn ∈ Lgal be such that n + Σdeg(ψi) + deg(ϕ) 6 k and x ∈ W c
• ϕ = p: Mc, x |= 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψn〉p
iff Mc, x |= 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψn〉> and Mc, x |= p by the semantics
iff 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψn〉> ∈ x by Π(k, n,>) and p ∈ x by definition of the valuation V c
iff 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψn〉p ∈ x
• ϕ = ¬χ: Mc, x |= 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψn〉¬χ
iff Mc, x |= 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψn〉> and Mc, x 6|= 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψn〉χ by the semantics
iff 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψn〉> ∈ x by Π(k, n,>) and 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψn〉χ /∈ x by Π(k, n, χ)
(note that n + Σdeg(ψi) + deg(χ) = n + Σdeg(ψi) + deg(¬χ) 6 k)
iff 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψn〉¬χ ∈ x
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• ϕ = χ1 ∨ χ2: Mc, x |= 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψn〉(χ1 ∨ χ2)
iff Mc, x |= 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψn〉χ1 or Mc, x |= 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψn〉χ2 by the semantics
iff 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψn〉χ1 ∈ x by Π(k, n, χ1) or 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψn〉χ ∈ x by Π(k, n, χ2)
(note that n + Σdeg(ψi) + deg(χi) 6 n + Σdeg(ψi) + deg(ϕ) 6 k)
iff 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψn〉(χ1 ∨ χ2) ∈ x
• ϕ = Kiχ: First remark that we can prove Π(k, n,¬χ) as in the first second case,
considering that Sub(Kiχ) = Sub(¬χ).
Now suppose that Mc, x |= 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψn〉Kiχ, therefore we have the two following prop-
erties:
{
Mc, x |= 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψn〉>
for all y ∈ W c, if xRciy then Mc, y |= [ψ1] . . . [ψn]χ
The first implies that 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψn〉> ∈ x by Π(k, n,>). Now suppose, towards a
contradiction, that 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψn〉Kiχ /∈ x. Then [ψ1] . . . [ψn]¬Kiχ ∈ x and using
〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψn〉> ∈ x we obtain 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψn〉¬Kiχ ∈ x and thus ¬Ki[ψ1] . . . [ψn]χ ∈ x.
Let y0 = Kix + ¬[ψ1] . . . [ψn]χ, y0 is thus a consistent theory, that can be extended,
by Lemma 5.18, to a maximal consistent theory y. Therefore, xRiy and we obtain
Mc, y |= [ψ1] . . . [ψn]χ or equivalently Mc, y 6|= 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψn〉¬χ. By Π(k, n,¬χ), this
implies that 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψn〉¬χ /∈ y. Contradiction.
Conversely, suppose that 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψn〉Kiχ ∈ x. In particular 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψn〉> ∈ x and
Mc, x |= 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψn〉> by Π(k, n,>). We also have Ki[ψ1] . . . [ψn]χ ∈ x. Suppose to-
wards a contradiction thatMc, x 6|= 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψn〉Kiχ. ThenMc, x |= 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψn〉¬Kiχ.
Therefore, there exists y ∈ W c such that xRciy and Mc, y |= 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψn〉¬χ. By
Π(k, n,¬χ) we obtain 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψn〉¬χ ∈ y. Now, Mc, x |= Ki[ψ1] . . . [ψn]χ and
xRiy implies Mc, y |= [ψ1] . . . [ψn]χ. With Mc, y |= 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψn〉> we get Mc, y |=
〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψn〉χ. By Π(k, n, χ) this implies that 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψn〉χ ∈ y. Contradiction.
• ϕ = [ψ]χ: Here we have n + Σdeg(ψi) + deg(ψ) + deg(χ) + 2 6 k (∗).
We first prove (I): Mc, x |= 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψn〉〈ψ〉¬χ iff 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψn〉〈ψ〉¬χ ∈ x. Indeed, as
(k−1, n+1,¬χ) ¿ (k, n, ϕ) we have Π(k−1, n+1,¬χ). Moreover, (n+1)+(Σdeg(ψi)+
deg(ψ)) + deg(¬χ) 6 k − 1 by (∗).
Now Mc, x |= 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψn〉[ψ]χ
iff
{
Mc, x |= 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψn〉>
Mc, x 6|= 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψn〉〈ψ〉¬χ
iff
{
〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψn〉> ∈ x by Π(k, n,>)
〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψn〉〈ψ〉¬χ /∈ x by (I)
iff 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψn〉[ψ]χ ∈ x
• ϕ = [G]χ: Here we have n + Σdeg(ψi) + deg(χ) + 2 6 k (∗∗).
We first prove (II): for all ψ′1, . . . , ψ′|G| ∈ Lel , Mc, x |= 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψn〉〈
∧
i∈G Kiψ
′
i〉¬χ
iff 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψn〉〈
∧
i∈G Kiψ
′
i〉¬χ ∈ x. Indeed, as (k − 1, n + 1,¬χ) ¿ (k, n, ϕ) we have
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Π(k−1, n+1,¬χ). Moreover, (n+1)+(Σdeg(ψi)+deg(
∧
i∈G Kiψ
′
i))+deg(¬χ) 6 k−1
by (∗∗) and observing that deg(∧i∈G Kiψ′i) = 0.
Now Mc, x |= 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψn〉[G]χ
iff
{
Mc, x |= 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψn〉>
Mc, x 6|= 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψn〉〈G〉¬χ
iff
{
〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψn〉> ∈ x by Π(k, n,>)
for all ψ′1, . . . , ψ′|G| ∈ Lel , Mc, x 6|= 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψn〉〈
∧
i∈G Kiψ
′
i〉¬χ
iff
{
〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψn〉> ∈ x
for all ψ′1, . . . , ψ′|G| ∈ Lel , 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψn〉〈
∧
i∈G Kiψ
′
i〉¬χ /∈ x by (II)
iff
{
〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψn〉> ∈ x
for all ψ′1, . . . , ψ′|G| ∈ Lel , [ψ1] . . . [ψn][
∧
i∈G Kiψ
′
i]χ ∈ x by maximality
iff
{
〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψn〉> ∈ x
[ψ1] . . . [ψn][G]χ ∈ x
considering
(
-the Rw([G])-cloture of x for the direct implication
-Axiom group announcement for the indirect one
iff〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψn〉[G]χ ∈ x.
¤
Theorem 5.24 The axiomatization GAL is sound and complete with respect to the class of
models C0.
Proof Soundness has been proved in Proposition 5.16.
Let ϕ ∈ Lgal be a a valid formula, then it is valid in the canonical model. Therefore
by Lemma 5.22 it is in every maximal consistent theory. Hence, it is a theorem of GAL.
Indeed, if it were not the case, then there would exists a consistent theory x such that
¬ϕ ∈ x. Therefore, by Lemma 5.18 there exists a mct y such that x ⊆ y. Therefore ¬ϕ ∈ y.
Contradiction.
¤
5.2 Expressivity
The notion used in this section have been introduced in Section 2.8. Known results are that
Lel is equally expressive as Lpal ([Plaza, 1989]), that in the single-agent situation Lapal is
equally expressive as Lpal , and that in the multi-agent situation Lapal is more expressive than
Lpal ([Balbiani et al., 2007]). In this section we demonstrate that in the single-agent situation
Lgal is equally expressive as Lel , and that in the multi-agent situation Lgal is more expressive
than Lel , and Lgal is not more expressive than Lapal . We conjecture that Lapal is not as least
as expressive as (multi-agent) Lgal .
Proposition 5.25 For a single agent Lgal is equally expressive as Lel and Lpal .
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Proof Let a be the unique agent. For all ϕ in Lgal we have that |= [a]ϕ ↔ ϕ. In fact, in
the single agent situation, the restriction of a pointed model (M, s) to a-equivalence class
is the submodel generated from (M, s) (see Definition 2.12). Thus it is bisimilar to (M, s)
(Proposition 2.15), from which directly follows that |= [a]ϕ ←→ ϕ.
¤
Theorem 5.26 If n > 2, then Lgal is more expressive than Lel and Lpal .
Proof Lgal is obviously at least as expressive as Lel . For the strictness part, consider the
formula 〈b〉Kap. Assume that there is an EL formula ψ equivalent to 〈b〉Kap. Formula ψ can
only contain a finite number of atoms. Let q be an atom not occurring in ψ. Consider the
following models M and M′ where a and b have common knowledge of their ignorance of p.
M: •p1
a,b •¬p0 ; M
′: •p,q11 a
b
•¬p,¬q00
b
•¬p,q01 a •p,¬q10
Figure 5.2: Distinguishing Lgal from Lel
It is easy to see that M, 1 6|= 〈b〉Kap, but that M′, 11 |= 〈Kbq〉Kap, and thus that
M′, 11 |= 〈b〉Kap. On the other hand, (M, 1) and (M′, 11) are bisimilar with respect to
the epistemic language not including atom q, thus ψ cannot distinguish between these two
pointed models. Therefore, ψ cannot be equivalent to 〈b〉Kap.
¤
Theorem 5.27 Lgal is not at least as expressive as Lapal .
Proof Consider the Lapal -formula ♦(Kap ∧ ¬KbKap), and suppose there is an equivalent
Lgal -formula χ. Assume an atomic proposition q not occurring in χ. We prove that the
pointed models (M, 10) and (Ma, 10) presented below cannot be distinguished by any Lgal -
formula χ, whereas ♦(Kap∧¬KbKap) is true in the former but false in the latter, thus again
deriving a contradiction.
The crucial insight is that in Lgal , unlike in Lapal , the only definable model restrictions of
M, 10 are the four models displayed below. And to make the formula ♦(Kap∧¬KbKap) true
in M, 10, one needs to be able to define the restriction to domain {11, 10, 00}. The formal
proof is by induction on the structure of ψ, and is formulated in terms also involving other
points of other model restrictions of M; of that proof we only give the formal proposition
and for state 10 the inductive cases for announcement and for group announcement.
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M: •p,q11 a
b
•¬p,q01
b
•p,¬q10 a •¬p,¬q00
Mb: •p,q11
b
•p,¬q10
Ma:
10•p,¬q a 00•¬p,¬q Mab: 10•p,¬q
Figure 5.3: Distinguishing Lapal from Lgal
Let ψ ∈ Lgal with q 6∈ Θψ. Then:
M, 10 |= ψ ⇔ Ma, 10 |= ψ ⇔ M, 11 |= ψ (i)
Mab, 10 |= ψ ⇔ Mb, 10 |= ψ ⇔ Mb, 11 |= ψ (ii)
M, 00 |= ψ ⇔ Ma, 00 |= ψ ⇔ M, 01 |= ψ (iii)
Inductive case announcement:
• M, 10 |= [χ]ψ
iff M, 10 |= χ implies M|χ, 10 |= ψ (*)
iff M, 10 |= χ implies
{
M, 10 |= ψ if M, 00 |= χ
Mb, 10 |= ψ otherwise
iff Ma, 10 |= χ implies
{
Ma, 10 |= ψ if M, 00 |= χ
Mab, 10 |= ψ otherwise (**)
iff Ma, 10 |= χ implies Ma|χ, 10 |= ψ
iff Ma, 10 |= [χ]ψ.
*: By induction hypothesis: M|χ = M if M, 00 |= χ, and M|χ = Mb otherwise.
**: By induction hypothesis: Ma|χ = Ma if Ma, 00 |= χ, and Ma|χ = Mab otherwise.
Inductive case group announcement (there are four different coalitions):
• M, 10 |= [∅]ψ
iff M, 10 |= ψ
• M, 10 |= [a]ψ
iff M, 10 |= ψ and Ma, 10 |= ψ
iff Ma, 10 |= ψ (by IH)
iff Ma, 10 |= [a]ψ
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• M, 10 |= [b]ψ
iff M, 10 |= ψ and Mb, 10 |= ψ
iff Ma, 10 |= ψ and Mab, 10 |= ψ (by IH)
iff Ma, 10 |= [b]ψ
• M, 10 |= [a, b]ψ
iff M, 10 |= ψ and Ma, 10 |= ψ and Mab, 10 |= ψ and Mb, 10 |= ψ
iff Ma, 10 |= ψ and Mab, 10 |= ψ (by IH)
iff Ma, 10 |= [a, b]ψ
¤
Conjecture 5.28 Lapal is not at least as expressive as Lgal .
Thus, we conjecture that the two logics are incomparable when it comes to expressivity.The
following gives an idea for a possible proof, discussed together with Barteld P. Kooi, even if
it does not succeed for now.
Sketch of proof : Let β = 〈a〉Kbp be a Lgal -formula. We already know, by Proposition
5.14, that it is equivalent to α = 〈a〉Kbp∧ 〈b〉Kap. The idea of the proof is to show a class of
pairs of models Mq,r,M′q,r (q, r ∈ PROP ) such that
1. for all q, r ∈ PROP , Mq,r, pqr |= ¬α and M′q,r, pqr |= α
2. for all ϕ ∈ Lapal , there exists q, r ∈ PROP such Mq,r, pqr |= ϕ iff M′q,r, pqr |= ϕ
Then the formula α would distinguish any such pair of models, and no Lapal -formula would
be able to distinguish all of them, so Lapal would not be more expressive than Lgal . Our
proposal was the following:
Formally, M∗q,r = {S,∼a,∼b, V } with S = {pqr ∈ {0, 1}3} (and S′ = S\{000}). The valu-
ation of p, q and r is defined by the name of the state, and is ∅ for any atom in PROP\{p, q, r}.
Now for all s, t ∈ S∗, s ∼a t iff (M∗q,r, s |= q −→ p iff M∗q,r, t |= q −→ p) and s ∼b t iff
(M∗q,r, s |= r −→ p iff M∗q,r, t |= r −→ p).
In particular, we have M∗q,r, pqr |= Ka(q −→ p) ∧Kb(r −→ p)
Clearly, 1) is true. Indeed, M, pqr |= [a]Kˆb(¬p∧¬q∧¬r) and M′, pqr |= 〈Ka(¬q∨p)〉Kbp.
Now to prove 2) it would be enough to prove that
(∗) for all ϕ ∈ Lapal{p}, for all q, r ∈ Θ,Mq,r, pqr |= ϕ iff M′q,r, pqr |= ϕ.
Indeed, let ϕ be an Lapal -formula, then let us call PROPϕ = {q1, . . . qn} the atomic proposi-
tions appearing in ϕ, and let q, r be atomic propositions that are not in PROPϕ. We define
ϕ∗ = ϕ(∀qi,⊥/qi) and then consider Mq,r and M′q,r. We have that Mq,r |= ϕ ←→ ϕ∗ and
M′q,r |= ϕ ←→ ϕ∗ with ϕ∗ ∈ Lapal{p}. (∗) is then sufficient to prove 2).
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Mq,r = (¬p¬qr) A (¬p¬q¬r)
B(p¬qr) (p¬q¬r)
(¬pqr) (¬pq¬r)
(pqr) (pq¬r)
and M′q,r = (¬p¬qr)
(p¬qr) (p¬q¬r)
(¬pqr) (¬pq¬r)
(pqr) (pq¬r)
Figure 5.4: Trying to distinguish Lgal from Lapal
Unfortunately, (∗) is false. The mistake came from the will to obtain a pair of models not
able to distinguish χ = Kap ∨Kbp ∨ ♦(Kap ∧ ¬Kbp) ∧ ♦(¬Kap ∧Kbp) which seemed to be a
reasonable translation for 〈a〉Kbp. Indeed 〈a〉Kbp means that after some a’s announcement b
knows p. Indeed, if a knows p she can announce it, if b knows p then a can announce nothing,
b will still know p. Now if none of the two agents know p but still 〈a〉Kbp is true, then some
a’s announcement could teach p to b (without a learning anything about p). By Proposition
5.14 the converse would also be true. Well Mq,r and M′q,r cannot actually distinguish χ
(and in fact probably none of the Lapal -formula of K-degree 1), but it can distinguish some
Lapal -formulas. For example the following one, which is true in M, pqr and not in M′, pqr:
Kˆa♦(Kˆap ∧¤(Ka¬p ←→ Kb¬p))
However, in spite of the mistake, we think that this may be a good starting point to find
bigger classes of pairs of models, able to distinguish every Lapal -formula from 〈a〉Kbp. We
would thus get an infinite set {Ci}i∈N of such classes of pairs, such that each class Ci is able
to distinguish 〈a〉Kbp from any Lapal -formula of K-degree i.
♦
Now consider a very special model class Mg, namely the class where an agent g has the
identity relation on all models (there may be other agents). It is clear that the announcement
made by g has the property that Kgϕ ←→ ϕ: everything true is known by g. Therefore ♦ϕ
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in APAL is equivalent to 〈g〉ϕ in GAL (ignoring a further translation downward in ϕ). If we
restrict the model class of the logic to Mg, we say that a super agent g exists. This makes
clear that:
Proposition 5.29 If a super agent g exists, GAL is at least as expressive as APAL.
Proof Given a ϕ ∈ Lapal , replace every occurrence of ¤ in ϕ by [g]. The resulting formula
is in Lgal and it is equivalent to the initial one in every epistemic model.
¤
5.3 Model Checking
If a given system can be modeled as a finite model, one would like to verify if a given property
written in a language for specifying desired properties of systems holds in the finite model. We
speak of the model checking problem, an area of automated deduction that has been addressed
for almost all logical languages, for example modal logic in [Gradel and Otto, 1999], temporal
logic in [Clarke et al., 1999], etc. There is a need, on the theoretical side, to provide a sound
mathematical basis for the design of algorithms devoted to the model checking problem.
Hence, the question arises whether the following decision problem is decidable:
input: a finite structure M = (S,∼1, . . . ,∼n, V ), a state x ∈ S and a formula ϕ ∈ Lgal,
output: determine whether ϕ is satisfied at x in M.
This decision problem, denoted (MC(GAL)) is a variant of the well-known model checking
problem. If one restricts to formulas ϕ ∈ Lel , then the above decision problem is known
to be P -complete. The notion of a formula like [{1, . . . , n}]ϕ being satisfied in a structure
M = (S,∼1, . . . ,∼n, V ) at state x ∈ S relies on the satisfiability of all (infinitely many)
formulas like [K1ϕ1 ∧ . . . ∧Knϕn]ϕ at x where ϕ1, . . . , ϕn ∈ Lel. In Theorem 5.31 we show
that (MC(GAL)) is in PSPACE and in Theorem 5.32 we show that it is PSPACE-hard.
5.3.1 Preliminary Results
Let ZM be the greatest bisimulation relation on M. Note that ZM is an equivalence relation
on S. For all s ∈ S, let ‖s‖ be the equivalence class of s modulo ZM. The bisimulation
contraction of M is the structure ‖M‖ = (S′,∼′1, . . . ,∼′n, V ′) such that:
• S′ = S|ZM , i.e. the quotient of S modulo ZM
• ‖s‖ ∼′i ‖t‖ iff there exist v, w ∈ S such that sZMv, tZMw and v ∼i w
• V ′(p) = V (p)|ZM
The following proposition will be obvious, because:
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• the bisimulation contraction is bisimilar to the original structure;
• bisimilar structures have the same logical theory[Blackburn et al., 2001];
• public announcement and group announcement are bisimilation preserving operations.
Proposition 5.30 For all ϕ ∈ Lgal , ‖M‖, ‖x‖ |= ϕ iff M, x |= ϕ.
In ‖M‖ = (S′,∼′1, . . . ,∼′n, V ′), every ‖s‖ ∈ S′ can be distinguished by a pure epistemic
formula from all other (non-bisimilar) states. Let us call ψ[[s]] the characteristic formula of
[[s]] in M′. Thus, for any i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, Kˆiψ[[s]] characterizes the class of equivalence for ∼′i.
Hence, for any i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, each union C′i of classes of equivalence for ∼′i is distinguished
from all other (non-bisimilar) states by a pure epistemic formula of the form Kiϕi. Therefore,
a pure epistemic formula of the form
∧
i∈G Kiϕi defines a restriction M′′ = (S′′,∼′′1, . . . ,∼′′n
, V ′′) where S′′ = ∩i∈GC′i. We call such a restriction a definable restriction.
5.3.2 Model Checking Algorithm
Proposition 5.31 (MC(GAL)) is in PSPACE.
Proof Since APTIME = PSPACE (see [Chandra et al., 1981]), it suffices to prove that
(MC (GAL)) is in APTIME. Let us consider the alternating algorithm 1 given on page
115. This algorithm takes as input a finite model M, a state s in M, a formula ϕ in Lgal and
b in {0, 1}. It stops with a reject iff either b = 0 and M, s |= ϕ or b = 1 and M, s 6|= ϕ whereas
it stops with an accept iff either b = 0 and M, s 6|= ϕ or b = 1 and M, s |= ϕ. Its execution
depends primarily on (ϕ, b). Each case is either existential or universal. For example, the case
(ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2, 1) is existential. It is an accepting case iff for some ϕ′ ∈ {ϕ1, ϕ2}, the case (ϕ′, 1)
is accepting, thus corresponding to the fact that ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2 is true at s in M iff for some ϕ′ ∈
{ϕ1, ϕ2}, ϕ′ is true at s in M. As well, the case (ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2, 0) is universal. It is an accepting
case iff for every ϕ′ ∈ {ϕ1, ϕ2}, the case (ϕ′, 0) is accepting, thus corresponding to the fact
that ϕ1∨ϕ2 is false at s in M iff for every ϕ′ ∈ {ϕ1, ϕ2}, ϕ′ is false at s in M. Cases labelled
with (∙) are both existential and universal.
Obviously,
• sat(M, s, ϕ, 1) accepts iff M, s |= ϕ,
• sat(M, s, ϕ, 1) rejects iff M, s 6|= ϕ,
• sat(M, s, ϕ, 0) accepts iff M, s 6|= ϕ,
• sat(M, s, ϕ, 0) rejects iff M, s |= ϕ.
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Algorithm 1 sat(M, s, ϕ, b)
case (ϕ, b) of
(∙) (p, 1): if s ∈ V (p) then accept else reject;
(∙) (p, 0): if s ∈ V (p) then reject else accept;
(∙) (⊥, 1): reject;
(∙) (⊥, 0): accept;
(∙) (¬ϕ′, 1): sat(M, s, ϕ′, 0);
(∙) (¬ϕ′, 0): sat(M, s, ϕ′, 1);
(∃) (ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2, 1): choose ϕ′ ∈ {ϕ1, ϕ2}; sat(M, s, ϕ′, 1);
(∀) (ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2, 0): choose ϕ′ ∈ {ϕ1, ϕ2}; sat(M, s, ϕ′, 0);
(∀) (Kiϕ′, 1): choose t ∈ ∼i (s); sat(M, t, ϕ′, 1);
(∃) (Kiϕ′, 0): choose t ∈ ∼i (s); sat(M, t, ϕ′, 0);
(∙) ([ϕ1]ϕ2, 1): compute the ϕ1-definable restriction M′ = (S′,∼1, . . . ,∼n, V ′) of M;
if s ∈ S′ then sat(M′, s, ϕ2, 1) else accept;
(∙) ([ϕ1]ϕ2, 0): compute the ϕ1-definable restriction M′ = (S′,∼1, . . . ,∼n, V ′) of M;
if s ∈ S′ then sat(M′, s, ϕ2, 0) else reject;
(∀) ([G]ϕ, 1): Compute ‖M‖, choose a definable restriction M′′ = (S′′,∼′′1, . . . ,∼′′n, V ′′)
of ‖M‖ s.t. S′′ = ∩i∈GCi where Ci are unions of classes of equivalence for
∼′i;
if s ∈ S′′ then sat(M′′, s, ϕ, 1) else accept;
(∃) ([G]ϕ, 0): Compute ‖M‖, choose a definable restriction M′′ = (S′′,∼′′1, . . . ,∼′′n, V ′′)
of ‖M‖ s.t. S′′ = ∩i∈GCi where Ci are unions of classes of equivalence for
∼′i;
if s ∈ S′′ then sat(M′′, s, ϕ, 0) else reject;
end case
The only difficult case is ([G]ϕ, 1). Computing ‖M‖ is easy and by Proposition 5.30 we
have that M, s |= 〈G〉ϕ iff ‖M‖, ‖s‖ |= 〈G〉ϕ. Then we just have to prove it in the case
where ‖M‖ = M. Let us suppose it, and let us see that, if there is a definable restriction
M′′ = (S′′,∼′′1, . . . ,∼′′n, V ′) of M such that S′′ = ∩i∈GCi where Ci are unions of classes of
equivalence for ∼i, if also s ∈ S′′ and M′′, s |= ϕ, then M, s |= 〈G〉ϕ. Let us then suppose
the first part of the implication.
M is supposed to be bisimulation-contracted, then we know that for all s ∈ M, there is
ϕs ∈ Lgal, s.t. for all t ∈ M, M, t |= ϕs iff s = t. It implies that s ∈ S′′ iff (for all i ∈ G,
s ∈ Ci) iff M, s |=
∧
i∈G(
∨
t∈Ci ϕt) which is equivalent to M, s |=
∧
i∈G Ki(
∨
t∈Ci ϕt). That
means that M′′ = M|∧i∈G Ki(∨t∈Ci ϕt) and then M, s |= 〈∧i∈G Ki(∨t∈Ci ϕt)〉ϕ (because
s ∈ S′′ and M′′, s |= ϕ). We obtain M, s |= 〈G〉ϕ.
Since sat can be implemented in polynomial time, (MC (GAL)) is in APTIME.
¤
Proposition 5.32 (MC(GAL)) is PSPACE-hard.
Proof We prove that (MC(GAL)) is PSPACE-hard. Let Ψ = Q1x1...QkxkΦ(x1, ..., xk)
be an entry of the problem QBF-SAT:
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• Q1, ..., Qk ∈ {∀, ∃}
• x1, ..., xk are Boolean variables
• Φ(x1, ..., xk) is a Boolean formula
We associate to Ψ a model M1;k = (W1;k,R1, . . . ,Rk, V ), a world x ∈ W1;k and a formula
ψ(Ψ) ∈ Lgal such that the following property (Pk) is true:
|= Ψ iff M1;k, x |= ψ(Ψ)
Let 1 ≤ m ≤ k, Wm;k = {x} ∪ {(xl, 0), (xl, 1)}l∈{m,...,k} be the set of possible worlds,
{p−m, p+m, ..., p−k , p+k } be the set of atoms, with V (p−l )={(xl, 0)} and V (p+l )={(xl, 1)}. Let
i, g ∈ AG and let us define
{
Ri = Wm;k ×Wm;k
Rg = {(s, s) such that s ∈ Wm;k}
(We remark that g is omni-
scient and that i assumes this fact)
M1;k : p−1 •(x1,0)
i
i
p−2 •(x2,0)
i
i (. . .) i p−k •(xk,0)
i
x•
i
i
p+1 •(x1,1) i p+2 •(x2,1) i (. . .) i p+k •(xk,1)
Figure 5.5: A model to prove the hardness of MC(GAL)
Ri is assumed to be reflexive, symmetrical and transitive, and Rg reflexive
We now define some formulas:
for all l ∈ {1, . . . , k}, ql = Kˆi(p−l ∧Ki¬p+l ) ∨ Kˆi(p+l ∧Ki¬p−l ) and rl = Kˆip+l ∧ Kˆip−l .
Intuitively, M1,k |= rl means that (xl, 0) and (xl, 1) are still possible worlds of the model (i.e.
the truth value of xl is not fixed) and M1,k |= ql means that one and only one of (xl, 0) and
(xl, 1) is still a possible world (i.e. we have fixed the value of xl).
We can now define the equivalence recursively:
let ψ0 = Φ(Kˆip+1 , . . . , Kˆip
+
k ), suppose ψl is defined for some l < k, then
ψl+1 =
{
Ki[g](q1 ∧ ... ∧ qk−l ∧ rk−l+1 ∧ ... ∧ rk → ψl) if Ql+1 = ∀
Kˆi〈g〉(q1 ∧ ... ∧ qk−l ∧ rk−l+1 ∧ ... ∧ rk ∧ ψl) if Ql+1 = ∃
Finally, ψ(Ψ) = ψk.
Example: If Ψ = ∀x1∃x2∀x3Φ(x1, x2, x3) then:
ψ(Ψ) = Ki[g](q1 ∧ r2 ∧ r3 → Kˆi〈g〉(q1 ∧ q2 ∧ r3 ∧Ki[g](q1 ∧ q2 ∧ q3 → Φ(Kˆip+1 , . . . , Kˆip+k ))))
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Intuitively, Ki[g](q1 ∧ r2 ∧ r3 → ϕ) means ‘After having fixed the value of x1 only, ϕ’ and
Kˆi〈g〉(q1 ∧ r2 ∧ r3 ∧ ϕ) as ‘There is a way of fixing the value of x1 only, such that ϕ’. We can
now prove |= Ψ ⇔M1;k, x |= ψ(Ψ) by induction on k. The induction is quite technical, but
the intuition is that something is true after having fixed the value of k + 1 boolean variables
if and only if it is true after having fixed the value of the first k variables, added the final one
and then fixed its value. More precisely:
Base case: k = 1:
Ψ = Q1x1Φ(x1), and M1 : p−1 •(x1,0)
i
x•
i
p+1 •(x1,1)
i
• If Q1 = ∀ then |= Ψ iff (|= Φ(>) and |= Φ(⊥))
iff ( p+1 • i •x |= Φ(Kˆip
+
1 ) and p−1 • i •x |= Φ(Kˆip
+
1 ))
iff M1, x |= Ki[g](q1 → Φ(Kˆip+1 )) i.e. M1, x |= ψ(Ψ)
• Else, Q1 = ∃ and |= Ψ iff (|= Φ(>) or |= Φ(⊥))
iff ( p+1 • i •x |= Φ(Kˆip
+
1 ) or p−1 • i •x |= Φ(Kˆip
+
1 ))
iff M1, x |= Kˆi〈g〉(q1 ∧ Φ(Kˆip+1 )) i.e. M1, x |= ψ(Ψ)
Inductive case: k → k + 1:
Suppose that (Pk) is true, and let us note: Ψ = Q1x1...QkxkQk+1xk+1Φ(x1, ..., xk, xk+1).
We pose Ψ˜(x1) := Q2x2..QkxkQk+1xk+1Φ(x1, ..., xk, xk+1) and we have |= Ψ ⇔|= Q1x1Ψ˜(x1).
Thus:
• If Q1 = ∀ then |= Ψ iff (|= Ψ˜(>) and |= Ψ˜(⊥))
iff M2;k+1, x |= ψ(Ψ˜(>)) and M2;k+1, x |= ψ(Ψ˜(⊥)) (by IH)
iff M1;k+1, x |= Ki[g](q1 ∧ r2 ∧ . . . ∧ rk+1 → ψ∗(Ψ˜(Kˆip+1 )))
with ψ∗ obtained by replacing any succession q2 ∧ . . . by q1 ∧ q2 ∧ . . .
• If Q1 = ∃ then |= Ψ iff (|= Ψ˜(>) or |= Ψ˜(⊥))
iff M2;k+1, x |= ψ(Ψ˜(>)) or M2;k+1, x |= ψ(Ψ˜(⊥)) (by IH)
iff M1;k+1, x |= Kˆi〈g〉(q1 ∧ r2 ∧ . . . ∧ rk+1 ∧ ψ∗(Ψ˜(Kˆip+1 )))
¤
We conclude:
Theorem 5.33 (MC(GAL)) is PSPACE-complete.
We observe that our results also extend to APAL: the model checking problem for arbi-
trary public announcement logic is also PSPACE-complete. A relevant detail in the proof of
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Proposition 5.32 is that it involves an omniscient agent g, and that the role of [g] is in APAL
played by ¤, and that of 〈g〉 by ♦. (See also the expressivity result involving g, Proposition
5.29.)
5.4 Announcements and Ability
Our initial intuitive interpretation of a formula of the form 〈C〉ϕ was that coalition C has the
ability to make ϕ come about by making some public announcement. We now have a better
understanding of group announcement logic; let us discuss to what extent that intuition is
precise.
Recent work on strategy logics have illuminated the fact that there are many subtly
different notions of ability in the context of incomplete information (see [Jamroga, 2003,
Jamroga and van der Hoek, 2004, A˚gotnes, 2006] or [Jamroga and A˚gotnes, 2007] for a
recent summary). For example, does ability entail knowledge of ability? In
[Jamroga and A˚gotnes, 2007, p. 433] three levels of ability in general strategy logics are
discussed. We now discuss counterparts of these in the special context of truthful public
announcements. In general strategy logics, such as atl or stit, agents and coalitions can
perform arbitrary state-transforming actions. In our setting the actions are truthful announce-
ments, and there is thus an intimate relationship between knowledge and ability. There are
two main questions of interest related to the mentioned different variants of ability here: are
they indeed different in this special context, and are they expressible in the logical language
of GAL?
5.4.1 Singleton Coalitions
For simplicity we first consider a singleton coalition {a}. What does it mean that agent a has
the ability to make a goal ϕ come about by making a public announcement? Let us begin
with the weakest form of ability.
Being able to, but not necessarily knowing it The formula 〈a〉ϕ means that there is
something which a knows, and if the fact that a knows it is announced, ϕ is a consequence.
However, it might be the case that a doesn’t know this, i.e., that Ka〈a〉ϕ is not true. As an
example, first observe that 〈Kaψ〉ϕ → Ka〈Kaψ〉ϕ is not a principle of public announcement
logic. As a counter-example take state s of the following model
•ps a •¬pt
and take ψa = > and ϕ = p. However, this does not mean that a cannot achieve ϕ in
all her accessible states by some other announcements (possibly different ones in different
states). But in group announcement logic, we have in the model above that s |= 〈a〉p (a can
announce Ka>), but t 6|= 〈a〉p and thus, s |= ¬Ka〈a〉p. So, 〈a〉ϕ → Ka〈a〉ϕ is not a principle
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of group announcement logic. This is a first illustration of the fact that we must be careful
when using the term “ability”: in some (but not necessarily all) circumstances it might be
counter-intuitive to say that a has the ability to make ϕ come about, when she is not aware
that she is; when she cannot discern between the actual situation and a situation in which
she does not have this ability.
Being able to, knowing that, but not knowing how Consider the following model M
(some model updates are also shown):
M : M|K1p : M|K1q :
•¬p,qu
2
2
•p,¬qv 2 •p,qs 1 •p,qt •
p,¬q
v
2 •p,qs 1 •p,qt
•¬p,qu
2
•p,qs 1 •p,qt
and let
ϕ = K2q ∧ (¬K2p ∨ Kˆ1(K2p ∧ ¬K2q))
If we take the current state to be s, we have a situation where 1 is able to make ϕ come
about and where she in addition knows this; a stronger type of ability than in the example
above. Formally: s |= 〈1〉ϕ, because s |= 〈K1q〉ϕ, and t |= 〈1〉ϕ because t |= 〈K1p〉ϕ. Thus,
s |= K1〈1〉ϕ. However, we argue, it might still be counter-intuitive to say that 1 can make ϕ
come about in this situation. The reason is that she has to use different announcements
in indiscernible states. Observe that s |= 〈K1p〉¬ϕ and t |= 〈K1q〉¬ϕ: while the same
announcements can be made in both states, they don’t have the same consequences. In
fact, there exists no single announcement agent 1 can make which will ensure that ϕ will
be true in both s and t. To see this, we can enumerate the possible models resulting from
1 making an announcement in s or t. Because such a model must include 1’s equivalence
class {s, t}, there are four possibilities. First, the starting model itself (e.g., 1 announces a
tautology), in which ϕ does not hold in s. Second, the model where only state u is removed
(e.g., 1 announces K1p), in which ϕ does not hold in s (as we saw above). Third, the model
where only state v is removed (e.g., 1 announces K1q), in which ϕ does not hold in t (as we
saw above). Fourth, the model where both u and v are removed, in which ϕ holds in neither
s nor t.
Since agent 1 cannot discern state s from state t, she has the ability to make ϕ come
about only in the sense that she depends on guessing the correct announcement. In other
words, she can make ϕ come about, knows that she can make ϕ come about, but does not
know how to make ϕ come about.
Being able to, knowing that, knowing how Thus, we can formulate a strong notion of
the ability of a to achieve ϕ by public announcements: there exists a formula ψ such that a
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knows ψ and in any state a considers possible, 〈Kaψ〉ϕ holds.
Compare this version of ability, “there is an announcement which a knows will achieve
the goal”, with the previous version above, “a knows that there is an announcement which
will achieve the goal”. We can call these notions, respectively, knowing de re and knowing de
dicto that the goal can be achieved, following [Jamroga and van der Hoek, 2004] who use the
same terminology for general strategy logics, after the corresponding notion used in quantified
modal logic. In our framework these notions are more formally defined as follows:
Knowledge de dicto: Agent i knows de dicto that she can achieve the goal ϕ in state s of
model M iff
∀t ∼i s ∃ψ ∈ Lel (M, t) |= 〈Kiψ〉ϕ (5.1)
Knowledge de re: Agent i knows de re that she can achieve the goal ϕ in state s of model
M iff
∃ψ ∈ Lel ∀t ∼i s (M, t) |= 〈Kiψ〉ϕ (5.2)
Note, however, that it is not prima facie clear that there is a distinction between these
notions in GAL, because of the intimate interaction between knowledge and possible actions
(announcements), but the model and formula above show that there indeed is.
We have seen how to express knowledge de dicto. In the most popular general strat-
egy logics such as atl, where actions are not necessarily truthful announcements, extended
with epistemics, knowledge de re is not expressible. Several recent works have focussed on
extending such logics in order to be able to express knowledge de re and other interaction prop-
erties between knowledge and ability : see [Jamroga and van der Hoek, 2004, A˚gotnes, 2006,
Jamroga and A˚gotnes, 2007, Broersen, 2008]. In the special case of GAL, however, it turns
out that knowledge de re in fact is already expressible (in the single agent case, at least), as
the following proposition shows.
Proposition 5.34
1. Knowledge de dicto (5.1) is expressed by the formula Ki〈i〉ϕ
2. Knowledge de re (5.2) is expressed by the formula 〈i〉Kiϕ
Proof
1. Immediate.
2. Let M be a model and s a state in M.
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Agent i knows de re that she can achieve ϕ
iff ∃ψ ∈ Lel, (M, s |= Kiψ and ∀t ∈ S (if s ∼i t then M, t |= 〈Kiψ〉ϕ))
iff ∃ψ ∈ Lel, (M, s |= Kiψ and ∀t ∈ S (if s ∼i t then M|Kiψ, t |= ϕ))
(since M, s |= Kiψ and s ∼i t implies that M, t |= Kiψ)
iff ∃ψ ∈ Lel, (M, s |= Kiψ and ∀t ∈ [[Kiψ]], M|Kiψ, t |= ϕ)
iff ∃ψ ∈ Lel, (M, s |= Kiψ and ∀t ∈ [[Kiψ]], (if s ∼i t then M|Kiψ, t |= ϕ))
iff ∃ψ ∈ Lel((M, s) |= Kiψ and M|Kiψ, s |= Kiϕ)
iff (M, s) |= 〈i〉Kiϕ.
¤
Thus, i knows de re that she can achieve ϕ iff she can achieve the fact that she knows ϕ.
This depends crucially on the fact that by “achieve” we mean achieve by truthful public
announcements; it is not true if we allow general actions. As an illustration of the latter case,
take the following example. An agent i is in front of a combination lock safe. The agent does
not know the combination. The available actions correspond to dialling different codes. The
agent is able to open the safe, 〈i〉open, because there is a successful action (dial the correct
code). She knows de dicto that she can open the safe, Ki〈i〉open, because this is true in
all the states she considers possible (a possible state correspond to a possible correct code).
But she does not know de re that she can open the safe, because there is no code that will
open the safe in all the states she considers possible. However, 〈i〉Kiopen does hold: there
is some action she can perform (dial the correct code) after which she will know that the
safe is open. In GAL, the fact that 〈i〉Kiϕ expresses (5.2) is a result of the inter-dependence
between knowledge and actions (announcements) and the S5 properties of knowledge. The
following are some properties of knowledge de dicto and de re in GAL.
Proposition 5.35 The following are valid.
1. Ki〈i〉ϕ → 〈i〉ϕ. Knowledge de dicto of ability implies ability; if you know that you can
do it then you can do it.
2. 〈i〉Kiϕ → Ki〈i〉ϕ. Knowledge de re implies knowledge de dicto; if you know how to do
it you know that you can do it.
3. 〈i〉Kiϕ ↔ Ki〈i〉Kiϕ. Knowledge de re holds iff knowledge of knowledge de re holds; you
know how to do it iff you know that.
Proof The first point is immediate from reflexivity of the accessibility relations. The second
point is also immediate; let ψ be fixed by (5.2). For the third point, the direction to the left
is immedate by point 1, so consider the direction to the right. Assume that M, s |= 〈i〉Kiϕ,
i.e., that (5.2) holds. Let u ∼i s. We must show that ∃ψ ∈ Lel ∀t ∼i u (M, t) |= 〈Kiψ〉ϕ.
Let ψ be as in (5.2), and let t ∼i u. By transitivity of ∼i we have that t ∼i s, and thus that
(M, t) |= 〈Kiψ〉ϕ by (5.2).
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¤
On first sight the expression 〈i〉Kiϕ of knowledge de re might seem to suffer from a similar
problem as the expression of “mere” ability of the first type we discussed above, 〈i〉ψ, namely
that while i has the ability to make ψ come about she does not necessarily know this (de
dicto). However, as the last point in the proposition above shows, if ψ is of the special form
Kiϕ (for the same agent i), then ability does in fact imply knowledge of ability. In every
circumstance where you can achieve a state where you know ϕ, you know that you can.
As illustrated above, the other direction of the second property in Prop. 5.35 does not
hold; knowledge de dicto does not imply knowledge de re. Given our expressions of these two
properties, we thus have that
Ki〈i〉ϕ → 〈i〉Kiϕ is not valid
– that you know that you can achieve ϕ does not necessarily mean that you can achieve a
state where you know ϕ.
5.4.2 More Than One Agent
In the case of more than one agent, there are even more subtleties. In particular, what does
it mean that a group knows how to achieve something, i.e., knows which joint announcement
will be effective? That everybody knows it? That they have common knowledge of it?
In [Jamroga and van der Hoek, 2004] it is argued that the answer depends on the situa-
tion. It might be the case that the agents have common knowledge (although they then need
some resolution mechanism for cases when there are more than one effective announcement,
in order to coordinate); that every agent knows the effective announcement; that the agents
have distributed knowledge about the effective announcement and thus can pool their knowl-
edge together to find out what they should do; that a particular agent (the “leader”) knows
the effective announcement and can communicate it to the others.
In GAL we do not have distributed or common knowledge in the language, but “everybody
knows” can be defined: EGϕ ≡
∧
i∈G Kiϕ, where G is a coalition. The following generalisation
of (5.2) says that in state s coalition G can make a truthful announcement which all the
members of G know will achieve the goal ϕ:
∃{ψi}i∈G ⊆ Lel ∀(t, s) ∈
⋃
i∈G
∼i (M, t) |= 〈
∧
i∈G
Kiψi〉ϕ (5.3)
However, while the single agent case (5.2) is expressed by 〈i〉Kiϕ, it is not in general the
case that (5.3) is expressed by 〈G〉EGϕ. The following is a counter-example. Let M and ϕ
be the following model and formula.
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•p,¬qt
•p,qs
1
2
•¬p,qu
ϕ = p ∧ q
Let G = {1, 2}. It is easy to see that group G in s does not know de re that they can achieve ϕ
in the sense of (5.3): it would imply, for instance, that it is possible to make an announcement
in state t which at the same time eliminates state t – which is impossible. However, 〈1, 2〉EGϕ
holds in s – {1, 2} can announce K1p ∧K2q.
Let us consider distributed and common knowledge. Assume for a moment that the
language is extended with operators CG and DG where G is a coalition, such that M, s |= DGϕ
iff for all (s, t) ∈ ⋂i∈G∼i M, t |= ϕ and M, s |= CGϕ iff for all (s, t) ∈ ∼G∗ M, t |= ϕ, where
∼G∗ is the reflexive transitive closure of
⋃
i∈G ∼i. The following version of (5.3) says that in
s, G can make a truthful announcement which G distributively know will achieve the goal ϕ:
∃{ψi}i∈G ⊆ Lel ∀t ∈ S
(
(s, t) ∈
⋂
i∈G
∼i ⇒ (M, t) |= 〈
∧
i∈G
Kiψi〉ϕ
)
(5.4)
Contrary to the case for “everybody knows”, this property is in fact expressed by the analogue
to the expression for the single-agent case. This can be shown similarly to Prop. 5.35 – observe
that (s, t) ∈ ⋂i∈G and M, s |= ∧i∈G Kiψi implies that M, t |= ∧i∈G Kiψi:
Proposition 5.36 The property (5.4) is expressed by the formula 〈G〉DGϕ.
The situation for common knowledge is, however, similar to that of “everybody knows”.
The following version of (5.4) says that in s G can make a truthful announcement which G
commonly know will achieve the goal ϕ:
∃{ψi}i∈G ⊆ Lel ∀t∼G∗s (M, t) |= 〈
∧
i∈G
Kiψi〉ϕ (5.5)
The model M, formula ϕ and coalition G = {1, 2} above is a counterexample showing that
(5.5) is not expressed by 〈G〉CGϕ: (5.5) does not hold in state s, but M, s |= 〈G〉CGϕ.
Summing up, it can be argued that all of the different notions of ability discussed in this
section are useful. For example, in different contexts it might be useful to reason about what
an agent can achieve by guessing the right actions to perform, while in others what she can
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achieve by identifying the correct actions with certainty. It is, however, of vital importance to
discriminate between these different notions, for example in the analysis of security protocols.
5.5 Security Protocols
Consider a sender and a receiver who attempt to communicate a secret to each other without
an eavesdropper learning it. A very powerful eavesdropper is one that intercepts all com-
munications. This creates the setting where sender, receiver, and eavesdropper are three
agents that can be modelled in a multi-S5 system and where all communications are public
announcements by sender and receiver. One specific example of such a setting is known as
the Russian Cards Problem (see [van Ditmarsch, 2003]). The setting is one where a pack of
all different cards are distributed over the three ‘players’, where every player only knows his
own cards, where sender and receiver have an informational advantage over the eavesdropper
because they hold more cards, and where the ‘secrets’ that should not be divulged are about
card ownership. Posed as a riddle it looks as follows—Alex and Brune are sender and receiver,
Cha the eavesdropper:
From a pack of seven known cards 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 Alex and Brune each draw three
cards and Cha gets the remaining card. How can Alex and Brune openly (publicly)
inform each other about their cards, without Cha learning from any of their cards
who holds it?
To simplify matters, assume that Alex has drawn {0, 1, 2}, that Brune has drawn {3, 4, 5}
and that Cha therefore has card 6, as in Figure 5.6.
¤£ ¡¢0 ¤£ ¡¢3¤£ ¡¢1 ¤£ ¡¢4¤£ ¡¢2 ¤£ ¡¢5¤£ ¡¢6
Figure 5.6: Three moody children playing in the Russian cards problem
The initial Kripke model D describing this setting consists of all possible card deals (val-
uations). In that model an epistemic class for an agent can be identified with the hand of
cards of that agent. For example, given that Alex holds {0, 1, 2}, he cannot distinguish the
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four deals—allow us to use some suggestive notation—012.345.6, 012.346.5, 012.356.4, and
012.456.3 from one another.
Given that all announcements that can be made by a player are known by that player,
they consist of unions of equivalence classes for that player and can therefore be identified
with sets of alternative hands for that player. One solution is where
Alex says “My hand of cards is one of 012, 034, 056, 135, 246” after which Brune
says “My hand of cards is one of 345, 125, 024.”
The last is equivalent in that information state to Brune saying “Cha has card 6.” Alex and
Brune in fact execute a protocol here, not in the sense of sets of sequences of announcements
but in the sense of functions from local states of agents to nondeterministic choice between
announcements. For example, Alex is executing “given cards i, j, k, the first of my five hands
is that actual hand ijk; the second of my five hands to announce is ikl where k, l are chosen
from the five remaining cards; the third is imn where m,n are the remaining two cards; etc...;
shuffle the hands before announcing them.”
We can describe this solution in logic. Agent a stands for Alex, b for Brune, and c for Cha.
Let qi stand for ‘agent i holds card q’ and let klmi stand for ki∧ li∧mi. The information and
safety requirements are as follows — the conjunction in the formula suggests a conjunction
over all hands of cards, ‘Cha does not learn any card’ means ‘Cha does not learn the ownership
of any card except her own card.’
Alex learns Brune’s cards
∧
ijk(ijkb −→ Kaijkb) (one)
Brune learns Alex’s cards
∧
ijk(ijka −→ Kbijka) (two)
Cha does not learn any card
∧6
q=0((qa −→ ¬Kcqa) ∧ (qb −→ ¬Kcqb)) (three)
These requirements should hold throughout the model after protocol completion (i.e., they
should be common knowledge between Alex and Brune). The safety requirement should be
satisfied both at the end and in all intermediate stages: after any announcement that forms
part of such a protocol.
All protocols are finite, because the model is finite and all informative announcements
result in proper model restriction. But it is unclear how long such protocols need to be.
The above solution was of length two, but settings that require strictly longer protocols are
also known. The uncertain but finite length cannot be described in public announcement
logic, but it can be described in group announcement logic. The diamond in 〈ab〉ϕ refers to
arbitrarily finite length protocols taking place between sender a and receiver b in the presence
of other agents, such as the eavesdropper, as was discussed in Section 5.1.3.
Let us see how this works for the length-two protocol above that solves the Russian Cards
Problem. First, we model the solution in public announcement logic. In the solution, first
Alex announces 012a∨034a∨056a∨135a∨246a (alex ). Then Brune announces 345b∨125b∨024b
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(brune). After these two announcements the solution requirements are satisfied. This can now
be described in various ways: as a sequence of two announcements by different agents, as a
sequence of two simultaneous announcements by Alex and Brune, or as a single announcement
by Alex and Brune.
D, 012.345.6 |= 〈Kaalex 〉〈Kbbrune〉(one ∧ two ∧ three)
D, 012.345.6 |= 〈Kaalex ∧KbT 〉〈KaT ∧Kbbrune〉(one ∧ two ∧ three)
D, 012.345.6 |= 〈Ka(alex ∧ [Kaalex ∧KbT ]T ) ∧Kb(T ∧ [Kaalex ∧KbT ]brune)〉(one ∧ two ∧ three)
The last one implies that we have, in this case:
D, 012.345.6 |= 〈ab〉(one ∧ two ∧ three)
Given that we should be able to realize the three postconditions after any execution of the
underlying protocol, and regardless of the initial card deal, the existence of a successful
protocol to realize them can be expressed all at once by the model validity
D |= 〈ab〉(one ∧ two ∧ three)
or in other words
“〈ab〉(one ∧ two ∧ three) is valid in the initial model for card deals” (5.6)
In principle, we can now model check this formula in that model, thus establishing that a
secure exchange is possible under the uncertainty conditions about card ownership in a fully
automated way.
We have so far overlooked one aspect of the meaning of announcements executing such
protocols. The security requirement three should be an invariant: its validity throughout
the model should be preserved after every good announcement. In this particular case we
can enforce that, because its negation is a positive formula: if it is ever not preserved, then
it is lost forever afterwards. Therefore, it suffices to guarantee it after the execution of the
protocol. Thus the above expression also incorporates that invariance.
One must be careful when interpreting the meaning of the existence of sequences of an-
nouncements. If we can replace the two successive announcements: Alex says “My hand
of cards is one of 012, 034, 056, 135, 246” after which Brune says “My hand of cards is one
of 345, 125, 024”, by a single one, does that not mean that all protocols can be reduced to
length 1? And what would in this case that single simultaneous announcement be? Well: as
both agents are announcing facts and not knowledge, their single announcement is simply the
conjunction of their successive announcements. As the second one for Alex and the first one
for Brune was ‘true’ (vacuous), this means that they could simultaneously have made their
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successive announcements: Alex says “My hand of cards is one of 012, 034, 056, 135, 246” and
simultaneously Brune says “My hand of cards is one of 345, 125, 024”. Unfortunately, even
though this indeed solves the problem, the agents do not know the public consequences of
their joint action merely from the public consequences of their individual part in it. This
situation was discussed in the previous section: there is a simultaneous announcement by
Alex and Brune which will achieve the goal, but Alex and Brune do not know that their
respective announcements will achieve the goal – they will not achieve the goal in all the
states they consider possible. A different execution of the protocol for Alex, when he holds
cards {0, 1, 2}, is the announcement “My hand of cards is one of 012, 035, 046, 134, 256”. From
that with Brune’s above announcement Cha can deduce straightaway that the card deal is
012.345.6. And, obviously, Brune does not know whether Alex is going to announce the origi-
nal or the alternative set of five hands, or any of many others. In epistemic terms,we can sum
up our achievements for this security setting as follows, also using the discussion and results
of Section 5.4.
D |= 〈ab〉(one ∧ two ∧ three) (5.7)
D 6|= 〈ab〉Ka(one ∧ two ∧ three) (5.8)
D 6|= 〈ab〉Kb(one ∧ two ∧ three) (5.9)
D |= 〈a〉Ka(two ∧ three ∧ 〈b〉Kb(one ∧ two ∧ three)) (5.10)
Recall (Proposition 5.34.2) that a formula of the form 〈i〉Kiϕ expresses the fact that agent i
knows de re that she can achieve ϕ; that she can make an announcement that will ensure that
ϕ is true in any state that i considers possible. Thus, the last formula above, (5.10), expresses
the fact that there is an announcement that Alex can make after which Brune has learnt his
cards and Cha remains ignorant, no matter which of the four card deals Alex considers possible
is the actual one, and such that Brune then can make an announcement after which all three
requirements hold. Thus, it is rational for Alex to make that announcement, and for Brune
to make a proper counter-announcement in the resulting state. Unlike the property (5.6),
(5.10) shows that Alex and Brune know how to execute a successful protocol.

Chapter 6
Permission and Public
Announcements
Consider an art school examining works at an exhibition. A student is supposed
to select one of the displayed works and is then permitted to make a number
of intelligent observations about it, sufficient to impress the examiners with the
breadth of her knowledge. Now in such cases it never hurts to be more informative
than necessary, in order to pass the exam, but a certain minimum amount of
intelligent information has to be passed on. This particular museum has both
the Night Watch by Rembrandt and Guernica by Picasso on display in the same
room! You pass the exam if you observe about the Night Watch that a big
chunk of a meter or so is missing in the left corner, that was cut off in order to
make the painting fit in the Amsterdam Townhall (a1), and that the painter was
Rembrandt van Rijn (a2). Clearly, this is not a very difficult exam. You also
pass the exam if you make two of the three following observations: that Guernica
depicts the cruelties of the Spanish Civil war (b1), that it is painted in black and
white and not in colour (b2), and that the painter was Pablo Picasso (b3). It is not
permitted to make observations about different paintings at the same time, so any
conjunction of ai’s and bj ’s is not permitted: it would amount to bad judgement if
you cannot focus on a single painting. You are obliged to make two observations
about the Rembrandt and in that case say nothing about the Picasso, or to make
at least two of the three possible observations about the Picasso and in that case
say nothing about the Rembrandt. We can treat the permissions and obligations
in this setting in an extension of public announcement logic.
To formalize the concept of “having the permission to say” we extend Plaza’s public
announcement logic [Plaza, 1989] with a modal operator P of permission, where Pϕ expresses
that it is permitted to say (i.e., announce) ϕ.
Our proposal can be seen as an adaption of the dynamic logic of permission pro-
posed by [van der Meyden, 1996]. Van der Meyden’s proposal was later elaborated on by
[Pucella and Weissman, 2004]). In Van der Meyden’s work, ♦(α,ϕ) means “there is a way
to execute α which is permitted and after which ϕ is true.” We treat the particular case
where actions are public announcements. Thus, for α in van der Meyden’s ♦(α,ϕ) we take
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an announcement ψ! such that ♦(ψ!, ϕ) now means “there is a way to execute the announce-
ment ψ which is permitted and after which ϕ is true.” The executability precondition for an
announcement (‘truthful public announcement’) is the truth of the announcement formulas,
therefore, the latter is equivalent to “ψ is true and it is permitted to announce ψ, after which
ϕ is true”. This suggests an equivalence of ♦(ψ!, ϕ) with, in our setting, Pψ ∧ 〈ψ〉ϕ, but our
operator behaves slightly different. This is because we assume that if you have the permission
to say something, you also have the permission to say something weaker, and because our
binary permission operator allows update of permissions after an announcement.
[van der Meyden, 1996] also introduces a weak form of obligation. The meaning of O(α,ϕ)
is “after any permitted execution of α, ϕ is true”. Similarly, we also introduce an obligation
operator Oϕ, meaning “the agents are obliged to announce ϕ.”
This chapter further relates to the extension of public announcement logic with protocols
by [van Benthem et al., 2009, Wang et al., 2009]. In their approach, one cannot just announce
anything that is true, but one can only announce a true formula that is part of the protocol,
i.e., that is the first formula in a sequence of formulas (standing for a sequence of successive
announcements) that is a member of a set of such sequences called the protocol. In other
words, one can only announce permitted formulas.
In the setting of informative actions like announcements we leave the beaten track for
permission in one important aspect. Cha is given permission by her parents to invite uncle
Jean for her 8th birthday party with his children friends and for a delightful canoe trip on
the river Rhoˆne, but not for the family dinner afterwards. When seeing uncle Jean, she only
mentions the canoe trip but not the children’s party. She does not mention the family dinner.
Has she transgressed the permissions given? Of course not. Permission to say p ∧ q implies
permission to say only q. She has also not transgressed the permission if she were not to invite
him at all. Permission to say p ∧ q implies permission to say nothing, i.e., to say the always
true and therefore uninformative statement >. Similarly, an obligation to say ϕ entails the
obligation for anything entailed by ϕ. If you are obliged to say p∧q you are also obliged to say
q. Now saying q does not therefore mean you have fulfilled the original obligation of p∧q, you
have only partially fulfilled the entailed weaker obligation of q. It may be worth to already
point out as this stage that the weakening of announcement formulas is unrelated to Ross’s
Paradox (see [Ross, 1941]): this is about the obligation to do one of two possible actions—the
alternative to that in public announcement logic would be the obligation to make one of two
possible announcements (announcement of) ϕ and (announcement of) ψ, completely different
from the obligation to make an announcement of (the disjunctive formula) ϕ∨ ψ. As we saw
in Section 3.2, in dynamic epistemic logics, there is a clear distinction between actions and
formulas. We comment the validity of the classical deontic paradoxes in Section 6.5.1.
We present first the syntax and the semantics of our logic, continue with various validi-
ties and semantics observations, and conclude with the completeness of the axiomatization
and the decidability of the problem of satisfiability. After that we present an example in
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detail: the card game La Belote. We conclude with some observations relating to stan-
dard deontic logical topics, and a more detailed comparison of our proposal with the rele-
vant dynamic logical literature, i.e. with [van der Meyden, 1996, Pucella and Weissman, 2004,
van Benthem et al., 2009].
Most parts of this chapter have been published in the Journal of Philosophical Logic
([Balbiani and Seban, 2011]).
6.1 The Logic of Permission and Obligation to Speak
6.1.1 Syntax
The logic POPAL of permitted announcements is an extension of the multi-agent epistemic
logic of public announcements ([Plaza, 1989]).
Definition 6.1 (Language Lpopal) The language Lpopal over a countable set of agents AG
and a countable set of propositional atoms PROP is defined as follows:
ϕ ::= p|⊥|¬ϕ|ψ ∨ ϕ|Kiϕ|[ψ]ϕ|P (ψ,ϕ)|O(ψ,ϕ)
where i ∈ AG and p ∈ PROP . The language Lpoel is the fragment without announcement
construct [ψ]ϕ, the language Lpal is the fragment without O and P , and the language Lel is
the fragment restricted to the Boolean and epistemic operators.
The intuitive reading of Kiϕ is “agent i knows that ϕ is true” whereas [ψ]ϕ is read as “after
announcing ψ, it is true that ϕ”. We read P (ψ,ϕ) as “(ψ is true and) after announcing ψ, it
is permitted to announce ϕ”. Similarly, O(ψ,ϕ) stands for “(ψ is true and) after announcing
ψ, it is obligatory to announce ϕ”. Note that announcements are assumed to be public and
truthful. Definitions by abbreviation of other Boolean operators are standard. Moreover, we
define by abbreviation:
• 〈ψ〉ϕ := ¬[ψ]¬ϕ;
• Pϕ := P (>, ϕ);
• Oϕ := O(>, ϕ).
Formula Pϕ stands for “It is permitted to announce ϕ” and Oϕ stands for “It is obligatory
to announce ϕ” (the semantics also entails the truth of ϕ, in both cases); 〈ψ〉ϕ stands for “ψ
is true and after announcing ψ, ϕ is true.” Note the difference with [ψ]ϕ: “if ψ is true, then
after announcing it, ϕ is true.” The latter is vacuously true if the announcement cannot be
made.
The degree deg of a formula is a concept that will be used in the completeness proof, in
Section 6.2.2. It keeps count of the number of P and O operators in a given formula.
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Definition 6.2 (Degree) The degree of a formula ϕ ∈ Lpopal is defined inductively on the
structure of ϕ as follows:
deg(p) = 0 deg(ψ1 ∨ ϕ2) = max(deg(ψ1), deg(ψ2))
deg(⊥) = 0 deg([ψ]ϕ) = deg(ψ) + deg(ϕ)
deg(¬ψ) = deg(ψ) deg(P (ψ,ϕ)) = deg(ψ) + deg(ϕ) + 1
deg(Kiψ) = deg(ψ) deg(O(ψ,ϕ)) = deg(ψ) + deg(ϕ) + 1
This is therefore not the usual modal degree function, that counts Ki operators. For all
formulas ϕ ∈ Lpopal , deg(ϕ) = 0 iff ϕ does not contain any occurrence of P or O iff ϕ ∈ Lpal .
6.1.2 Semantics
The models of our logic are Kripke models with an additional permission relation P between
states and pairs of sets of states, that represents, for each state, the announcements that are
permitted to be done in this state.
Definition 6.3 (Permission Kripke Model) Given a set of agents AG and a set of atoms
PROP , permission Kripke models have the form M = (S, {∼i}i∈AG, V,P) with S a non-
empty set of states, for each i ∈ AG, ∼i an equivalence relation between states of S, valuation
function V mapping propositional atoms to subsets of S, and P ⊆ S × 2S × 2S such that if
(s, S′, S′′) ∈ P then s ∈ S′′ and S′′ ⊆ S′.
If the equivalence relation ∼i holds between states s, t ∈ S, this means that, as far as
agent i is concerned, s and t are indiscernible. The membership of (s, S′, S′′) in P can be
interpreted as follows: in state s, after an announcement that restricts the set of possible
states to S′, a further announcement in S′ that restricts that set to S′′ is permitted. We will
explain this in more detail after giving the semantics.
We simultaneously define the restriction Mψ of a model M after the public announcement
of ψ, and the satisfiability relation |=. In the definitions we use the abbreviation [[ψ]]M =
{s ∈ S | M, s |= ψ}. If no ambiguity results, we occasionally write [[ψ]] instead of [[ψ]]M.
Definition 6.4 (Restricted model) For any model M and any ψ ∈ Lpopal , we define the
restriction Mψ = (Sψ,∼ψi , Vψ,Pψ) where:
• Sψ = [[ψ]]M
• for all i, ∼ψi = ∼i ∩ (Sψ × Sψ)
• for all p ∈ PROP , Vψ(p) = V (p) ∩ Sψ
• Pψ = {(s, S ′, S′′) ∈ P | s ∈ Sψ, S′ ⊆ Sψ, S′′ ⊆ Sψ}
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Definition 6.5 (Satisfiability relation) Let M be a model and let s be a state of S. The
satisfiability relation |= is defined inductively on the structure of ϕ:
M, s |= p iff s ∈ V (p)
M, s 6|= ⊥
M, s |= ¬ψ iff M, s 6|= ψ
M, s |= ψ1 ∨ ψ2 iff (M, s |= ψ1 or M, s |= ψ2)
M, s |= Kiψ iff for all t ∼i s, M, t |= ψ
M, s |= [ψ]χ iff (M, s |= ψ ⇒Mψ, s |= χ)
M, s |= P (ψ, χ) iff for some (s, [[ψ]]M, S′′) ∈ P, S′′ ⊆ [[〈ψ〉χ]]M
M, s |= O(ψ, χ) iff for all (s, [[ψ]]M, S′′) ∈ P, S′′ ⊆ [[〈ψ〉χ]]M.
For all ϕ ∈ Lpopal , M |= ϕ iff for all s ∈ S, M, s |= ϕ; and |= ϕ iff for all models M we
have M |= ϕ.
We do not impose that S′ and S′′ are denotations of formulas in the language for (s, S′, S′′)
to be in P . This semantics is thus more general than the intuitive one for “having the
permission to say”. Indeed, if S′ or S′′ do not correspond to a restriction of S made by
an announcement, then (s, S′, S′′) ∈ P does not correspond to some announcement being
permitted.
The semantics of P (ψ, χ) expresses that after announcement of ψ it is permitted to an-
nounce a χ weaker than the restriction given in the relation P . If the S′′ in (s, [[ψ]], S′′) is the
denotation of some [[〈ψ〉ϕ]], we get that after announcement of ψ it is permitted to announce
a χ weaker than (implied by) ϕ.
Remark 6.6 For any finite list of formulas σ = (σ1, . . . , σn) we can define Mσ by a direct in-
duction on the length of σ. Similarly, for every ϕ ∈ Lpopal we abbreviate [σ]ϕ := [σ1] . . . [σn]ϕ.
This will be particularly useful in Section 6.6.
We shall make another important observation before going ahead. In Proposition 6.7 we
notice that Lpopal may be reduced to a language with a unary operator Pϕ that we would
read simply ‘it is permitted to say ϕ’. We get the equivalence of their expressivity through
the translation P (ψ,ϕ) := 〈ψ〉Pϕ. We prove this result after discussing it a while.
The language with unary operator (let us call it L1popal ) has an advantage and an incon-
venience with respect to Lpopal . Its advantage is that it is easier to read and to translate into
natural language: sentences such as ‘after the announcement of ψ it is permitted to say ϕ’ are
quite boring and not intuitive. Its inconveniences are on one hand that the unary nature of
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its operators is farther to the semantics made of triplets that we just saw, on the other hand
that technical results are more difficult to obtain, because the language cannot be reduced
to a language without announcements. In the following chapter we decided to use a kind of
language with unary operator, but in this one let us use binary ones.
As we show now, both languages are expressively equivalent, and the reader may prefer
to translate binary operators into unary ones using the translation P (ψ,ϕ) := 〈ψ〉Pϕ used in
the following proof.
Proposition 6.7 The language Lpopal is expressively equivalent to the language L1popal .
Proof Clearly, Lpopal is at least as expressive as L1popal , indeed the latter is a sublanguage
of the former, considering that the Pϕ and Oϕ are defined by the following abbreviations
Pϕ := P (>, ϕ) and Oϕ := O(>, ϕ). To prove the equivalence, it is thus sufficient to prove
that for all ψ,ϕ ∈ Lpopal , |= P (ψ, ϕ) ←→ 〈ψ〉P (>, ϕ) and |= O(ψ,ϕ) ←→ 〈ψ〉O(>, ϕ). We
refer to proposition 6.9 to see that |= [ψ]P (>, ϕ) ←→ (ψ −→ P (ψ,ϕ)) and |= [ψ]O(>, ϕ) ←→
(ψ −→ O(ψ,ϕ)). It remains to prove that |= P (ψ,ϕ) −→ ψ (and idem for O). But by
definition of T , if (s, [[ψ]]M, S′′) ∈ P then s ∈ [[ψ]]M. Then we have the wanted result.
¤
6.1.3 Example: Art School
Consider the example presented in the introduction. In an art school examination you are
asked to “describe precisely one (and only one) of the presented pictures”. There are two
distinct sets of intelligent observations to make (modelled as atomic propositional variables):
A = {a1, a2}, B = {b1, b2, b3}, with A ∪ B = PROP . The domain of discourse consists of
all possible valuations S = 2PROP , in the actual state s all atoms are in fact true, and our
student is in fact an omniscient agent g (i.e. ∼g= idS) that can announce anything she likes.
The set P is given as P = {(s, [[>]], [[a1 ∧ a2]]), (s, [[>]], [[b1 ∧ b2]]), (s, [[>]], [[b1 ∧ b3]]), (s, [[>]], [[b2 ∧
b3]]), (s, [[>]], [[b1 ∧ b2 ∧ b3]])}. Note that [[>]] = S. We now have that
• It is permitted to say a1 (M, s |= P (>, a1)), because (s, [[>]], [[a1 ∧ a2]]) ∈ P and [[a1 ∧
a2]] ⊆ [[〈>〉a1]]M (where [[〈>〉a1]]M = [[a1]]M): it is permitted to say something weaker
than a1 ∧ a2.
• It is not permitted to say a1 ∧ b2 (M, s |= ¬P (>, a1 ∧ b2)) because the denotation of
that formula is not contained in either of the members of the set P .
• It is not obligatory to say a1 (M, s 6|= O(>, a1)), because it is permitted to say b1 ∧ b2,
and [[a1]] 6⊆ [[b1 ∧ b2]].
• It is obligatory to say ob := (a1 ∧ a2) ∨ (b1 ∧ b2) ∨ (b2 ∧ b3) ∨ (b1 ∧ b3) as all members of
P are stronger.
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This last obligation is also the strongest obligation in this setting. It is, e.g., also obligatory
to say a1 ∨ b1 ∨ b2 (M, s |= O(>, a1 ∨ b1 ∨ b2)) because this is weaker than ob. However, as
already mentioned, this does not mean that a student has fulfilled her obligation when saying
a1 ∨ b1 ∨ b2 - she then only fulfills part of her obligation (and will therefore fail the exam!).
We observe that our intuition of what an obligation is corresponds to the strongest obligation
under our definition—reasons to prefer the current definition are technical, such as getting
completeness right. A different definition, nearer to our intuition, is proposed in Chapter 7.
6.1.4 Valid Principles and Other Semantic Results
The O and P operators are not interdefinable. This is because the obligation to say ϕ means
that anything not entailing ϕ may not be permitted to say, and not only that it is not
permitted to say ¬ϕ. As an example, consider the following two models that have the same
domain S = {s1, s2}, the same valuation V (p) = {s1}, the same epistemic relation ∼i= S×S,
but that differ on the permission relation: M = (S, V,∼i,P) and M′ = (S, V,∼i,P ′) where
P = {(s1, S, {s1}), (s2, S, S)} and P ′ = {(s1, S, {s1}), (s1, S, S), (s2, S, S)}.
Let L−popal be the language without the obligation operator O. The models M and M′
satisfy the same formulas in that language: for all k ∈ {1, 2} and all ϕ ∈ L−popal , (M, sk |= ϕ
iff M′, sk |= ϕ). The proof is obvious for all inductive cases of ϕ except when ϕ takes
shape P (ψ,ϕ). In that case, observe from the semantics of P and the given relations P and
P ′ that only formulas of type P (>, ϕ2) (or simply P (ϕ2)) can be true in these models, as
the second argument of all triples in P and P ′ is the entire domain S. Further these two
properties: first anything that is true in s1 is permitted to be said, formally for all ϕ ∈ Lpopal ,
M, s1 |= ϕ ↔ P (ϕ) and M′, s1 |= ϕ ↔ P (ϕ). Second anything that is permitted to be said
in s2 is a validity of the model, formally for all ϕ ∈ Lpopal , M, s2 |= P (ϕ) → (ϕ ↔ >) and
M′, s2 |= P (ϕ) → (ϕ ↔ >). So M and M′ are modally equivalent in L−popal . On the other
hand, as (s, S, S) is not in P we have that M, s1 |= O(>, p) but M′, s1 |= ¬O(>, p), so the
models are not modally equivalent in Lpopal . We conclude that:
Proposition 6.8 L−popal is strictly less expressive than Lpopal.
The standard validities for public announcement logic are preserved in this extension
of the logic with permission and obligation (for details, see a standard introduction like
[van Ditmarsch et al., 2007]):
• |= [ψ]p ↔ (ψ −→ p)
• |= [ψ]⊥ ↔ ¬ψ
• |= [ψ]¬ϕ ↔ (ψ −→ ¬[ψ]ϕ)
• |= [ψ](ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2) ↔ ([ψ]ϕ1 ∨ [ψ]ϕ2)
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• |= [ψ]Kiϕ ↔ (ψ −→ Ki[ψ]ϕ)
• |= [ψ1][ψ2]ϕ ↔ [〈ψ1〉ψ2]ϕ
For example, [ψ]p ↔ (ψ −→ p) says that p is true after announcement of ψ iff ψ implies
p (is true). As ψ is the condition to be able to make the announcement, this principle
merely says that an announcement cannot change the valuation of atoms. Of course, for
other formulas than atoms we cannot get rid of the announcement that way. A typical
counterexample (the Moore-sentence) is that (p ∧ ¬Kip) −→ (p ∧ ¬Kip) is a trivial validity
whereas [p ∧ ¬Kip](p ∧ ¬Kip) is false, because whenever p ∧ ¬Kip can be announced, p is
known afterwards: Kip.
Additional to the principles for public announcement logic, two principles address how to
treat a permission or obligation operator after an announcement.
Proposition 6.9
For all p ∈ POPAL, all ψ,ϕ, ψ1, ψ2, ϕ1, ϕ2 ∈ Lpopal :
1. |= [ψ1]P (ψ2, ϕ) ↔ (ψ1 −→ P (〈ψ1〉ψ2, ϕ))
2. |= [ψ1]O(ψ2, ϕ) ↔ (ψ1 −→ O(〈ψ1〉ψ2, ϕ))
Proof For all M, all s ∈ S and all ψ1, ψ2, ϕ ∈ Lpopal we have:
1. (⇒) Suppose that M, s |= [ψ1]P (ψ2, ϕ) and s ∈ [[ψ1]]M. Then for some S′′ ⊆
[[〈ψ2〉ϕ]]Mψ1 , (s, [[ψ2]]Mψ1 , S′′) ∈ Pψ1 . This implies that for some S′′ ⊆
[[〈ψ1〉〈ψ2〉ϕ]]M, (s, [[〈ψ1〉ψ2]]M, S′′) ∈ Pψ1 , i.e. for some S′′ ⊆ [[〈ψ1〈ψ2〉〉ϕ]]M,
(s, [[〈ψ1〉ψ2]]M, S′′) ∈ P . Finally M, s |= P (〈ψ1〉ψ2, ϕ).
(⇐) Suppose that M, s |= (ψ1 −→ P (〈ψ1〉ψ2, ϕ)). If M, s 6|= ψ1 then obviously M, s |=
[ψ1]P (ψ2, ϕ). Otherwise s ∈ [[ψ1]]M and M, s |= P (〈ψ1〉ψ2, ϕ). Therefore, there
exists S′′ ⊆ [[〈〈ψ1〉ψ2〉ϕ]]M such that (s, [[〈ψ1〉ψ2]]M, S′′) ∈ P . Thus s ∈ [[ψ1]]M,
S′′ ⊆ [[〈ψ2〉ϕ]]Mψ1 and (s, [[ψ2]]Mψ1 , S′′) ∈ Pψ1 . Finally M, s |= [ψ1]P (ψ2, ϕ).
2. (⇒) Suppose that M, s |= [ψ1]O(ψ2, ϕ) and s ∈ [[ψ1]]M. Then for all (s, [[ψ2]]Mψ1 , S′′) ∈
Pψ1 , S′′ ⊆ [[〈ψ2〉ϕ]]Mψ1 . This implies that for all (s, [[〈ψ1〉ψ2]]M, S′′) ∈ Pψ1 , S′′ ⊆
[[〈ψ1〉〈ψ2〉ϕ]]M i.e. for all (s, [[〈ψ1〉ψ2]]M, S′′) ∈ P , S′′ ⊆ [[〈ψ1〉〈ψ2〉ϕ]]M. Finally
M, s |= O(〈ψ1〉ψ2, ϕ).
(⇐) Suppose that M, s |= (ψ1 −→ O(〈ψ1〉ψ2, ϕ)). If M, s 6|= ψ1 then obviously M, s |=
[ψ1]O(ψ2, ϕ). Otherwise s ∈ [[ψ1]]M and M, s |= O(〈ψ1〉ψ2, ϕ). Therefore, for all
(s, [[〈ψ1〉ψ2]]M, S′′) ∈ P we have S′′ ⊆ [[〈〈ψ1〉ψ2〉ϕ]]M. Thus s ∈ [[ψ1]]M and for all
(s, [[ψ2]]Mψ1 , S
′′) ∈ Pψ1 we have S′′ ⊆ [[〈ψ2〉ϕ]]Mψ1 . Finally M, s |= [ψ1]O(ψ2, ϕ).
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For example, principle [ψ1]P (ψ2, ϕ) ↔ (ψ1 −→ P (〈ψ1〉ψ2, ϕ)) of Proposition 7.18 says
the following: “(After announcing ψ1 we have that (ψ2 is true and after announcing ψ2
it is permitted to announce ϕ)) iff (On condition that ψ1 is true (〈ψ1〉ψ2 is true and after
announcing 〈ψ1〉ψ2 it is permitted to say ϕ)).”
Using the meaning of the public announcement operator, the right part is the same as
“On condition that ψ1 is true, after announcing ψ1, ψ2 is true and after then announcing ψ2
it is permitted to say ϕ.” Which gets us back to the left part of the original equivalence.
Another validity of the logic spells out that equivalent announcements lead to equivalent
permissions.
Proposition 6.10 For all models M and all formulas ψ,ψ′, ϕ, ϕ′ ∈ Lpopal : If M |= (ψ ←→
ψ′) ∧ ([ψ]ϕ −→ [ψ′]ϕ′) then M |= P (ψ,ϕ) −→ P (ψ′, ϕ′) and M |= O(ψ,ϕ) −→ O(ψ′, ϕ′).
Proof For all ψ,ψ′, ϕ, ϕ′ ∈ Lpopal , if M |= (ψ ←→ ψ′) and M |= 〈ψ〉ϕ −→ 〈ψ′〉ϕ′, then
[[ψ]]M = [[ψ′]]M and [[〈ψ〉ϕ]]M ⊆ [[〈ψ′〉ϕ′]]M. It implies that for all (s, [[ψ]]M, S′′) ∈ P , we have
(s, [[ψ′]]M, S′′) ∈ P and if S′′ ⊆ [[〈ψ〉ϕ]] then S′′ ⊆ [[〈ψ〉′ϕ′]].
¤
We continue with a proposition on allowed logical compositions of permitted and obliged
announcements.
Proposition 6.11 For all ψ,ϕ, ϕ1, ϕ2 ∈ Lpopal :
1. |= (O(ψ,ϕ1) ∧O(ψ,ϕ2)) ↔ O(ψ,ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2)
2. |= (P (ψ,ϕ1) ∧O(ψ,ϕ2)) −→ P (ψ,ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2)
3. |= (ψ ∧O(ψ,ϕ) ∧ ¬P (ψ,ϕ)) ↔ (ψ ∧ ¬P (ψ,>))
Proof For all models M and all state s ∈ S we have
1. M, s |= O(ψ,ϕ1) ∧ O(ψ, ϕ2) iff for all (s, [[ψ]], S′′) ∈ P , S′′ ⊆ [[〈ψ〉ϕ1]] & S′′ ⊆
[[〈ψ〉ϕ2]] iff for all (s, [[ψ]], S′′) ∈ P , S′′ ⊆ [[〈ψ〉ϕ1]]∩ [[〈ψ〉ϕ2]] = [[〈ψ〉(ϕ1 ∧ϕ2)]] iff M, s |=
O(ψ,ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2).
2. Suppose M, s |= P (ψ,ϕ1) ∧ O(ψ,ϕ2). Then for some (s, [[ψ]], S′′) ∈ P , S′′ ⊆ [[〈ψ〉ϕ1]]
and for all (s, [[ψ]], S′′) ∈ P , S′′ ⊆ [[〈ψ〉ϕ2]]. Thus, for some (s, [[ψ]], S′′) ∈ P , S′′ ⊆
[[〈ψ〉ϕ1]] ∩ [[〈ψ〉ϕ2]] = [[〈ψ〉(ϕ1 ∧ ψ2)]], which is equivalent to M, s |= P (ψ,ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2).
3. M, s |= ψ∧O(ψ,ϕ)∧¬P (ψ,ϕ) if and only if M, s |= ψ and for all (s, [[ψ]], S′′) ∈ P , S′′ ⊆
[[〈ψ〉ϕ]] and S′′ 6⊆ [[〈ψ〉ϕ]]. This is equivalent to M, s |= ψ and the fact that there is no
S′′ such that (s, [[ψ]], S′′) ∈ P , which means that M, s |= ψ ∧ ¬P (ψ,>).
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¤
We also have that if ϕ is permitted, then any ϕ ∨ ψ is also permitted (namely anything
weaker than ϕ is also permitted) and similarly, if ϕ is obligatory, than any ϕ ∨ ψ is also
obligatory. In the example in the previous section we already illustrated that this notion
of weakened obligation is not intuitive—one might rather see the announcement of ϕ ∨ ψ as
something towards fulfilling an obligation. The weakened permission of ϕ∨ψ we find intuitive
in the setting of permitted announcements. Unlike in the Ross Paradox [Ross, 1941], note
that this is not a choice between two different announcements, but the single announcement
of a disjunction.
Proposition 6.9 suggests the following translation tr :Lpopal −→ Lpoel :
Definition 6.12 (the translation tr) We define tr(ϕ) by induction on the complexity of
ϕ as follows:
• tr(p) = p
• tr(⊥) = ⊥
• tr(¬ϕ) = ¬tr(ϕ)
• tr(ψ ∨ ϕ) = tr(ψ) ∨ tr(ϕ)
• tr(Kiϕ) = Kitr(ϕ)
• tr(P (ψ,ϕ)) = P (tr(ψ), tr(ϕ))
• tr(O(ψ,ϕ)) = O(tr(ψ), tr(ϕ))
• tr([ψ]p) = tr(ψ) −→ p
• tr([ψ]⊥) = ¬tr(ψ)
• tr([ψ]¬ϕ) = tr(ψ) −→ ¬tr([ψ]ϕ)
• tr([ψ](ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2)) = tr([ψ]ϕ1) ∨ tr([ψ]ϕ2)
• tr([ψ]Kiϕ) = tr(ψ) −→ Kitr([ψ]ϕ)
• tr([ψ1][ψ2]ϕ) = tr([〈ψ1〉ψ2]ϕ)
• tr([ψ1]P (ψ2, ϕ)) = tr(ψ1) −→ P (tr(〈ψ1〉ψ2), tr(ϕ))
• tr([ψ1]O(ψ2, ϕ)) = tr(ψ1) −→ O(tr(〈ψ1〉ψ2), tr(ϕ))
An elementary proof by induction on the structure of ϕ, using Proposition 6.9, now
delivers:
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Proposition 6.13 For all ϕ ∈ Lpopal , |= ϕ ←→ tr(ϕ).
In other words, adding public announcements to a logical language with permitted and
obligatory announcement does not increase the expressivity of the logic.
Finally, we need to show a property of the degree function: for all ϕ ∈ Lpopal , Π(ϕ) :
deg(tr(ϕ)) = deg(ϕ). This property will be used in the completeness proof. To prove it, we
first introduce a preliminary lemma:
Lemma 6.14 For all ψ,ψ′ ∈ Lpopal ,
1. deg(ψ) 6 deg([ψ]ψ′) and deg(tr(ψ)) 6 deg(tr([ψ]ψ′))
2. deg(〈ψ〉ψ′) = deg([ψ]ψ′) and deg(tr(〈ψ〉ψ′)) = deg(tr([ψ]ψ′))
Proof
1. By a simple induction on the structure of ψ′.
2. Let us look at the second one, the first being similar and easier:
deg(tr(〈ψ〉ψ′)) = deg(tr(¬[ψ]¬ψ′)) = deg(¬tr([ψ]¬ψ′))
= deg(tr([ψ]¬ψ′)) = deg(tr(ψ) −→ ¬tr([ψ]ψ′))
= max(deg(tr(ψ)), deg(¬tr([ψ]ψ′))) = max(deg(tr(ψ)), deg(tr([ψ]ψ′)))
= deg(tr([ψ]ψ′)) by 1.
¤
Lemma 6.15 For all θ ∈ Lpopal : for all ψ ∈ Lpopal , if Π(ψ) then Π([ψ]θ) and Π(θ).
Proof Let us prove it by induction on the structure of θ. We denote by =∗ the equalities
that come from Π(ψ).
Base cases
−θ = p: let ψ ∈ Lpopal be such that Π(ψ)
Π([ψ]p)

deg(tr([ψ]p))
= deg(tr(ψ) −→ p)
= max(deg(tr(ψ)), deg(p))
= deg(tr(ψ))
=∗ deg(ψ)
= deg([ψ]p)
and Π(p)
{
deg(tr(p))
= deg(p)
θ = ⊥: let ψ ∈ Lpopal be such that Π(ψ)
Π([ψ]⊥)

deg(tr([ψ]⊥))
= deg(¬tr(ψ))
= deg(tr(ψ))
=∗ deg(ψ)
= deg([ψ]⊥)
and Π(⊥)
{
deg(tr(⊥))
= deg(⊥)
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Inductive cases: let us suppose that for all ψ, Π(ψ) implies Π([ψ]χ) and Π(χ) for all χ that
are subformula of θ. We denote by =IH1 the equalities that come from Π([ψ]χ) and by
=IH2 the ones that come from Π(χ).
• θ = ¬χ : let ψ ∈ Lpopal be such that Π(ψ)
Π([ψ]¬χ)

deg(tr([ψ]¬χ))
= deg(tr(ψ) −→ ¬tr([ψ]χ))
= max(deg(tr(ψ)), deg(tr([ψ]χ)))
=∗IH1 max(deg(ψ), deg([ψ]χ))
= deg(ψ) + deg(χ)
= deg([ψ]¬χ)
and Π(¬χ)

deg(tr(¬χ))
= deg(¬tr(χ))
= deg(tr(χ))
=IH2 deg(χ)
= deg(¬χ)
• θ = Kiχ : Identical
• θ = χ1 ∨ χ2 : let ψ ∈ Lpopal be such that Π(ψ)
deg(tr([ψ](χ1 ∨ χ2)))
= deg(tr([ψ]χ1) ∨ tr([ψ]χ2))
= max(deg(tr([ψ]χ1)), deg(tr([ψ]χ2)))
=IH1 max(deg([ψ]χ1), deg([ψ]χ2))
= deg(ψ) + max(deg(χ1), deg(χ2))
= deg([ψ](χ1 ∨ χ2))
and

deg(tr(χ1 ∨ χ2))
= deg(tr(χ1) ∨ tr(χ2))
=IH2 max(deg(χ1), deg(χ2))
= deg(χ1 ∨ χ2)
• θ = P (ψ′, χ) : let ψ ∈ Lpopal be such that Π(ψ). We denote by =@ the equalities
that comes from Lemma 6.14
Π([ψ]P (ψ′, χ))

deg(tr([ψ]P (ψ′, χ)))
= deg(tr(ψ) −→ P (tr(〈ψ〉ψ′), tr(χ)))
= max(deg(tr(ψ)), deg(P (tr(〈ψ〉ψ′), tr(χ))))
=∗ max(deg(ψ), deg(tr(〈ψ〉ψ′)) + deg(tr(χ)) + 1)
=@IH1 max(deg(ψ), deg(〈ψ〉ψ′) + deg(tr(χ)) + 1)
=@ deg(〈ψ〉ψ′) + deg(tr(χ)) + 1
=@IH2 deg(ψ) + deg(ψ
′) + deg(χ) + 1
= deg([ψ]P (ψ′, χ))
and Π(P (ψ′, χ))

deg(tr(P (ψ′, χ)))
= deg(P (tr(ψ′), tr(χ)))
= deg(tr(ψ′)) + deg(tr(χ)) + 1
=IH2 deg(ψ′) + deg(χ) + 1
= deg(P (ψ′, χ))
• θ = O(ψ′, χ) : Identical
• θ = [ψ′]χ: let ψ ∈ Lpopal be such that Π(ψ)
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Π([ψ][ψ′]χ)

deg(tr([ψ][ψ′]χ))
= deg(tr([〈ψ〉ψ′]χ)) by definition
=IH1 deg([〈ψ〉ψ′]χ)
because Π(〈ψ〉ψ′) (by IH1) and then Π([〈ψ〉ψ′]χ)
= deg(〈ψ〉ψ′) + deg(χ)
= deg(ψ) + deg(ψ′) + deg(χ)
= deg([ψ][ψ′]χ)
and Π([ψ′]χ)
{
deg(tr([ψ′]χ))
=IH1 deg([ψ′]χ) because Π(ψ′) by IH2
¤
Therefore we have:
Proposition 6.16 For all ϕ ∈ Lpopal , Π(ϕ) : deg(tr(ϕ)) = deg(ϕ).
Proof Since Π(>), the previous proposition guarantees this one.
¤
6.2 Axiomatization
We define the axiomatization POPAL and prove its soundness and completeness. Let
POPAL be the least set of formulas in our language that contains the axiom schemata
and is closed under the inference rules in Table 6.1. We write `POPAL ϕ for ϕ ∈ POPAL.
The axiom of ‘obligation and prohibition’ and the inference rule of ‘substitution’ deserve
some explanation. This last inference rule simply express the fact that the announcements of
two equivalent formulas give the same result, and that if announcing ϕ gives more information
than announcing ϕ′, if the first is permitted then the second also is. This intuition has been
explained in the introduction of this chapter. Axiom ‘obligation and prohibition’ is a quite
complicated way to express the intuitive implication O(ψ,ϕ) −→ P (ψ,ϕ): everything that is
obligatory to be said is also permitted to be said. In fact, this last property is not valid in our
models, because it may happen that the set P is empty. In this case, nothing is permitted
(not even the fact to say nothing), and thus everything is obligatory. This axiom allows
to consider such borderline cases. If we want to avoid them, we can consider the class of
models in which for all ψ, ψ −→ P (ψ,>) is valid, that we call ‘permissive models’. In these
models ‘obligation and prohibition’ is equivalent to O(ψ,ϕ) −→ P (ψ,ϕ). Moreover we have
the following:
Remark 6.17 Let M, s be a pointed model, and let χ ∈ Lpopal . If M, s |= P (ψ, χ)∨¬O(ψ, χ)
then for all ϕ ∈ Lpopal we have M, s |= O(ψ,ϕ) −→ P (ψ,ϕ).
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all instances of propositional tautologies
Ki(ψ −→ ϕ) −→ (Kiψ −→ Kiϕ) distribution
Kiϕ −→ ϕ truth
Kiϕ −→ KiKiϕ positive introspection
¬Kiϕ −→ Ki¬Kiϕ negative introspection
[ψ]p ↔ (ψ −→ p) atomic permanence
[ψ]⊥ ↔ ¬ψ ann. and false
[ψ]¬ϕ ↔ (ψ −→ ¬[ψ]ϕ) ann. and negation
[ψ](ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2) ←→ ([ψ]ϕ1 ∨ [ψ]ϕ2) ann. and disjunction
[ψ]Kiϕ ↔ (ψ −→ Ki[ψ]ϕ) ann. and knowledge
[ψ1][ψ2]ϕ ↔ [〈ψ〉1ψ2]ϕ ann. composition
[ψ]P (ψ′, ϕ) ↔ (ψ −→ P (〈ψ〉ψ′, ϕ)) ann. and permission
[ψ]O(ψ′, ϕ) ↔ (ψ −→ O(〈ψ〉ψ′, ϕ)) ann. and obligation
P (ψ,ϕ) −→ 〈ψ〉ϕ permission and truth
O(>,>)
(O(ψ,ϕ1) ∧O(ψ,ϕ2)) ↔ O(ψ,ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2) obligations composition
(P (ψ,ϕ1) ∧O(ψ,ϕ2)) −→ P (ψ,ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2) obligation and permission comp.
(ψ ∧O(ψ,ϕ) ∧ ¬P (ψ,ϕ)) ↔ (ψ ∧ ¬P (ψ,>)) obligation and prohibition
From ϕ and ϕ −→ ψ infer ψ modus ponens
From ϕ infer Kiϕ necessitation of Ki
From ϕ infer [ψ]ϕ necessitation of announcement
From (ψ ←→ ψ′) ∧ (〈ψ〉ϕ −→ 〈ψ′〉ϕ′) infer
(P (ψ,ϕ) −→ P (ψ′, ϕ′)) and (O(ψ,ϕ) −→ O(ψ′, ϕ′)) substitution
Table 6.1: Axiomatization of POPAL
We define the consistency and the maximality of a set x of formulas as usual: x is POPAL-
consistent iff for all nonnegative integers n and for all formulas ϕ1, . . . , ϕn ∈ x, ¬(ϕ1 ∧ . . . ∧
ϕn) 6∈ POPAL whereas x is maximal iff for all formulas ϕ, ϕ ∈ x or ¬ϕ ∈ x.
6.2.1 Soundness
Proposition 6.18 POPAL is sound on the class of all permission Kripke models.
Proof By Propositions 6.9, 6.10 and 6.11.
¤
Note that we have in particular that
Proposition 6.19 For all ϕ ∈ Lpopal ,`POPAL ϕ ←→ tr(ϕ).
6.2.2 Completeness
To prove the completeness result, we use a classical method through the canonical model. To
do so, we first define the following:
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Definition 6.20 Let Sc be the set of all `POPAL-maximal consistent sets, x ∈ Sc, and
ψ ∈ Lpopal . We define Axψ := {y ∈ Sc | 〈ψ〉χ ∈ y for all O(ψ, χ) ∈ x}.
How to interpret such a set Axψ? A `-maximal consistent set y is in Axψ if it contains 〈ψ〉ϕ
for every announcement ϕ that is obligatory in x after the announcement of ψ.
Remark 6.21 By Remark 6.17, we get that if P (ψ,>) ∈ x then :
• x ∈ Axψ. Indeed we then have O(ψ,ϕ) ∈ x only if P (ψ,ϕ) ∈ x only if 〈ψ〉ϕ ∈ x.
• for all formula χ ∈ Lpopal , O(ψ, χ) −→ P (ψ, χ) ∈ x.
It is also the case if, for some formula μ ∈ Lpopal , P (ψ, μ) ∈ x or ¬O(ψ, μ) ∈ x.
We are now able to define the canonical model for POPAL:
Definition 6.22 (Canonical Model)
The canonical model Mc = (Sc,∼ci , V c,Pc) is defined as follows:
• Sc is the set of all `POPAL-maximal consistent sets
• for any p ∈ PROP , V c(p) = {x ∈ Sc | p ∈ x}
• x ∼ci y iff Kix = Kiy, where Kix = {ϕ|Kiϕ ∈ x}
• Pc = {(x, S′, S′′) : ∃P (ψ,ϕ) ∈ x| S′ = {y ∈ Sc : ψ ∈ y} , S′′ = {y ∈ Sc : 〈ψ〉ϕ ∈
y} ∩Axψ}
⋃ {(x, S′, S′′) : ∃(ψ ∧ ¬O(ψ,ϕ)) ∈ x| S′ = {y ∈ Sc : ψ ∈ y} , S′′ = Axψ}.
The definition of Pc requires some explanation. The main idea is that we put in Pc the
triplets (x, S′, S′′) such that S′′ is as big as possible (i.e. corresponds to the least restriction).
For that purpose, considering that S′ corresponds to the announcement of ψ, two kinds of
transitions (x, S′, S′′) (i.e. two kinds of announcements) are in Pc:
1. if some P (ψ,ϕ) ∈ x, we take for S′′ the expression of ϕ ∧ ∧χi where the χi are such
that O(ψ, χi) ∈ x: as every restriction in Pc has to restrict more than every restriction
corresponding to the χi, then S′′ is the least restriction that insure that P (ψ,ϕ) ∈ x.
2. if some ¬O(ψ,ϕ)) ∈ x, we take for S′′ the set Axψ, which is the biggest set we can take
to insure that the obligations in x are satisfied.
Proposition 6.23 The canonical model is a model.
Proof The set of states and the valuation are clearly well defined, and as the equality is an
equivalence relation between sets of formulas, ∼ci is an equivalence relation. Pc is a set of
triplets of the expected form, the only thing we have to verify is that for every (x, S′, S′′) ∈ Pc,
we have x ∈ S′′ ⊆ S′. Indeed, let (x, S′, S′′) ∈ Pc, thus there are two possibilities:
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1. There exists a P (ψ,ϕ) ∈ x such that S′ = {y ∈ Sc : ψ ∈ y} and S′′ = {y ∈ Sc : 〈ψ〉ϕ ∈
y} ∩ Axψ. In this case, clearly S′′ ⊆ S′ because for all y ∈ Sc, 〈ψ〉ϕ ∈ y only if ψ ∈ y.
Now x ∈ {y ∈ Sc : 〈ψ〉ϕ ∈ y} comes from the axiom ‘permission and truth’ considering
that P (ψ,ϕ) ∈ x. It remains to show that x ∈ Axψ, which is proved by Remark 6.21.
2. There exists a (ψ ∧ ¬O(ψ,ϕ)) ∈ x such that S′ = {y ∈ Sc : ψ ∈ y} and S′′ = {y ∈ Sc :
∀O(ψ, χ) ∈ x, 〈ψ〉χ ∈ y}. In this case, S′′ ⊆ S′ comes from the fact that [ψ]O(>,>) ∈ x,
and thus ψ ∈ x implies that O(ψ,>) ∈ x. Therefore if y ∈ S′′ then 〈ψ〉> ∈ y, which
means that y ∈ S′. Now to show that x ∈ S′′ let us consider O(ψ, χ) ∈ x and let us show
that 〈ψ〉χ ∈ x. Indeed, by Remark 6.21, ¬O(ψ,ϕ) ∈ x implies O(ψ, χ) −→ P (ψ, χ) ∈ x,
with O(ψ, χ) ∈ x we get P (ψ, χ) ∈ x by ‘modus ponens’, and finally 〈ψ〉χ ∈ x by
‘permission and truth’.
¤
In the canonical model, a state is a set of formulas. The link between the fact that a
formula ϕ is in a set x and the fact that Mc, x |= ϕ is given by the Truth Lemma. In the
proof of the Truth Lemma, we need the following
Lemma 6.24 For any x ∈Mc and any ψ,ϕ, α, β ∈ Lpoel ,
1. if Axψ ⊆ {y : 〈ψ〉ϕ ∈ y}, then O(ψ,ϕ) ∈ x,
2. if P (α, β) ∈ x and {y : 〈α〉β ∈ y} ∩Axα ⊆ {y : 〈α〉ϕ ∈ y}, then P (α,ϕ) ∈ x
Proof
1. By hypothesis, any maximal consistent set that contains 〈ψ〉χ for all O(ψ, χ) ∈ x
contains also 〈ψ〉ϕ, thus {〈ψ〉χ : O(ψ, χ) ∈ x} ∪ {[ψ]¬ϕ} is inconsistent. By definition,
it has a finite subset {〈ψ〉χ1, . . . , 〈ψ〉χn, [ψ]¬ϕ} that is inconsistent. Thus ` 〈ψ〉χ1 ∧
. . . ∧ 〈ψ〉χn −→ 〈ψ〉ϕ, i.e. ` 〈ψ〉
∧
χi −→ 〈ψ〉ϕ and then ` O(ψ,
∧
χi) −→ O(ψ,ϕ) by
the inference rule of substitution. By axiom ‘obligations composition’ O(ψ,
∧
χi) ∈ x,
and by ‘modus ponens’ O(ψ,ϕ) ∈ x.
2. By hypothesis, any maximal consistent set that contains 〈α〉β and 〈α〉χ for all O(α, χ) ∈
x contains also 〈α〉ϕ. Thus {〈α〉β}∪{〈α〉χ : O(α, χ) ∈ x}∪{[α]¬ϕ} is inconsistent. By
definition, this set has a finite subset {〈α〉β, 〈α〉χ1, . . . , 〈α〉χn, α¬ϕ} that is inconsistent.
Thus ` (〈α〉β ∧ 〈α〉χ1 ∧ . . . ∧ 〈α〉χn) −→ 〈α〉ϕ, i.e. ` 〈α〉(β ∧
∧
χi) −→ 〈α〉ϕ and then
` P (α, β ∧∧χi) −→ P (α,ϕ). O(α,∧χi) ∈ x is true by axiom ‘obligation composition’
and P (α, β) ∈ x by hypothesis. Thus P (α, β ∧ ∧χi) ∈ x is true by axiom ‘obligation
and permission comp.’. Finally, P (α,ϕ) ∈ x by ‘modus ponens’.
¤
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Proposition 6.25 (Truth Lemma for Lpoel) For all ϕ ∈ Lpoel we have:
Π(ϕ) : for all x ∈ Sc,Mc, x |= ϕ iff ϕ ∈ x
Proof The proof is by induction on the degree of ϕ.
Base case If deg(ϕ) = 0 then ϕ ∈ Lel and Π(ϕ) is a known result (See Proposition 4.1 or
[Blackburn et al., 2001] or [Fagin et al., 1995] for details). Note that (Sc,∼ci , V c) is the
classical canonical model for Lel .
Induction steps Let k ∈ N, let us suppose that Π(ψ) is true for all ψ ∈ Lpoel such that
deg(ψ) 6 k.
Note that it follows that Π(ψ) is true for all ψ ∈ Lpopal such that deg(ψ) 6 k. Indeed,
for all such ψ, for all x ∈ Sc, Mc, x |= ψ iff Mc, x |= tr(ψ) iff tr(ψ) ∈ x iff ψ ∈ x.
Let ϕ be such that deg(ϕ) ≤ k +1 and let us reason by induction on the structure of ϕ.
• ϕ = p;⊥;¬ψ; ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2; Kiψ: See the proof of the truth lemma for Lel in
[Blackburn et al., 2001] or [Fagin et al., 1995].
• ϕ = P (ψ, χ):
(⇒) Suppose that Mc, x |= P (ψ, χ). This implies that Mc, x |= ψ (and thus ψ ∈ x
by IH) and that there exists S′′ ⊆ [[〈ψ〉χ]]Mc such that (x, [[ψ]]Mc , S′′) ∈ Pc.
Now, there are two possibilities:
– There exists P (α, β) ∈ x s.t. (∗)[[ψ]]Mc = {y ∈ Sc : α ∈ y} and S′′ =
{y ∈ Sc : 〈α〉β ∈ y} ∩ Axα. In this case S′′ ⊆ [[〈ψ〉χ]]Mc by hypothesis, and
[[〈ψ〉χ]]Mc = [[〈α〉χ]]Mc by (∗). Thus S′′ ⊆ [[〈α〉χ]]Mc . By lemma 6.24.2, with
P (α, β) ∈ x, this implies that P (α, χ) ∈ x by substitution rule. By (∗) again
we obtain that P (ψ, χ) ∈ x.
– There exists ¬O(α, β) ∈ x s.t. [[ψ]]Mc = {y ∈ Sc : α ∈ y} and S′′ = Axα. On one
hand, this implies that ` ψ ←→ α and then ¬O(ψ, β) ∈ x by substitution rule.
On the other hand, with the fact that S′′ ⊆ [[〈ψ〉χ]]Mc we obtain, by lemma
6.24.1, that O(ψ, χ) ∈ x. Now, if we suppose P (ψ, χ) /∈ x then ¬P (ψ,>) ∈ x
by Remark 6.21. Therefore, using the fact that ψ ∈ x,we obtain O(ψ, β) ∈ x by
the same Remark. This leads to a contradiction which proves that P (ψ, χ) ∈ x.
(⇐) If P (ψ, χ) ∈ x then let us define S′ = [[ψ]]Mc and S′′ = [[〈ψ〉χ]]∩Axψ. We obtain
(x, S′, S′′) ∈ Pc by definition of Pc. Therefore, as S′′ ⊆ [[〈ψ〉χ]] = [[tr(〈ψ〉χ)]],
Mc, x |= P (ψ, χ).
• ϕ = O(ψ, χ):
(⇐) Suppose that O(ψ, χ) ∈ x and Mc, x 6|= O(ψ, χ). Thus Mc, x |= ψ otherwise
we would have Mc, x |= O(ψ, χ). Now Mc, x 6|= O(ψ, χ) implies that there exists
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(x, [[ψ]], S′′) ∈ Pc such that S′′ 6⊆ [[〈ψ〉χ]]. That is impossible, because by definition
S′′ ⊆ Axψ ⊆ [[〈ψ〉χ]].
(⇒) Suppose that O(ψ, χ) 6∈ x and Mc, x |= O(ψ, χ). Then ¬O(ψ, χ) ∈ x and,
by definition of Pc, (x, [[ψ]], Axψ) ∈ Pc. But then Mc, x |= O(ψ, χ) leads to Axψ ⊆
[[〈ψ〉χ]] by the semantics. Now, if we prove that [[〈ψ〉χ]] = {y : 〈ψ〉χ ∈ y} we obtain
O(ψ, χ) ∈ x by Lemma 6.24.1. It would lead to a contradiction and then to the
wanted result. Now [[〈ψ〉χ]] = [[tr(〈ψ〉χ)]] by Proposition 6.13. [[tr(〈ψ〉χ)]] = {y :
tr(〈ψ〉χ) ∈ y} by IH (because tr(〈ψ〉χ) ∈ Lpoel and deg(tr(〈ψ〉χ)) ≤ k). Finally,
{y : tr(〈ψ〉χ) ∈ y} = {y : 〈ψ〉χ ∈ y} by Proposition 6.19.
¤
Proposition 6.26 POPAL is sound and complete with respect to the class of all permission
Kripke models.
Proof The soundness has been shown in Proposition 6.18. By Proposition 6.25 we can show
the completeness with respect to the class of all permission Kripke models. Indeed, for all
ϕ ∈ Lpopal :
|= ϕ ⇒ |= tr(ϕ) ⇒ Mc |= tr(ϕ) ⇒ ` tr(ϕ) ⇒ ` ϕ.
¤
6.3 Decidability
We prove in this section that POPAL is decidable by proving a small model property. To
do so, we use a filtration method, extending the notion of filtration introduced in Definition
2.16. We first introduce to notions that are useful in this method:
Definition 6.27 (Closed set) Let X ⊆ Lpoel . We shall say that X is closed if the following
properties are satisfied:
• X is closed under subformulas
• for all P (ψ,ϕ) ∈ X, tr(〈ψ〉ϕ) ∈ X
• for all O(ψ,ϕ) ∈ X, tr(〈ψ〉ϕ) ∈ X
Definition 6.28 Let M = (S,∼i, V,P) be a model and Γ be a closed set of formulas. Let
!Γ be the relation on S defined, for all s, t ∈ S, by:
s!Γt iff ∀ ϕ ∈ Γ : (M, s |= ϕ iff M, t |= ϕ)
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Note that !Γ is an equivalence relation. For all s ∈ S, let us denote by |s|Γ (or simply
|s|) the equivalence class of s with respect to !Γ; and for S′ ⊆ S′′, we write !Γ(S′) for
{t ∈ S | ∃s ∈ S′ : s!Γt}.
We can now generalize the notion of filtration in the context of permission models:
Definition 6.29 (Filtration) We call the filtration ofM through Γ (or simply the filtration
of M) the model MΓ = (SΓ,∼Γi , V Γ,PΓ) where:
• SΓ = S/!Γ
• |s| ∼Γi |t| iff for all Kiϕ ∈ Γ, (M, s |= Kiϕ iff M, t |= Kiϕ)
• V Γ(p) =
{
∅ if p 6∈ Γ
V (p)/!Γ if p ∈ Γ)
• PΓ = {(|s|, S1, S2): there exists t ∈ |s| and S′′ ⊆ S s.t. S′′/!Γ = S2 and
(t,
⋃
(S1), S′′) ∈ P}
In this definition, S1 is a set of equivalence classes, and
⋃
S1 is the set of all states that
are represented by an element of S1. Here is a useful lemma:
Lemma 6.30 Let Γ ⊂ Lpoel be a finite closed set. For any model M, its filtration MΓ
contains at most 2m nodes, where m = Card(Γ).
Proof Let M be a model. Let g : SΓ −→ 2Γ be defined by g(|s|) = {ψ ∈ Γ : M, s |= ψ}. It
follows from the definition of !Γ that g is well-defined and injective. Thus the size of SΓ is
at most 2m.
¤
The epistemic relations of a model and their filtrations over a set Γ are linked by the
following property:
Proposition 6.31 Let M be a model and let Γ be a closed set of formulas. Then for all
s, t ∈ S, for all ϕ ∈ Γ:
1. s ∼i t ⇒ |s| ∼Γi |t|.
2. |s| ∼Γi |t| and Kiϕ ∈ Γ and M, s |= Kiϕ ⇒M, t |= ϕ.
Proof
1. Let s, t ∈ S such that s ∼i t, and let Kiϕ ∈ Γ. Then we have M, s |= Kiϕ iff for all
u ∼i s,M, u |= ϕ iff for all u ∼i t, M, u |= ϕ iff M, t |= Kiϕ. Then by definition of ∼Γi
we obtain |s| ∼Γi |t|.
2. Let us suppose the first part of the implication. Since |s| ∼Γi |t|, Kiϕ ∈ Γ and M, s |=
Kiϕ then M, t |= Kiϕ. Since ∼i is reflexive M, t |= ϕ.
148 CHAPTER 6. PERMISSION AND PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENTS
¤
Proposition 6.31 is sufficient to prove the following:
Proposition 6.32 (Filtration lemma) Let M be a model and let Γ be a closed set of for-
mulas. For all ϕ ∈ Γ we have:
(F oϕ) ∀s ∈ S, (M, s |= ϕ iff MΓ, |s| |= ϕ).
Proof By induction on the degree of ϕ.
base case If deg(ϕ) = 0 then ϕ ∈ Lel and the proof of (F oϕ) is done by induction on the
complexity of ϕ (see [Blackburn et al., 2001] or [Fagin et al., 1995] for details, note that
Γ is in particular closed under subformulas).
induction steps Let k ∈ N. Suppose that (F oψ) is true for all ψ ∈ Lpoel such that deg(ψ) 6
k. Let ϕ be such that deg(ϕ) ≤ k + 1 and let us reason on the structure of ϕ.
• ϕ = p;⊥;¬ψ; ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2,Kiϕ: See the proof of the filtration lemma in [Blackburn et al., 2001]
or [Fagin et al., 1995].
• ϕ = P (ψ, χ): Let s ∈ S. By construction of Γ we know that{
!Γ([[ψ]]M) = [[ψ]]M and
(∗) !Γ([[〈ψ〉χ]]M) = !Γ([[tr(〈ψ〉χ)]]M) = [[tr(〈ψ〉χ)]]M = [[〈ψ〉χ]]M.
(⇒) Suppose M, s |= P (ψ, χ). Let S′′ ⊆ [[〈ψ〉χ]]M = [[tr(〈ψ〉χ)]]M be such that
(s, [[ψ]],S′′) ∈ P , and let Soo = S′′/!Γ . We have (by IH) that Soo ⊆ [[tr(〈ψ〉χ)]]MΓ
and we obtain that (|s|, [[ψ]]MΓ , Soo) ∈ PΓ by definition of the filtration and (∗). Fi-
nally, MΓ, |s| |= P (ψ, χ)
(⇐) Suppose MΓ, |s| |= P (ψ, χ). Let Soo ⊆ [[tr(〈ψ〉χ)]]MΓ be such that
(|s|, [[ψ]]MΓ , Soo) ∈ PΓ. Then by definition of PΓ, there exists t ∈ |s| and S′′ such
that S′′/!Γ = S
oo and (t, [[ψ]], S′′) ∈ P . By IH, Soo ⊆ [[tr(〈ψ〉χ)]]MΓ implies that
S′′ ⊆ [[tr(〈ψ〉χ)]]M. Therefore, M, t |= P (ψ, χ). Finally, as s!Γt, M, s |= P (ψ, χ).
• ϕ = O(ψ, χ): Let s ∈ S,
(⇒) Suppose M, s |= O(ψ, χ) and let Soo be such that
(|s|, [[ψ]]MΓ , Soo) ∈ PΓ, we want to show that Soo ⊆ [[〈ψ〉χ]]MΓ . By definition of
the filtration, we can construct S′′ such that S′′/!Γ = S
oo and (t, [[ψ]], S′′) ∈ P for
some t ∈ |s|. Thus S′′ ⊆ [[〈ψ〉χ]]M, because M, t |= O(ψ, χ) (as s!Γt). Finally
Soo ⊆ [[〈ψ〉χ]]MΓ by (∗) and IH.
(⇐) Suppose MΓ, |s| |= O(ψ, χ) and let S′′ be such that
(s, [[ψ]], S′′) ∈ P . We show that S′′ ⊆ [[〈ψ〉χ]]M. Let Soo = S′′/!Γ , then by
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definition of the filtration, (|s|, [[ψ]]MΓ , Soo) ∈ PΓ. Thus Soo ⊆ [[〈ψ〉χ]]MΓ and then
S′′ ⊆ [[〈ψ〉χ]]MΓ by (∗) and IH.
¤
Definition 6.33 (Closure) For all ϕ ∈ Lpoel , we construct the P-Closure of ϕ, noted Cl(ϕ),
inductively on the structure of ϕ:
• Cl(p) = {p}
• Cl(⊥) = {⊥}
• Cl(¬ϕ) = {¬ϕ} ∪ Cl(ϕ)
• Cl(ψ ∨ ϕ) = {ψ ∨ ϕ} ∪ Cl(ψ) ∪ Cl(ϕ)
• Cl(Kiϕ) = {Kiϕ} ∪ Cl(ϕ)
• Cl(P (ψ,ϕ)) = {P (ψ,ϕ)} ∪ Cl(ψ) ∪ Cl(ϕ) ∪ Cl(tr(〈ψ〉ϕ)).
• Cl(O(ψ,ϕ)) = {O(ψ,ϕ)} ∪ Cl(ψ) ∪ Cl(ϕ) ∪ Cl(tr(〈ψ〉ϕ)).
Proposition 6.34 For all ϕ ∈ Lpoel , Cl(ϕ) is well-defined and it is a finite closed set.
Proof The proof is by induction on the degree of ϕ.
base case If deg(ϕ) = 0 then ϕ ∈ Lel and we only need to prove that Cl(ϕ) is a well-defined
finite set closed under subformulas, which is straightforward.
inductive cases Let k ∈ N, let us suppose that Cl(ψ) is a well-defined finite closed set for
any ψ such that deg(ψ) ≤ k. Let ϕ be such that deg(ϕ) ≤ k + 1 and let us reason
inductively on the structure of ϕ.
• ϕ = p;⊥;¬ψ; ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2; Kiψ: Trivial.
• ϕ = P (ψ, χ) or O(ψ, χ): By IH, Cl(ψ), Cl(χ) and Cl(tr(〈ψ〉χ)) are well-defined
finite closed sets, so Cl(P (ψ, χ)) and Cl(O(ψ, χ)) are well-defined finite sets. We
only need to prove that they are closed, which is straightforward.
¤
Proposition 6.35 (Finite model property)
Let ϕ ∈ Lpoel , if ϕ is satisfiable then ϕ is satisfiable in a model containing at most 2m
nodes, where m = Card(Cl(ϕ)).
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Proof Suppose that M and s are such that M, s |= ϕ. Let Γ = Cl(ϕ). Then by Proposition
6.32, MΓ, |s| |= ϕ. By Lemma 6.30, MΓ contains at most 2m states.
¤
Theorem 6.36 POPAL is decidable.
Proof Let ϕ ∈ Lpopal be a formula. The following procedure decides whether ϕ is satisfiable
or not:
1. Compute Φ = tr(ϕ)
2. Compute Γ = Cl(Φ)
3. For all permission Kripke models M of size ≤ 2Card(Γ) check if there exists s ∈M such
that M, s |= Φ.
¤
6.4 Extended Example: La Belote
We now consider the French card game “la Belote”. For a full description of the game, see
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Belote. The game is played with four players, who form
two teams, and with 32 cards of a regular full deck of cards (the ranks 2 to 6 are eliminated).
The name of the game, “belote”, is also used in the game to designate a pair of a King and
a Queen of a trump suit.
After the deal, and after the choice of a trump suit, the first player chooses and plays a
card of her hand, followed by the other players in clockwise order. The player who played
the highest trump card or the highest of the same color as the first player’s card wins the
round and starts the next round. Except for the first player of a round, each player has to
follow suit or, if she cannot, to play trump. Moreover, when a trump has been played, it is
forbidden to play a lower trump.
The act of playing a card can be seen as the public announcement that the corre-
sponding card belonged to the corresponding player. We model the game with the set
of propositional atoms PROP expressing card ownership, namely PROP = {RCi | R ∈
{7, 8, 9, 10, J,Q,K,A}, C ∈ {♣,♥,♦,♠}, i ∈ {A,B,C,D}}. An atom RCi stands for ‘player
i holds the card with rank R of suit C’. For any suit C and player i, we introduce the
abbreviations Ci =
∨
R RCi, and C
>R
i =
∨
R′>R R
′Ci.
A model M = (S, {∼i}, V,P) is called a “model of La Belote” if
1. for each state s, for any R and C, there is exactly one i such that s ∈ V (RCi) (i.e. the
states of M are deals of cards);
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2. for any s, t ∈ S and any i, s ∼i t implies that for all R,C: s ∈ V (RCi) iff t ∈ V (RCi)
(i.e. each player can distinguish different cards);
3. P is constructed from (S, {∼i}, V ) according to the rules of the game.
The last item means that in a given deal s, for all the cards p held by an agent i that are
permitted by the rules to be played, (s, S, Spi) ∈ P . If after p has been played by player i it
is permitted for player j to play q, then we also need that (s, Spi , S〈pi〉qj ) ∈ P . And so on, for
all possible moves.
Let M be a model of La Belote. The trump suit has been selected before the game starts,
we will suppose that it is clubs. The set of atoms is partially ordered as follows (∗ can be one
of the players A,B,C,D). First, any trump is higher than any non-trump. But the cards are
also ordered in the following way: for non-trumps (i.e. for any C 6= ♣):
7C∗ < 8C∗ < 9C∗ < JC∗ < QC∗ < KC∗ < 10C∗ < AC∗
For trumps:
7♣∗ < 8♣∗ < Q♣∗ < K♣∗ < 10♣∗ < A♣∗ < 9♣∗ < J♣∗
For more details, see the mentioned website.
We now list a number of model validities of La Belote. These formulas are valid at the
beginning of each round of the game, in other words, the models M considered below result
from any iteration of a sequence of four permitted announcements. We will call 1 the player
that opens the round, followed by 2, etc.
1-One player at once:
For all ψ ∈ Lpopal , all i 6= j, all pi, qj ∈ PROP , M |= P (ψ, pi) −→ ¬P (ψ, qj).
Two different players are not allowed to play simultaneously.
2-Each card is played once:
For all p ∈ PROP , all ψ ∈ Lpopal , M |= ¬P (〈p〉ψ, p).
If a card has been played once, it cannot be played again.
3-Obligation to follow suit:
For all ranks R and all suits C,
M |= C2 −→ O(RC1, C2).
If the player 2 can follow the suit asked by 1, she is obliged to do so.
152 CHAPTER 6. PERMISSION AND PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENTS
4-Obligation to play trump:
For all ranks R, all suit C 6= ♣, M |= ♣2 −→ O(RC1, C2 ∨ ♣2).
If the player 2 can follow the suit asked by 1 or play trump, she is obliged to do so.
5-Permission to say “belote et rebelote”:
For all players i, M |= K♣i ∧Q♣i ∧ (P (ψ,Q♣i) ∨ P (ψ,K♣i)) −→ P (ψ,Q♣i ∧K♣i).
If the player one is allowed to play the queen of the trump suit, she is allowed to
announce that she has the royal couple (called the “belote”). This does not mean that
she is allowed to play both cards, but playing one of them she is allowed to announce
that she also has the other one.
6-Obligation to go up at trump:
For all ψ ∈ Lpopal , all player i and all R, M |= ♣>Ri −→ O(〈ψ〉R♣i−1,♣>Ri ).
This says that if the previous player played trump and if you have higher cards than
the played trump, then you are obliged to play one of them.
§¨ ¥¦Q♥ §¨ ¥¦K♠
§¨ ¥¦7♦ §¨ ¥¦Q♣
§¨ ¥¦8♥ §¨ ¥¦K♣
§¨ ¥¦8♣ §¨ ¥¦A♣
Figure 6.1: The moody children playing la belote
We apply these conditional rules about the permission to speak to the state (deal) s, presented
in Figure 6.1, in which each player has 2 cards. Alex starts the game. According to the rule,
our model validates the following formulas:
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• M, s |= P (8♥A) ∧ P (7♦A) ∧ ¬P (8♥A ∧ 7♦A):
Alex has the permission to play one of his cards, but not both.
• M, s |= O(8♥A, Q♥B):
If Alex plays the 8♥ card, Brune is obliged to play a card of the same suit, thus she
cannot play her K♠ card (rule (3)).
• M, s |= P (〈8♥A〉Q♥B , Q♣C ∧K♣C):
Cha has the permission to announce that she has both cards of the “belote” (rule (5)).
• M, s |= O(〈〈8♥A〉Q♥B〉Q♣C , A♣D):
The ‘go up at trump”applies if Cha plays the queen of clubs. As Dan has a unique
higher trump, she has the obligation to play it.
6.5 Comparison to the Literature
6.5.1 Classic Deontic Principles and Paradoxes
As we reviewed before, deontic logic started out with Von Wright’s operators P and O binding
formulas in expressions Pϕ and Oϕ, then came Meyer’s and Van der Meyden’s mind-frame
switch to operators P and O binding actions, and finally we treated communicative actions
that are represented by the announced formulas. Recall that in our framework we treat
the obligation and permission to speak ϕ (as Pϕ and Oϕ, using the abbreviation) and not
the obligation and permission that ϕ. Well, if we end up with such expressions, how do its
validities relate to the standard and historical Von Wright approach? In this subsection, we
summarily treat that matter.
First, a disappointment: the P and O operators we have introduced are not normal modal
operators (the triples in the P relation rather suggest a modality with a neighbourhood-type
of semantics). They do not satisfy necessitation! A formula may be valid, but that does not
make it an obligation, or permitted; if you are not allowed to announce p nor ¬p, it does not
help you a great deal that p ∨ ¬p is a validity!
Something else has to be underlined once again: our formalism allows to consider situations
in which nothing is permitted to be said, which is equivalent to the fact that everything is
obligatory. To avoid such borderline cases, we will often consider the class of models in which
for all ψ, ψ −→ P (ψ,>) is valid, called the ‘permissive models’. Our comments on classical
deontic paradoxes is in this context of permissive models.
Obligation distributes over conjunction (and implication), as O(ϕ∧ψ) ←→ (Oϕ∧Oψ) is
a special case (in the case where the first argument is >) of Proposition 6.11.1. Permission
does not distribute over conjunction: we may have that p and q are both permissible an-
nouncements, such that Pp and Pq are true, but not at the same time, P (p∧ q) may be false.
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This reflects that for a given Kripke model with domain S and actual state s the relation
P may contain (s, S, [[p]]) and (s, S, [[q]]) but not (s, S, [[p ∧ q]]). However, given weakening of
permitted announcements, a valid principle indeed is P (ϕ ∧ ψ) −→ (Pϕ ∧ Pψ).
Permitted announcements are true, obligatory ones also in the permissive models: Pϕ −→
ϕ and Oϕ −→ ϕ, a principle obviously false in classic deontic logic. But one has to realize the
special reading of such implications in our setting! Pϕ −→ ϕ is valid because a precondition
for a permitted announcement is the truth of the announcement formula. It does not formalize
that all permitted actions always take place. A similar slip of the deontic mind occurs
when observing that Pϕ −→ P (ϕ ∨ ψ) is valid. Doesn’t this conflict with Ross’s Paradox
[Ross, 1941]? We addressed this matter in the introduction, let us go over the details. Ross’s
Paradox is about the reading (for permission and for obligation) that ‘to be permitted to
do a or b’ entails ‘to be permitted to do a’ and ‘to be permitted to do b’. In the setting of
permitted announcements we have to clearly distinguish the action of announcing from the
formula being announced. Permission to announce a or b indeed entails permission to perform
either announcement, and choose between them. This is a nondeterministic action. This is
different from the permission to make an announcement weaker than the announcement of a,
such as a∨ b. In other words, permission to announce a or b is not the same as permission to
announce a∨ b. Possibly, “permission to announce a or b” might be called ambiguous, as the
‘or’ may mean logical disjunction of formulas or non-deterministic choice between programs.
But once the reading has been chosen, the course is clear.
We already observed that obligation and permission are not interdefinable. In Proposition
6.8 we showed that obligation adds to the expressivity of the logic. So Oϕ ←→ ¬P¬ϕ is not
valid. Now, Clearly, Oϕ −→ ¬O¬ϕ is valid in the class of permissive models. The norm is
thus still considered as non-contradictory, we may want, to avoid this ‘paradox’, to include
different norms in the same framework. We leave this for further research. But then again,
even in the permissive cases, Pϕ ∨ P¬ϕ is not valid: there is nothing against both p and
¬p being forbidden announcements at the same time! For yet another example, consider
the schema O(Oϕ −→ ϕ), formalizing the requirement that obligations are fulfilled. In our
setting, either we are in a non-permissive case and thus this obligation is satisfied, or it is
a permissive one and thus as Oϕ −→ ϕ is valid, this is equivalent to the validity of O>,
which indeed is a validity (note that > is weaker than any obligatory announcement, and
that weakening holds for obligation).
A more recent development in deontic logic is the interaction between obligations and per-
missions and explicit agency (see [Chisholm, 1963, Horty, 2001]). The well-known Meinong-
Chisholm reduction of “The agent is obliged to do a” to “It is obligatory that the agent does
a” seems to have an interesting parallel in the logic of permitted announcements. In the logic
of public announcements, the announcement by agent a is typically reduced to ‘the (public)
announcement of ‘agent a knows ϕ’. It is relevant to recall at this stage that public announce-
ments are supposedly made by outsiders of the system, not by agents modelled explicitly in
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the logical language. This observation can be applied in the logic of permitted and obligatory
announcements! A Meinongian turn to permitted announcements seems to interpret OKiϕ—
“It is obligatory that agent i announces ϕ” (announcements of ϕ by an agent i in the system
are known to be true by that agent, so in fact have form Kiϕ)—as an indirect form of agency
in our logic, namely, we can let it stand for “Agent i is obliged to announce ϕ.”
6.5.2 Deontic Action Logics
For the purpose of comparing our work with the existing literature we present a variant
of the semantics for permission. Our current understanding of P (ψ,ϕ) is that “after the
announcement of ψ it is permitted to give at most the information ϕ”. Any weakening of ϕ
is also permitted. Instead, it was until now “after the announcement of ψ it is permitted to
give exactly the information ϕ”. We will write P= for that modality. It has the semantics:
for all M and s in the domain of M:
M, s |= P=(ψ,ϕ) iff (s, [[ψ]], [[〈ψ〉ϕ]]) ∈ P .
The logic with P subsumes the one with P=: let us expand a given relation P with all
supersets for the third argument of a triple in that relation: for all subsets S′′′ of the domain
of a given model M, if (s, S′, S′′) ∈ P and S′′ ⊆ S′′′, then add (s, S ′, S′′′) to P . Call the
resulting relation P= and let M= be the model with P= instead of P . On the language
without obligation, inductively define a translation •= that replaces all occurrences of P by
P=. We now have that M, s |= P (ψ,ϕ) iff M=, s |= P=(ψ,ϕ). We compare the proposal
using the operator P= with the related works presented in Section 3.3.
The Dynamic Logic of Permission Recall the framework proposed by
[van der Meyden, 1996] and presented in Section 3.2.2. Our semantics for P=(ψ,ϕ)
consists of the particular case where actions are public announcements. Thus, for α in Van
der Meyden’s ♦(α,ϕ) we take an announcement ψ! such that ♦(ψ!, ϕ) now means ‘it is
permitted to announce ψ, after which ϕ is true’. The precise correspondence is:
Proposition 6.37 ♦(ϕ!, θ) is equivalent to P=(>, ϕ) ∧ 〈ϕ〉θ
Proof Given a model M with domain S, we can see the announcement ϕ! as an atomic
action which links each state s ∈ [[ϕ]]M to the same state s ∈ Sϕ. This is a permitted action
in Van der Meyden’s semantics if and only if (s, S, Sϕ) ∈ P . By definition, M, s |= P=(>, ϕ)
iff (s, S, Sϕ) ∈ P . The formula θ should then hold after the permitted announcement of ϕ.
¤
Van der Meyden’s ♦(ϕ!, θ) is found in a syntactic variant Perm(ϕ)θ in
[Pucella and Weissman, 2004]. Now, we have that P=(>, ϕ) is equivalent to Perm(ϕ). Given
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the abbreviation P (ϕ) in our language for P=(>, ϕ), the correspondence is therefore very
close.
Merging Frameworks for Interaction Recall the logical language Ltpal of Van Benthem
et al.’s protocol logic TPAL ([van Benthem et al., 2009]) presented in Section 3.3. We have
seen that the domain was a set of histories, a history h being a succession of announcements,
with the following semantics for the dynamic operator: MΠ, h |= 〈ψ〉ϕ iff
• MΠ, h |= ψ
• h′ = hψ ∈ Π
• MΠ, h′ |= ϕ
This suggests to translate P=(ψ,ϕ) in Lpopal by [ψ]〈ϕ〉> in Ltpal . (For convenience, we
write announcements ψ! and ϕ! instead of singleton event models with precondition ψ and
ϕ, respectively.) Unfortunately, this translation is imprecise. Consider executing these two
announcements in a state s of an initial model M. If sψ 6∈ H then MΠ, s |= [ψ]〈ϕ〉>:
after a non-permitted announcement, anything is permitted to be said, because anything
holds after a necessity-type modal operator that cannot be executed. But M, s 6|= P=(ψ,ϕ),
because (s, [[ψ]], [[〈ψ〉ϕ]]) is not in the P relation to validate it. In other words, in our logic
we get the full forest produced by the protocol of all truthful public announcements, but
some branches are coloured with permitted and others are coloured with not-permitted. The
Van Benthem et al. approach produces a forest restricted to the protocol (i.e., restricted to
permitted announcements only).
A more serious problem with such a translation is as follows. Our semantics allows that
if something is later permitted to be said, we are already permitted to say something now in
a different way, a consequence of the axiom “announcement and permission” [ψ]P (ψ′, ϕ) ↔
(ψ −→ P (〈ψ〉ψ′, ϕ)). (This axiom holds for P= as well.) In TPAL this would amount
to requiring that (announcement) protocols are postfix-closed in the restricted sense that if
π′π′′ = π ∈ Π, then there is a single announcement ξ (combining all the announcements in
the initial π′ part in one complex announcement) such that ξπ′′ ∈ Π.
Our logic with P instead of P= and with obligation O as well makes the comparison even
more problematic.
As we now know, the notion of “obligation to say ϕ” cannot be captured only by the
negation of permission to say anything else than ϕ (except in a very radical dictatorship),
but much more by the fact that all that does not say at least ϕ is not permitted. This notion
of obligation we consider a strong point of our logic POPAL, in which it differs from known
other proposals.
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6.6 Tableaux
We introduce here a proof method for PPAL, the logic reduced to the language wihtout
obligation operator. This proof uses analytic tableaux to construct, given a formula ϕ, a
model that satisfies ϕ (or prove its inconsistency if it fails). In order to do so we use notations
near to the one proposed by [Balbiani et al., 2010] for a tableau method for PAL.
6.6.1 Definitions
The ‘formulas’ appearing in the tableau are L1ppal -formulas prefixed by a natural number (n)
that stands for a possible world in the model, and by a list of formulas (σ) representing
successive updates.
Definition 6.38 (Labelled formula) A labelled formula is a triple of the form 〈σ, n, ϕ〉
such that: σ is a (possibly empty) finite list of formulas of L1ppal , n ∈ N and ϕ ∈ L1ppal .
The intuition behind this notation is that 〈σ, n, ϕ〉 appears in the tableau if the state n is
still a state of the model after having announced successively the elements of the list σ, and
the resulting state (after the announcements) satisfies ϕ. In other words 〈σ, n, ϕ〉 appears in
the tableau if n ∈ Wσ and Mσ, n |= ϕ. If n ∈ Wσ we say that ‘n survives (the announcement)
σ’.
To define what is a branch in this context, we denote by L(N) the set of all the finite lists of
L1ppal -formulas. For any list σ = (σ1, . . . , σn) we write hd(σ) = σn, tl(σ) = (σ1, . . . , σn−1), and
for any formula ψ ∈ L1ppal , σ ◦ ψ = (σ1, . . . , σn, ψ) ∈ L(N). We write ε ∈ L(N) to designate the
empty list. Finally, § is a countable set of formal symbols whose aim is to represent subsets
of the initial set of worlds in a model.
Definition 6.39 (Branch) Let § be a countable infinite set of symbols. A branch is a set of
terms t of the form:
1. “〈σ, n, ϕ〉” (labelled formula);
2. “nRim” where i ∈ AG, n,m ∈ N;
3. “Π(n, S, S ′)” where n ∈ N and S, S ′ ∈ §;
4. “n ∈ S”, “n 6∈ S” where n ∈ N and S ∈ §;
5. “S ` σ”, “S a σ”, “S 6` σ” and “S 6a σ” where S ∈ § and σ ∈ L(N).
We denote by [♦] the set of terms of the first category, [R] for the second category, [Π] for the
third, [∈] for the fourth and finally [`] for the fifth.
nRim corresponds to the fact that the corresponding worlds of n and m are linked by
R in a model. Π corresponds to P . The term “n ∈ S” (“n 6∈ S”) means that the world n
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belongs (does not belong) to the set represented by S. The term “S ` σ” means “all worlds
in the set represented by S survive the announcement of σ”. The term “S a σ” means “all
worlds which survive the announcement of σ are in S”. The term “S 6` σ” means “there
exists a world n in S that does not survive the announcement of σ”. The “S 6a σ” means
“there exists a world n which survives the announcement of σ and which is not in S”.
Definition 6.40 (Initial Tableau for ϕ) Given a formula ϕ ∈ L1ppal , the set containing a
unique branch {〈ε, 0, ϕ〉} is called the initial tableau for ϕ. We represent it as T0(ϕ).
We define now the notion of ‘tableau for ϕ’. Informally, a tableau for ϕ is a set of
branches obtained from the initial tableau by applying some rules. These rules are presented
in a concise way in Table 6.2. We read them in the following way, considering a branch b of
a given tableau T :
α1 ; . . . ; αn
β1; . . . ; βp
(R1)
:
If the patterns α1; . . . αn are unifiable with a subset of terms of b and terms of the form
β1, . . . , βp can not be found in b, then we add the instantiated instances of β1, . . . , βp
in b. Formally if there exists a substitution s such that s(α1), . . . , s(αn) ∈ b and for
all s′, {s′s(β1), . . . , s′s(βp)} 6⊆ b then R1(b) = b ∪ {s′s(β1), . . . , s′s(βp)} where s′ is a
substitution for free variables of s(β1), . . . , s(βp).
α1; . . . αn
β1, . . . , βp | γ1, . . . , γr (R2)
If the patterns α1; . . . αn are unifiable with a subset of terms of b and no terms of the
form β1, . . . , βp or γ1, . . . , γr can be found in b, then we create one branch where we add
β1, . . . , βp in b and another branch where we add γ1, . . . , γr. Formally if there exists a
substitution s such that s(α1), . . . , s(αn) ∈ b, for all s′, {s′s(β1), . . . , s′s(βp)} 6⊆ b and
{s′s(γ1), . . . , s′s(γr)} 6⊆ b then R1(b) = b∪{s′s(β1), . . . , s′s(βp)}; b∪{s′s(γ1), . . . , s′s(γr)}
where s′ is a substitution for free variables of s(β1), . . . , s(βp), s(γ1), . . . , s(γr).
A deterministic rule (such as R1) modifies a given branch, a non deterministic one (such as
R2) makes copies of a given branch and modifies them. We give some details about the rules
appearing in Table 6.2 to make precise the understanding of this table:
• The rule (R∨) means that if a node n survives the list of announcements σ and satisfies
ψ ∨ ϕ after the announcements, then we will consider one branch where n survives the
list of announcements σ and satisfies ψ and another branch where n survives the list of
announcements σ and satisfies ϕ.
• The rules (RT ), (RS) and (R4) capture respectively the reflexivity, symmetry and
transitivity of the relation Ri.
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• The rule (Rσ) explains the mechanism of announcement. If a world n survives after the
announcement of σ, where σ is not the empty list, then it means the world survives after
the announcement of the tail of σ and satisfies the head of σ after the announcement.
• The rule (RSB) concerns the behaviour of literals (propositions or negation of propo-
sitions) towards announcements: if a literal l is true in n after the announcements of σ
then the literal l is already true in the world n without any announcement.
• The rule (R ∈) is a “cut” rule and choose for all nodes n and all already used symbols
S ∈ § whether n should belong to the set represented by S or not.
• The rule (RP ) creates a new permission relation Π(n, S1, S2), S1 and S2 representing
subsets of the domain. S1 ` σ and S1 a σ ensures that S1 corresponds to the domain
of Mσ and S2 ` σ ◦ ϕ ensures that S2 corresponds to a subset of [[ϕ]]Mσ .
• The rule (R¬P ) guarantees that if a permission relation exists, it does not satisfy the
conditions that would make the announcement of ϕ permitted.
• The rule (R `) explains the meaning of S ` σ: if a state belongs to S it ‘survives’
after the successive announcements of σ. Similarly (R a), (R 6`) and (R 6a) explains the
meaning of S a σ, S 6` σ and S 6a σ.
Definition 6.41 (Tableau for ϕ) Given a formula ϕ ∈ L1ppal we define the set T ab(ϕ) of
‘tableaux for ϕ’ inductively as follows:
• T0 = {{〈ε, 0, ϕ〉}} is in T ab(ϕ)
• If T is obtained from T ′ ∈ T ab(ϕ) by applying one of the rules of Table 6.2 to one of
the branch of T ′, then T ∈ T ab(ϕ)
Definition 6.42 (Closed Tableau) Let b be a branch. We say that b is closed if it contains
〈σ, n,⊥〉 for some σ, n. We say that a tableau T for ϕ is closed if every branch in b ∈ T is
closed. We say that a tableau (resp. branch) is open if it is not closed.
Definition 6.43 (Satisfiability) The branch b is said satisfiable iff there exists a model
M = 〈W,∼, V,P〉 and a function f : N −→ W such that
1. for all i ∈ AG, if (nRin′) ∈ b then f(n) ∼i f(n′)
2. for all 〈σ, n, ϕ〉 ∈ b: f(n) ∈ Wσ and Mσ, f(n) |= ϕ
3. for all Π(n, S1, S2) in b, there exists S1, S2 ⊆ W such that (f(n), S1, S2) ∈ P and
(i) for all m ∈ N,
{
if (m ∈ S∗) is in b then f(m) ∈ S∗
if (m /∈ S∗) is in b then f(m) /∈ S∗
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〈σ, n, ψ ∨ ϕ〉
〈σ, n, ψ〉 | 〈σ, n, ϕ〉 (R∨)
〈σ, n,¬(ψ ∨ ϕ)〉
〈σ, n,¬ϕ〉
〈σ, n,¬ψ〉
(R∧)
〈σ, n,Kiϕ〉 ; nRim
〈ε,m, [σ]ϕ〉 (RKi)
〈σ, n,¬Kiϕ〉
〈σ,m,¬ϕ〉 ; nRim (RKˆi)
〈σ, n, [ψ]ϕ〉
〈σ, n,¬ψ〉 | 〈σ ◦ ψ, n, ϕ〉 (R[.])
〈σ, n,¬[ψ]ϕ〉
〈σ ◦ ψ, n,¬ϕ〉 (R〈.〉)
〈σ, n, ϕ〉
〈tl(σ), n, h(σ)〉 (Rσ)
〈σ, n,¬¬ϕ〉
〈σ, n, ϕ〉 (R¬)
.
nRin
(RT )
nRim
mRin
(RS)
〈σ ◦ ψ, n, l〉
〈ε, n, l〉 (RSB)
nRim ; mRio
nRio
(R4)
〈σ, n, ϕ〉 ; 〈σ, n,¬ϕ〉
〈σ, n,⊥〉 (R⊥)
〈σ, n, Pϕ〉
S1 ` σ
Π(n, S1, S2) ; S1 a σ
S2 ` σ ◦ ϕ
(RP )
〈σ, n,¬Pϕ〉 ; Π(n, S1, S2)
S1 6` σ | S1 6a σ | S2 6` σ ◦ ϕ (R¬P )
.
n ∈ S | n 6∈ S (R ∈)
Π(n, S′, S′′)
n ∈ S′′ (RΠ)
S ` σ ; n ∈ S
〈σ, n,>〉 (R `)
S 6` σ
n ∈ S ; 〈ε, n, [σ]⊥〉 (R 6`)
S a σ ; n 6∈ S
〈ε, n, [σ]⊥〉 (R a)
S 6a σ
n 6∈ S ; 〈σ, n,>〉 (R 6a)
Table 6.2: Tableau rules for PPAL
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(ii) for all σ ∈ L(N),

if (S∗ ` σ) is in b then S∗ ⊆ Wσ
if (S∗ 6` σ) is in b then S∗ 6⊆ Wσ
if (S∗ a σ) is in b then S∗ ⊇ Wσ
if (S∗ 6a σ) is in b then S∗ 6⊇ Wσ
A tableau is said to be satisfiable if it contains a satisfiable branch.
6.6.2 Properties
We show in this section soundness and completeness of the tableau method:
Proposition 6.44 (Soundness) If ϕ is satisfiable, then there exists no closed tableau for ϕ.
Proof It is enough to see that any tableau rule preserves satisfiability of a given tableau,
i.e if b is a satisfiable branch, then the set B of branches generated from b by applying a rule
contains a satisfiable branch.
Indeed, if ϕ is satisfiable then the initial tableau for ϕ is satisfiable. Therefore every
tableau would be satisfiable. Hence every tableau would contain an open branch (otherwise
〈σ, n,⊥〉 ∈ L and thus Mσ, f(n) |= ⊥) Q.E.D.
For every tableau rule we prove that it preserves satisfiability, by showing that it preserves
the three constraints of the definition of satisfiability (Definition 6.43).
• R∧,R∨, R¬,RK,RKˆ,RSB, R[.],R〈.〉: We let the reader prove that conditions 1 and 2
are preserved. Similar proofs can be found in [Balbiani et al., 2010]. Furthermore [Π],
[∈] and [`] do not change by applying these rules. Therefore condition 3 is clearly
preserved.
•R⊥: No satisfiable branch can satisfy the conditions to apply this rule, therefore it neces-
sarily preserves satisfiability.
•RT,R4,RS: Condition 1 is preserved by the fact that the relation in the constructed model
is an equivalence relation. Conditions 2 and 3 are preserved because only [R] is modified
by this rule.
•Rσ: If f(n) ∈ Wσ then f(n) ∈ Wtl(σ) and Mtl(σ), f(n) |= hd(σ). Therefore condition 2 is
preserved. Conditions 1 and 3 are preserved because only [♦] is modified by this rule.
•RP: Conditions 1 and 2 are preserved because [♦] and [R] are not modified by this rule.
Condition 3.i is preserved because [∈] is not modified by this rule, and the sets S1, S2
created are new. For condition 3.ii recall that by hypothesis Mσ, f(n) |= Pϕ (and
f(n) ∈ Wσ). Then there exists (f(n), S1, S2) ∈ P such that S1 = Wσ and S2 ⊆ Wσ◦ϕ.
Let us consider the Π(n, S1, S2) created by the rule RP , we can easily verify that
(f(n), S1, S2) ∈ P is a good candidate to satisfy the requisites of 3.ii.
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•R¬P: Conditions 1 and 2 and 3.i are preserved because [♦], [R], [∈] and [Π] are not modified
by this rule. For condition 3.ii, by hypothesis, Mσ, f(n) |= ¬Pϕ (and f(n) ∈ Wσ) and
there exists a (f(n), S1, S2) ∈ P satisfying conditions 3.i and 3.ii. But Mσ, f(n) |=
¬Pϕ imposes that S1 6⊆ Wσ or S1 6⊇ Wσ or S2 6⊆ Wσ◦ϕ. Therefore, by choosing the
corresponding branch 3.ii is preserved by the rule.
•R∈: Conditions 1, 2 and 3.ii are preserved because only [∈] is modified by this rule. By
hypothesis, n is a node and Si is a letter appearing in an element of [Π]. Thus by
hypothesis f(n) ∈ W and there exists Si ⊆ W satisfying 3.i and 3.ii. Therefore either
f(n) ∈ Si and we choose n ∈ Si in [∈] or f(n) 6∈ Si and we choose n 6∈ Si in [∈].
•R` : Conditions 1. and 3. are evidently satisfied. The hypothesis imposes that there exists
S′ ⊆ Wσ with f(n) ∈ S′. Therefore f(n) ∈ Wσ and Mσ, f(n) |= >, which is condition
2.
•Ra : Conditions 1. and 3. are evidently satisfied. The hypothesis imposes that there exists
S′ ⊇ Wσ with f(n) /∈ S′. Therefore f(n) /∈ Wσ , which means that M, f(n) |= [σ]⊥.
Condition 2 is thus satisfied.
•R 6` : Condition 1. and 3.ii are evidently satisfied. By hypothesis, there exists S′ 6⊆ Wσ
satisfying 3.i. Therefore there exists a f(n) ∈ S′ such that M, f(n) |= [σ]⊥. Therefore
the rule preserves 2. and 3.i.
•R 6a : Condition 1. and 3.ii are evidently satisfied. By hypothesis, there exists S′ 6⊇ Wσ
satisfying 3.i. Therefore there exists f(n) ∈ Wσ s.t. f(n) /∈ S′ (and Mσ, f(n) |= >).
Therefore the rule preserves 2. and 3.i.
¤
Definition 6.45 Let b a branch and R = α1;...;αnβ1;...;βp|γ1...γr a rule. We say that R is applicable
on b iff there exists a substitution s such that s(α1), . . . , s(αn) ∈ b and for all substitutions s′
we have {s′s(β1), . . . , s′s(βp)} 6⊆ b and {s′s(γ1), . . . , s′s(γr)} 6⊆ b.
Let us now prove completeness. We first need the notion of saturated tableau:
Definition 6.46 Let b a branch. We say that b is saturated under a rule R iff R is not
applicable on b.
A branch b is said saturated if and only if it is saturated under all tableau rules.
Let T be a tableau for ϕ0. T is said saturated if and only if for all branch b ∈ T , b is
either closed or saturated.
Proposition 6.47 If there exists an open saturated tableau for ϕ0, then ϕ0 is satisfiable.
In order to prove it, we require the following notion of degree of a formula:
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Definition 6.48 (Degree) We define the degree of a formula ϕ ∈ Lpopal inductively
as follows: deg(p) = 0, deg(¬ϕ) = deg(ϕ), deg(ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2) = max(deg(ϕ1), deg(ϕ2)),
deg(Kiϕ) = deg(ϕ), deg([ψ]ϕ) = deg(ψ) + deg(ϕ) + 2, deg(Pϕ) = deg(ϕ) + 2.
Proof (of Proposition 6.47) Let T be an open saturated tableau for ϕ0, and b be an
open branch of T . b is saturated under every tableau rule. We then construct the model
M = (W,∼, V,P) with:
• W = {n ∈ N | 〈σ, n, ϕ〉 ∈ b for some σ, ϕ}
• for every agent i, ∼i= {(n, n′) | nRin′ ∈ b}
• for every propositional atom p, V (p) = {n ∈ N | 〈ε, n, p〉 ∈ b}
• P = {(n, g(S1), g(S2)) ∈ W × 2W × 2W | Π(n, S1, S2) ∈ b}, where by definition g(S) =
{n ∈ N | (n ∈ S) ∈ b}.
First of all, it is easy to see that M is a model. In particular
• for every agent i ∼i is an equivalence relation by rules RT , R4 and RS
• for every (n, S1, S2) ∈ P , n ∈ S2 by rule RΠ and S1 ⊆ S2 by rule RP with R ` and
R a.
For all a ∈ N, k ∈ N, ϕ ∈ L1ppal , we call ρ(a, k, ϕ) the following property:
∀n ∈ W, ∀σ = (σ1, . . . , σk), if (∗)
{
k + Σdeg(σi) + deg(ϕ) 6 a
〈(σ1, . . . , σk), n, ϕ〉 ∈ b
then
{
n ∈ Wσ
Mσ, n |= ϕ
Note that ρ(a, k, ϕ) is true if k + deg(ϕ) > a (†).
For any pair of triplets (a′, k′, ϕ′) and (a, k, ϕ) in N×N×L1ppal , we say that (a′, k′, ϕ′) ¿
(a, k, ϕ) if and only if: a′ < a or (a′ = a and k′ < k) or ((a′, k′) = (a, k) and ϕ′ ∈ Sub(ϕ)). It
is a well-founded (partial) order.
Let us suppose that ρ(a′, k′, ϕ′) is true for all (a′, k′, ϕ′) ¿ (a, k, ϕ), and let us prove that
ρ(a, k, ϕ) is true, by reasoning on the structure of ϕ. It would prove that ρ(a, k, ϕ) is true for
all (a, k, ϕ) in N × N × L1ppal , and in particular that (a, 0, ϕ) is true for all a, ϕ in N × L1ppal ,
which implies Proposition 6.49.
Let n be in W , and σ1, . . . , σk ∈ L1ppal be such that (∗). We note σ = (σ1, . . . , σk).
Case ϕ = p: First, if k = 0 then 〈ε, n, p〉 ∈ b iff n ∈ V (p) iff M, n |= p and the result is
proved. Hence we assume that k > 1. Now, by hypothesis, we have 〈(σ1, . . . , σk), n, p〉 ∈ b,
then
1. 〈(σ1, . . . , σk−1), n, σk〉 ∈ b (by Rσ-sat), and then
{
n ∈ Wtl(σ)
Mtl(σ), n |= σk
by ρ(a, k − 1, σk)
because (k − 1) + deg(σ1) + ∙ ∙ ∙+ deg(σk) 6 a. Therefore n ∈ Wσ.
2. 〈ε, n, p〉 ∈ b (by RSB-sat). We obtain M, n |= p by definition of the valuation. Thus
Mσ, n |= p
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Cases ϕ = ¬p,>,⊥: Idem, using the fact that the branch is open.
Case ϕ = ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2: By hypothesis, we have 〈σ, n, ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2〉 ∈ b. Thus, by R∨-sat, we have
〈σ, n, ϕ1〉 ∈ b or 〈σ, n, ϕ2〉 ∈ b . As for both i, deg(ϕi) 6 deg(ϕ), and ϕi ∈ Subf(ϕ) we can
apply ρ(a, k, ϕi) and thus we obtain
{
n ∈ Wσ
Mσ, n |= ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2
Case ϕ = ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2: Identical, using R∧-sat.
Case ϕ = Kiϕ1: By hypothesis, we have 〈σ, n,Kiϕ1〉 ∈ b. Therefore, on one hand we obtain
〈σ, n, ϕ1〉 ∈ b (by RT -sat) and thus
{
n ∈ Wσ
Mσ, n |= ϕ1
(by ρ(a, k, ϕ1)). On the other hand, let
m ∈ Wσ be such that n ∼i m, let us show that Mσ,m |= ϕ1. But by definition of ∼i,
nRim ∈ b and thus, by RK-saturation, 〈σ,m,ϕ1〉 ∈ b.
Case ϕ = ¬Kiϕ1: By hypothesis, we have 〈σ, n,¬Kiϕ1〉 ∈ b. By RKˆ-sat, there exists a
m ∈ W s.t. nRim ∈ b and 〈σ, m,¬ϕ1〉 ∈ b. This leads to the desired result by ρ(a, k,¬ϕ1).
Case ϕ = [σk+1]ϕ1: We suppose a > 2, otherwise it is already proven by (†) because
k + deg(ϕ) > a. We write σ′ = σ ◦ σk+1. Now, by hypothesis we have 〈σ, n, [σk+1]ϕ1〉 ∈ b,
thus by R[.]-saturation:
- either 〈σ, n,¬σk+1〉 ∈ b and then Mσ, n |= ¬σk+1 by ρ(a− 2, k,¬σk+1), because
k + deg(σ1) + ∙ ∙ ∙+ deg(σk) + deg(¬σk+1)
6 k + deg(σ1) + ∙ ∙ ∙+ deg(σk) + deg(σk+1) + deg(ϕ1)
= k + deg(σ1) + ∙ ∙ ∙+ deg(σk) + deg([σk+1]ϕ1)− 2 6 a− 2
- or 〈σ, n, σk+1〉 ∈ b. In this case 〈σ′, n, ϕ1〉 ∈ b and we obtain that
{
n ∈ Wσ′
Mσ′ , n |= ϕ1
by
ρ(a− 1, k + 1, ϕ1) because
k + 1 + deg(σ1) + ∙ ∙ ∙+ deg(σk) + deg(σk+1) + deg(ϕ1)
= k + deg(σ1) + ∙ ∙ ∙+ deg(σk) + deg([σk+1]ϕ1)− 1 6 a− 1
Case ϕ = ¬[σk+1]ϕ1: We suppose a > 2, otherwise it is already proven by (†), because
k +deg(ϕ) > a. We write σ′ = σ ◦σk+1. By hypothesis we have 〈σ, n,¬[σk+1]ϕ1〉 ∈ b, thus by
R〈.〉-saturation, 〈σ, n, σk+1〉 ∈ b and 〈σ′, n,¬ϕ1〉 ∈ b, which implies that Mσ, n |= σk+1 and
Mσ′ , n |= σ¬ϕ1 by ρ(a− 1, k + 1,¬ϕ1) because
k + 1 + deg(σ1) + ∙ ∙ ∙+ deg(σk) + deg(σk+1) + deg(¬ϕ1)
= k + deg(σ1) + ∙ ∙ ∙+ deg(σk) + deg(¬[σk+1]ϕ1)− 1 6 a− 1.
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Case ϕ = Pϕ1: We suppose a > 2, otherwise it is already proven by (†), because k +
deg(ϕ) > a. By hypothesis we have 〈σ, n, Pϕ1〉 ∈ b, thus by RP -saturation, there is a
Π(n, S1, S2) ∈ b such that {S1 ` σ, S1 a σ>, S2 ` σ ◦ ϕ1} ⊆ b. Therefore, by construction of
P , (n, g(S1), g(S2)) ∈ P . Let us show that g(S1) = Wσ and g(S2) ⊆ Wσ◦ϕ1 .
First let m ∈ g(S1), thus [m ∈ S1] is in b and then, by R `-saturation, 〈σ,m,>〉 ∈ b. Thus
by ρ(a − 1, k,>) we obtain m ∈ Wσ, because k + deg(σ1) + ∙ ∙ ∙ + deg(σk) 6 k + deg(σ1) +
∙ ∙ ∙+ deg(σk) + deg(Pϕ1)− 1 6 a− 1. Thus g(S1) ⊆ Wσ.
Second let m ∈ g(S2), thus [m ∈ S2] is in b and then, by R `-saturation, 〈σ◦ϕ1,m,>〉 ∈ b.
By Rσ-sat 〈σ,m,ϕ1〉 ∈ b and ρ(a, k, ϕ1) we obtain
{
n ∈ Wσ
Mσ, n |= ϕ1
, because k + deg(σ1) +
∙ ∙ ∙+ deg(σk) + deg(ϕ1) 6 k + deg(σ1) + ∙ ∙ ∙+ deg(σk) + deg(Pϕ1) 6 a. Thus g(S1) ⊆ Wσ◦ϕ1 .
Third, let m ∈ Wσ. Towards a contradiction assume that m 6∈ g(S1). Thus [m 6∈ S1] is in
b, and by R a-saturation we have that 〈ε,m, [σ]⊥〉 ∈ b. Therefore, by R[.]-saturation iterated,
- either 〈ε,m,¬σ1〉 ∈ b and M, m |= ¬σ1 by ρ(a, 0,¬σ1)
- or 〈σ1,m,¬σ2〉 ∈ b and Mσ1 ,m |= ¬σ2 by ρ(a, 1,¬σ2)
- . . .
- or 〈(σ1, . . . , σk),m,⊥〉 ∈ b and Mσ,m |= ⊥ by ρ(a− 1, k,>)
In all cases, that is in contradiction with the hypothesis m ∈ Wσ.
Case ϕ = ¬Pϕ1: We suppose a > 2, otherwise it is already proven by (†), because k +
deg(ϕ) > a. By hypothesis we have 〈σ, n,¬Pϕ1〉 ∈ b and we want to show that show that
for all (n, S1, S2) ∈ P , S1 6= [[〈σ〉>]] or S2 6⊆ [[〈σ〉ϕ1]]. Let (n, S1, S2) ∈ P , by definition of P ,
we have Π(n, S1, S2) ∈ b with g(S1) = S1 and g(S2) = S2. Thus, by R¬P -saturation, either
(S1 6` σ) ∈ b or (S1 6a σ) ∈ b or (S2 6` σ ◦ ϕ1) ∈ b.
In the first case, by R 6` -saturation, there exists a m ∈ W such that (m ∈ S1) is in b and
〈ε,m, [σ]⊥〉 ∈ b. Thus m ∈ S1 and 〈ε,m, [σ]⊥〉 ∈ b. As in the previous case, this is equivalent
to m /∈ Wσ. Therefore S1 6⊆ [[〈σ〉>]].
In the third case we prove S2 6⊆ [[〈σ〉ϕ1]] in the same way.
In the second case, by R 6a -saturation, there exists a m ∈ W such that (m /∈ S1) is in b
and 〈σ,m,>〉 ∈ b. Thus m /∈ g(S1) and, by ρ(a− 1, k,>), m ∈ Wσ. Therefore S1 6⊇ [[〈σ〉>]].
¤
We are now able to prove completeness of the tableau method:
Theorem 6.49 (Completeness) If every tableau for ϕ is open then ϕ is satisfiable.
Proof
Let SN , called the naive strategy be the following application of the tableau rules
SN :
(
(R∨); (RKi); (R[.]); (Rσ); (R∧); (RKˆi); (R〈.〉); (R¬); (RT ); (RS); (RSB); (R4); (R⊥);
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(R¬P ); (R ∈); (RΠ); (RP1); (RP2); (RP ); (R`); (R 6`); (R a); (R 6a)
)∗
. It can be called naive
because it simply applies all the rules in an arbitrarily chosen order, and then starts again.
If a rule is applicable, it is applied to one of the oldest instances that match with the
conditions of the rule (FIFO). Remark that SN satisfies the fact that for all i > 0, if a rule
R is applicable in Ti then it will be considered at some step j > i.
Now let ϕ ∈ L1ppal be such that for all T ∈ T ab(ϕ), T is open. Let (Tn) = T ab(ϕ) the
(possibly infinite) list of all the tableaux for ϕ constructed by applying strategy SN to the
initial tableau for ϕ, T0 = T0(ϕ).
Now there are two possibilities for a given formula ϕ: starting from the initial tableau for
ϕ, either SN ends after n steps or SN never ends. In the first case Tn is saturated (because
no rule can be applied anymore) and it is open by hypothesis. Then it is an open saturated
tableau. By proposition 6.47 we obtain the wanted result.
In the second case, let T∞ be the infinite tree representing the infinite executions of SN : for
all n ∈ N, the nodes of depth n are the branches of Tn. Therefore the root node is {〈ε, 0, ϕ〉}
and every node is a set containing every one of its ancestor nodes. It is a finitely branching
tree because every rule creates a finite number of branches. Therefore, as it is infinite, it has
an infinite tree-branch B∞. We prove that this is an open branch. Indeed it is an infinite
union of branches that are included one in the other for all i ∈ N, Bi ⊆ Bi+1. We can thus
define their limit
⋃
i∈N Bi and obtain B∞.
Now for all i ∈ N, Bi is open. Therefore B∞ does not contain 〈σ, n,⊥〉 for any σ, n.
Furthermore B∞ is saturated by construction. Therefore it is an open saturated (infinite)
branch. By Proposition 6.47 this leads to the satisfiability of ϕ.
¤
6.6.3 Implementation
We first have implemented the semi-algorithm corresponding to the tableau. In order to get
a more efficient algorithm, we implement the tableau method using two modifications of the
tableau method. First, we add two additive rules RP1 and RP2:
Π(m,S1, S2); 〈σ, n, Pϕ〉; S1 ` σ; S1 a σ; S2 ` σ ◦ ϕ
Π(n, S1, S2)
(RP1)
Π(m,S1, S2); 〈σ, n, Pϕ〉; S1 ` σ; S1 a σ
Π(n, S1, S3) ; S3 ` σ ◦ ϕ (RP2)
Table 6.3: Two additive tableau rules
The rules (RP1) and (RP2) simply subsume the rule (RP ) in order to avoid cre-
ation of useless extra symbols of §. Second, we construct the models following strat-
egy Strat defined as the application of the first rule which is applicable in the follow-
ing list (R∨); (RKi); (R[.]); (Rσ); (R∧); (RKˆi); (R〈.〉); (R¬); (RT ); (RS); (RSB); (R4); (R⊥);
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(R¬P ); (R ∈); (RΠ); (RP1); (RP2); (RP ); (R`); (R 6`); (R a); (R 6a) and then restart strategy
Strat, or quit if there is no applicable rule.
We have implemented the strategy Strat under LotrecScheme1 which is a software for
rewriting terms close to the tool Lotrec (see [Gasquet et al., 2005] and [Said, 2010]). We have
written all rules of the Table 6.2. Figure 6.2 shows the implementation of rules (Rσ), (R4)
and (RP2).
Figure 6.2: Rules (Rσ), (R4) and (RP2)
We write (lf L PHI) in the node A for 〈L,A, ϕ〉. We use the primitive cdr and car of Scheme
to get respectively the tail and the head of the list L. (R4) is a graphical representation of
transitivity. All terms S ` σ, Π(n, S1, S2)... are written in an extra node called “extra”.
We adapt also the language Lppal in order to implement it. Thus Kiϕ is written ¤iPHI
and [ψ]ϕ is written Ann¤(PSI)PHI . The other constructions (¬,∧, ...) are identical.
Let us see, as an example, the satisfiability of the following formula ϕ = PK1p ∧ PK1q ∧
¬PK1(p∧ q)∧ Kˆ2PK1(p∧ q)∧ [K1p]PK1(p∧ q). It expresses the possibility of the following:
• Agent 1 is permitted to say (she knows) p and (she knows) q but is not permitted to
say (she knows) p ∧ q – as for Alex in the first example.
• Agent 2 imagines that Agent 1 is permitted to say p ∧ q (she may not know the rule).
• Agent 1 has the permission to say (she knows) p ∧ q after the announcement that (she
knows) p.
Figure 6.3 presents the output of LotrecScheme if we ask for a model of ϕ. The actual
state is n24, in the top left of the model. The node ‘Pi’ is not a state but represents the set
1http://www.irit.fr/~Francois.Schwarzentruber/lotrecscheme/.
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Figure 6.3: The output of the tableau method for PK1p∧PK1q∧¬PK1(p∧ q)∧ Kˆ2PK1(p∧
q) ∧ [K1p]PK1(p ∧ q)
P of permitted transitions. As for ‘extra’, it is a list of the membership (or not) of the states
of the models to the sets of states considered in ‘Pi’. The membership of a state n to a set S
is reproduced inside the state.
Let us have a look at ‘Pi’: Π(n24, S28, S35) corresponds to PK1p, Π(n24, S28, S29) cor-
responds to PK1q, Π(b25, S28, S38) corresponds to Kˆ2PK1(p∧ q) and Π(n24, S41, S42) cor-
responds to [K1p]PK1(p ∧ q). We explain the details of this last example.
Π(n24, S41, S42) means that in the state n24, the transition from the submodel based
on S41 to the submodel based on S42 is a permitted transition. S41 is the following set of
states: S41 = {n24, b25, a66, b69} (the four states in the top of the model). Those are exactly
the states that satisfy K1p: S41 = [[K1p]]. Now S42 = {n24}, and n24 satisfies K1(p ∧ q).
Therefore the restriction to S42 is stronger than the restriction to [[〈K1p〉K1(p∧q)]]. Therefore
[K1p]PK1(p ∧ q).
Unfortunately this tableau method does not provide a terminating algorithm. For in-
stance, if you want to check if P (Kˆ1Kˆ2p) the tableau method will not terminate. But we
believe that we can tune the tableau method by adding a loop check rule in order to obtain
a terminating procedure. We guess that the loop check rule may look like: “if there are two
nodes n1 and n2 containing the same formulas, and such that “n1 ∈ S” ∈ b iff “n2 ∈ S” ∈ b
and “Π(n1, S1, S2)” ∈ b iff “Π(n2, S1, S2)” ∈ b then we merge the two nodes n1 and n2.”
Nevertheless, this tableau method for PPAL opens perspectives in the purpose of creating
6.6. TABLEAUX 169
a framework taking rules of games expressed in POPAL and building automatically artificial
agents able to reason about the corresponding game and play it.

Chapter 7
Private Permissions
7.1 Introduction
A medical laboratory (L) gets the results of the blood analysis of a patient called Michel
(M). This confirms that Michel does not have AIDS (A). But of course, the results could
have been different. To prevent that patients commit suicide when they learn that they are
ill, French laboratories are not allowed to inform a patient directly of the results of a blood
analysis (by email, by post, or whatever inconvenient form of impersonal or unprofessional
communication). They have to inform a doctor (D), who receives the patient in his office, and
then informs the patient. This protocol has to be followed when the patient has AIDS, but
also when he does not have AIDS, otherwise having an appointment with the doctor could
already be interpreted as confirmation of the disease, and we still get the terrible situation of
lonely people in distress, that are a suicide risk.
Our aim, in this chapter, is to be able to formalize this kind of situation in which agents
can communicate with each other, and where there are restrictions, that can be deontic, moral
or hierarchical, on these announcements.
To formalize the concept of ‘having the permission to say to somebody’ we develop here a
variant of POPAL presented in the previous chapter. Indeed, the language considered here is
an extension of Plaza’s public announcement logic ([Plaza, 1989]), which we could call ‘private
announcement logic’, with a modal operator PGi for permission, where P
G
i ϕ expresses that
agent i is allowed to say ϕ to the agents of the group G. As for POPAL, this logic can be seen
as an adaption of the dynamic logic of permission proposed by [van der Meyden, 1996], later
elaborated by [Pucella and Weissman, 2004], presented in Section 3.2. Recall that in Van der
Meyden’s work, ♦(α,ϕ) means “there is a way to execute α which is permitted and after which
ϕ is true”: we treat now the particular case where actions are announcements made by an
agent to a group of agents. We also introduce an obligation operator OGi ψ, meaning that the
agent is obliged to say ψ to the group G.
Once again, there is a relation between this proposal and the extension of public an-
nouncement logic with protocols by [van Benthem et al., 2009] presented in Section 3.3. In
their approach, one cannot just announce anything that is true, but one can only announce a
true formula that is part of the protocol, i.e., that is the first formula in a sequence of formu-
las (standing for a sequence of successive announcements) that is a member of a set of such
sequences called the protocol. In other words, one can only announce permitted formulas. We
171
172 CHAPTER 7. PRIVATE PERMISSIONS
do not have this limitation here: we can distinguish an announcement that cannot be done
(because its content is false) from an announcement that is feasible but forbidden.
The permissions we model here are permissions for individual agents modelled in a multi-
agent system. For example, if we have three agents a, b, c, we want to formalize that a has
permission to say p to b, but not to c. We can model permission for agents using the standard
method that agents only announce what they know: so agent a says Kap to b only. This
would leave open what c learns from this interaction. The solution we chose is similar to
the semi-public announcements ([Baltag and Moss, 2004]) where agents not involved in the
communicative interaction at least are aware of the topic of conversation and of the agents
involved in it: if a actually announces p to b, c considers it possible that a announces Kap to
b, or that he announces ¬Kap to the same b. We also model such permissions and obligations
of individual agents towards other agents in the system, or to groups of other agents.
7.2 Logic of Permitted and Obligatory Private Announce-
ments
7.2.1 Introducing Agency and Individual Permission
The reader may recall the previous chapter to better understand the current one. Indeed, as we
will see in Proposition 7.15, the notion of permission of this logic with private announcements
can be seen as an extension of the notion of permission formalized in POPAL and presented
in Chapter 6: if the group that ‘receive’ the announcement is always the whole group of agents
AG, then any ‘private’ announcements to the group G is a public one. The analogous feature
is not true for obligation, given that we have a different intuition of obligation in this chapter.
We want to consider private announcements, i.e. informative events in which an agent
gives a piece of information that she has to another agent (or to a group of agents). Some
choices have to be made. First, we consider that the content of an announcement is true,
second we consider that the agent who is speaking can speak only about her own knowledge
(it is the only thing she can actually know to be true), third we consider that the agents
who hear the announcement believe it (and update their knowledge in consequence). This
third point implies, in our understanding, that if the receiver of the announcement is a group
then the information will be common to all its agents: anyone of them knows that any
other one modified her knowledge. These points, except maybe the second, are classical in
the field of dynamic epistemic logic ([van Ditmarsch et al., 2007]). But one characteristic of
‘private announcement’ still has to be fixed: what do the other agents learn? Indeed, the
announcement can be hidden (and the others may believe that nothing is happening), or it
may be the case that the other agents see who is communicating with who, without knowing
anything about the content of the message. They may also know both the agents involved
and the topic of the announcement, without knowing its truth value.
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In [Baltag and Moss, 2004] the authors propose a general framework to express these
different kinds of announcements. The main idea is that an announcement is represented by
a graph: its states are deterministic events (and are labelled by formulas of the language that
express the content of the messagea`); a relation between two states, labeled by an agent i, is
like in Kripke models an uncertainty for these agents about which of the two messages is given.
With this formalism the previous examples of announcement can be represented as follows
(in these examples i gives the information ϕ to j, the actual event being double-surrounded):
Public announcement: Kiϕ
AG
Hidden announcement : Kaϕ
AG
AG\{i,j} >
AG
Visible private announcement: Kiϕ
AG
AG\{i,j}
AG\{i,j}
Kiϕ1
AG
AG\{i,j}.
Kiϕn
AG
Idem with known topic: Kiϕ
AG
AG\{i,j} ¬Kiϕ
AG
For both technical and practical reasons we restrict our formalism to the last kind of
announcements, in which both the agents involved and the topic of the message are publicly
known. In this context, we consider announcements of the type !Gi ϕ with ϕ ∈ Lel , i ∈ AG
and G ⊆ AG. This formula represents the semi-private announcement by i to the group
G of what she knows about ϕ. That can be “I know that ϕ is true”, “I don’t know if
ϕ is true” (analogously to the treatment of questions in [Groenendijk and Stokhof, 1997]).
Our formalism does not use event models, announcements are simply modelled as models
restrictions, but the result of such an announcement is exactly the same as the result of the
action of the corresponding event model as described previously:
Kiϕ
(AG\{i})\G ¬Kiϕ
You can read this in the following way: The actual action is that agent i says “I know
that ϕ” and the agents in the group G know it, but every other agent that is not in G cannot
distinguish this action from agent i saying “I don’t know either ϕ”.
It is worth noting that every state of every model satisfies only one of the two previous
preconditions: in every state, either i knows ϕ, or she does not know ϕ. This implies that
the action of !Gi ϕ on an epistemic model is only a copy of it with less epistemic arrows (if j
learns that i knows ϕ, she does not consider anymore the states in which ¬Kiϕ was true).
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Note that !Gi ϕ is identical to !
G
i Kiϕ and that !
G
i ¬Kiϕ is the same action model but pointed
in the other state.
Such semi-public announcements can be modelled as restrictions on accessibility relations,
while keeping the entire domain intact.
In the following subsection, instead of a permission relation that is the same for all agents,
we define individual permission relations, one for each agent, and based on these structures
we propose operators (let us take the one argument version) PGi ψ and O
G
i ψ for “agent i is
permitted to announce whether she knows ψ to group G”, and “agent i is obliged to announce
whether she knows ψ to group G”. The more general form of obligation is O ~Gi ~ψ, where i has
obligations (~ψ =) ψ1, ..., ψn to groups of agents ( ~G =) G1, ..., Gn.
Let us see it in details.
7.2.2 Syntax of Lpopral
We first define the following partial language Lpral :
Definition 7.1 (Lpral) The language of private announcement logic Lpral over PROP and
AG is defined inductively as follow:
ψ ::= p|⊥|¬ψ|ψ ∨ ψ|Kiψ|[!Gi ψ]ψ
where i ∈ AG, G ⊆ AG, and p ∈ PROP
We are now able to introduce properly the syntax of our language:
Definition 7.2 The language of permitted and obligatory private announcements logic Lpopral
is defined inductively as follows:
ϕ ::= p|⊥|¬ϕ|ϕ ∨ ϕ|Kiϕ|[!Gi ψ]ϕ|PGi ψ|O ~Gi ~ψ
where i ∈ AG, G ⊆ AG, p ∈ PROP , ψ ∈ Lpral , ~ψ = (ψ1, . . . , ψn) is a tuple of Lpral -formulas
and ~G = (G1, . . . , Gn) a tuple of subsets of AG. We call Lppral the fragment of the language
without obligation operators (and Lpral is the fragment of the language without permission
and obligation operators).
The boolean operators have the classical reading, and Kiϕ is read “agent i knows that
ϕ”. We read [!Gi ψ]ϕ as “after the announcement by agent i to the group G that (she knows)
ψ, where the agents not in G also consider possible that i announces that she does not know
ψ, ϕ becomes true”, PGi ψ by “i is allowed to say ψ to the group G” and O
~G
i
~ψ by “i is
obliged to say ψ1 to G1 or . . . or ψn to Gn”. The obligation is thus presented as a list of
allowed announcements, and the agent satisfies her obligation by announcing one of them.
This construction may seem complicated, and looks like a disjunction: is it possible to reduce
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O
~G
i
~ψ to some kind of
∨
i O
Gi
i ψi? The answer is no: the following example shows that you
can have the obligation to announce one thing or one other without having the obligation to
announce any particular one of the two.
Example 7.3
In the Cluedo game1, a murder has been committed and every player has some information
about the weapon that has been used, the murderer or the room where the murder took place. A
player (A) makes a proposal: “I suggest it was Professor Plum (PP), in the library (L), with
the candlestick (C).” If another player (B) knows that this proposal is not correct, she has to
show to A one card that invalidates it (for example showing the card that says that Professor
Plum is innocent). B is thus obliged to give information to A, but she has no obligation to
give one particular information. Suppose that B knows that the three propositions PP , L and
C are false. Therefore we have (considering ~A = (A,A,A)) :
O
~A
B(¬PP,¬L,¬C) ∧ ¬(OAB(¬PP ) ∨OAB(¬L) ∨OAB(¬C)).
The following technical notation will allow us to define the notion of strong obligation:
Definition 7.4 Let k, n ∈ N, let
{
~ψ := (ψ1, . . . , ψn)
~G := (G1, . . . , Gn)
and let
{
~ψ′ := (ψ′1, . . . , ψ′k)
~G′ := (G′1, . . . , G′k)
.
We note (~ψ′, ~G′) < (~ψ, ~G) if (~ψ′, ~G′) 6= (~ψ, ~G) and there exist j1, . . . , jk ∈ N such that
1 6 j1 < ∙ ∙ ∙ < jk 6 n and for all l ∈ {1, . . . , k},
{
ψjl = ψ
′
l
Gjl := G
′
l
This notation can be understood as the fact that the announcements (formula and group) of
the first couple are announcements of the second. In particular, k < n.
We can now introduce the following useful abbreviations.
Definition 7.5
• 〈!Gi ψ〉ϕ := ¬[!Gi ψ]¬ϕ
• Strong obligation: O ~Gi ~ψ := O ~Gi ~ψ ∧
∧
(~ψ′, ~G′)<(~ψ, ~G) ¬O
~G′
i (~ψ′)
• [!Gi ψ∼]ϕ := [!Gi ψ]ϕ∧ [!Gi ¬Kiψ]ϕ: whatever i announces to G about her knowledge on ψ,
ϕ becomes true after the announcement
• (Finite) sequence of announcements: an announcement !Gi ψ is a sequence of announce-
ments, and if σ1, σ2 are sequences of announcements, then σ1; σ2 is a sequence of an-
nouncements.
• For all sequences of announcements σ1, σ2, we define [σ1; σ2]ϕ := [σ1][σ2]ϕ, 〈σ1; σ2〉ϕ :=
〈σ1〉〈σ2〉ϕ and [(σ1; σ2)∼]ϕ := [σ∼1 ][σ∼2 ]ϕ
1For a complete explanation of the rules of this game: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cluedo
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• If the tuple of groups (and announcements) are made of a unique element, we abbreviate
in the following way: OGi ϕ := O
(G)
i (ϕ)
The first operator is the dual of [!Gi ψ]. As we will see, it is equivalent to [!
G
i ψ]ϕ with the
supplementary condition that i can announce ψ. The second construction, [!Gi ψ
∼]ϕ, means
that whatever i knows about ψ, if she says it to G then ϕ becomes true. The third one
defines a stronger (and in our opinion more realistic) notion of obligation: not only a list
of announcements one of which you have to ensure, but the smallest such list. This strong
obligation will guarantee us to avoid Ross’s paradox, indeed with this interpretation if you
are (strongly) obliged to make an announcement you are not (strongly) obliged to make this
announcement or another one. The fourth definition allows us to consider every sequence of
announcements σ. The fifth abbreviates the notation in the case where the considered tuples
are 1-uples.
7.2.3 Semantics for Lpral
The models of our logic will be epistemic models augmented with an additional relation
P between states and sets of relations, that represents, for each state, the announcements
that are explicitly permitted to be done in this state. To define it properly, we need some
preliminary notions:
Definition 7.6 (AG-relation) Let AG and S be two sets. We define an AG-relation over S
(or simply AG-relation) as a set R = {Ri}i∈AG such that for all i ∈ AG, Ri is an equivalence
relation over S.
Definition 7.7 (Inclusion of AG-relations) Let R = {Ri}i∈AG and R′ = {R′i}i∈AG be
two AG-relations over S
• We say R′ ⊆ R if for all i ∈ AG, R′i ⊆ Ri.
• For all i ∈ AG, we say R′ ⊆i R if R′i = Ri and for all j ∈ AG\{i}, R′j ⊆ Rj.
Remark 7.8 For all i, G ∈ AG× 2AG, we have that R′ ⊆i R only if R′ ⊆ R. Note also that
⊆ and ⊆i are partial orders on AG-relations, in particular, they are transitive.
We are now able to define the notion of restriction of an AG-relation:
Definition 7.9 Let M = (S,R, V ) be an epistemic model over PROP and AG (cf. Defini-
tion 2.17), G ⊆ AG and ψ ∈ Lel an epistemic formula. We denote by R!Gi ψ the AG-relation
R′ = {Ri}i∈AG such that:
• R′i = Ri
• for all j 6∈ G, R′j = Rj
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• for all j ∈ G, R′j = {(s, t) ∈ Rj s.t. M, s |= Kiψ iff M, t |= Kiψ}.
Therefore we define M!Gi ψ = (S,R!Gi ψ, V ).
We underline some elements:
• We could have removed the first line R′i = Ri. Indeed, in both cases (i ∈ G and i /∈ G)
the other two lines would have imposed this condition. We do not remove it to be more
explicit.
• R!Gi ψ ⊆i R
• M!Gi ψ is still an epistemic model, as R!Gi ψ is clearly an equivalence relation.
We remark also that we can extend this notion of restriction to any Lpral -formula considering
the following semantics to interpret Lpral -formulas:
Definition 7.10 (Satisfiability relation for Lpral) Let M be a model and let s be a state
of S. The satisfiability relation M, s |= ϕ is defined inductively on the structure of ϕ:
• M, s |= p iff s ∈ V (p)
• M, s 6|= ⊥
• M, s |= ¬ψ iff M, s 6|= ψ
• M, s |= ψ1 ∨ ψ2 iff (M, s |= ψ1 or M, s |= ψ2)
• M, s |= Kiψ iff for all t ∼i s, M, t |= ψ
• M, s |= [!Gi ψ]χ iff M, s |= Kiψ implies M!Gi ψ, s |= χ
where M!Gi ψ = (S,R!Gi ψ, V ) with R!Gi ψ the AG-relation R
′ = {Ri}i∈AG such that:
• R′i = Ri
• for all j 6∈ G, R′j = Rj
• for all j ∈ G\{i}, R′j = {(s, t) ∈ Rj s.t. M, s |= Kiψ iff M, t |= Kiψ}.
7.2.4 Semantics for Lpopral
We can now define the models of our logic, that are epistemic models augmented in the
following way.
Definition 7.11 A model over a countable set of atomic propositions PROP and a countable
set of agents AG is a structure M = (S,R, V,P) with
• S being a non-empty set of states
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• R being a AG-relation over S.
• V mapping every p ∈ PROP to a subset of S
• for all i ∈ AG, Ti = {(s,R′,R′′) : R′,R′′ are AG-relations, s ∈ S, R′′ ⊆i R′ ⊆ R}
• P = {Pi}i∈AG where for all i ∈ AG, Pi ⊆ Ti.
The membership of (s,R′,R′′) in Pi can be interpreted as follows: in state s, after every
announcement that restricts the AG-relation to R′, every announcement of i that restricts
the AG-relation to R′′ is ‘permitted’. Indeed, only Lpral -formulas can be announced, so
the definitions of restriction appearing in Definitions 7.9 and 7.10 are sufficient to define
the update of a model M after the announcement !Gi ψ as the restriction M!Gi ψ, and the
interpretation of our logical language employing that model restriction.
Definition 7.12 (Satisfiability relation and restricted model) Let M be a model and
let s be a state of S. The satisfiability relation M, s |= ϕ is defined inductively on the structure
of ϕ:
• M, s |= p iff s ∈ V (p)
• M, s 6|= ⊥
• M, s |= ¬ψ iff M, s 6|= ψ
• M, s |= ψ1 ∨ ψ2 iff (M, s |= ψ1 or M, s |= ψ2)
• M, s |= Kiψ iff for all t ∼i s, M, t |= ψ
• M, s |= [!Gi ψ]χ iff M, s |= Kiψ implies M!Gi ψ, s |= χ
• M, s |= PGi χ iff there exists ψ ∈ Lpral such that
1. M, s |= Kiψ
2. [[Kiψ]]M ⊆ [[Kiχ]]M and
3. (s,R,R!Gi ψ) ∈ Pi
• M, s |= O ~Gi ~ϕ iff
1. for all k ∈ {1, . . . , | ~G|}, M, s |= Kiϕk and (s,R,R!Gki ϕk) ∈ Pi, and
2. for all (s,R,R!Hi χ) ∈ Pi there exists a k ∈ {1, . . . , |AG|} such that R!Hi χ = R!Gki χ
and [[Kiχ]]M ⊆ [[Kiϕk]]M
where M!Gi ψ = (S,R!Gi ψ, V,P
′) with P = {Pi}i∈AG such that for all j ∈ AG,
P ′j = {(s,R1,R2) ∈ Pj s.t. R1 ⊆ R!Gi ψ}
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The semantics of the permission operator is thus the following: we say that i is allowed to
say (that she knows) χ to G if there is something (ψ) that she knows, which announcement
is more informative than the announcement of χ and gives a restriction that is in Pi. The
intuition hard encoded in the semantics for obligation is that given two different things that
you are permitted to say, you should only have the obligation to announce the weaker of both.
This explains the part “for all (s,R,R!Gi χ) ∈ Pi there exists a k such that R!Gi χ = R!Gki χ and
[[Kiχ]]M ⊆ [[Kiϕk]]M” of the definition. This also intuitively entails that if you are obliged to
do something then it should at least be permitted, and that intuition is indeed valid for the
given semantics of obligation: for all ϕ ∈ Lpral : |= OGi ϕ −→ PGi ϕ.
But this notion of obligation still does not say what you are actually forced to say: indeed,
adding formulas to the tuple ~ϕ would maintain this obligation. This pushed us to define the
notion of ‘strong obligation’ as the smallest such ~ϕ satisfying the definiendum: M, s |= O ~Gi ~ϕ
iff M, s |= O ~Gi ~ϕ and for all ~ϕ′ < ~ϕ, M, s 6|= O ~G′i (~ϕ′).
Remark 7.13 We define also M(!Gi ψ;!Hj χ) := (M!Gi ψ)!Hj χ, and we obtain inductively Mσ for
every finite sequence of announcements σ.
What is precisely the epistemic effect of the restriction !Gi ψ? For every agent j ∈ G after
the announcement of !Gi ψ it becomes valid that j is able to distinguish the states where i
knew ψ from the states where she did not know ψ. The other agents cannot distinguish any
state they could not distinguish before, but they know that group G agents can.
Let us make another important remark.
Remark 7.14 From Definition 7.5 we obtain:
• M, s |= 〈!Gi ψ〉ϕ iff M, s |= Kiψ and M!Gi ψ, s |= ϕ
• By a direct induction on n and by Remark 7.13 we obtain that for any sequence of
announcements σ =!G1i1 ψ1; !
G2
i2
ψ2, . . . ; !Gnin ψn, we have M, s |= 〈σ〉ϕ iff (M!G1i1 ψ1 , s |=
〈!G2i2 ψ2, . . . ; !Gnin ψn〉ϕ and M(!G1i1 ψ1;!G2i2 ψ2), s |= 〈!
G3
i3
ψ3, . . . ; !Gnin ψn〉ϕ and . . . and M〈σ〉, s |=
ϕ). We abbreviate this by saying that M, s |= 〈σ〉ϕ iff M, s |= 〈σ〉> and Mσ, s |= ϕ.
7.2.5 Comparison With the Non-Agent Version
As we announced in section 7.1, except for the notion of obligation that differs in the semantics,
we can see this work as an extension of the previous work on permitted public announcement
logic presented in Chapter 6. More precisely, consider the fragment of Lpopral in which the
group that receives any announcement is the entire group of agents AG. Let us call LAGpopral this
particular language, in which the announcements have the form !AGi ψ (we thus abbreviate it
in !iψ). The important remark is that such an announcement just divides the model into two
submodels, depending on the initial valuation of Kiψ: R!iψ is the restriction of R to [[Kiψ]]
180 CHAPTER 7. PRIVATE PERMISSIONS
and [[¬Kiψ]]. Now, for every model M = (S,R, V,P) of PPrAL we define the following
model M∗ = (S∗,R∗, V ∗,P∗) of PPAL:
• S∗ = S
• R∗ = R
• V ∗ = V
• for every announcement !iψ we define S!iψ = [[Kiψ]]M. Therefore we can define Sσ for
every succession of announcements σ by a direct induction (using Remark 7.13). Note
that Rσ is
• P∗ = {(s, Sσ, Sσ!iψ) ∈ S × 2S × 2S s.t. (s,Rσ,Rσ!iψ) ∈ P},
Therefore, an announcement !iψ in M has the same meaning as the public announcement
of Kiψ in M∗: if ϕ ∈ LAGpopral we define ϕ∗ ∈ Lpopal where ϕ∗ is obtained from ϕ by replacing
any occurrence of an announcement !iψ by Kiψ and any occurrence of PAGi ψ by P (>, Kiψ).
Hence the following:
Proposition 7.15 Let ϕ be a LAGppral -formula. Then we have :
for every model M, and every state s ∈ S, M, s |= ϕ iff M∗, s |= ϕ∗.
To prove it we need the following lemma:
Lemma 7.16 Let ϕ ∈ (LAGppral )∗ (i.e. the fragment of Lpopal obtained by translating a
Lppral -formula). Therefore for every model M, every sequence of announcements σ =
!i1ψ1; . . . ; !inψn such that M, s |= 〈σ〉> we have (Mσ)∗, s |= ϕ iff M∗|K(σ), s |= ϕ where
K(σ) := Ki1ψ1, . . . ,Kinψn.
In particular (if n = 1) for every model M, announcements !iψ such that M, s |= Kiψ we
have (M!iψ)∗, s |= ϕ iff M∗|Kiψ, s |= ϕ.
Proof We prove it by induction on the formula ϕ:
Base cases: for ϕ = p by definition of V ∗. For ϕ = ⊥ it is trivial.
Inductive cases: Suppose that it is true for every subformula of ϕ∗
• ϕ = ¬χ, χ1 ∨ χ2 : direct
• ϕ = Kjχ: (Mσ)∗, s |= Kjχ
iff for t ∈ S′∗(= S) such that s(R′∗j )t, (Mσ)∗, t |= χ
iff for t ∈ S such that sR′jt, (Mσ)∗, t |= χ (because R′∗ = R′)
iff for t ∈ S such that sRjt and M, t |= 〈σ〉>, (Mσ)∗, t |= χ
(by definition of R′j)
iff for t ∈ S such that sRjt and M, t |= Kiψ, M∗|Kiψ, t |= χ (by IH)
iff M∗|Kiψ, s |= Kjχ
7.2. LOGIC OF PERMITTED AND OBLIGATORY PRIVATE ANNOUNCEMENTS 181
• ϕ = 〈χ〉θ: Note that ϕ is obtained by translating a Lppral -formula, thus ϕ =
〈Kjχ∗〉θ∗ where χ ∈ Lpral , θ ∈ Lppral . Now:
(M!iψ)∗, s |= 〈Kjχ∗〉θ∗
iff (M!iψ)∗, s |= Kjχ∗ and (M!iψ)∗|(Kjχ∗), s |= θ∗
iff M∗|Kiψ, s |= Kiχ∗ (by IH) and (M!iψ;!jχ)∗, s |= θ∗ (by IH)
iff for t ∈ S such that sR′jt, (M!iψ)∗, t |= χ (because R′∗ = R′)
iff for t ∈ S such that sRjt and M, t |= Kiψ, (M!iψ)∗, t |= χ
iff for t ∈ S such that sRjt and M, t |= Kiψ, M∗|Kiψ, t |= χ (by IH)
iff M∗|Kiψ, t |= Kjχ
¤
Proof (of Proposition 7.15) We prove it by induction on the structure of ϕ.
base cases (ϕ = p,⊥): Comes from the fact that S = S∗ and V = V ∗.
induction steps Let us suppose that it is true for every subformula of ϕ:
• ϕ = ¬ψ,ψ1 ∨ ψ2: by a simple use of IH
• ϕ = Kiψ: by IH using that R∗ = R
(We can consider in particular that the property is true for every ψ ∈ Lel )
• ϕ = 〈!iψ〉χ: Therefore, ϕ∗ = 〈Kiψ〉χ∗. Now
M, s |= 〈!iψ〉χ
iff M, s |= Kiψ and M!iψ, s |= χ
iff M∗, s |= Kiψ and (M!iψ)∗, s |= χ∗
iff M∗, s |= Kiψ and (M)∗|Kiψ, s |= χ∗
iff M∗, s |= 〈Kiψ〉χ∗
iff M∗, s |= (〈!iψ〉χ)∗
• ϕ = PAGi χ:
M, s |= PAGi χ
iff there exists ψ ∈ Lel s.t.

M, s |= Kiψ
[[Kiψ]]M ⊆ [[Kiχ]]M and
(s,R,R!Gi ψ) ∈ Pi)
iff there exists ψ ∈ Lel s.t.

M∗, s |= Kiψ
[[Kiψ]]M∗ ⊆ [[Kiχ]]M∗ and
(s, S, [[Kiψ]]) ∈ P∗i )
iff M∗, s |= P (>, Kiχ)
¤
We also have a different intuition than in Chapter 6 of what ‘strong obligation’ means.
The obligation is here seen as a disjunction (the obligation to make one of the announcements
of ~ψ) but as the minimal one.
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7.2.6 Properties
First, here is a characterization of the link between a model and its reduction after an an-
nouncement:
Proposition 7.17 For all formulas ϕ, all models M, all states s of the model and all se-
quences of announcements σ we have: Mσ, s |= ϕ ⇐⇒ M, s |= [σ∼]ϕ.
Proof Let us first prove it for a single announcement !Gi ψ:
M!Gi ψ, s |= ϕ
iff
{
M, s |= Kiψ implies M, s |= 〈!Gi ψ〉ϕ
M, s |= ¬Kiψ implies M, s |= 〈!Gi ¬Kiψ〉ϕ
iff M, s |= (Kiψ −→ 〈!Gi ψ〉ϕ) ∧ (¬Kiψ −→ 〈!Gi ¬Kiψ〉ϕ)
iff M, s |= [!Gi ψ]ϕ ∧ [!Gi ¬Kiψ]ϕ (because |= ¬Kiψ ←→ Ki¬Kiψ)
iff M, s |= [!Gi ψ∼]ϕ.
By the definition of [.∼] in Definition 7.5 and by Remark 7.13 the result extends to every
sequence of announcements.
¤
Let us see some properties of our logic, and in particular a reduced language that is
expressively equivalent.
Proposition 7.18 For all p ∈ PROP , all i ∈ AG, all G ⊆ AG, all ψ ∈ Lpral , and all
ϕ,ϕ1, ϕ2 ∈ Lpopral
1. |= [!Gi ψ]p ←→ (Kiψ −→ p)
2. |= [!Gi ψ]⊥ ←→ ¬Kiψ
3. |= [!Gi ψ]¬ϕ ←→ (Kiψ −→ ¬[!iψG]ϕ)
4. |= [!Gi ψ](ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2) ←→ ([!Gi ψ]ϕ1 ∨ [!Gi ψ]ϕ2)
5. for all j ∈ G ∪ {i}, |= [!Gi ψ]Kjϕ ←→ (Kiψ −→ Kj [!Gi ψ]ϕ)
6. for all j 6∈ (G ∪ {i}), |= [!Gi ψ]Kjϕ ←→ (Kiψ −→ Kj([!Gi ψ∼]ϕ))
These equivalences need some explanation, let us see the first one. It says that p is true after
every possible announcement by i of ψ iff if i knows ψ (and then he can announce it) then p
is true. This only says that an announcement cannot change the valuation.
Proof This proof is very similar to the proof of reduction of PAL (see [Plaza, 1989] for
details). Let us see the proof of the last two ones, with R′ := R!Gi ψ.
5. (⇒) let j ∈ G, s ∈ S such that M, s |= [!Gi ψ]Kjϕ ∧ Kiψ and t a state such that
(s, t) ∈ Rj . We want to show that M, t |= [!Gi ψ]ϕ. Now either M, t |= ¬Kiψ and it is
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finished, or M, t |= Kiψ and thus (s, t) ∈ Rj implies that s, t ∈ R′j (by definition of R′).
As M!Gi ψ, s |= Kjϕ we obtain that M!Gi ψ, t |= ϕ Q.E.D.
(⇐) let j ∈ G, s ∈ S such that M, s |= Kiψ∧Kj [!Gi ψ]ϕ and t ∈ [[Kiψ]] a state such that
(s, t) ∈ R′j . We want to show that M!Gi ψ, t |= ϕ. By definition of R
′, (s, t) ∈ R′j implies
(s, t) ∈ Rj , and thus M, t |= [!Gi ψ]ϕ. As t ∈ [[Kiψ]], M, t |= [!Gi ψ]ϕ Q.E.D.
6. (⇒) let j /∈ (G ∪ {i}), s ∈ S such that M, s |= [!Gi ψ]Kjϕ ∧Kiψ and t a state such that
(s, t) ∈ Rj . We want to show that M, t |= [!Gi ψ∼]ϕ. Recall that in this case Rj = R′j .
Now M, s |= [!Gi ψ]Kjϕ∧Kiψ implies that M!Gi ψ, s |= Kjϕ. Considering that (s, t) ∈ R
′
j
we obtain M!Gi ψ, s |= ϕ. By Proposition 7.17 this means that M, t |= [!
G
i ψ
∼]ϕ Q.E.D.
(⇐) let j /∈ (G ∪ {i}), s ∈ S such that M, s |= Kiψ ∧Kj [!Gi ψ∼]ϕ and t ∈ [[Kiψ]] a state
such that (s, t) ∈ R′j . We want to show that M!Gi ψ, t |= ϕ. Recalling that Rj = R
′
j ,
M, s |= Kj [!Gi ψ∼]ϕ implies M, t |= [!Gi ψ∼]ϕ. Thus M, t |= [!Gi ψ]ϕ and, as t ∈ [[Kiψ]],
M!Gi ψ, t |= ϕ Q.E.D.
¤
Definition 7.19 We call LelPO the following language:
ϕ ::= p|⊥|¬ϕ|ϕ ∨ ϕ|Kiϕ|〈σ〉PGi ψ|〈σ〉¬PGi ψ|〈σ〉O ~Gi ~ψ|〈σ〉¬O ~Gi ~ψ
where ψ ∈ Lel , i ∈ AG, G ⊆ AG, σ is a sequence of announcements and for all ψj , Gj in the
tuples ~ψ, ~G, we have ψj ∈ Lel and Gj ⊆ AG. It is the restriction of Lpopral to the fragment
without announcements except a sequence before permission and obligation operators. We call
LelP the restriction of LelPO to the fragment without obligation operators.
Note that we cannot make the announcement disappear completely. This is due to the
unary nature of the permission and obligation operator (cf. discussion on page 133). But it
is possible to consider only formulas with announcements preceding exclusively permission or
obligation operators. We could also have chosen the following equivalent language:
ϕ ::= p|⊥|¬ϕ|ϕ ∨ ϕ|Kiϕ|〈σ〉PGi ψ|[σ]PGi ψ|〈σ〉O ~Gi ~ψ|[σ]O ~Gi ~ψ.
Corollary 7.20 (of Proposition 7.18) LelPO is expressively equivalent to Lpopral . LelP is
expressively equivalent to Lppral . Lel is expressively equivalent to Lpral .
This last language, LelP , will be used in Section 7.2.7 to prove the completeness of the given
axiomatization. To prove Corollary 7.20, we use the following translation
Definition 7.21 We define tr : Lpopral −→ LelPO inductively on the structure of the formula:
• tr(⊥) = ⊥ and for all atom p ∈ PROP , tr(p) = p
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• tr(¬ϕ) = ¬tr(ϕ) ; tr(ϕ ∨ ψ) = tr(ϕ) ∨ tr(ψ) ; tr(Kiϕ) = Kitr(ϕ)
• tr([!Gi ψ]p) = Kitr(ψ) −→ p ; tr([!Gi ψ]⊥) = ¬Kitr(ψ)
• tr([!Gi ψ]¬ϕ) = Kitr(ψ) −→ ¬tr([!Gi ψ]ϕ)
• tr([!Gi ψ](ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2)) = tr([!Gi ψ]ϕ1) ∨ tr([!Gi ψ]ϕ2)
• for all j ∈ G, tr([!Gi ψ]Kjϕ) = Kitr(ψ) −→ Kjtr([!Gi ψ]ϕ)
• for all k 6∈ G, tr([!Gi ψ]Kkϕ) = Kitr(ψ) −→ Kktr([!Gi ψ∼]ϕ)
• tr(PGi ψ) = PGi tr(ψ) ; tr(O ~Gi ~ψ) = O ~Gi (tr(ψ1), . . . , tr(ψn)).
Note that it is actually true that for all ϕ ∈ Lpopral , tr(ϕ) ∈ LelPO . In fact, after any sequence
of announcements, anything else than a P or an O is reduced by the translation. Note also
that tr(Lppral ) = LelP and tr(Lpral ) = Lel .
Proof (of Proposition 7.20) We prove the first property, we can prove the other two
properties in the same way. Clearly Lpopral is at least as expressive as LelPO (because the
second is included in the first). We use the translation tr defined in the previous definition.
We obtain the wanted result by Proposition 7.18.
¤
Another interesting property of our semantics is that, without any additive assumption,
the following proposition is true:
Proposition 7.22 For all models M and all formulas ψ1, ψ2 ∈ Lpral all i, j ∈ AG, we have
that if M |= Kiψ1 −→ Kiψ2 then M |= PGi ψ1 −→ PGi ψ2.
Note that this translates our intuition that: if an agent is allowed to give some information
to some group of agents, then she is also allowed to give less information to the same group.
Corollary 7.23 If we have M |= Ki(ψ1 −→ ψ2) then M |= PGi ψ1 −→ PGi ψ2.
This corollary comes directly from the Kripke nature of the models, that implies that
|= Ki(ψ1 −→ ψ2) −→ (Kiψ1 −→ Kiψ2).
Proof (of Proposition 7.22) By definition of the semantics of P and by transitivity of the
implication. More precisely: let s ∈ S, suppose that M, s |= PGi ψ1, we want to show that
M, s |= PGi ψ2. Then let ψ0 ∈ Lpral be such that M, s |= Kiψ0, M |= Kiψ0 −→ Kiψ1 and
(s,R,R!Gi ψ0) ∈ Pi, the three conditions of the semantics of P . Then we can keep the first and
the third one, and replace the second, by transitivity of the implication, by M |= Kiψ0 −→
Kiψ2. We then obtain M, s |= PGi ψ2.
¤
Let us see now what are the consequences of the composition of different obligations or
permissions:
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Proposition 7.24 For every ψ ∈ Lpopral , every agent i, every group G and every n-tuple ~ψ
and ~G of Lpopral -formulas and groups,
1. |= PGi (ψ) −→ Kiψ
2. |= O ~Gi ~ψ −→
∧
k∈{1,...,n} P
Gk
i ψk
3. |= O ~Gi ~ψ −→ O ~Gi ~ψ
4. for all permutation η, |= (Oη( ~G)i η(~ψ) ←→ O ~Gi ~ψ) ∧ (Oη(
~G)
i η(~ψ) ←→ O ~Gi ~ψ)
5. |= PGi ψ ∧OGi ϕ −→ PGi (ψ ∧ ϕ1)
Proof The first proposition comes directly from s ∈ [[Kiψ]]M in the semantics of P , the
second one from (s,R,R
!
Gk
i ϕk
) ∈ Pi in the semantics of O, the third is induced by the syntax
of O and the fourth one by the semantics of O and O.
Now the fifth one. Suppose that M, s |= PG1i ψ ∧ OGi ϕ. Therefore there exists χ ∈ Lpral
such that M, s |= Kiχ, [[Kiχ]]M ⊆ [[Kiψ]]M and (s,R,R!G1i χ) ∈ Pi (because M, s |= P
G1
i ψ).
But as M, s |= OGi ϕ necessarily [[Kiχ]]M ⊆ [[Kiϕ]]M. Recalling that [[Kiϕ]]M ∩ [[Kiψ]]M =
[[Ki(ϕ ∧ ψ)]]M we get [[Kiχ]]M ⊆ [[Ki(ϕ ∧ ψ)]]M and thus M, s |= PGi (ψ ∧ ϕ1)
¤
7.2.7 Soundness and Completeness
In this section, we give a sound and complete axiomatization of our logic. For technical
reasons, we restrict this proposal to the language without obligation operators Lppral . We
conjecture that a complete axiomatization for the whole logic exists, and plan to prove it in
a further work.
Let PPrAL be the axiomatization presented in table 7.1
Proposition 7.25 PPrAL is sound in all the models.
Proof The soundness of the tautologies of propositional logic, of modus ponens, of the first
four axioms of table 7.1, and of the necessitation rule for every Ki comes from the fact that
for every model M = (S, V,R,P), (S, V,R) is a Kripke model where every Ri ∈ R is an
equivalence relation (see [Fagin et al., 1995] for details). From the fifth to the tenth axiom,
the soundness is proven by Propositions 7.18. Soundness of the last axiom is direct.
Let us prove soundness of the eleventh axiom. Let M be a model and s be a state
of M. Suppose that M, s |= 〈σ〉PGi ϕ, then M, s |= 〈σ〉> and Mσ, s |= PGi ϕ (with the
abbreviation proposed in Remark 7.14). By Proposition 7.24 we get Mσ, s |= Kiϕ. Finally,
M, s |= 〈σ〉Kiϕ.
Now note that the soundness of the permission inference rule has been proved in Propo-
sition 7.22 using the same Remark 7.17.
¤
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all instantiations of propositional tautologies
Ki(ψ −→ ϕ) −→ (Kiψ −→ Kiϕ) distribution
Kiϕ −→ ϕ truth
Kiϕ −→ KiKiϕ positive introspection
¬Kiϕ −→ Ki¬Kiϕ negative introspection
[!Gi ψ]p ←→ (Kiψ −→ p) atomic permanence
[!Gi ψ]⊥ ←→ ¬Kiψ ann. and false
[!Gi ψ]¬ϕ ←→ (Kiψ −→ ¬[!Gi ψ]ϕ) ann. and negation
[!Gi ψ](ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2) ←→ ([!Gi ψ]ϕ1 ∨ [!Gi ψ]ϕ2) ann. and disjunction
if j ∈ G ∪ {i}, [!Gi ψ]Kjϕ ←→ (Kiψ −→ Kj [!Gi ψ]ϕ) ann. and knowledge (1)
if k 6∈ G ∪ {i}, [!Gi ψ]Kkϕ ←→ (Kiψ −→ Kk[!Gi ψ∼]ϕ) ann. and knowledge (2)
〈σ〉PGi ϕ −→ 〈σ〉Kiϕ rationality of permission
〈σ〉¬PGi ϕ −→ 〈σ〉> ann reduction
From ϕ and ϕ −→ ψ infer ψ modus ponens
From ϕ infer Kiϕ necessitation of Ki
From ϕ infer [!Gi ψ]ϕ necessitation of announcement
From [σ∼](Kiϕ −→ Kiϕ′) infer [σ∼](PGi ϕ −→ PGi ϕ′) Permission rule
Table 7.1: The axiomatization PPrAL
Remark 7.26 Note that we have in particular that for all ϕ ∈ Lppral , `PPrAL ϕ ←→ tr(ϕ).
We often use this property in the following proofs, in particular to use ϕ instead of tr(ϕ), for
the sake of simplicity, when we need an LelP -formula.
To prove the completeness result, we define the canonical model for PPrAL in two phases:
Definition 7.27 (Epistemic part of the canonical model) We define the following tu-
ple EMc = (Sc, V c,Rc) where Rc = {Rci}:
• Sc is the set of all `PPrAL-maximal consistent sets
• for every p ∈ PROP , V c(p) = {x ∈ Sc | p ∈ x}
• for every i ∈ AG, xRciy iff Kix = Kiy, where Kix = {ϕ|Kiϕ ∈ x}.
Therefore, EMc is an epistemic canonical model, and the truth lemma for Lel applies here:
for all ϕ ∈ Lel , EMc, x |= ϕ iff ϕ ∈ x. Furthermore, this extends to Lpral : for all ϕ ∈ Lpral ,
EMc, x |= ϕ
iff EMc, x |= tr(ϕ) by Proposition 7.18
iff tr(ϕ) ∈ x by the truth lemma for Lel
iff ϕ ∈ x by Remark 7.26
Given a formula ψ ∈ Lpral we can thus define the relation R!Gi ψ as in Definition 7.9. We
are now able to define properly the canonical model for Lppral :
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Definition 7.28 (Canonical model) The canonical model Mc = (Sc,Rci , V c,Pc) is de-
fined as follows:
• Sc is the set of all `PPrAL-maximal consistent sets
• for every p ∈ PROP , V c(p) = {x ∈ Sc | p ∈ x}
• for every i ∈ AG, xRciy iff Kix = Kiy, where Kix = {ϕ|Kiϕ ∈ x}
• T ci = {(x,Rcσ,Rσ!Gi χ) : χ ∈ Lpral , σ a sequence of announcements, G ⊆ AG}, and P
c
i =
T ci \ {(x,Rcσ,Rcσ!Gi χ) : for some ψ ∈ Lpral ,` [σ
∼](Kiχ −→ Kiψ) and 〈σ〉¬PGi ψ ∈ x}
Remark 7.29 Note that to define Pci in the canonical model we need to define Rσ and Rσ!Gi χ
which suppose that we are able to define properly what Mc, x |= 〈σ〉> and Mc, x |= 〈σ〉Kiχ
mean . But note that for all ψ ∈ Lpral , Mc, x |= ψ iff EMc, x |= ψ. Thus it has been done
already.
Proposition 7.30 The canonical model is a model.
Proof Indeed, Sc is a set, V c, Pci and Rci for all i have the desired form. The only property
we have to show is that if (x,R1,R2) ∈ Pci then R2 ⊆i R1. Thus, let us suppose that
(x,R1,R2) ∈ Pci , we have σ, χ,G such that R1 = Rcσ and R2 = Rcσ|!Gi χ. By definition of ⊆i
we obtain the wanted result.
¤
In the canonical model, a state is thus a set of formulas. The link between the fact that
a formula ϕ is in a set x and the fact that Mc, x |= ϕ is given by the following proposition:
Proposition 7.31 (Truth Lemma for LelP) For all ϕ ∈ LelP we have:
Π(ϕ) : for all x ∈ Sc,Mc, x |= ϕ iff ϕ ∈ x
Proof We prove it by induction on the number of occurrences of a P operator.
base case: If ϕ is a formula without permission, Π(ϕ) is a known result, the canoni-
cal model considered here being an extension of the canonical model for S5 (see
[Blackburn et al., 2001] or [Fagin et al., 1995] for details).
Main induction step: Let us then suppose that Π(ϕ) is true for every formula ϕ with at
most n occurrences of a permission operator. Note that by Remarks 7.20 and 7.26 we
can suppose the result for every formula of Lppral containing at most n occurrences of
a permission operator.
Let us now prove the wanted result for every formula with at most n + 1 occurrences of
a permission operator by induction on the structure of the formula ϕ:
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• ϕ = ¬ψ: Mc, x |= ¬ψ iff Mc, x 6|= ψ iff ψ 6∈ x (by IH) iff ¬ψ ∈ x (by maximality
of x)
• ϕ = ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2: Mc, x |= ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2 iff Mc, x |= ϕ1 or Mc, x |= ϕ2 iff ϕ1 ∈ x or ϕ2 ∈ x
(by IH) iff ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2 ∈ x
• ϕ = Kiψ: Let us first suppose that Kiψ ∈ x and let y be such that xRciy, we want
to show that Mc, y |= ψ. Indeed we have Kiψ ∈ y and then ψ ∈ y, which implies
(by IH) that Mc, y |= ψ.
Reciprocally, let us suppose that Mc, x |= Kiψ and that Kiψ /∈ x. Then Kix∪{¬ψ}
is consistent which means that there exists a y such that xRiy and ¬ψ ∈ y. By IH
we obtain Mc, y 6|= ψ and thus Mc, x 6|= Kiψ which is a contradiction. Thus the
hypothesis Kiψ /∈ x was wrong and Kiψ ∈ x.
• ϕ = 〈σ〉PGi χ:
(⇒) By the main base case , we have that for every Lpral -formula θ, 〈σ〉θ ∈ x
iff Mc, x |= 〈σ〉θ (∗). Let us suppose that 〈σ〉PGi χ /∈ x, i.e. ¬〈σ〉PGi χ ∈ x by
maximality, we want to show that Mc, x 6|= 〈σ〉PGi χ.
Now, either 〈σ〉> /∈ x and thus Mc, x 6|= 〈σ〉> by IH, and then it is finished.
Or 〈σ〉> ∈ x, and then 〈σ〉¬PGi χ ∈ x. Let us suppose it. To show that Mc, x 6|=
〈σ〉PGi χ let us take ψ ∈ Lpral -formula such that Mc |= [σ∼](Kiψ −→ Kiχ) and
let us prove that (x,Rcσ,Rcσ|!Gi ψ) 6∈ P
c
i . Indeed if it is true for all such ψ we would
have Mc, x 6|= 〈σ〉PGi χ. Now, by IH we have that ` [σ∼](Kiψ −→ Kiχ), which
means with 〈σ〉¬PGi χ ∈ x that (x,Rcσ,Rcσ|!Gi ψ) 6∈ P
c
i Q.E.D.
(⇐) If 〈σ〉PGi χ ∈ x, then in particular 〈σ〉KGi χ ∈ x (and for all ϕ ∈ Lppral ,
[σ∼]ϕ ∈ x iff 〈σ〉ϕ ∈ x, using the axioms 5–10). Now for all ψ ∈ Lpral such that
` [σ∼](Kiχ −→ Kiψ) we have, by the permission inference rule, that [σ∼]PGi ψ ∈ x
and thus 〈σ〉PGi ψ ∈ x. Therefore, by definition of Pc, (x,Rcσ,Rcσ!Gi χ) ∈ P
c
i . This
proves that Mc, x |= 〈σ〉PGi χ.
• ϕ = 〈σ〉¬PGi χ:
(⇒) Suppose that Mc, x |= 〈σ〉¬PGi χ. Then (x,Rcσ,Rcσ|!Gi χ) /∈ P
c
i , i.e. there exists
a ψ ∈ Lpral such that ` [σ∼](Kiχ −→ Kiψ) and 〈σ〉¬PGi ψ ∈ x. Thus, by the
permission inference rule , we obtain that 〈σ〉¬PGi χ ∈ x.
(⇐) If 〈σ〉¬PGi χ ∈ x then, by definition of Pci , for all ψ ∈ Lpral such that `
[σ∼](Kiψ −→ Kiχ) we have (x,Rcσ,Rcσ|!Gi ψ) /∈ P
c
i . This is equivalent, by the main
base case, to the fact that for all ψ ∈ Lpral such that Mc |= [σ∼](Kiψ −→ Kiχ) we
have (x,Rcσ,Rcσ|!Gi ψ) /∈ P
c
i . That means exactly that Mc, x 6|= 〈σ〉PGi χ. We also
have that 〈σ〉> ∈ x by the last axiom, which implies that Mc, x |= 〈σ〉> by the
main base case. Therefore from Mc, x |= ¬〈σ〉PGi χ we obtain Mc, x |= 〈σ〉¬PGi χ
by using many times axiom ann. and negation.
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Theorem 7.32 PPrAL is sound and complete with respect to the class of all models.
Proof Soundness has been proved in Proposition 7.25. For the completeness part, let
ϕ ∈ Lppral be a valid formula. Thus we have: |= ϕ only if |= tr(ϕ) only if Mc |= tr(ϕ) only if
` tr(ϕ) (by Proposition 7.31) only if ` ϕ (by Remark 7.26).
¤
7.3 Case Study: AIDS
Let us recall the case of Michel, a patient who took an AIDS test, presented in the in-
troduction. His case can be represented as in Figure 7.1 with individual permissions and
transgressions. Let us explain the visual primitives.
AL
L
L
L
M,D ¬A L
L
L
L
ALM
D
M ¬A
LM
D
AL
L,M
D ¬A
L,M
M
ALMD ¬ALMD
Figure 7.1: AIDS example
At the top, a two-state epistemic model where neither Michel nor the doctor can distin-
guish between a state where Michel has Aids (A) and a state where he has not (¬A). Instead,
the laboratory knows (there is no label L on the double links between A and ¬A). We see
three more of such epistemic models in the figure, on the left is the situation where the un-
certainty has been removed for the doctor but where Michel still is uncertain, on the right
is the dual where the doctor is still uncertain, but Michel knows. For the record: this is the
suicide-risk situation that we want to avoid! So getting there should not be permitted. At
the bottom, everybody knows.
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The pointed (and colored) arrows stand for the results of announcements. If they are
dotted (and red), they are not permitted, if they are plain (and green), they are permitted.
The reader may note that such a representation is not a model of POPrAL: the transi-
tions representing announcements are transitions between states and not triplets (s,R1,R2).
This is true, but we claim that such a graphical representation (much more readable) is anal-
ogous to the formal one. Indeed, the epistemic models appearing in the figure have the same
domain (set of states) as the initial one, and their relation R′ is a subrelation of the initial
one R. Furthermore, the pointed arrows (that represent announcements) start from a state
and end in the same state of a reduced model. Finally, if such a pointed arrow is indexed
by an agent a then the relation R′ in the resulting model satisfy R′ ⊆a R. For all these
reasons, this graphic representation is identical to the formal one, that should be written in
the following (complex) way: 1 M = (S,R, V,P) where PROP = {A}, AG = {M,D,L} and
• S = {s1, s2}
• R = {RM , RD, RL} with
– RM = RD = {(s1, s1), (s1, s2), (s2, s2)}
– RL = {(s1, s1), (s2, s2)}
• V (A) = {s1}
It remains to define P properly. To do so, let us call R1 the left epistemic model’s relation,
R2 the right epistemic model’s one, and R3 the bottom epistemic model’s one. Formally for
all i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, Ri = {RiM , RiD, RiL} with:
• R1M = RM ; R1D = R1L = RL
• R2D = RD ; R2M = R2L = RL
• R3M = R3D = R3L = RL
We are now able to define P = {PM ,PD,PL} with
• PM = {(s1,R1,R1), (s2,R1,R1), (s2,R2,R2), (s1,R2,R3), (s2,R2,R3), (s1,R3,R3),
(s2,R3,R3)}
• PD = {(s1,R1,R3), (s2,R1,R3), (s1,R3,R3), (s2,R3,R3)}
• PL = {(s1,R,R1), (s2,R,R1), (s1,R1,R1), (s2,R1,R1), (s1,R2,R3), (s2,R2,R3),
(s1,R3,R3), (s2,R3,R3)}
We admit that these models are quite difficult to be read by a human being. But this is
not the case for a computer, and the proposed equivalent graphical representation is useful
to do direct comments, as we do here. The reflexive arrows labelled with L in the top
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Kripke model (information state) for the laboratory show that the empty announcement, i.e.
the announcement of ‘true’, after which the same structure results, is not permitted for the
laboratory: the laboratory is obliged to say something informative. In the top information
state, it is permitted for the laboratory to announce the outcome of the test to the doctor.
This action (whether A is true, or the different action for when A is false) brings us to the left
state (plain arrows). Also, these are the only plain arrows from those states: the laboratory
is obliged to inform the doctor: M, s1 |= ODL A and M, s2 |= ODL ¬A
Apart from the reflexive arrows, two more non-permitted actions on top are: informing
Michel (go to right): M, s1 |= ¬PML A, and informing the doctor and Michel at the same
time (straight to the bottom, where everybody knows): M, s1 |= ¬P {D,M}L A. The other
connections can be similarly explained. Finally, after the violation of the laboratory informing
Michel, the laboratory is still obliged to inform the doctor, and also Michel is obliged to contact
the doctor: M, s1 |= 〈!ML A〉(ODL A ∧ ODMA) — which we could now interpret that action will
be undertaken if Michel has not contacted the doctor after the laboratory has improperly
informed him directly of the outcome of the AIDS-test. Therefore, the plain arrows from the
right to the bottom are labelled both with L and with M . Further intricacies in the reflexive
arrows on the right-hand side are left to the imagination of the reader.

Chapter 8
Conclusion
Situations involving norms and communication are frequent: communicative games (such as
card games), medical databases, protocols of communication, etc. However, there exists no
general framework to handle such situations. Yet such a general framework would be of great
interest from a theoretical point of view to analyse and explain such situations, and from a
practical one, to create artificial agents able to reason in terms of permission to communicate.
The field of logic may be appropriate to create such frameworks, and many logi-
cians are trying to make progress in this direction (see for example [Aucher et al., 2010,
van Benthem et al., 2009]). This me´moire is an attempt to use dynamic epistemic logics in
order to understand the notion of ‘right to say’. We may first recall what has been presented
so far.
After having introduced our work, we presented in a first part the basic notions of modal
logic for the study of knowledge. Some would disagree with the fact that such a basic pre-
sentation appears in a memoir of Ph. D. But can we pretend that scientists may not be
concerned about making readable their work? To be readable was the aim of this chapter.
We then presented the works in progress on dynamic epistemic logic (DEL), essentially
since Plaza introduced the Public Announcement Logic [Plaza, 1989], and the basic notions
of deontic logic. We saw that in the field of DEL some notions could be developed, and we
added our contribution to the building in the Chapter 4 and 5. We saw that the notion of
objectivity and group capacity (in the field of DEL) introduced in these chapters may be
useful to understand and solve problems about protocols of communication. We presented
several technical results (decidability, complexity) of the logics LAUOB and GAL introduced.
That led us to the last two chapters, which gave proposals to understand the notion of
right to say in a dynamic context, namely POPAL and POPrAL. The first of them treats the
case where the announcements are public and can be thought as external events (made by an
omniscient agent). The second generalizes the first treating a case of private announcement
(that includes public ones) and considering agency of announcements. Technical results have
also been proved.
However, much remains to be done. First of all, there are technical results we would like
to obtain in each chapter proposed here. For example, chapters 5,6 and 7 have few results
of complexity, results we consider interesting. What is the class of complexity of the SAT-
problem for POPAL (resp GAL, POPrAL)? As another example, we would also like to
extend the axiomatization of PPrAL to get one for the whole language of POPrAL.
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The tableau method for PPAL proposed in Section 6.6 could also be generalized to
the whole language Lpopal , integrating in it the deontic operator of permission O. Another
easy extension would be to add a tableau rule (RP=) as proposed in Table 8.1 to consider
operator P= presented in section 6.5.2. This operator may be useful if a different intuition of
permission is required. A more important extension would be to develop an analogous method
〈σ, n, Pϕ〉
Π(n, S1, S2); S1 ` σ; S1 a σ; S2 ` σ ◦ ϕ; S2 a σ ◦ ϕ (RP
=)
Table 8.1: Tableau rule for P=
for POPrAL or even for a more general logic for dynamic epistemic logic and permission (cf.
Section 8.2).
Moreover, we could imagine an attempt to mix the different languages proposed in this
thesis, and consider together notions of permission, group announcements, knowledge and
update of objective beliefs.
Besides, other recent works could open ways to expand our formalism. We could con-
sider for example to expand the framework with changing permissions, as in Pucella et al.
[Pucella and Weissman, 2004]. In this context, as in the example of Section 7.3, this would
mean to define an operation that defines or modifies the permission relation P of a given
model, which could be a POPAL or a POPrAL model.
As another example, following [Cuppens et al., 2005b], it would be interesting to integrate
the notion of role in the attribution of permissions and obligations, or to consider the notion
of deadline (cf [Cuppens et al., 2005a]) that gives sense to the notion of obligation imposing
a limited time to fulfill the obligation.
Besides it would be possible to use this formalism. Therefore, there is no doubt that this
thesis opens to further researches, and an exhaustive list of all such possible technical results
or conceivable extensions seems impossible – in fact the reader may imagine a lot of them.
Yet some possible extensions of our work appears of greater interest, and we present in the
two next sections the two most important in our opinion.
8.1 Dealing with Privacy Policies
In [Aucher et al., 2010] the authors propose a formalism close to ours with the difference that
in their proposal the ‘right to say’ can be derived from the ‘right to know’. In other words,
they assume that there is a list of permissions or obligations to know that have to be satisfied.
This list defines whether an announcement is permitted or not: it is permitted if and only
if it leads to a situation that satisfies these obligations/permissions. A basic presentation of
this framework has been done in Section 3.3.
This condition (‘the permission to say is derivable from the permission to know’) does not
allow to model every situation: two different announcements that lead to the same epistemic
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situations (then that satisfy the same permissions to know) can be one permitted the other
forbidden, as far as they are announced in different situations. The situation presented
in section 7.3 is such a counter-example: we have M, A |= ¬P {D,M}L A ∧ 〈!ML A〉PDL A: the
laboratory is not allowed to announce A to the doctor and Michel at the same time, but after
having informed Michel it is allowed to announce it to the doctor. These two announcements
are not permitted in the same way, and yet they lead to the same situation (the A-situation
at the bottom of Figure 7.1) — but they did not come from the same one!
But in some situations, the restrictions on announcements are derivable from a Privacy
Policy which says what each agent is allowed to know. Therefore, we would try to adapt
Aucher et al.’s notion of Privacy Policy, to model those multi-agent situations in which the
right to know is the relevant notion, deriving the permission relation P (as presented in
Chapter 7) from it. We make here a draft of such a proposal, that would avoid, in our
opinion, another limit of their work, namely that it is limited to a single 2-agents situation,
in which a sender gives information to a receiver, the latter having a perfect knowledge of
the epistemic state of the former.
Let us see a compelling example, cited from [Aucher et al., 2010]:
Consider the information about websites contacted by a user (U), which are avail-
able on a server logfile. The list of websites for each user is clearly a sensitive
information which he would not like to disclose. However, knowing which websites
have been visited is a valuable information, for example, for the configuration of a
firewall, or to make statistics. Thus it has become anonym by replacing the names
of the users with numbers by means of a hashcode (h). So even if one knows the
list of users one cannot understand who contacted which website. However, from
the association between users and numbers and between numbers and websites the
original information can be reconstructed. Therefore the mappings from the users
to the numbers (c) and from the numbers to the websites (e) can be distributed
individually but not altogether since their association would allow to reconstruct
the mapping from the users to the websites they visited (v): c ∧ e −→ v.
The last sentence says that the user u is permitted to know c and to know e but not to know
v. The privacy policy being the set of what is (not) permitted to be known by the agent,
it would be in this case {¬P (KUv)}: it is not permitted that U knows v. To construct our
model, presented in Figure 8.1, we start from an initial epistemic model and we define PS as
the set of transitions such that Kuv is wrong in the resulting state.
In Figure 8.1, as in Figure 7.1, double arrows represent knowledge, dotted arrows (red)
represent non-permitted announcements and plain (green) arrows permitted ones. At the top
a three-state Kripke model where the user does not know neither c nor e, nor v. We see
three more of such models in the figure. On the left is the situation where the uncertainty
on c has been removed, on the right is the situation in which the uncertainty on e has been
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Figure 8.1: server example
removed. At the bottom, v is known (epistemic situation we want to forbid). Once again,
the pointed arrows stand for the results of announcements. If they are dotted, they are not
permitted, if they are plain, they are permitted. To make the figure readable, we put only
the pointed arrows for the e, c, v-states. Thus this model says that the server is allowed to
say c or to say e to the user, but not to say v to her: M, (e, c, v) |= P us c∧P us e∧¬P us v. After
the announcement of one of the two pieces of information e or c, the server is not allowed to
say to the user the other one: M, (e, c, v) |= 〈!use〉¬P us c ∧ 〈!us c〉¬P us e .
We can thus define the notion of privacy policy in the following way: An epistemic norm
is a construction of the form pre −→ Piψ or pre −→ ¬Piψ with pre, ψ ∈ Lel and i ∈ AG. A
privacy policy is a finite set of epistemic norms.
We interpret pre −→ Piψ (resp. pre −→ ¬Piψ) by “if pre is true then i is allowed (resp.
not allowed) to get to a situation where ψ is true”. We note pre −→ Fiψ := pre −→ Oi¬ψ.
We can thus construct deterministically a POPrAL model starting from an epistemic
model and a privacy policy. Following [Aucher et al., 2010] we consider two situations: the
liberal situation considers that every situation that is not explicitly forbidden is permitted,
the dictatorial one considers that every situation that is not explicitly permitted is forbidden.
Let M = (S, V,R) be an epistemic model and PP be a privacy policy, we construct
the liberal model MlPP = (S, V,R,P l) and the dictatorial one MdPP = (S, V,R,Pd) in the
following way: for all agent i ∈ AG,
P li = {(s,R1,R2) | ∀(pre −→ ¬Piψ) ∈ PP, if MR1 , s |= pre then MR2 , s 6|= ψ}
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Pdi = {(s,R1,R2) | ∃(pre −→ Piψ) ∈ PP,MR1 , s |= pre and MR2 , s |= ψ}
8.2 Dynamic Epistemic Logic with Permission
Another possible further work would be to make a step forward in the way developed in
chapters 6 and 7. Indeed, we first considered only public announcements, and then a kind
of private announcements – that include public ones – in which the topic of the message and
the agents involved in the communication are publicly known. The first further step in this
work would thus be to avoid this limit by considering permission over other kinds of private
communication. In this sense, having a general framework for permission and obligation over
every epistemic action (cf. Section 3.1.3) would be a final step. How could we obtain such a
framework?
First, given an event model A, the language we may propose would extend action model
logic with additive operators Pia and Oia standing for ‘i is allowed to make the announcement
a’ and ‘i is obliged to make the announcement a’, where a ∈ A. The models would be of
the form M = (S,R, V,P) where P is constituted by triples (s,E1, E2). In such triples, E1
would represent the epistemic situation after a first announcement and E2 the situation after
a second one. Note that in this case, epistemic situations are not necessarily submodels of the
initial model as in chapter 6, and neither are they represented by subrelations as in chapter
7. They can be state models of any kind. Therefore we could imagine the following semantics
for the new operators:
M, s |= Pa iff M, s |= pre(a) implies there exists N1, N2 such that (s,N1, N2) ∈ P ,
N1←→M⊗A, (s, a) and N2←→M⊗A, (s, a; b)
It would be quite a complex semantics. Indeed, to verify if an announcement is permitted
we would have to test the bisimilarity of the resulting state model with the ones appearing
in P . But avoiding every restriction on the structure of epistemic events, it is impossible to
fix the structure of the resulting state model. Bisimilarity is in this context the good notion
to test the epistemic result of an announcement.
Note that we would need to define the ⊗-closure of an event model A, to ensure that if a
and b are in A, then (a; b) ∈ A. But such a definition (and other useful notions) are feasible.
We do not go further in this presentation, which is still a work in progress, but we think that
it could be a good starting point for a generalization of the frameworks presented in chapters
6 and 7.
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